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I. Introduction
As death and injury tolls increase, concern over "drunk driving"'
has become nationwide. Citizen groups have been formed,2 federal leg-
islation passed, 3 a presidential commission appointed,4 and new law en-
forcement techniques implemented to reduce the number of drunk driv-
ers.5 Florida's situation reflects the national picture. During 1980,
1. As used herein "drunk driving" includes driving under the influence, driving
with unlawful blood alcohol level and driving while intoxicated. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration claims drinking occurs in at least 40-55% of all fatal car
accidents. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 52 (1981).
2. The largest national organization is MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driv-
ing), with eighty-three chapters in twenty-nine states. See Starr, The War Against
Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34.
3. See Alcohol Traffic Safety - National Driver Register Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-364, 96 Stat. 1738 (1982) which provides incentive grants to those states adopt-
ing specified sanctions for drunk driving offenses and establishes a National Driver
Register to help states exchange information about individual driving records. See S.
REP. No. 360, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H. REP. No. 867, 97th Cong., 2d Sess,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3367-76.
4. On June 4, 1982 a thirty member commission, headed by former Secretary of
Transportation John Volpe, was formally sworn in and directed to provide national
focus on drunk driving. See Drunken driving panel ready to go to work, Fort Lauder-
dale News and Sun-Sentinel, June 5, 1982, at 7A, col. 1.
5. In Montgomery County, Maryland; police use a "Sobriety Checkpoint" proce-
dure to detect imparied drivers. All drivers are stopped for inspection but only those
smelling of alcohol must perform a "sobriety test" consisting of walking a straight line,
standing on one leg and reciting the alphabet. Between November 1981 and March
1982, this procedure detected over one hundred impaired drivers. The Drunk Blitz, The
Nat'l L.J., March 22, 1982, at 1, col. 2. See also Death on the Road, Wall St. J., Apr.
20, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
The American Civil Liberties Union has questioned the checkpoint's constitution-
ality. However, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), approved rou-
tine Border Patrol stops at permanent checkpoints to search for illegal aliens. The
Court rejected arguments that reasonable suspicion was required, since traffic flow past
the checkpoint would not allow "the particularized study of a given car that would
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens." Id. at 557. Since the
checkpoints were publicly known and administrative officials fixed the location, the in-
trusion differed from random highway stops based on a particular officer's whim. Re-
ferral to a second inspection place based on Mexican ancestry alone was considered
reasonable. The parallel to sobriety checkpoints is obvious. Traffic past the checkpoint
does not allow time to study all drivers. Likewise, an objective fact, breath smell, deter-
mines who is questioned further.
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drinking was the third highest factor in accidents statewide.' In 1981
there were 48,084 arrests for driving under the influence of either li-
quor or drugs.7 While nationwide traffic fatalities declined in 1981,
Florida's increased.8
Given this situation, the 1982 Florida legislature passed one of the
nation's toughest "drunk driving" laws. 9 Effective July 1, 1982, it aims
at deterring drunk driving by three methods: (1) increasing penalties,
(2) making evidence gathering easier, and (3) making exclusion of evi-
dence harder. While praiseworthy in its goals, the law contains several
provisions of dubious constitutionality and others which create
Officials supporting "sobriety checkpoints" may also rely on Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979), which found stopping automobiles to check for driver licenses
and registrations without probable cause or reasonable suspicion violated the fourth
amendment when individual officers arbitrarily chose the cars. The Court indicated
other methods could satisfy fourth amendment reasonableness standards: "This holding
does not preclude. . . developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncom-
ing traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. at 663 (emphasis
added). As Maryland procedure requires all drivers to stop, its constitutionality should
be upheld. See United States v. Prichard, 645 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1981) (Roadblock
stopping all west-bound vehicles, except semi-trucks to check licenses and registrations
constitutional; Delaware v. Prouse distinguished.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981),
reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1069 (1981).
6. Drinking existed in 36,986 accidents, nine percent of the statewide total. Six-
teen percent of drivers and/or pedestrians -in fatal accidents had been drinking. DE-
PARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 6,
15 (1980).
7. This was 10.4 percent of the total statewide arrests, second only to larceny at
14.6 percent. FLA. L. ENFORCEMENT ANN. REP. 109 (1981).
8. During 1981 motor vehicle deaths declined four percent nationwide but, in
Florida, they increased eight percent. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC
SAFETY MAGAZINE, May-June 1982, at 26.
9. The 1982 legislature actually amended the drunk driving laws twice. See 1982
Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 155, 403 (West). At least five other states recently changed their
laws to provide for harsher penalties and/or stricter enforcement. See CAL. VEH. CODE
§§ 23151-23229 (Deering Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §§ 11.501-11.501.2
(Supp. 1981); 1982 Kan. Sess. Laws. ch. 144, 619; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§
1312-1314 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 205-205.2 (Supp. 1981). For
discussions of Illinois's and California's new laws see Comment, Drunk Drivers versus
Implied Consent: A Sobering New Illinois Statute, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 479 (1982);
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problems of statutory interpretation. This article's purpose is to review
the new law's changes in light of the constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation problems it contains. Since some issues are new in Florida,
reference is made to the case law of other jurisdictions, as well as previ-
ous Florida cases.
II. Statutory Offense Provision and Penalty Changes
A. Statutory Offenses
Former Florida law considered "drunk driving" so serious that
three different criminal violations could occur: (1) driving under the
influence; (2) driving while intoxicated; or (3) driving with unlawful
blood alcohol10 The new law retains these offenses, merely rearranging
and consolidating their statutory placement. Driving under the influ-
ence violates either of two statutory provisions. Florida Statutes section
316.193(1)11 makes it unlawful: "under the influence of alcoholic bev-
erages, model glue, or any substance controlled . . ., to the extent...
normal faculties are impaired,. . . to drive or be in the actual physical
control of any vehicle within this state. ' 12 Florida Statutes section
316.1934(1)13 substantially duplicates this provision, replacing former
Florida Statutes Section 322.262(1).14 However, under section
316.1934(1) controlled substances are also included, while model glue
10. See infra text accompanying notes 12-22.
11. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(1) (Supp. 1982).
12. Id. Driving under the influence can be shown several ways. If blood alcohol
content level registers 0.10 percent or more, under Florida Statutes section
316.1934(2)(c) (Supp. 1982) this is prima facie evidence of being under the influence.
State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980) declared this a rebuttable, rather
than conclusive, presumption. Field sobriety tests are often used to bolster the state's
claim. These may be administered without consent, if there is "sufficient cause to be-
lieve" the driver has violated the law. State v. Liefert, 247 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1971). Such tests may be protected by the Florida Accident Report Privilege.
DuVal Motor Co. v. Woodward, 419 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1982).
13. Florida Statutes section 316.1934(1) (Supp. 1982) makes it unlawful "for
any person who is under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances
when affected to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired, to drive or be in the
actual physical control of any motor vehicle within this state." Controlled substances
are enumerated in Florida Statutes section 893.03, schedules I through V.
14. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(1) (1981).
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is omitted.
Previous Florida law made driving with blood alcohol content 0.10
or more, illegal under two provisions. The new law retains this dual
prohibition. Former Florida Statutes section 316.193(3)15 has been re-
placed and its prohibition combined with driving under the influence in
present section 316.193(1). Former Florida Statutes section
322.262(2)(c),1 has been renumbered as section 316.1934(2)(c). 17
Under former Florida Statutes section 860.01(1), a person com-
mitted a separate offense when driving "intoxicated or under the influ-
ence" and deprived "of full possession of his normal faculties. .. .
Florida Statutes section 316.1931(1)19 replaces section 860.01(1) and
also prohibits being "in actual physical control of"20 a motor vehicle in
this condition. When property damage or personal injury results from
such condition, the offense is a first degree misdemeanor under both
past and present law.21 If another's death results, the crime becomes
D.W.I. manslaughter under both past and present law. However, for-
mer section 860.01(2) only applied to intoxication"' from alcohol. Thus
15. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3) (1981).
16. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(2)(c) (1981).
17. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (Supp. 1982).
18. FLA. STAT. § 860.01(1) (1981).
19. FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(1) (Supp. 1982).
20. "In actual physical control" exists whenever a vehicle can be operated and a
driver is not too intoxicated to do so. See vol. - Op. Att'y Gen. 066-69 (1966).
21. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(2) (Supp. 1982) and former FLA. STAT. §
860.01(2) (1981).
22. Proof of intoxication requires more than just driving under the influence.
"[T]he term, 'intoxicated', is stronger than and includes the terms 'under the influence'
of intoxicating liquor." Taylor v. State, 46 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1950) (citing Cannon
v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, 362 (1925)).
Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979), rejected the claim that former §
860.01(2), now § 316.1931(2), violated due process, because it did not require causal
connection between intoxication and the resulting death, thus allowing a non-negligent
driver to be found guilty of D.W.I. manslaughter. The court declared only three ele-
ments are needed to show D.W.I. manslaughter, that: "(1) a death occurred; (2) the
death resulted from the operation of a vehicle by the defendant, and (3) the defendant
was intoxicated at the time he operated the vehicle." Baker, 377 So. 2d at 18. The
negligence occurred when the driver began driving while intoxicated and continued un-
til the accident happened. Since driving while intoxicated is per se reckless, the legisla-
ture could rationally conclude imposing criminal sanctions without a showing of causa-
1831Drunk Driving Laws17:1983
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if the intoxication was from glue or controlled substances, D.W.I. man-
slaughter charges were not possible. 3 Present section 316.1931(2) pro-
vides that D.W.I manslaughter charges may be brought even if the in-
toxication occurs from these substances.
B. Penalties
One of the new law's major changes was to increase penalties for
conviction. Former Florida law imposed different penalties for first of-
fenses of driving under the influence and driving with unlawful blood
alcohol.24 No reason for such disparate treatment appeared in the pre-
vious statutory scheme. Under the new law, both violations are equally
punishable.2 5 The new penalty provisions raise the minimum fine for
driving under the influence to two hundred fifty dollars. For a second
conviction there is a minimum fine of five hundred dollars, the previous
maximum for either second offense,26 and a maximum of one thousand
dollars. For a third or subsequent offense a minimum of a one thousand
dollar and a maximum of a two thousand five hundred dollar fine is set,
compared to a previous maximum of one thousand dollars for driving
under the influence and five hundred dollars for driving with unlawful
blood alcohol.27
Like previous law, driving while intoxicated carries the same pun-
ishment as driving under the influence.2 8 When this is a first-degree
tion between driving in such a condition and any death would act as a deterrent.
23. But see State v. Rafferty, 405 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
where manslaughter charges were brought due to intoxication from a controlled
substance.
24. Under former Florida Statutes section 316.193(2)(a) (1981) first offenders
convicted of driving under the influence faced a fine between twenty-five dollars and
five hundred dollars plus possible imprisonment up to six months. Under former Florida
Statutes section 316.193(4)(a) (1981) first offenders for driving with unlawful blood
alcohol faced no minimum and a maximum two hundred-fifty dollar fine, one-half the
possible maximum for driving while impaired. Likewise first offenders with unlawful
blood alcohol could be sentenced to only a maximum ninety days, one-half the possible
maximum for driving while impaired.
25. See FLA.. STAT. § 316.193(2)(a), (b) (Supp. 1982).
26. See former FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(b), 4(c) (1981).
27. See former FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(c), 4(c) (1981).
28. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1931(1) (Supp. 1982).
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misdemeanor, because of personal injury or property damage, Florida
Statutes section 316.1931(2) continues to impose punishment under the
general penalty provisions of sections 775.082 and 775.083.29 However
no penalty can be less than that imposable under section 316.193. 0
This ensures the mandatory penalty provisions for repeat offenses apply
when a lesser penalty might otherwise be given.
Contrary to popular belief the new "drunk driving" law does not
substantially change imprisonment penalties. First offenses may still
carry no mandatory jail terms.31 Second and third offenses within three
and five years, respectively, are punishable by minimum mandatory
sentences of ten and thirty days respectively.3 2 However, if a driver is
29. Under FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (1981), a first degree misdemeanant may
receive up to one year imprisonment, plus a one thousand dollar ($1,000.00) fine under
FLA. STAT. § 775.083(1)(d) (1981).
30. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (Supp. 1982).
31. According to public opinion, there is no mandatory imprisonment sentence
for a first offender for any of the three offenses. See Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-
Sentinel; Apr. 25, 1982, at 15A, col. 1. However a strict reading of FLA. STAT. §
316.193 does not support this. Section 316.193 states in part:
(2) Any person who is convicted of a violation ... shall be punished.
(a) By a fine of:
[the various fines for first, second and third offenses are listed.]
and
(b) By imprisonment for:
1. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.
(emphasis added).
If the legislature wished to use imprisonment to supplement fines for first offenders, the
words "and/or" should have been used. Former section 316.193(2)(a) (1981) clearly
indicated imprisonment for first offenders was not mandatory:
Any person who is convicted of a violation ... shall be punished.
(a) For first conviction thereof, by imprisonment ... or by fine ... or by
both such fine and imprisonment.
(emphasis added.)
If the legislature did not intend mandatory incarceration for first offenders, it
should amend section 316.193(2) next session to clarify this.
32. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(4)(b), (c) (Supp. 1982). This also applies to repeat
first degree misdemeanants under § 316.193(1) (Supp. 1982). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 29-31. Under the new law's enhanced sentencing provisions, prior convic-
tions for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, and/or driving with
unlawful blood alcohol are considered the same offenses. See FLA. STAT. §
316.193(4)(c) (Supp. 1982).
185 1Drunk Driving Laws1 7:1983
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convicted of a second offense more than three years after a first convic-
tion or a third offense more than five years after a first conviction, im-
prisonment is governed by the first offender provisions.
Besides a fine or possible jail term, prior offenders could be re-
quired to attend alcohol education programs and undergo evaluation
and treatment. 83 This is now mandatory for all first-time offenders and
encompasses chemicals other than alcohol.3 ' Considering the legisla-
ture's recognition that chemicals besides alcohol impair driving, this
change is wise.3 5
First offenders must also do fifty hours of "public service" or
"community work project."86 As there is no definition of "public ser-
vice" or "community work project", each county can fashion its own
requirements3 7 in keeping with the differing community needs of Flor-
ida's counties. No public service is required of repeat offenders within
three and five year periods. Evidently the legislature envisioned a sen-
tencing scheme where most first offenders receive the minimum fine,
required education and/or evaluation, and no incarceration unless un-
usual circumstances exist. The community service requirement should
usually be an alternative, and not a supplement, to incarceration for
33. Former Florida Statutes section 316.193(5) (1981) stated in part: "At the
discretion of the court, any person convicted ... may be required to attend an alcohol
education course specified by the court and may be referred to an authorized agency
for alcoholism evaluation and treatment. .. ."
34. See FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3) (Supp. 1982).
35. A Minnesota Department of Public Safety study reports assessment and re-
habilitation may be more effective than increased fines and incarceration. According to
the study, "Convicted drunk drivers who went through an assessment and rehabilita-
tion were only half as likely to be re-arrested for drunk driving as those who had no
assessment and received the conventional penalties of a fine and/or jail sentence." NA-
TIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC SAFETY MAGAZINE, Aug. 1979, at 19.
36. See FLA. STAT. § 316.193(4)(a) (Supp. 1982).
37. How widely counties may define this is shown in recent newspaper articles.
In Palm Beach County, offenders donating one pint of blood receive credit for eight
hours of work. See Patrol Targets Drunk Drivers, Miami Herald, June 13, 1982, at
6B, col. 1. Broward County created a Community Service Program to oversee the re-
quirement. Counselors examine an offender's background and work schedules before
making a public service assignment. Assignments cover a broad range of menial activi-
ties. The new Program monitors an offender's hours to make sure the full requirement
is met. See Civic Jobs Lined Up for Drunk Motorists, Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-
Sentinel, Aug. 8, 1982, at lIB, col. 1.
1186 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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first offenders.38 Since second and third offenders receive mandatory
jail terms, the legislature apparently felt an added community service
requirement would have no appreciable effect.
Statutory provisions requiring suspension or revocation of a
driver's license for any "drunk driving" offense remain basically un-
changed.39 Like the penalty provisions, the suspension term has been
lengthened and standardized.4 0 Limited privileges for necessary busi-
ness uses can be obtained if a convicted driver successfully completes
the required substance abuse education. 1 Since the course's aim is to
rehabilitate and educate problem drivers, this provision will provide in-
centive to complete such training promptly. However, any driver twice
convicted of a "drunk driving" offense or whose license has been twice
suspended for refusal to comply with the implied consent law's testing
provisions42 is ineligible for limited driving privileges.
38. State legislators commenting on the new law called this a compromise be-
tween mandatory sentencing for first offenders and previous sentencing provisions. Fear
a mandatory first time sentence would further strain Florida's overcrowded jails led to
the compromise. See Drunk Driving Law May Stagger, Fort Lauderdale News, Apr.
21, 1982, at lB, col. 2. Even without mandatory sentencing for first time offenders, the
new law has strained Florida's court system. After six months experience, jury trials in
drunk driving cases have increased by 25% and guilty pleas have dropped by 12%. See
Courts feel impact of new drunk driving law, Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel,
Jan. 23, 1983, at IB, col. 5.
Florida is not alone in requiring community service. The new Kansas law requires
either a minimum forty-eight hours incarceration or 100 hours public service. 1982
Kan. Sess. Laws. ch. 144, § 5, 624.
39. Florida Statutes section 322.28(2) (Supp. 1982) requires suspension or revo-
cation for any of the three offenses. Former Section 322.28(2) (1981) applied only to
driving under the influence of alcohol. Present Florida Statutes section 322.28(2) ap-
plies to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances.
40. Florida Statutes section 322.28(2)(a) (Supp. 1982) provides a minimum sus-
pension period of 180 days to one year for first conviction of driving with unlawful
blood alcohol or driving under the influence. Former section 322.28(2)(a) (1981) pro-
vided different suspension periods for these two offenses: 30 to 90 days for unlawful
blood alcohol and 90 days to one year for being under the influence. Thus the new bill
again expresses the legislature's intent to treat these two offenses similarly.
Revocation periods for second and third convictions within five and ten years of a
prior conviction have been substantially increased from six months to five years for
second offenses, and from five years to ten years for third offenses.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 322.271(2) (Supp. 1982).
42. For discussion of the Implied Consent Law's required test submission pro-
1871
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The new law makes it harder for drivers whose licenses have been
suspended or revoked to regain their driving privileges and impossible
to do so after a certain point. When privileges are revoked, a driver
must retake the examination after revocation expires . 3 Before re-test-
ing, the driver must prove he has completed any required driver train-
ing or substance abuse courses. 4 However no driver's license can be re-
issued to anyone convicted of four "drunk driving" offenses.45 This pro-
vision is appropriate since after three unsuccessful attempts to rehabili-
tate a driver through a combination of education, fines and imprison-
ment, any further attempts will most likely be futile. Unlike provisions
relating to fines and penalties," this prohibition has no applicable time
period. Thus four offenses alone, no matter how far apart, will cause
permanent loss of license.
III. Miscellaneous Statutory Changes
The new law initially made six other major changes: (1) provisions
for urinalysis, (2) provisions for non-forcible blood testing, (3) provi-
sions to increase the admissibility of chemical intoxication test results,
(4) provisions modifying the Accident Report Privilege, (5) provisions
admitting refusals of mandatory testing, and (6) provisions for limited
forcible blood testing. With the exception of the provisions modifying
the Accident Report Privilege, all represent changes in the Florida Im-
plied Consent Law which requires drivers to agree to chemical testing
in return for driving privileges. However, as described below, the
changes in provisions for non-forcible blood testing were subsequently
amended to conform to prior law. Since the last change raises constitu-
tional questions, it is discussed in the next section. The others are ex-
amined below.
grams see infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
43. See FLA. STAT. § 322.28(2)(d) (Supp. 1982).
44. Id. Like the new requirements for limited driving privileges, this should en-
courage convicted drivers to complete these quickly.
45. FLA. STAT. § 322.28(2)() (Supp. 1982). This prohibition also applies to any
driver convicted of vehicular manslaughter and one other "drunk driving" offense.
However at least one of the four convictions must have occurred after July 1, 1982.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
1 188 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/9
A. Urinalysis Provisions
Under the former Implied Consent Law 7 drivers only consented to
blood alcohol content tests. When tests were used to determine the
presence of controlled substances, courts split on the admissibility of
the results. In State v. DeMoya,.8 the driver took a requested blood test
but objected when results were used to show methaqualone. The Third
District Court of Appeal suppressed the results, strictly construing the
Implied Consent Law as limited to tests for alcohol. However in State
v. Rafferty,49 after breath tests showed no alcohol, a driver initially
consented to both blood and urine testing showing methaqualone but
later claimed his consent was invalid as he was not in full control of his
faculties. Disregarding this argument, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal decided only probable cause was needed citing Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia.50 Since the Implied Consent law only forbade non-consensual
blood testing for alcohol, urine testing for controlled substances was
governed by pre-law standards.5 1
The new law eliminates this conflict. Florida Statutes section
316.1932(1)(a) 52 extends the implied consent provisions to both breath
testing for alcohol and urine testing for controlled substances. Testing
is permissible at any "detention facility or any other facility mobile or
otherwise. . . equipped to administer such tests in a reasonable man-
ner. . . .",3 Breath and/or urine testing can be done if "reasonable
47. Formerly FLA. STAT. §§ 322.261-322.262 (1981), now §§ 316.1932-316.1934
(Supp. 1982).
48. 380 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
49. 405 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
50. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
51. The result might have been different if only blood sampling for controlled
substances had been done. The former Implied Consent Law could have intended to
limit blood sampling to alcohol detection alone. Since urinalysis was also done, it was
not necessary for the Fourth District Court of Appeal to reach this issue.
DeMoya's result might have been different had the state relied on Schmerber.
Since this was not done, the Third District Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to
confront such an issue. DeMoya, 380 So. 2d at 506.
52. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a) (Supp. 1982).
53. Id. This contemplates use of "BAT" Mobiles, previously used by several
counties for urinalysis and breath testing. See S. Gordon, "BATMOBILE": An Experi-
ence Paper Based on 100-hour Internship (1980) (unpublished M.S. Criminal Justice
thesis) (Available in Nova University Library), reporting that in January, 1980, seven
1891Drunk Driving Laws7:1983
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cause" exists that a driver is under the influence. One type of testing
does not preclude the other, but the question arises whether the same
facts can supply "reasonable cause" for both tests. If so, police will
routinely administer both once a driver is lawfully arrested. One source
reports urinalysis is often done after breath tests fail to show blood
alcohol content above the statutorily presumed level of "under the in-
fluence." Indeed Rafferty noted "the zero readings yielded by the
breathalyzer tests" 55 as one factor police could use to conclude the
driver was probably under the influence of drugs.
Another question is the proper testing methods for urinalysis. Un-
like breath and blood testing, the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services has not been given responsibility to establish urine test-
ing procedures.5" Arguably, each county could establish separate
procedures as long as the courts consider them accurate. Prior Florida
case law on scientific testing is among the most liberal in the United
States. Many states allow testimony concerning a scientific process only
if it has "such standing and scientific recognition among . . . authori-
ties as would justify the courts in admitting the expert testimony de-
clared from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far
made. ' 57 However, in Coppolino v. State,58 Florida adopted a liberal
standard for admitting scientific testimony: whether "the tests in ques-
tion were sufficiently reliable to justify their admission."5 9
out of eight urinalysis specimens for drivers who registered a .00% breathalyzer reading
showed methaqualone. Methaqualone is listed as a controlled substance in Florida
Statutes section 893.03(2), Schedule II.
54. Gordon, supra note 53, at 8-14.
55. 405 So. 2d at 1004.
56. Florida Statutes section 316.1932(2)(a) (Supp. 1982) authorizes the Depart-
ment to approve "tests determining the weight of alcohol"; section 316.1933 (Supp.
1982) authorizes the Department "to approve satisfactory techniques or methods" for
determining alcoholic content of blood and section 316.1934(3) (Supp. 1982) provides
that blood or breath tests to be considered valid must be performed by "methods ap-
proved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services." There is no mention
of authority to approve urine testing methods.
57. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), disapproving use
of the systolic blood pressure deception test, a precursor of the polygraph.
58. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d
120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
59. Id. at 71. Coppolino concerned admission of chemical testing for suc-
cinylcholine chloride in the body. Before Coppolino, experts believed this was impossi-
14
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In counties where urine testing has not yet gained judicial accept-
ance,60 either test requires expert testimony about the reliability of the
ble to determine. However, two experts testified they had devised a method whereby
determination was possible. Relying on their testimony, the results were admitted and
the defendant found guilty of second degree murder. For different views of Coppolino,
see F. BAILEY, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS 227-79 (1971); M. HELPERN, AUTOPSY 16-
45 (1977).
Since the method used had not gained recognition among the scientific community
- a pre-requisite under Frye - several writers argue Coppolino rejected Frye in favor
of a lower "relevancy" standard:
'General scientific acceptance' is a proper condition for taking judicial no-
tice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified ex-
pert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of
prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time. If the
courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed 'requirement of
general acceptance' not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practi-
cal way of utilizing the results of scientific advances.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 491 (Cleary ed. 1972). See also Gianelli, The Admissibil-
ity of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). Gianelli criticizes both standards and urges requiring
the state in a criminal case to establish a new scientific technique's reliability beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Gianelli also criticizes the Coppolino standard for appellate review: "[the judge's]
ruling on admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is
shown." Coppolino, 223 So. 2d at 70. He claims this confuses the judge's traditional
discretion in accepting an expert's qualification with the acceptance of a new scientific
process:
The answer to the question about the reliability of a scientific technique or
process does not vary according to the circumstances of each case. It is
therefore inappropriate to view this threshold question of reliability as a
matter within each trial judge's individual discretion.
Gianelli, supra note 59, at 1223 (citing Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d
364, 367 (1978) (voiceprint analysis inadmissible as not having achieved general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community.)) Gianelli claims the abuse of discretion standard
makes a judge's decision to submit or exclude scientific evidence practially non-revers-
ible. Following Coppolino, Florida appellate courts have never reversed for admission
or exclusion of scientific evidence. See infra cases cited in note 61.
60. Neither DeMoya nor Rafferty addressed the particular method of testing's
reliability. DeMoya only concerned blood testing for controlled substances, thus the
particular method used there is not helpful.
Under the new law, Broward County will use a three level extraction procedure to
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urine testing used."1 After a method's reliability has once been estab-
lished, judicial notice could be used subsequently. 2 Absent either
method of proof, evidence of urinalysis is inadmissible. The Legislature
should have delegated responsibility to the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services to determine proper urine testing procedure.
Only experience will determine whether the Legislature has created a
problem by not doing so.
test urine. The first level is thin line chromatography; the second is the E.M.I.T. assay
test for cocaine and benzodiazepines; the third level occurs subsequent to a positive
second level test and is thin line chromatography confirmed by ultra-violent spec-
trophometery. Dade County plans to use only gas chromatography. Telephone inter-
view with Gene DeTuscan, Toxicologist, Broward County Medical Examiner's Office
(July 6, 1982.)
61. After Coppolino, Florida courts have never mentioned Frye and adhere to
the more liberal standard. See Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (admitting voiceprint, "Florida courts have long enjoyed considerable dis-
cretion in the admittance of novel or experimental evidence, if they feel certain stan-
dards of scientific reliability have been attained."); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903,
904 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (no error to exclude defendant's statements made
under hypnosis because the "court remains unconvinced of the reliability of statements
procured by way of hypnosis"); Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (no error to exclude psychological testimony); Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d
1024, 1029 (Fla. 1981) (admission of microanalysis showing unknown hair samples
"highly likely" those of defendant depends upon "whether scientific tests are so unrelia-
ble and scientifically unacceptable that admission [is] error.")
For a detailed discussion of Worley v. State, admitting voiceprints see Comment,
Criminal Law: Voiceprint Evidence is Being Heard, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 608 (1973);
Comment, Criminal Law - Evidellce - Voiceprints Admissible to Corroborate Testi-
mony Identifying Accused As One Who Had Made False Bomb Threats By Tele-
phone.-Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), 1 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 349 (1973).
62. Judicial notice may take three separate forms: (1) Notice of prior decisions
recognizing a method as reliable or unreliable, See Reed, 391 A.2d at 372-76 (1978);
State v. Primm, 4 Kan. App. 2d 314, 606 P.2d 112 (1980) (judicial notice of general
reliability of radar to measure speed); Jent, 408 So. 2d 1024 (judicially noticing earlier
decision in Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964
(1981) which admitted microanalysis). Under Florida Statutes section 90.201 judicial
notice would be required of previous controlling decisions concerning a method; (2)
Notice of the scientific literature in the area, see Reed, 391 A.2d 367; (3) Notice of
expert testimony in prior opinions, see Gianelli supra note 59, at 1218-19 for a brief
critique of all three methods. For detailed discussion of judicial notice in Florida see C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE §§ 90.201-207 (1977).
192 Nova Law Journal
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B. Non-forcible Blood Testing Provisions
Former Florida Statutes section 322.261(c)63 allowed blood sam-
pling when a driver could not take a breath test because of a mental or
physical condition. Consent was implied and could not be withdrawn
later. Any blood test taken either without a driver's consent or pursu-
ant to section 322.261(2)(c) was inadmissible. Generally if no consent
was given, the driver had to be unconscious. However, if serious enough
physical injuries existed, and a driver was hospitalized, section 322.261
allowed blood sampling, since the driver was considered "so incapaci-
tated as to render impractical or impossible the administration"6 4 of
the breath test. 5
Present Florida Statute section 316.1932(2)(c) retains these re-
quirements. As originally amended, a driver had to be "advised as soon
as practicable of such blood withdrawal and the intended use thereof"6
and given the opportunity to withdraw his consent. This provision
would have given drivers more rights than they previously had to ex-
clude evidence, and placed them in an "all win-no, loss" situation.67
This modification clearly was not constitutionally required. In
Breithaupt v. Abram 8 an unconscious driver objected to the use of his
blood sample, but the Supreme Court found no constitutional obstacles.
Likewise, Filmon v. State69 rejected an argument that allowing con-
63. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(2)(c) (1981).
64. Id.
65. State v. Bierbaum, 46 Fla. Supp. 163 (Palm Beach County 1977), which
held the state must show a driver's condition mde requesting a breath test useless.
Being at a hospital was insufficient. However, since there the driver was facially bleed-
ing, complaining of pain and receiving emergency treatment, the showing was met.
Likewise any blood test performed must be done "upon request of a law enforcement
officer. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(2)(c) (Supp. 1982). See Campbell v. State, 423
So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), declaring inadmissible results of hospital
blood tests performed to administer medical treatment and not at police officer's
request.
66. See 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 155, § 3(West).
67. If blood tests register low blood alcohol content few drivers would withdraw
consent. If the test showed a high blood alcohol level, most would withdraw consent
and accept the consequences.
68. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
69. 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1976), cert. dismissed sub nom. Filmon v. Florida, 430
U.S. 980 (1980). The original Implied Consent Law was criticized for not giving
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scious drivers to withhold consent but not permitting unconscious or
incapacitated drivers to later do so violated equal protection.
Fortunately the legislature subsequently deleted this provision."0
Thus unconscious or incapacitated drivers still cannot withdraw their
consent to blood samples and exclude the test results.
C. General Provisions Concerning Validity of Blood Alcohol
Content Analysis
Defendants charged with "drunk driving" offenses frequently con-
tend proper administrative procedure has not been followed, thus mak-
ing test results inadmissible. Former Florida Statutes section
322.262(3)71 provided in part that
Chemical analyses of the person's blood or breath, in order to
be considered valid under the provisions of this section, must have
been performed according to methods approved by the Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services and by an individual possess-
ing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose.72
Under prior case law, the state had the burden of showing testing
provisions were followed. 73 Any analysis violating administrative rules
"equal treatment" to all drivers and may have led to the original amendment. See
Comment, Florida's 'Implied Consent' Statute: Chemical Tests for Intoxicated Driv-
ers, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 698, 716 (1968), which states, "A much fairer procedure
would be to inform the unconscious person after he regains consciousness of his rights
and at that time gave him a choice between having the evidence used against him or
having his license suspended."
70. 1982 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 403, § 3(West).
71. FLA. STAT. § 322.262(3) (1981).
72. Id.
73. See State v. Wills, 359 So. 2d 566, 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("stat-
utes like Florida's . . . expressly condition the validity of test results on compliance
with health department regulations."); State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla.
1980) ("test results are admissible into evidence only upon compliance with the statu-
tory provisions and the administrative rules"). For civil cases, at least one Florida court
has decided compliance with the administrative rules and statutory implied consent
laws provisions is not required for admission of blood alcohol test results used to show a
driver's comparative negligence. Grant v. Brown, 429 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983).
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was inadmissible.7 4 Results were excluded for the state's failure to es-
tablish intoximeter registration,7 5 operator qualifications,'7 breathalyzer
equipment's non-accessibility to unauthorized personnel, 7 and equip-
ment's working condition.7 8
Whether such results will occur under the new Implied Consent
Law is questionable. Florida Statutes sections 316.1932(1)(b)79 and
316.1934(3)80 still authorize the Department to approve breath and
blood testing procedure. However both sections provide that "Any in-
substantial differences between approved techniques and actual testing
74. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services rules are in the Flor-
ida Administrative Code, chapter 1OD-42, Implied Consent. These supplement the De-
partment of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles regulations. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE,
ch. 15 B-3, Rules of Administering and Determining Chemical Tests for Intoxication.
75. See Turk v. State, 403 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Florida
Administrative Code, rule IOD-42.23 violated; unsigned photographic copy of machine
registration certificate fails to satisfy both best evidence rule, as not under seal required
by Florida statutes section 92.18, and hearsay rule since witness not qualified to estab-
lish copy as Business Record exception.)
76. See Turk, 403 So. 2d 1077 (Florida Administrative Code, rule 1OD-42.25
violated, copy of certificate establishing breathalyzer operator's qualifications not prop-
erly authenticated); Grala v. State, 414 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(blood test results improperly admitted, no proof of identity or qualifications of person
who withdrew blood, admisson harmless, evidence still sufficient to convict.) But see
Gillman v. State, 390 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1980) (blood sample drawn by hospital employee
who not yet completed one year's required work for permanent licensing as clinical
laboratory technologist improperly excluded; letter permitting temporary work as
clinical laboratory technologist sufficient authorization).
77. See Wills, 359 So. 2d at 568 (former H.R.S. rule 1OD-42.07 requires only
"reasonable compliance" and not insuring "impossib[ility] for anyone other than au-
thorized personnel to obtain key" to drawer where machine kept; rule violated as multi-
ple keys of unauthorized personnel unlocked gun locker where machine was); State v.
Dixon, 50 Fla. Supp. 110 (Orange County 1980) (Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
rule 15B-3.03 rule violated; breathalyzer kept in open locker in room accessible to un-
certified personnel).
78. See Dixon, 50 Fla. Supp. at 110 (machine removed from service eleven days
after driver tested possibly not working properly when driver tested, failure to follow
monthly inspection rule requires results exclusion). Florida trial courts have also re-
cently excluded breath tests, because police radios may interfere with the breathalyzer
machine accuracy. See Radio interference causes breath tests to be thrown out, Fort
Lauderdale News, Dec. 12, 1982, at 18A, col 3.
79. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(b) (Supp. 1982).
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procedures in individual cases shall not render the test or test results
invalid.""1
Unfortunately, what the legislature considered "insubstantial dif-
ference" is unclear. When certain procedures are administratively man-
dated, arguably any deviation is "substantial" or else they should not
have been required. But to so construe section 316.1934(3) and
316.1932(1)(b) ignores the above quoted language. Since the integrity
of a scientific testing process is concerned, the state should produce
expert testimony about a deviation's possible effect.82 This recognizes
the burden case law places upon the state. Expert testimony would not
be needed in all cases - only those in which the administrative regula-
tions have not been followed.8 3 Initially any testing procedure should be
considered valid until the defense produces evidence showing deviation.
The prosecution then must prove the deviation does not effect the over-
all results.
Another question is whether a judge or jury initially determines
whether any difference is so "insubstantial" that test results are not
invalid. While the answer is not clear, strong indications exist that the
initial determination on admissibility of test results lies with the judge,
with the ultimate determination on their validity left to the jury. Cop-
polino established that the trial judge has wide discretion in admitting
scientific evidence and must determine whether any proffered tests are
"so unreliable and scientifically unacceptable that their admission into
evidence was error".8 4 The key word is "unreliable". Since standard
breath and blood testing procedures were established to avoid this, any
81. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(l)(b); FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(3).
82. Who qualifies as an expert on the question of "insubstantial differences" is
another issue. Generally only breathalyzer technicians appear at drunk driving trials.
They may not be qualified to testify what happens when differences in administrative
or statutory procedures occur: "The technician merely follows prescribed routines, and
is not expected to understand their underlying fundamentals. He knows how, but not
why." Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 393, 394
(1964), cited in Gianelli, supra note 59, at 1214-15. Arguably a manufacturer's repre-
sentative is necessary.
83. See Bender v. State, 382 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1980): "When the prosecution
presents testimony in evidence concerning motor vehicle driver intoxication, which in-
cludes an approved alcohol test method by a properly licensed operator, the fact finder
may presume the test procedure is reliable. ...
84. 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
1 196 Nova Law Journal
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deviation from them could affect the results' reliability. Coppolino
seems to embody the procedure mandated by Florida Statutes section
90.105, Preliminary Questions85 stating in part: "(1) the court shall
determine preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of
evidence."8 6
If a difference between testing procedures used and those required
by regulations is not "insubstantial", the results should be excluded and
not considered by the jury. If the judge determines any differences
would not affect the testing results' reliability, the jury is allowed to
accept them or not.
Should the judge's initial determination be made in the jury's
presence? Unfortunately section 90.105 does not afford a definite an-
swer. Section 90.105(3) requires hearings outside the jury's presence
only when confessions are involved. For other preliminary matters sec-
tion 90.105(3) requires them to be held outside the jury's presence
85. Coppolino declared that
the question is not actually one of sufficiency or weight of the evidence for
there was ample evidence before the jury to support its finding as to cause
of death. Instead, the queston really involves the competency of the evi-
dence. That is, should the trial judge have allowed into evidence testimony
concerning Dr. Umberger's tests.
Id. at 70, (emphasis added).
Subsequent Florida cases recognize the initial determination on scientific evidence is
the judge's alone. See Ashley v. State, 370 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(evaluating questions of relevancy, materiality and competency for judge). Jent v.
State, 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1981) (determination for court to make on reliability).
86. FLA. STAT. § 90.105 (1981). The section states in full:
Preliminary questions-
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the court shall determine prelimi-
nary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence.
(2) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the existence of a pre-
liminary fact, the court shall admit the proffered evidence when there is
prima facie evidence sufficient to support a finding of the preliminary fact.
If prima facie evidence is not introduced to support a finding of the prelim-
inary fact, the court may admit the proffered evidence subject to the sub-
sequent introduction of prima facie evidence of the preliminary fact.
(3) Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be
similarly conducted when the interests of justice require or when an ac-
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"when the interests of justice require or when an accused is a witness,
if he so requests." 87 Arguably, a defendant's testimony may sometimes
be needed to meet the initial burden of producing evidence that some
difference exists.88 In these cases, the jury cannot be present. But when
the defense shows a difference only through cross-examination of prose-
cution witnesses, the jury may be present.89 Indeed judicial economy
may be served by having jurors present. If results are ultimately sub-
mitted for their consideration, defense counsel can be expected to em-
phasize on cross examination the differences involved, hoping jurors
will use them to disregard test results. Thus by having jurors present
when the preliminary issue is determined, needless repitition of testi-
mony is avoided.
What happens if the jury hears testimony on this preliminary
question, and the judge excludes test results because a substantial dif-
ference exists? If the state dismisses its case, no harm is done. How-
ever, if the state continues, is a mistrial necessary? The answer seems
to be "it depends." If the judge determines an instruction to disregard
the excluded evidence would suffice, the trial can continue. If not, then
mistrial is the only remedy.90 By adding this new language, the Legisla-
87. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(3) (1981).
88. For example, the defendant could testify that during the twenty minute re-
quired observation period he drank liquid or vomited, thus affecting test results. See
FLA. ADMIN. CODE, rule IOD-42.24.
89. An analogy may be drawn to admissibility of co-conspirator statements
under the Federal rules of Evidence. Even federal courts which suggest preliminary
foundations for co-conspirator statements should be done outside the jury's presence do
not always require this procedure.
United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g en banc, 590 F.2d
575 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979), held Federal Rule of Evidence
104 (a) requires a judge to make determinations of the admissibility of co-conspirator
statements unders rule 801(d)(2)(E) "whenever reasonably practicable" before admit-
ting the statements themselves. Subsequent decisions establish this procedure is not
mandatory, and judges may admit co-conspirator statements subject to later "connect-
ing up" at trial. See United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1982).
90. Again, experience with the federal co-conspirator exception supports this. See
James, 590 F.2d at 583 ("the judge must decide whether the prejudice arising from the
erroneous admission of the co-conspirator's statements can be cured by a cautionary
instruction to disregard the statement or whether a mistrial is required"); United
States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
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ture has created much uncertainty. Prosecutors may find it wiser not to
bring cases where any difference exists.
D. Florida Accident Report Privilege
Florida Statutes section 316.066,91 Written Report of Accidents,
requires every driver involved in an accident causing one hundred dol-
lars property damage or bodily injury to another person to file a written
report with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
Likewise police officers investigating these accidents must make a re-
port within twenty-four hours. 2 To insure drivers' cooperation and to
preserve their fifth amendment Privilege against Self-incrimination,
section 316.066(4) provides in part that: "No such report shall be used
in evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an
accident. . .."93
Early case law applied this provision to drivers' statements
whatever form they took. The crucial consideration was whether the
statements were made to fulfill either the driver's or the investigating
officer's duty. Where an investigating officer recorded a driver's ver-
sion of an accident to satisfy his reporting duties, admission was pro-
hibited.9 4 Likewise, when drivers made statements to investigating of-
ficers to satify their statutory duty, bystanders who overheard them
could not testify. 5 However, only statements forming a basis for the
report were privileged - not the entire report itself. Thus police could
use accident reports to refresh their memory for purposes of testifying
about non-privileged matters.9 6
91. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(1) (Supp. 1982).
92. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(3)(a) (Supp. 1982).
93. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4) (Supp. 1982).
94. Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1949) (driver's oral statements to of-
ficer preparing accident report and driver's signed statement prepared by officer prop-
erly excluded as privileged in civil action arising out of accident).
95. Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1955) ("to allow one party to
establish their contents by the testimony of witnesses who may have overheard the
driver . . . making an oral report to the patrolman investigating it, would defeat the
purpose of the statute").
96. Lobree v. Caporossi, 139 So. 2d 510, 512-13 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
See also Soler v. Kukula, 297 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (privilege
not prevent cross-examination based on report, if officer used report to testify on direct
199 1Drunk Driving Laws
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Besides a driver's oral statements, prior case law found privileged
those blood tests taken to complete an accident report and not for pos-
sible criminal charges. Where blood tests were done to complete the
accident investigation, the privilege attached and results excluded. 97
However, once an officer "changed his hat" and began a criminal inves-
tigaton any consensual statements or blood tests were not protected. 98
Ultimately the crucial test for deciding whether statements or blood
alcohol testing were within the privilege became "whether the informa-
tion sought to be excluded was taken .. .for the purpose of making
[an] accident report and formed a basis for that report." 99
Mere change from a civil to criminal investigation did not make
test results admissible unless a driver was clearly advised of the change.
An explicit warning easily achieves this; anything else is arguably in-
sufficient, since "to do any less simply erodes the protection which the
Legislature affords drivers". 100 Where one officer conducted both the
civil and criminal investigations, the officer's warning to the driver usu-
ally sufficed. 101 Where different officers were involved, whether the
same officer or a different one requested the blood test was often cru-
cial.102 The report's actual completion date or time was insignificant. 10 3
Under these interpretations of section 316.066(4) blood tests were
excluded where their results would have provided significant evidence
of intoxication. Case law construing the privilege as applied to blood
examination).
97. Cooper v. State, 183 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See also
State v. Thomas, 212 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
98. State v. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1968) (no doubt driver [knew]
investigation phase ended and blood being taken in connection with possible man-
slaughter charge).
99. State v. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 1971).
100. Elder v. Ackerman, 362 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(report excluded since unrealistic far sixteen year old driver at serious accident scene
"to discern the nuances of the dichotomy existing between investigations for automobile
accident reports investigations from the criminal aspects of automobile accidents").
101. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632.
102. See State v. Edge, 397 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Timmons
v. State, 214 So. 2d 11, 14 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970
(1969).
103. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618.
24




alcohol testing has been criticized as illogical and inconsistent.104 The
new law significantly changes Florida Statutes section 316.066(4). Oral
statements still remain privileged. However, chemical results are ex-
plicitly excluded from the privilege's scope: "The results of breath,
urine and blood tests administered . . . shall not fall within the confi-
dential privilege afforded by this subsection, but shall be admissible
into evidence in accordance with the provisions of § 316.1934(2)."1 °5
This is one of the better changes. Chemical tests are outside the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If tests are other-
wise validly taken, results should be admissible without privilege
problems under section 316.066.
E. Admissibility of Refusals of Testing
Some states explicitly exclude 08 while many explicitly admit 07 re-
fusals to submit to chemical testing. What happens when the state law
is silent on this issue? Unfortunately, decisions have gone both ways.108
Florida's situation before the new law's passage is typical of the confu-
104. See Note, Admissibility of the Results of Blood Test in a Criminal Case
Arising Out of an Auto Accident, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 978 (1968) ("The statu-
tory accident report privilege should not be used in a manner that will cause the exclu-
sion of evidence obtained under ... implied consent law when an accident results,");
Rumrell, Wrights & Havens, The Case for Admissibility of Blood Alcohol Test Re-
sults in Civil and Criminal Trials, 55 FLA. B.J. 362, 365 (May, 1981) ("The court-
created privilege against noncommunicative blood alcohol tests should be eliminted.").
105. FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4).
106. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(e) (West. Supp. 1981).
107. See ALA. CODE § 32-A-5-194(c) (Supp. 1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-692(H) (Supp. 1982). Besides Florida, three other states recently amended their
Implied Consent laws to explicitly admit refusals. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §
11.501.2(c) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001(C) (Supp. 1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 487.805(4) (1979). 4
108. [Elven in those states ... . which are silent on the issue of admissi-
bility of a refusal to submit to the test, they come to opposite conclusions
as to the effect of the statute. Some hold that the option given by the
statute to refuse prevents the admissibility of evidence of the refusal, while
others hold that even though a person may refuse to take the test, this is
not a statutory right to refuse, and the evidence of such refusal is, there-
fore, not precluded by statute.
State v. Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, _, 613 P.2d 384, 386 (1980).
201 1
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sion. The first Implied Consent Law made driving a privilege in return
for which drivers impliedly consented to testing. Arrested drivers were
warned any refusal to submit would result in license suspension,"'0 but
no statutory language said whether such refusal was admissible. De-
spite the original Implied Consent Law's passage, Florida courts did
not allow admission of testing refusals. 110
The new Florida Implied Consent Law explicitly makes admission
109. Former Florida Statutes section 322.261(l)(a) (1981) stated in part
Any person who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of this
state of operating a motor vehicle within this state shall by so operating
such vehicle be deemed to have given his consent to submit to an approved
chemical test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his blood . . . Such person shall be told that his failure to sub-
mit to such a chemical test will result in the suspension of his privilege to
operate a motor vehicle....
But see State v. Gunn, 408 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (absence of
warning did not merit suppression of results); Pardo v. State, 429 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (giving of warning not a prerequisite to valid blood alcohol test in
criminal case; required only for imposition of license suspension for revocation of con-
sent to testing).
110. State v. Duke, 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), construed for-
mer Florida Statutes section 322.261(1)(a) in light of State v. Esperti, 220 So. 2d 416
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), cert. dismissed, 225 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1969) admitting a
refusal of nitrate testing as circumstantial evidence of guilt. Esperti distinguished Gay
v. Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that admisibility of
refusal violated privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968),
finding the driver had been incorrectly given a choice to not submit, whereas in Esperti
there was no choice given. Gay v. Orlando's conclusion was considered dicta and a due
process rather than a privilege against self-incrimination decision. Since under Florida
Statutes section 322.261(1)(a), a legal choice did not exist, Duke found refusals
admissible.
However, in Sambrine v. State, 386 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme
Court declared
[a]ny careful reading of Section 322.261 leads to the inescapable con-
clution that a person is given the right to refuse testing. If this were not so,
it is unclear why the legislature provided for a definite sanction [license
suspension] and a detailed procedure for the enforcement of such
suspension.
Id. at 548.
Sambrine admittedly did not directly deal with the issue of testing refusals admis-
sibility. Subsequent cases have applied it to this situation and consider it as disapprov-
ing Duke. See Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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a consequence of refusal. Florida Statutes section 316.1932(1)(a) pro-
vides that when a driver is "lawfully arrested" and police have "reason-
able cause to believe" the driver is under the influence, "[r]efusal to
submit to a chemical breath or urine test upon request .. .shall be
admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding."",,
However, despite this explicit language, admitting evidence of a
refusal has until recently presented constitutional questions involving
the privilege against self-incrimination. While this issue seems settled
in favor of a refusal's admissibility, due process problems in doing so
may still be very much alive. Thus discussion of both these areas is
necessary.
The Florida and United States Supreme Courts have rejected all
constitutional challenges to blood alcohol testing per se. Even before
the first Implied Consent law's enactment, Florida addressed a Privi-
lege against Self-Incrimination objection to blood sampling in
Touchton v. State."2 A vehicular manslaughter defendant had been
arrested and taken to a hospital where blood used to show intoxication
was taken. Rejecting claims that this procedure violated the Florida
privilege against self-incrimination,"' the court noted the blood sample
had not been protested. After Touchton, the propriety of blood extrac-
tions arose in Schmerber v. California1 4 where a hospital physician,
acting under police direction, withdrew blood from an arrested driver,
who protested based on advice of counsel. The Court acknowledged ex-
tracting blood over protest was 'compulsion' for fifth amendment pur-
poses. However, the main issue was whether this required the driver "to
be a witness against himself.""' 5 Distinguishing between physical and
testimonial evidence, the Court found no violation, holding "the privi-
lege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide. . . evidence of a testimonial or commu-
nicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analy-
111. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(1)(a) (Supp. 1982).
112. 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752 (1944).
113. At that time FLA. CONsT. Declaration of Rights, § 12 provided in part: "No
person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
This provision is presently contained in section 9, FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights,
Florida Constitution.
114. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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sis . . did not involve compulsion to these ends."116
Following Schmerber, Florida joined a number of states passing
Implied Consent laws requiring drivers to submit to chemical testing
through breath or blood sampling under certain conditions.1 7 In State
v. Mitchell,1i8 a manslaughter defendant challenged a blood sample
taken pursuant to former Florida Statutes section 322.261 (1)(b)"Il
without his consent and before his arrest. Agreeing, the Second District
Court of Appeal relied on the absence of consent to find a Privilege
against Self-Incrimination violation.1 20 The Florida Supreme Court re-
versed citing Schmerber where the blood sample taken over the driver's
protest was not excluded on fifth amendment grounds. Subsequent
cases extended Mitchell to breath tests as well.12 '
While Schmerber held a blood test does not violate fifth amend-
ment principles, the Supreme Court created uncertainty about what
would happen if a driver refused testing. 22 Generally, courts have un-
116. Id.
117. For discussion of problems posed by the original Implied Consent Law, see
Comment, supra note 69.
118. 245 So. 2d 618.
119. Former Florida Statutes section 32.261(1)(c) (1981) allowed blood extrac-
tions if a driver's physical condition made it "impractical" or "impossible" to adminis-
ter other testing. See text accompanying note 58 for discussion of this provision.
120. 227 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
121. See State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1980).
122. This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the State tried to
show that the accused had incriminated himself when told that he would
have to be tested. Such incriminating evidence may be an unavoidable by-
product of the compulsion to take the test, especially for an individual who
fears the extraction or opposes it on religious grounds. If it wishes to com-
pel persons to submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the State may
have to forgo the advantage of any testimonial products of administering
the test-products which would fall within the privilege.***
Petitioner has raised a similar issue . . ., in connection with a police
request that he submit to a 'breathalyzer' test ... He refused the request,
and evidence of his refusal was admitted. . . He argues that the introduc-
tion of this evidence and a comment by the prosecutor .. upon his refusal is
ground for reversal under Griffin v. California, . . . We think general
Fifth Amendment principles, rather than the particular holding of Griffin,
would be applicable in these circumstaces, see Miranda v. Arizona ...
Since trial here was conducted after our decison in Malloy v. Hogan, . ..
making those principles applicable to the States . . . petitioner's conten-
28
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dertaken a two-step analysis in deciding whether statutes atithorizing
admission of refusal against a driver are constitutional: first considering
whether admission would violate. the Privilege against Self-Incrimina-
tion; and then, if necessary, considering whether admission would vio-
late Due Process because either the driver has been misled into believ-
ing a right to refuse existed or because the refusal is of low probative
value and its admission would unduly pressure drivers to testify. Each
of these objections to admitting refusals is briefly discussed below.
1. Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Shortly after Schmerber, the California Supreme court decided
two companion cases providing the main arguments against constitu-
tional attacks. People v. Ellis 23 held admitting a defendant's refusal to
speak for voice identification was permissible since the voice tests were
physical evidence rather than testimonial evidence. 2" When the defen-
dant wrongfully refused to do so, his refusal was admissible not as tes-
timonial evidence but circumstantial conduct from which a jury could
infer guilt, much like escape.' 25 People v. Sudduth12' applied this rea-
soning to refusals of breath testing. Since under Schmerber no right to
tion is foreclosed by his failure to object...
384 U.S. at 765-66 n.9.
As could be expected, this language has received differing interpretations from
courts and commentators. Compare Comment, The Admissibility of Refusals In
Drunk Driving Prosecutions: A Violation of the Fifth Amendment, 10 PAc. L.J. 141
(1978); and Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78
YALE L.J. 1074 (1969) with Cohen, The Case for Admitting Evidence of Refusal to
Take a Breath Test, 6 TEX. TECH L. REv. 927 (1975); Hauser, Admissibility of Re-
fusal to Submit to Blood Alcohol Test, 6 NOVA L.J. 209 (1982); Arenella, Schmerber
and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination. A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31
(1982).
123. 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr 385 (1966).
124. "[T]he speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts,
but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated
sounds, the verbal meaning of which are unimportant." Id. at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at
387.
125. "[I]t can scarcely be contended that the police, who seek evidence from the
test itself, will tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to produce this
evidence." Id. at 397, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
126. 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
205 11 7:1983
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refuse testing existed, comment on such refusal violated no constitu-
tional privilege. Any contrary result encouraged destruction of evidence
and escape from convictions.
The Ellis-Sudduth circumstantial evidence rationale has been
used by most courts to find no constitutional violation.127 However,
shortly after Sudduth, Florida, in Gay v. Orlando,128 became the first
,state subscribing to a contrary minority viewpoint. There, the admis-
sion of a driver's refusal to allow a breathalyzer test resulted in reversal
of his conviction. The Fourth District Court of Appeal relied on
Schmerber to find the refusal a testimonial by-product 29 and found
compulsion because of the driver's situation, "a choice of either volun-
tarily submitting to the test or refusing and thereby making a self-in-
criminating statement."1 '' Whether by design or otherwise, Gay v. Or-
lando neither mentioned Ellis nor explained why it disapproved the
refusal as circumstantial evidence analysis. While Gay has been much
127. See, e.g., Campbell v. Superior court, 106 Ariz. 542, , 479 P.2d 685, 692
(1971) ("person does not have a right to refuse and because refusal is not 'testimonial
communication' . . . comment ... not improper"); City of Westerville v. Cunning-
ham, 150 Ohio St. 2d 121, .. , 239 N.E.2d 40, 41 (1968) ("reasonable to infer that a
refusal ... indicates the defendant's fear of the results of the test and his conscious-
ness of guilt,"); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 229 Pa. Super. 131, _, 324 A.2d 441,
450 (1979); State v. Meints, 189 Neb. 264, ... , 202 N.W.2d 202, 203 (1972); State v.
Wilson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 130, _, 613 P.2d 384, 385 (1980) ("refusal[s] . . .could
each be treated as an act or conduct indicating consciousness of guilt"; however ex-
cluded per state law). Some pre-Schmerber cases used the same analysis to admit re-
fusals. Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, -, 81 S.E.2d 614, 618 (1954)
("merely details the behavior or conduct of the accused"); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa
1168, 1171, 300 N.W. 275, 277 (1941) ("the refusal was merely a circumstance to be
considered."); State v. Durrant, 55 Del. 510, .. , 188 A.2d 526, 528 (1963) ("it is
proper in a criminal case to show defendant's conduct .... The fact that defendant
declined to submit to a sobriety test is such a circumstance which a jury may
consider.").
For two criticisms of the Ellis-Sudduth circumstantial evidence rationale see
Comment, supra note 122, at 153-57 and Arenella supra note 122, at 46-47.
128. 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968).
129. "[P]etitioners' statement was self-incriminating and carried an inference of
guilt. In fact, it is difficult to see any relevancy ... other than providing such an
inference." Id. at 898.
130. Id.
1206 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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criticized,131 several courts cited it to find admission of refusals -a fifth
amendment violation.1 32 Other cases have reached similar results.133
131. See Hauser, supra note 122; Cohen, supra note 122; Comment, Admissibil-
ity of Testimonial By-Products of a Physical Test, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 50, 58-59
(1969) ("the decision is in conflict with the growing body of legal opinion").
132. See Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972); State v.
Jackson, 637 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1981), cert. granted, vacated and remanded for reconsid-
eration, Montana v. Jackson, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983). Arguably, Johnson could have
relied on a non-constitutional evidentiary basis for excluding refusals, rather than a
fifth amendment one, stating "[T]he refusal to take such tests are not relevant to the
question of guilt or innocence although the statute itself authorizes the results to be
allowed in evidence and creates a presumption in certain situations." 188 S.E.2d at
417. Gay excluded refusals not because of irrelevancy, but precisely because they were
relevant, testimonial and compelled.
133. See State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863 (1973), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); State v. Adams, 247 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1978).
The clearest articulation of the minority view is Clinard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 716
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Clinard first decided refusals were testimonial under general
fifth amendment principles:
a defendant's silence or negative reply to a demand or request by an
officer made upon him while under the necessary compulsion attendant
with custodial arrest, which demand or question reasonably called for an
immediate reply by the defendant, is clearly a tacit or overt expression and
communication of the defendant's thoughts in regard thereto.
Id. at 718.
Clinard then, unlike Gay, addressed the circumstantial evidence argument and
concluded it was erroneous.
[I]f an accused under custodial arrest is requested or offered a chemi-
cal test for intoxication, anything he does other than affirmatively agree to
same is a refusal to submit. Thus, escape and flight are not 'compelled', a
necessary factor under the Fifth Amendment, but a refusal to take a
chemical test by silence or negative reply to a State's request or offer is
compelled.
Id. at 718-19.
Few cases finding refusals admissible did more than merely cite the Schmerber
footnote for the proposition that the issue was left undecided there. Newhouse v. Mis-
terly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970), relying on Ellis
and Sudduth to find no privilege violation resulted from admitting refusals attempted
to deal with the usually ignored Schmerber language. "The first portion. . . discusses
an accused who incriminates himself 'when told that he would have to be tested'. . ..
In context the Court seems here to be talking of an incriminatng statement by the
accused which is induced by the requirement that the test be taken. . . ." Id. at 518.
If no such statement was made, Newhouse considered the first part of the Schmer-
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Fortunately the United States Supreme Court has recently resolved
any question involving admissions of refusals and the fifth amendment
Privilege against Self-Incrimination.
In South Dakota v. Neville,'" an arrested driver declined a blood
alcohol test after being warned several times that his refusal could lead
to loss of driving privileges."i 5 Before trial he successfully moved to
suppress all evidence of the refusal. On the state's appeal from the sup-
pression order, the South Dakota Supreme Court, while recognizing
there may be no federal constitutional right to refuse blood-alcohol
testing, determined a refusal's admission violated a driver's fifth
amendment rights. The court first decided a refusal was a communica-
tive act1"8 for fifth amendment purposes and also decided the evidence
ber footnote inapplicable. Refusal was not a statement but conduct indicating a guilty
conscience. In a curious bit of reasoning, Newhouse also found the second part
inapplicable.
Read together,. the two portions . . . indicate that a refusal to take a
blood test is not a testimonial 'statement' within the Fifth Amendment;
rather, it is a best described as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt.
See People v. Ellis. Nonetheless, the reference to the Miranda footnote
can be read to imply that where an underlying right to refuse such a blood
test is present, it would be improper to draw adverse inferences from fail-
ure of the accused to respond to a request . . . because the accused would
thereby be penalized for exercising his rights to refuse the test.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Newhouse implied such "underlying right" arose from state statutes or state con-
stitutional decisions governing refusals. Close scrutiny demonstrates that such reason-
ing would have eliminated all federal constitutional considerations when deciding
whether a refusal is admissible. If a statute or state constitutional decision gave a right
to refuse testing, cases should be decided on the basis of the statutory language or state
constitutional law, not federal constitutional principles. If so, then the Court's indica-
*tion that "general Fifth Amendment principles" should apply in analyzing refusals to
submit to breath testing would become meaningless.
134. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
135. South Dakota's Implied Consent Law originally gave drivers the right to
refuse breath testing, See S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 32-23-10 (1973). Admitting a
driver's refusal violated this statutory right. State v. Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 241 N.W.2d
566 (1976). However the South Dakota legislature subsequently changed its Implied
Consent Law to provide that "such refusal may be admissable into evidence at the
trial." See S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982).
136. "A defendant's silence or refusal to submit to a requested blood test is a
tacit or overt expression and communication of defendant's thoughts." State v. Neville,
1208 7:1983 1
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was "compelled" by the arrest circumstances."' 7
Accepting certiorari to resolve the conflict among the states on this
question, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first
noted Schmerber would clearly permit states to force suspected drivers
to give blood alcohol tests and characterized the passage of implied
consent laws as means "to avoid violent confrontations".1 38 While ac-
knowledging the Ellis-Sudduth argument that refusals are physical
acts from which evidence of guilt can be circumstantially inferred
rather than communications or testimony, the Court declined to rest its
decision on this basis.139 Instead the Court found "compulsion" for the
fifth amendment purposes was not present based upon two factors.
First, the Court noted "the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting
the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' ,,.14o Clearly Neville did not
present such a situation. Indeed, since the police respected the driver's
refusal of testing, there was a total lack of physical force. Second, the
Court noted the driver was clearly given a choice: submit to testing or
have his refusal admitted at trial. The ultimate choice between the al-
ternatives was made by the driver, not by the state. The mere fact that
the driver was compelled by law to decide between these did not involve
a fifth amendment violation. While not every situation where an indi-
vidual is forced to choose between two alternatives will mean there is
no "compulsion", 41 since South Dakota could have lawfully eliminated
312 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1982) (citing Gay v. Orlando, 202 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. (1967) as authority).
137. In essence, the court found the driver caught between two choices: cooperat-
ing and possibly incriminating himself or refusing and possibly doing the same. State v.
Neville, 312 N.W. at 726.
138. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 921.
139. The Court most likely did so in order to avoid having to re-consider in fu-
ture cases when consciousness of guilt could be fairly inferred from refusals and when
it could not.
While we find considerable force in the analogies to flight and suppression
of evidence . . ., we decline to rest our decision on this ground. As we
recognized in Schmerber, the distinction between real or physical evidence,
on the one hand, and communications or testimony, on the other, is not
readily drawn in many cases. The situations arising from a refusal present
a difficult gradation [between various types of refusals]."
Id. at 921-22 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)).
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any choice whatever and forcibly obtained the evidence, the mere fact
it set up an alternative with possible unpleasant ramifications did not
make any constitutional difference.142 Thus the Court held "a refusal to
take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it,
is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination."143
After Neville, the constitutionally of Florida Statutes section
316.1932(l)(a) is no longer debatable.
2. Due Process Grounds
Due process problems with admitting refusals may exist for two
reasons. First, the driver may be misled about the right to refuse or
consequences of refusal. Second, courts may feel refusals lack probative
value and unfairly force drivers to offer explanatory testimony.
Drivers can be misled about their rights to refuse in a number of
ways. The clearest instance occurs when an arrested driver is told he
has the right to refuse testing even though state law grants none.
Under such circumstances admitting a refusal would be unfair since its
probative value is difficult to ascertain. The driver could be refusing
because of fear of failing the test or merely due to a choice to take
what was represented as a legal right. Indeed, writers disagreeing with
Gay v. Orlando's discussion argue it is more properly interpreted on
due process grounds.1 44 Likewise in State v. Duke,1 45 although the
court found no statutory right to refuse testing, it decided the driver
could have been misled by the arresting officer into believing he had a
ment problems: First, where a criminal defendant would be given the choice of either
truthfully testifying involuntarily, falsely testifying thus risking perjury charges, or de-
clining to testify thus risking contempt charges. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
378 U.S. 52 (1964) and second, where the given alternative was so-unpleasant a person
would almost certainly admit guilt. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 ("a test so painful,
dangerous or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs").
142. "[T]he choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an
easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires
suspects and defendants to make difficult choices." Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
143. Id.
144. See Hauser, supra note 122, at 237-38; Comment, supra note 131, at 56-
58.
145. 378 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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legal choice.14 If Miranda warnings are given to an arrested driver,
the driver may believe a refusal is allowed. Even pre-Neville cases
holding admission did not violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion have recognized this possibility. 147 When this happens additional
admonitions are almost universally required.
Situations may occur where a person in custody does not have fair
notice of the limits of his rights,, and becomes confused about
whether he need comply with official directions. . . . where a
driver exhibits confusion as to the scope of his rights, the officers
should tell him of his duty to comply with directions or alterna-
tively elaborate on their description of his rights. 48
Florida case law contains no requirement that an additional admo-
nition be given that Miranda warnings do not provide a legal basis for
refusal. However Duke implies that such a warning should be required
to avoid misleading drivers.149 Such warnings should be required; espe-
cially since now Neville decided that admitting refusals does not violate
fifth amendment protections more states are likely to statutorily declare
that refusals should be admissible.
Additionally, after Neville, one Due Process issue has been settled.
146. The arresting officer told the driver, "I am now offering to give an approved
test of your breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of your blood."
Id. at 98. Emphasizing the officer's use of the word "offering", the court found "a
reasonable person in the defendant's position could believe he had a Legal choice as to
whether to submit to the test." Id.
147. See People v. Ellis, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1966).
148. Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1969), relying on the
following language from Ellis
After having given [Mliranda warnings, if the police direct a defendant to
speak for voice identification and he refuses, they must, as a prerequisite to
the use of the defendant's refusal to speak as evidence of consciousness of
guilt, advise him that the right to remain silent does not include the right
to refuse to participate in such a test.
421 P.2d at 398-99.
See also State Dept. of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971).
149. "The defendant should have been told that the officer was prepared to give
an approved chemical test; that the driver did not have a right to refuse; but that if he
did refuse that his driver's license would be revoked for a period of three months." 378
So. 2d at 98.
211 1
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Besides raising Privilege against Self-Incrimination arguments, the
driver claimed Due Process was violated, because he was not told his
refusal could be used at trial. The driver argued his situation was anal-
ogous to that in Doyle v. Ohio'8 0 where the Court found admitting a
defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warning was fundamentally
unfair. The Court rejected this for two reasons. First, "the right to si-
lence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of constitutional dimen-
sion, and thus cannot be burdened." 151 The driver's right to refuse did
not arise from any constitutional right but from a statute existing only
through legislative grace. Second, Mirandd warnings emphasized the
disadvantages of speaking, not any adverse consequences from silence.
In Neville, the statutory warning about potential loss of driving privi-
leges, "contained no such misleading assurances as to the relative con-
sequences of his choice." 152 Indeed, if anything, the assurances were in
the opposite directon-refusal would lead to state action to suspend the
driver's license.1 83 Thus after Neville, mere failure to warn that refusal
of testing is admissible against the driver at trial does not violate due
process rights.
Although Florida law, like South Dakota's, provides that refusal of
testing is admissible, no statute requires the driver be so informed. Af-
ter Neville, the question still remains whether a warning should not be
legislatively required although its absence is admittedly not constitu-
tionally fatal. Why such a requirement is omitted is puzzling, consider-
ing how easy it would be to give such a warning. Police officers have
found no difficulty complying with the Miranda warnings in similar
circumstances. Moreover, whether drivers should be warned of a re-
fusal's consequences should be considered in connection with Florida
Statutes section 316.1932(a)'M stating "A warning of the consent pro-
vision of this section shall be printed above the signature line on each
new or renewed driver's license issued after the effective date of this
150. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
151. Neville, 103 S. Ct. at 923.
152. Id. at 924.
153. "It is true the officers did not inform respondent of the further consequence
that evidence of refusal could be used against him in court, but we think it unrealistic
to say that the warnings given here implicitly assure a suspect that no consequences
other than those mentioned will occur." Id.
154. FLA. STAT. § 316.1932(e) (Supp. 1982).
1212 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
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Additional language should be included that any refusal of consent
would be admissible in court. Even commentators arguing refusals
should be admissible agree drivers should be so warned. 156 One state
supreme court requires such warnings." 7
States viewing refusals probative of a guilty conscience see no due
process problem in admitting them and possibly forcing drivers to tes-
tify. Other states have questioned the probative value of refusals. The
Supreme Court in Schmerber recognized that some factual circum-
stances cast considerable doubt on a refusal's relevance, although
Schmerber having no concerns based on fear, health or religion, did not
present such a situation. 158
Some courts consider only these instances,159 but others recognize
additional circumstances when admission would be unfair.1 60 The only
empirical study examining reasons for refusals concludes they stem
from unknown sources. 61 One Florida writer argues that forcing driv-
155. Id.
156. See Hauser, supra note 122, at 236-38; Arnella, supra note 122, at 57,
n.130. Indeed Neville suggests such should be done even though not constitutionally
required: "Since the State wants the suspect to submit to the test, it is in its interest
fully to warn suspects of the consequences of refusal. We are informed that police
officers in South Dakota now warn suspects that evidence of their refusal can be used
against them in court." 103 S. Ct. at 924, n.17.
157. Puller v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285 (Alaska 1978); See
also State v. Parker 16 Wash. App. 632, _, 558 P.2d 1361, 1363 (1976) ("had the
statute intended evidentiary use of . . . refusal, it is logical that the arresting officer
would be required to inform [a driver] refusal could be used in a criminal
proceeding").
158. 384 U.S. at 771. Neville did not overrule this language.
159. See Ellis, 421 P.2d at 398.
160. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 247 S.E.2d 475, 478 (W. Va. 1978) ("where
there is no explanation of defendant's refusal offered, the evidence is untrustwor-
thy. . . . Defendant could have been afraid of the test itself and not the results. .. ");
State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 3 (Mont. 1981) ("not always reliable, and is highly preju-
dicial to the defendant, in effect forcing him to take the witness stand to explain...").
161. Argeriou, Refusal to Take Breathalyzer Test-Rebutting Adverse Presump-
tion, 11 CRImI. L. BULL. 350 (1975). This study of 281 drunk driving offenders using
ten variables to compare test takers versus nontakers concludes there is "little support
for the assumption that individuals who refused . . . did so as a result of heightened
'consciousness of guilt' and a conscious desire to avoid providing additional and specific
chemical evidence of their level of intoxication." Id. at 353.
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ers to offer explanations does not violate due process."6 2 However, this
is predicated on the belief the defendant could only be cross-examined
on the reasons for refusal, if he does not testify on other matters. Ar-
guably Florida Statutes section 90.612(2)163 allows for this. However
this argument ignores the last sentence, "The court may, in its discre-
tion permit inquiry into additional matters. 164
When discretion is exercised to allow widened cross-examination,
is reversal likely? Based on one recent case, the answer must be "no".
In MaGahee v. Massey,16 5 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a Florida
rape conviction. MaGahee was accused of attacking the victim on Oc-
tober 11, 1973. To prove he was the perpetrator, the state offered testi-
mony of another witness that the defendant exposed himself one month
before at the same place the rape occurred. MaGahee testified not
about the events of October llth, but that he was elsewhere at the
earlier time. When cross-examination went beyond this, defense coun-
sel's objection was overruled. Additionally, the prosector commented in
closing argument about McGahee's failure to testify about the October
1 th events. Both the Fourth District Courts of Appeals and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court affirmed without opinions.1 6 The Eleventh Circuit
denied a habeas corpus petition which argued that extended cross-ex-
amination violated fifth amendment privileges, since it considered these
waived when McGahee voluntarily chose to testify. The court distin-
guished this situation from instances where the defendant, by testifying
on collateral matters, does not open up the cross-examination. 167 Once
162. Hauser, supra note 122, at 239.
163. Florida Statutes section 90.612(2) (1981) states in part "Cross-examination
of a witness is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting the credibility of the witness."
164. Id.
165. 667 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982).
166. McGahee v. State, 302 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dis. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 311 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1975).
167. Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 909 (1969) was cited as an example of a collateral matter. Calloway found that
by testifying solely to a confession's circumstances, a defendant does not open up him-
self up to cross-examination or comment in closing argument on failure to testify about
other matters. The line is a fine one and easily crossed. See also United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338-40. (9th Cir. 1977) (limiting the Calloway collateral mat-
ter versus merits distinction to confessions alone, defendant's testimony to post-robbery
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a defendant testifies about the "merits", the cross-examination becomes
full-bloom. In McGahee this happened once the defendant testified on
the element of identity.
Refusal of chemical testing surely will not be considered a collat-
eral matter. Since the refusal is likely to happen at the arrest scene,
courts may easily surmise that by testifying about this, the defendant
opens himself up to cross-examination about everything happening at
the scene. Moreover, if courts consider refusal relevant to show a guilty
conscience, explaining why a person refused goes directly to the
"merits".
If Florida decides refusals should be admissible in certain cases,
better procedure would be to utilize Florida Statutes section 90.105,168
Preliminary Questions. Since the Supreme Court indicated admitting
refusals under certain circumstances violates due process, initial screen-
ing of reasons for refusal should be done at preliminary hearings. Ini-
tial decisions about a confession's voluntariness are solely for a
judge.'69 However, due process does not require a hearing outside the
jury's presence in every case of alleged suggestive identification since
determining an identification's reliability is a traditional jury role.170
However such hearings are "advisable" and sometimes "constitution-
ally necessary". 71 The issue of admitting testing refusal is significantly
different from a suggestive identification question. Other witnesses, es-
pecially the victim, are available for examination in an identification
case. However, in a refusal issue the driver is likely to be the only one
knowing why he refused the test.172 Forcing drivers to testify before a
jury on this would possibly subject them to extended cross-examination
and unfavorable inferences from not testifying on other matters.
public admissions of participation goes to merits), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
168. FLA. STAT. § 90.105, Preliminary Questions (1981).
169. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). This is necessary since a jury
might focus on the confession's reliability and not its voluntariness or be influenced in
the voluntariness decision by need to use the confession in evaluating a defendant's
guilt.
170. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
171. Id. at 349.
172. One exception might be where the driver refused for medical reasons. Then
a doctor could supply the needed explanation.
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Florida Statutes section 90.105(1)173 obligates judges to decide
"preliminary questions concerning" the admissibility of evidence. If the
defendant wishes to testify concerning his reason for refusal, the second
sentence of section 90.105(3)174 should require a preliminary hearing.
If the court finds refusal was for a valid reason, the refusal should be
excluded. 1 5 If the state meets its burden of disproving this 76 a refusal
would be submitted to a jury for consideration of its weight. Thus driv-
ers would be given some opportunity to demonstrate valid grounds for
refusal and not have to worry about waiving their fifth amendment
rights not to testify at trial.177
IV. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Forcible Blood Sampling
Florida courts have condemned taking blood samples from pro-
testing drivers. However all cases excluding forcible blood extractions
were based on the original Implied Consent Law's language. Former
Florida Statutes' section 322.261 (1)(c) 17 1 allowed blood tests when a
driver was "so incapacitated as to render impractical or impossible the
administration"1791 of a breath test and acceptable medical standards
were followed. This provision has been retained by the new law.' 80
When blood sampling was done contrary to these provisions, the sample
173. See FLA. STAT. § 90.105(l) (1981).
174. FLA. STAT. § 90.105(3) (1981).
175. Not all courts agree reasons for refusal are a matter for courts initially. See
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 324 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1979), considering this a jury issue.
176. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), prosecution has burden of prov-
ing voluntariness of confession by preponderance of the evidence. Cf. Saltzburg, Stan-
dards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975) sug-
gesting that for confessions, dying declarations and some declarations against interest,
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be used for preliminary fact-finding.
177. Another alternative is to make refusals admissible only if the defendant tes-
tifies and not in the state's case-in-chief. Two states adopt this compromise approach.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08 (1980).
178. FLA. STAT. § 322.261(1)(c) (1981).
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70 for discussion of temporary
changes made in section 322.261(1)(c), now section 316.1932(2)(c).
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results were excluded."' 1
The Supreme Court has viewed unfavorably due process and
fourth amendment arguments against non-consensual blood testing.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 1 2 found a physician's blood extraction from an
unconscious driver in a hospital emergency room "would not be consid-
ered offensive by even the most delicate."'8 3 However, the Rochin v.
California18 4 situation where police illegally broke into a suspect's
home and forcibly pumped his stomach to make him regurgitate nar-
cotics and shocked the court's conscience as "brutal"18 5 and "offen-
sive"18s6 was distinguished from Breithaupt where no force other than
puncturing the skin occurred. This intrustion was considered small
when balanced against society's interest in detecting and deterring in-
toxicated drivers. Breithaupt emphasized that due process violations
depend not on personal reaction to a particular procedure but on what
the community considers offensive. Emphasizing the routineness of
such procedures, along with the states' widespread acceptance of blood
extractions,18 7 the Court concluded they were "not such 'conduct that
shocks the conscience' . . . nor such a method of obtaining evidence
181. In State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert.
dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1978), blood was forcibly taken from a resisting
driver. The court found "the implied consent evidenced by accepting the privilege of
operating a motor vehicle in this state may be revoked at the time the chemical test is
suggested .... Otherwise the sections providing for suspension upon refusal to submit
would be superfluous." Id. at 1210-11.
Likewise in Sambrine v. State, 378 So. 2d 96, blood was withdrawn from a driver
who refused a breathalyzer test. Disagreeing with the state's argument that only proba-
ble cause was needed, the court noted former section 322.1262(1)(c) provided for blood
sampling only when a driver was mentally or physically incapable of withdrawing the
implied consent. See also Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), af'd per curiam, 386 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1980); Lytwyn v. State, 353 So. 2d 222
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); McDonald v. State, 364 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978), excluding blood tests taken in violation of the Implied Consent Law.
182. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
183. Id. at 436.
184. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
185. Id. at 172.
186. Id. at 174.
187. Forty-seven states had approved chemical intoxication testing through ei-
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that it offends a 'sense of justice."188 Subsequently Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia189 likewise rejected a fourteenth amendment due process objec-
tion to blood extractions taken over a conscious driver's protest. In
Schmerber, the driver was conscious and had verbally, but not physi-
cally, protested the extraction. The Court refused to distinguish be-
tween invading the skin to secure blood samples of conscious as op-
posed to unconscious drivers. 190
Schmerber also considered fourth amendment objections to blood
extractions. The Court recognized blood extractions involve a search
and seizure1 91 but focused on whether they were "unreasonable" under
the circumstances. Probable cause based upon the smell of Schmerber's
breath and his general physical appearance supplied justificaton. Since
delay in getting a warrant threatened loss of evidence, none was re-
quired. Likewise the procedures used were reasonable because blood
sampling is generally effective in determining blood alcohol content and
the procedure as performed by a doctor in a hospital, comported with
standard medical practices. Fourth amendment objections to Florida's
Implied Consent law fared no better than fifth amendment claims.
State v. Mitchell 92 rejected fourth amendment arguments that arrest
was needed before blood could be taken, and recognized that the ques-
tion was rather the "relevance and likely success" of a blood test. 3
188. 352 U.S. at 437.
189. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
190. "We 'cannot see that it should make any difference whether one states un-
equivocally that he objects or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such condi-
tion that he is unable to protest."' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760, n.4 (citing Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. at 441 (Warren, J., dissenting)).
191. The seizure occurred when Schmerber was arrested at the hospital, followed
by the search which occurred when blood was taken from his body.
192. 245 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1971).
193. Id. at 622 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966)). See
also Filmon v. State, 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1976), cert. dismissed sub. nom., Filmon v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 980 (1980); State v. Edge, 397 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1981). But see United States v. Harvey, 701 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1983) construing blood
sampling in Schmerber as a search incident to lawful arrest, thus requiring formal
arrest before blood extraction unless consent given. Several states have upheld blood
samples from unconscious drivers on a different basis. In Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d
166 (Tex. Crim. 1982), blood taken from an unconscious driver was admitted over his
fourth amendment objections. The court agreed Schmerber was distinguishable since
there the driver was both under arrest and conscious. However the court justified the
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After Breithaupt and Schmerber, there is no constitutional prob-
lem with extracting blood from an unconscious or verbally protesting
driver. Other situations may present difficulties however. The new
"drunk driving" law adds a section on blood sampling going beyond
Breithaupt and Schmerber. Florida Statutes section 316.1933,194 Blood
Test for Impairment or Intoxication states in part:
(1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to
[breath or urine tests] or any recognized power to revoke the im-
plied consent to such tests, if a law enforcement officer has proba-
ble cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual
physical control of a person while under the influence of alcoholic
beverages or controlled substances has caused the death or serious
bodily injury of a human being, such person shall submit, upon
request of a law enforcement officer, to a test of his blood for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood or the
presence of controlled substances. The law enforcement officer may
use reasonable force, if necessary to require such person to submit
to the administration of the blood test.*** 19 5
Whether the provision allowing police to "use reasonable force, if
necessary" constitutionally affords an arrested driver due process is
questionable. As mentioned above, Breithaupt and Schmerber both re-
jected due process violations. However, neither case covers the situation
contemplated by section 316.1933. Indeed Schmerber noted three situ-
ations where section 316.1933 presents problems. "It would be a differ-
ent case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reason-
able request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to
sampling based on Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), which upheld taking finger-
print scrapings from an unarrested defendant. Aliff noted both the routiness of blood
testing and the possibility evidence would be lost if delay ensued. This presented exi-
gent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. See also State v. Oevering, 268
N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1978); DeVaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (Ind.
1972); Van Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1979); State v. Campbell, 615 P.2d
190 (Mont. 1980); State v. Heintz, 286 Or. 239, 594 P.2d 385 (1979) relying on simi-
lar reasoning to uphold blood sampling from severely injured or unconscious drivers.
194. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (Supp. 1982).
195. Id. at (1). "Serious bodily injury" is defined as "a physical condition which
creates a substantial risk of death or serious, personal disfigurement, or protracted loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Id.
2191
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resistance with inappropriate force".""
Arguably, the easiest situation to resolve occurs when a driver pro-
tests blood extraction and makes "a reasonable request to undergo a
different form of testing. 197 Schmerber specifically notes several rea-
sons a driver would do so: "Petitioner is not one of the few who on
grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple, might prefer
some other means of testing, such as the 'breathalyzer' test petitioner
refused. 98
Does Florida Statutes section 316.1933 require arresting officers to
first offer other tests or administer them if requested? The key lan-
guage appears in Florida Statutes section 316.1933's beginning: "Not-
withstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests pro-
vided in Fla. Stat. § 316.1932. ... "' Thus whether a driver is
capable of giving a breath or urine sample appears irrelevant if proba-
ble cause exists and serious bodily injury to another occurred. This lan-
guage clearly conflicts with the Schmerber dictum. Police may desire
blood sarhples because of their recognized reliability.200 However when
the desire to obtain blood conflicts with an individual's reasonable de-
sire for other testing methods, the alternatives should be constitution-
ally required. Under such conditions, Schmerber implies that no
amount of force, no matter how slight, is "reasonable". Several states
have recognized Schmerber's dictum by prohibiting blood sampling in
these circumstances.20 1 Forcibly taking blood when these arise violates
196. 384 U.S. at 760, n.4. This language was again cited with approval in Nev-
ille as examples of situations which could present Due Process problems. See 103 S.
Ct. at 921, n.9.
197. 384 U.S. at 760, n.4.
198. Id. at 771.
199. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (Supp. 1982).
200. Blood testing is generally considered the most reliable, followed by breath
testing and then urinalysis. See Fitzgerald & Hume, The Single Chemical Test for
Intoxication: A Challenge to Admissibility, 66 MASS. L. REV. 23 (1981); A. MOEN-
SSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 2.04-2.07 (2d ed.
1978). Ironically Perryman v. State, 242 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971),
upheld the propriety of denying blood tests to a driver who previously refused breath
testing.
201. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(d), (e) (Deering 1972) exempting from blood
testing hemophiliacs and persons taking anticoagulants for a heart conditon; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1982) exempts religious objectors.
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due process, despite Florida Statutes section 316.1933's authorization.
The remaining two situations Schmerber contemplates involve the
same question, what is "reasonable force"? A literal reading of "if the
police initiated the violence, '20 2 could prevent use of any force once a
driver refuses. Since Schmerber also used the words "or responded to
resistance with inappropriate force,"203 the prior language should be
read as "if the police initiated the [unnecessary] violence."'204 Since
blood extractions involve searches and seizures, some courts after
Schmerber feel the question of "reasonable force" involves fourth
amendment considerations rather than due process ones. 0 5 Where
force is reasonable for fourth amendment purposes, it would satisfy due
process.
"Reasonableness" must be considered separately under each set of
facts. As stated by one court "[t]here is no slide-rule formula yet de-
vised for ascertaining whether specific conduct is or is not reasona-
ble." 206 Courts have considered searches of the body's exterior differ-
ently from searches involving invasions of the body's interior. Greater
justification is required when the body is invaded and the force used to
make such an invasion should be closely scrutinized. 0 Unfortunately,
after Schmerber, few cases address the constitutionality of forcible
blood extractions. Many are decided on other issues, such as violations
of state Implied consent laws. Florida can no longer consider blood
sampling solely in statutory violation terms when the section 316.1933's
conditions exist. Thus examination of case law dealing with other bod-
ily invasions is needed.
Bodily invasions are common in narcotics border searches. While
202. 384 U.S. at 760, n.4.
203. Id
204. Id.
205. See Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 914 (1958); People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 528 (1975). Even before Rochin, Breithaupt and Schmerber, one writer argued
courts were merging due process and fourth amendment "reasonableness" standards.
Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41 CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1950).
206. Blackford, 247 F.2d at 751.
207. See Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968) (penis scraping to obtain
victim's menstrual blood permissible search incident to lawful arrest involving no intru-
sion of body's surface), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1123 (1969).
17:1983 221 1Drunk Driving Laws
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there is often official force used to search the person's body, the courts
have usually upheld the constitutionality of the law enforcement ac-
tions involved. Shortly after Breithaupt, Blackford v. United States08
challenged the forcible extraction of narcotics from a defendant's rec-
tum. Blackford was forcibly restrained and undressed, then subjected
to an unsuccessful anal probe. Following this, several forcibly given en-
emas resulted in recovery of narcotics. Applying a "reasonableness"
test claimed to be stricter than a due process scrutiny, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found substantial factual similarity to Breithaupt and many differ-
ences with Rochin.
Rochin was subjected to a whole series of abuses and violations of
his rights commencing with the unlawful entry into his dwelling,
continuing with the forcible attempt by the officers to prevent him
from swallowing the capsules, and culminating with the forcible
stomach pumping. In contrast, Blackford was treated civilly
throughout and was subjected to physical pressure only when the
examinations were to be performed. 09
The court dismissed claims the procedures used inflicted unreason-
able pain. As long as the infliction was not malicious or excessive no
problem existed. Numerous cases have relied on Blackford's interpreta-
tion of Rochin and upheld anal searches, 210 emefics, 211 and stomach
pumping212 to force narcotics from a suspect's body.
Like body searches at the border, operations to recover bullets
from a defendant's body involve fourth amendment and due process
issues. Generally, the courts have upheld such procedures. In United
States v. Crowder,21 3 an operation to recover a bullet from the defen-
208. 247 F.2d 745.
209. Id. at 752.
210. See Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Ng Pui Yu v.
United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965).
211. See Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 381
U.S. 920 (1965); Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960); Blefare v.
United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
212. Belfare, 362 F.2d 870. Cf. People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624 (non border
search found unreasonable because no warrant obtained, unnecessary to consider due
process issue).
213. 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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dant's arm was permitted. The operation was a minor surgical proce-
dure done under acceptable medical conditions, with probable cause to
believe it would produce relevant evidence. 14
Are border searches and operations distinguishable from blood
sampling? All involve bodily invasion. Border searches and operations
for bullets are necessary to obtain evidence which may not be obtaina-
ble otherwise. However, in regard to blood alcohol testing less intrusive
breath and urine tests exist. Moreover, to some people blood sampling
will be more dangerous than minor operations or border search devices.
Yet since section 316.1933 gives police authority to require blood sam-
pling as long as "reasonable force" is used the driver has no opportu-
nity to prevent being exposed to the danger. Although in blood sam-
pling the Supreme Court recognizes delay will result in loss of
evidence, this relates only to the need for testing, not the exact method
chosen. A recent New York case illustrates this important distinction.
Matter of Abe A.; Jon L. v. District Attorney,215 upheld an order re-
quiring blood samples needed to connect the defendant with his busi-
ness partner's murder. Blood at the scene was of two types; the victim's
and a rare kind belonging to one percent of the population. After decid-
ing probable cause existed and safe medical procedures would be used,
the court noted that "no alternative means of obtaining the evidence
was brought forward. .. 216 This situation contrasts greatly with the
usual drunk driving case where alternatives are available to determine
blood alcohol content. Measured by this criteria, section 316.1933 can-
not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
A few cases exclude blood samples because of due process viola-
tions resulting from either police initiated force or unnecessary force in
214. Before the operation, a warrant was issued approving only the recovery of a
bullet in the arm. A second bullet was left undisturbed, since an operation to secure
this presented danger of permanent damage. See also State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d
621 (Mo. 1977); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1972), cert.
dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); State v. Allen, 291 S.E.2d 459 (S.C. 1982); State v.
Martin, 404 So. 2d 960 (La. 1981). Contra Indiana v. Adams, 229 N.E.2d 834 (Ind.
1973), cert. denied sub nom., 415 U.S. 935 (1974), adopting per se rule that surgical
removal of bullets violates fourth amendment.
215. 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265 (1982).
216. Id. at __, 437 N.E.2d at 271.
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response to a suspect's resistance. In People v. Kraft,217 while the ac-
tual procedure used to extract blood was medically safe, the surround-
ing circumstances made the process medically unacceptable. Police ar-
rested Kraft after an accident and took him to a local hospital
handcuffed. One officer punched Kraft to force him into the hospital,
without any good reason for doing so. Once the handcuffs were re-
moved, the driver objected to the blood extraction on morality grounds.
When he resisted, his arms were grabbed and he was led to an exami-
nation room where he was pushed onto the floor and held down by two
officers until blood was taken. The court found the police "were aggres-
sive beyond all need." '218 Likewise, in United States v. Townsend,2 1 9 the
defendant was beaten without explanation and had his arms twisted
when he resisted efforts to scrape his penis for blood samples in a rape
case. Citing Rochin, the court found this violated due process.
Kraft and Townsend demonstrate the excessive police action Flor-
ida Statutes section 316.1933(1) may generate.2 Why did the legisla-
ture pass such a provision considering other sections of the new Implied
Consent law? Breathalyzers show the same results as blood analysis;
when a refusal occurs, the new law makes it admissible. Since the Su-
preme Court in Neville upheld admitting evidence of refusals, §
316.1933(1) will do more harm than good. Implied Consent laws were
passed to prevent the very violence section 316.1933(1)(a) may
cause.221 Considering there were incidents of police violence under the
former Implied Consent Law222 this section will only encourage more.
217. 3 Cal. App. 3d 890, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1970).
218. 3 Cal. App. 3d -, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
219. 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957).
220. See also People v. Allen, 86 Cal. App. 3d 948, 150 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1978)
police officer's putting gun to defendant's neck and threatening to shoot unless sus-
pected heroin balloons were not swallowed, violated due process since "the officers were
aggressive beyond all need." Id. at -, - P.2d -, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
221. "In general, legislatures have recognized that people under the influence of
alcohol tend to be more abusive, and combative than they would be if sober. To require
law enforcement officials to withdraw blood could easily lead to a pitched battle be-
tween police and the accused." Hauser, supra note 122, at 222.
222. See, e.g., State v. Riggins, 348 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
where police sat on a driver and twisted his broken arm to force submission. Unsuccess-
ful, they threatened to jail him even though he was catheterized. Not surprisingly, at
this point the driver gave the sample.
1224 7:1983 1
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Hopefully section 316.1933(l)(a) will be seldom improperly utilized
and soon repealed or declared unconstitutional.
B. Miranda Warnings and Drunk Driving
Another Privilege against Self-Incrimination question is whether
arrested drivers must be given Miranda warnings. Under present Flor-
ida practices, arresting officers fill out an Alcohol Influence Report
before chemical testing.2 23 The report contains not only the arresting
officer's observation of the driver, but also specific questions drivers
must be asked.224 The answers may affect the weight given chemical
test results showing a driver's blood alcohol content. Since the statutory
presumptions resulting from chemical influence are only "prima facie"
evidence and not conclusive, 25 a driver's trial testimony can explain
why the results should be ignored.2 26 However, by providing the infor-
mation police ask for, drivers may assist the state in building its case.
Miranda v. Arizona227 held that whenever a person is in custody and
under interrogation, certain warnings must be given prior to question-
ing to apprise the individual of his fifth amendment rights.2 Since by
statute a driver must be "lawfully arrested" before being required to
undergo chemical testing, Miranda's custody requirement is satis-
fied.229 Likewise the questions asked constitute "interrogation. 23 °
223. Florida Highway Patrol Form No. 711.
224. For example, the driver is asked: "Have you been drinking?" and "Are you
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage now?" Id.
225. FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(2)(c) (Supp. 1982).
226. See Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 200, at 28-35 discussing factors affect-
ing an individual's blood alcohol level.
227. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
228. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any ques-
tioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
229. Miranda indicates custody exists "After a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
Courts have difficulty dealing with the second part of this definition. A narrow con-
struction would allow more police questioning without warnings. In State v. Roberti,
644 P.2d 1104 (Or. 1982), a police officer admitted he intended to arrest before ques-
225[117:1983
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Only two Florida cases discuss whether drivers charged with traffic
offenses should be given Miranda warnings. County of Dade v. Calla-
han2 31 considered whether Miranda warnings should be given before
field sobriety or breathalyzer tests are administered. Merely citing
cases from other states finding Miranda warnings unnecessary in drunk
driving cases, the court held that since the driver was charged with
violating a city ordinance making drunk driving a petty offense, no
warnings were needed. In State v. Oliverl23 an arrested driver refused
to answer questions asked before a breath test was taken. The county
court refused to suspend his license holding he was "under no obliga-
tion to answer questions or to perform physical tests. His sole duty is to
blow into the breathalyzer machine."2 3 However, the Circuit Court re-
versed, based on Callahan and the additional rationale that since im-
plied consent proceedings are civil administrative matters not criminal
cases, the driver was not entitled to warnings.
The Callahan-Oliver reasoning is questionable at best. Neither
case analyzed whether Miranda should apply to drunk driving arrests
and were merely content to cite other cases holding it does not. The
rationale that there is a distinction between criminal drunk driving pro-
ceedings and civil license suspensions has been heavily criticized by one
tioning a driver, but claimed this was not communicated. Examining whether this con-
stituted custody, the court originally decided the definition's second part referred to
"situations of greater deprival of freedom of action than the ordinary stop of a car ...,
but short of formal arrest." Id. at 1109.Custody did not exist since the officer never
mentioned his intentions. Justice Linde, dissenting, argued one of the majority opinion's
dangers is potential misapplication in all drunk driving cases. "[I]t may be thought to
stand for proposition that the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants some-
how is sui generis as far as Miranda warnings before questioning are concerned." Id.
at 1125.
On rehearing, the court decided custody existed when the officer formed the intent
to arrest. Roberti, 646 P.2d 1341 (1982), petiton for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3208
(U.S. Sept. 28, 1982) (No. 82-315).
230. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), defined this as "not only...
express questioning; but also . . . any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
231. 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
232. 47 Fla. Supp. 111 (Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, 1977).
233. Id. at 114 (Palm Beach County Court 1976).
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recent federal court considering a "right to counsel" issue.23 4 Since
these two cases summarily discuss Miranda's application a brief look at
other jurisdictions is needed.
State courts are split on this issue. 3 5 Among courts finding warn-
ings unnecessary New Jersey's seem typical. State v. Macuk,2 31 cited
by Callahan, found Miranda inapplicable to drunk driving arrest for
four reasons, all debatable. 37 Macuk noted Miranda and succeeding
Supreme Court cases construing it all involve serious offenses. Thus
until the Supreme Court acts otherwise, Macuk would limit its scope.
This "petty offense" reasoning is wrong. There is no indication Mi-
randa was intended to apply only to felonies. Indeed the opinion's lan-
guage indicates otherwise.2 38 Likewise subsequent decisions reject the
petty offense argument for sixth amendment purposes. Where incarcer-
ation results the Supreme Court has held the "right to counsel"
applies.2 9
Secondly, Macuk felt Miranda was limited to stationhouse ques-
tioning designed to "sweat out" a confession. This reasoning misreads
Miranda in two respects. Miranda was concerned with such cases but
234. Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982). As Heles notes, a drunk
driving arrest may result in criminal charges even though chemical testing is refused.
The option is not the driver's but the state's. See also infra, text accompanying notes
248-57 for further criticism of this distinction.
235. See State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980); State v. Lawson, 285
N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. 1974); Commonwealth v. Bonser, 258 A.2d 675 (Pa.
1969), holding Miranda applicable Contra, City of Columbus v. Hayes, 9 Ohio App.
2d 38, 222 N.E. 829 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 941 (1967); State v. Bliss, 238
A.2d 848 (Del. 1968); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1972).
236. 57 N.J. 1, 268 A.2d 1 (1970).
237. See Comment, Miranda and Misdemeanors, 14 LAND & WATER L. REV.
521 (1979) heavily criticizing Macuk's rationale.
238. If the Court wished to draw a felony-misdemeanor distinction, it could eas-
ily have done so. The Court aimed at protecting a person's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, whenever the need arose: "[T]here can be no doubt that the
fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and
serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way. . ." 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). This also refutes the Cal-
lahan criminal offense vs. civil administrative proceedinns distinction.
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not limited to them. The Court has indicated Miranda applies when
custodial interrogation takes place outside a police station. 240
Thirdly, the court in Macuk felt drunk driving offenses did not
merit the extra time needed to inform drivers of their rights. This is a
re-hash of the "petty offense" argument. The time consumed in reading
a suspect the warnings is short, and many police departments have pro-
vided standard Miranda warnings cards to use.
Fourth, since New Jersey arrested many drivers yearly for
drunken driving, to provide lawyers for all who might request them
pursuant to Miranda would be too troublesome. This argument has
been effectively eliminated in states adopting state-wide public de-
fender systems, like Florida. The real reason for this argument is fear
drivers would invoke the right to silence after being warned, thus mak-
ing cesation of questioning mandatory.241
Whether many drivers would invoke Miranda to remain silent and
demand counsel after a drunk driving arrest is debatable.24 2 At any
rate, this argument misses the main issue. If Miranda warnings must
be given, drivers are within their rights to remain silent notwithstand-
ing any inconvenience this causes police.
Unfortunately the United States Supreme Court has declined all
opportunities to decide this issue.24 3 More recent state cases have ap-
plied Miranda to the drunk driving situation. 4 State v. Fields,245
240. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) finding Miranda applicable to
in-custody questioning in a defendant's bedroom.
241. See also State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d at 850 (citing large number of yearly
drunk driving arrests as "practical reason why motor vehicle offenses should be treated
somewhat differently ... than most other offenses").
242. See Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519 (1967), concluding that for only eight of eighty-one suspects whose
interrogations were observed did Miranda have any effect; Seeburger & Wettick, Mi-
randa in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 PITm. L. REV. 1 (1967) concluded Mi-
randa had no appreciable effect on crime clearance rates.
243. In State v. Lewin, 163 N.J. Super. 439, 395 A.2d 211 (1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 905 (1979), Justices Brennan, White and Stewart noted the split among state
courts and dissented from denial of certiorari.
244. Even states admitting refusals of testing have applied Miranda to drunk
driving situations. See Commonwealth v. Bonser, 258 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1969); Campbell
v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 685 (Ariz. 1971).
245. 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980). See also Note, Criminal Law - Accusatory
State of Proceedings - Custody Test Requires Miranda Warnings After DWI Arrest,
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found Miranda inapplicable to preliminary questions used to determine
whether a person had been driving a wrecked vehicle. However, once
the driver was arrested, Miranda protections were needed. Fields rec-
ognized a driver arrested for drunk driving is within custody and ques-
tioning him is interrogation. The court recognized a drunk driving ar-
rest's implications and refused to consider it a mere traffic offense.
Florida clearly considers drunken driving a serious offense. Only a
brief look at Florida Statutes Section 316.193246 is needed to demon-
strate this. Moreover, considering drunken driving a minor violation
forces police to unnecessarily distinguish instances where the offense is
punishable by less than six months imprisonment and when it may re-
sult in manslaughter charges. The Florida Supreme Court has never
considered whether Miranda applies to drunken driving offense arrests.
When the time comes, it should follow the recent trend and apply Mi-
randa in this context.
C. Right to Counsel and Chemical Intoxication Testing
In Schmerber, the Supreme Court held admitting results of a
blood test, taken over the driver's objections based on incorrect advice
of counsel,2 47 did not violate the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Close reading shows the decision is not persuasive authority against a
right to counsel claim. The driver was afforded the chance to contact
his attorney. The right to counsel claim did not involve an access ques-
tion but merely whether the attorney's advice was correct - a question
the Court resolved in its fifth amendment discussion.
When Schmerber was tested, California had no Implied Consent
law. Afterwards nearly every state passed one. Case law considering
whether an arrested driver has a right to counsel unfortunately focuses
on different standards. Most decisions discuss the difference between
criminal proceedings under a state's drunk driving laws and civil li-
cense suspension proceedings under a state's implied consent law.
Others consider whether the decision to submit to chemical testing is a
"critical stage" requiring counsel. Additionally, a few states distinguish
57 N.D.L. REV. 673 (1981).
246. FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (Supp. 1982).
247. The attorney incorrectly advised Schmerber the blood sample was prohib-
ited by the privilege aginst self-incrimination.
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between a right to consult counsel versus the right to have counsel pre-
sent when testing is done.
1. Civil License Suspension versus Criminal Proceedings.
If an arrested driver refuses testing, all states with implied consent
laws provide administrative mechanisms for revocation or suspension of
a driver's license. 48 One recurring question is whether refusal based on
a right to counsel claim constitutes refusal for revocation or suspension
purposes. If a driver refuses, two possibilities arise: criminal prosecu-
tion and license suspension. 49 Several states differentiate between the
nature of these two proceeding as far as the right to counsel.2 50 Those
states holding no right to counsel exists strictly construe the sixth
amendment's language that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right . .. to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.251
These states reason that since license suspensions are not "criminal
prosecutions", no right to counsel is involved. Vermont illustrates the
extremes to which such decisions go. In State v. Dellveneri2 52 the Ver-
mont Supreme Court, based upon the summary nature of the implied
consent law's administrative suspension hearing, a civil proceeding, de-
cided that a driver was not required to be informed of a right to coun-
sel before deciding to take breathalyzer tests. However, when the pro-
ceedings became criminal the same court surprisingly found such a
248. See Florida Statutes section 316.1932(1)(d)(g) (Supp. 1982) for a descrip-
tion of Florida suspension procedures.
249. Indeed until testing is refused, only criminal prosecution is possible since
there would be no basis for civil license suspension. When strong evidence exists, even
absent test results, prosecution is a distinct possibility. See Prideaux v. State Dept. of
Public Safety, 310 Minn. 176, -, 247 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1976).
250. See Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1979) ("well
established ... that proceedings involving the suspension or revocation of a license
• ..are civil, not criminal in nature"); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 298 (N.D.
1974) ("proceedings under the Implied Consent Law are civil in nature"); Gottschalk
v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 1179, 140 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1966) ("Neither [federal or
state constitution giving Right to Counsel] is applicable to this administrative
proceeding. .. ").
251. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
252. 128 Vt. 84, 258 A.2d 834 (1969).
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/9
Drunk Driving Laws
right. State v. Welch 253 held an accused's right to counsel was violated
when police officers convinced a driver to submit to a breath test after
he requested counsel. Dellveneri was discussed, but summarily distin-
guished based on the criminal nature of the proceedings in Welch.
This stretches the right to counsel issue to an extreme. Theoreti-
cally, under Vermont law, if the driver had continued to refuse testing
and not been afforded a chance to consult counsel, the refusal could not
have been admissible in a criminal trial since his 'sixth amendment
rights were violated. However, if a civil license suspension proceeding
was brought, the refusal could be admitted since the nature of those
proceedings recognize no such right.
Fortunately several courts refuse to draw such illogical distinctions
between the two proceedings. 54 Such courts recognize the dual pos-
sibilities an arrest for drunk driving has and adopt a more realistic
view. Heles v. South Dakota,25 5 the only federal court decision, re-
cently declared
In effect the threat of a license revocation (the civil proceeding) is
a tool employed at the time of arrest to gather evidence against the
driver to utilize in a later criminal prosecution.*** To say that the
person does not have a right to contact an attorney prior to decid-
ing whether to take the sobriety test, because the license revocation
proceeding, initiated once the test is refused, is civil in nature to-
tally ignores the fact that the person is in custody pursuant to an
arrest on a criminal charge. The proceedings are all criminal in
nature until testing is actually refused. 256
Heles correctly notes that drunk driving arrests have all the char-
acteristics of any other criminal apprehension. The driver is formally
placed under arrest, often given Miranda warnings, and most likely
taken to jail for temporary detention. The only unusual aspect is the
253. 135 Vt. 312, 376 A.2d 351 (Vt. 1977).
254. See Prideaux, 310 Minn. 176, 247 N.W.2d 385; Leopold v. Tofany, 68
Misc. 2d 3, 325 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), affd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 550,
327 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1971).
255. 530 F. Supp. 646. (D.S.D. 1982).
256. Id. at 651-52 (footnotes omited). Recently, the Eighth Circuit declared
Heles moot, since the driver had died when the district court rendered its decision. The
case was remanded with directions to vacate.
231117:1983
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possibility of license suspension if refusal occurs. Especially significant
are the Miranda warnings which include notification of a right to coun-
sel during questioning. Given these, drivers may easily be misled into
believing a right to counsel exists and should not be expected to draw a
fine civil versus criminal distinction.257
2. Critical Stage Analysis
States refusing to use the fictitious civil-criminal distinction focus
on the situation when an accused is asked to undergo testing - not the
nature of any later proceeding. The right to counsel guaranteed in all
criminal prosecutions has been extended well beyond the mere right to
representation at trial. Any criminal proceeding whose nature makes it
a "critical stage", is one where an accused is entitled to counsel.25 8
Courts have considered whether the decision to undergo chemical in-
toxication testing amounts to a critical stage under two bases: (1)
whether the testing procedure itself amounts to a critical stage, (2)
whether state court rule or statute makes testing a critical stage.
Most courts find that the nature of the testing process itself is not
a "critical stage," where counsel is necessary. United States v. Wade259
considered whether any pre-trial proceeding is a "critical stage" by ex-
amining "whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
ingfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effec-
tive assistance of counsel at the trial itself. 2 60
Wade considered a post-indictment lineup where the accused is
confronted with possible eyewitnesses a critical stage since a lineup was
inherently suggestive and seldom could be accurately reconstructed at
trial. However Wade indicted that where a scientific process, like blood
testing, is used to gather and evaluate evidence pre-trial, no such criti-
257. See also State Dept. of Highways v. Beckey, 192 N.W.2d 441, 192 N.W.2d
444 (Minn. 1971) (confusion generated by Miranda warnings is a reasonable ground to
refuse test).
258. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), preliminary hearing where
witnesses testify is a critical stage where counsel needed; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961), arraignment where defenses must be asserted or lost requires cousel.
259. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
260. Id. at 227.
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cal stage exists.
"[K] nowledge of the techniques of science and technology is suffi-
ciently available . ., that the accused has the opportunity for a mean-
ingful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the ordi-
nary processes of cross-examination of the Government's expert
witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own ex-
perts." 261Virtually all courts concluding chemical blood testing is not a
"critical stage" rely on this language. The sole exception is State v.
Fitzsimmons,262 where the Washington Supreme court decided the
right to counsel should apply to breathalyzer testing. Fitzsimmons
termed drunk driving a unique charge. Since physical evidence would
soon disappear, arrangements must be made for immediate supplemen-
tal testing and disinterested witnesses found. In this second respect,
Fitzsimmons was misguided. Presenting disinterested witnesses is not
peculiar to drunk driving but applies to any criminal charge. Some
time will necessarily have passed before counsel can be contacted and
arrive. Any witnesses will likely be gone. Counsel arguably will be able
to use witnesses listed on an officer's accident report-something which
can be obtained long afterwards.
Several states have decided that under their state laws or court
rules, the right to counsel attaches to the decision whether to undergo
testing. Some states explicitly guarantee such right,26 3 while others im-
ply it from the decision an accused must make. Decisions finding no
statutorily created right to counsel reason that since the arrested driver
does not have a right under the Implied Consent law to refuse testing,
counsel's advice is not required, even though the driver retains the
261. Id. at 227-28.
262. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980), cert. granted, vacated and re-
manded, 449 U.S. 977 (1980). The Court, remanded for consideration whether the
judgment was based upon state or federal constitutional grounds or both. Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall and Stevens dissented. On remand, the Washington Supreme
Court held its decision rested primarily on a state court rule, but declared its previous
constitutional discussion "helps demonstrate the application and effect of the court
rules". 620 P.2d 999, 1000 (Wash. 1980).
263. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a)(4) (Supp. 1981) which provides:
"That he has the right to call an attorney and select a witness to view for him the
testing procedures; but that the test shall not be delayed for this purpose for a period in
excess of 30 minutes from the time he is notified of his rights."
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power to refuse.2 6
4
Prideaux v. State Department of Public Safety,26 5 the leading
case to the contrary, relied on a state statute guaranteeing arrested per-
sons the right to consult counsel as soon practicable.2 "6 The court ex-
amined the possible choices facing an arrested driver and penalties
which may arise therefrom. Since Minnesota law gave drivers the
power to choose between submitting or not, the driver's decision was
considered important enough to afford counsel. Likewise Heles v.
South Dakota26 focused partially on state law to find counsel should
be afforded. "The fact that by statute, South Dakota allows the ar-
rested driver to refuse to take the test, brings into play important legal
considerations. ' 26 8 Since state law created such a choice, it would be
unfair to deny the advice of counsel in making the choice.2 69
3. Nature of the Right to Counsel
Once courts find a right to counsel exists when a person is re-
quested to undergo blood content analysis, the extent of that right must
be determined. Even if the right exists, only one court requires that an
arrested driver be explicitly informed. Most decisions discuss what
should happen when the driver requests counsel. In this regard the
264. See Campbell v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 685, 693 (Ariz. 1971) ("person
does not have a right to refuse . . . only the physical power; therefore. . . there is no
issue of counsel's ability to assist"); See also Dunn v. Petit, 388 A.2d 809 (R.I. 1978).
265. 247 N.W. 2d 385.
266. See MIN. STAT. § 481.10 (1971).
267. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982).
268. Id. at 652.
269. See also Fuller v. State Dept. of Transp., 275 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1979),
state statutorily required to honor arrested driver's request to consult counsel before
deciding to take chemical test; Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App. 1975),
court rule requires person held in custody opportunity to consult counsel; McNulty v.
Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 328 N.E.2d 798 (1975), state statutes allows communica-
tion with attorney following arrest or detention; Comment, The Right to Counsel
Under Oregon's Implied Consent Law, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 236 (1974) arguing that
Oregon law requires the right to consult counsel before deciding to submit to chemical
testing; Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel. The Case Against
Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REV. 935 (1980), arguing that even if counsel is not
constitutionally required, states should legislatively provide for such.
270. Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d 385.
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courts are almost uniform in finding a limited right. Only reasonable
opportunity to consult counsel is needed, such as a phone call. Any-
thing more would seem to jeopardize the opportunity to gather evi-
dence, since alcohol metabolizes in the body rapidly.
State v. Fitzsimmons71 is the only case requiring more. Most
cases arise when a driver wishes to call an attorney. What happens
when the driver claims indigency and requests counsel? Fitzsimmons
requires that counsel be afforded under the circumstances. While this
appears to present police officers with an unsurmountable obstacle, es-
pecially since many drunk driving arrests occur late at night, Fitzsim-
mons suggests that reasonable methods, such as having police carry
lists of volunteer attorneys, could be utilized. Fitzsimmons rejected the
state's argument that this would present problems because counsel
would always want to be present at testing, since telephone consulta-
tions might often be sufficient. The suggestion is curious as the court
had found the decision to submit to testing a critical stage where coun-
sel is needed to find possible defense witnesses. No attempt was made
to reconcile these apparent conflicts. Likewise, the court did not con-
sider what happens when a telephone call alone would not suffice.
4. Right to Counsel in Florida
Florida courts have not acted favorably on right to counsel claims.
In the earliest case, State v. Wilson, 2 an arrested driver claimed his
sixth amendment rights were denied when police refused to delay
breathalyzer testing until his attorney arrived. Wilson had been af-
forded the opportunity to consult counsel but still refused testing when
his attorney had not arrived after an hour and fifteen minutes. Rather
than deciding the issue on the narrow basis that Wilson had been af-
forded all that was constitutionally required-a reasonable opportunity
to consult counsel rather than actually having an attorney present-the
court focused on the civil nature of the proceedings under the Implied
Consent Law, rather than a criminal prosecution. Thus Wilson fol-
lowed those cases finding license suspensions not a "criminal prosecu-
tion" under the sixth amendment.
271. 610 P.2d 893.
272. 34 Fla. Supp. 141 (Circuit Court of Fifteenth Judicial Circuit 1970).
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Subsequently, State v. Oliver, 17 again raised the right to counsel
question in connection with breath testing. There an arrested driver,
given Miranda warnings and advised of the consequences for refusing
the breathalyzer, requested an opportunity to contact counsel. In-
formed that an attorney's presence was not needed to administer the
test, Oliver's repeated requests ended with the arresting officer certify-
ing his refusal to submit. Relying on Wilson, the Circuit Court re-
versed a county court ruling that Oliver was entitled to consult counsel
before taking the test. The court first decided that any proceedings re-
sulting from refusal to cooperate with the police would be civil, under
the Implied Consent Law, rather than criminal. Additionally, the court
noted that County of Dade v. Callahan274 had declared this a petty
offense not needing Miranda warnings and State v. Webb27 5 had held
there was no right to counsel in petty offense cases summarily triable
and punishable by less than six months imprisonment. Thus Oliver de-
clared the right to counsel did not apply.
Unfortunately, no Florida Supreme Court or District Court of Ap-
peal cases have addressed the right to counsel issue in the context of
blood alcohol testing. Recent developments show State v. Oliver is erro-
neous law. First, Oliver's reasoning is clearly questionable. Oliver failed
to distinguish between the different provisions the drivers were charged
with violating. In Callahan the offense charged was violation of a mu-
nicipal ordinance rather than a state-wide statute as in Oliver. Sec-
ondly, State v. Webb upon which Oliver heavily relied, is also question-
able. Webb declared that offenders accused of petty traffic offenses are
not entitled to a jury trial. Webb did not, as Oliver says, discuss the
sixth amendment right to counsel in such proceedings. Indeed had
Webb done so, the decision would be wrong.276 Why Oliver failed to
273. 47 Fla. Supp. 3 (Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, 1977).
274. 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
275. 335 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1976).
276. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court rejected the petty
offense-serious crime argument for right to counsel purposes twice, first noting "the
right to trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to
a judge alone." Id. at 29. and secondly, forcefully declaring the distinction between the
two. "While there is historical support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by
jury to 'serious criminal cases' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the
right to assistance of counsel . . ." Id. at 30.
1236 Nova Law Journal 7: 1983 1
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note this is unexplainable 7 7 and shows its error. Thirdly, Oliver did not
distinguish between the types of offenses before it and the Webb court.
Webb did not deal with a drunk driving offense but with driving with-
out a valid inspection sticker and with an expired driver's license. Fi-
nally, statutory changes raise further questions about the continued vi-
tality of the Webb-Callahan cases. Today, defendants can have jury
trials in any "drunk driving" case.278 This effectively does away with
the Oliver-Callahan rationale that these can be summary proceedings.
Moreover, Oliver never considered whether the same rationale would
apply if the charge had been D.W.I. manslaughter--certainly not sum-
marily triable and clearly not a petty offense.
At least two subsequent county court cases have not followed Oli-
ver. In State v. Roche279 denial of a request to consult counsel before
deciding to submit to a breath test caused reversal over the state's
claim that this was a refusal. The Orange County Court agreed there is
no sixth amendment right to counsel before deciding to take a breath
test.280 Thus police were not required to inform a driver of such. How-
ever, when drivers request the chance to consult counsel, the court us-
ing a due process analysis found that a reasonable opportunity to do so
was required. On appeal, merely stating its agreement with courts find-
ing no limited right to consult counsel, the Circuit Court proceeded to
do a brief Wade "critical stage" analysis.28 1 However, the County
Court never relied on this, but rather chose a due process approach.
Misunderstanding and mixing the two grounds, the Circuit Court re-
277. Oliver is the only decision relying on a petty offense - felony distinction to
find there is no right to consult counsel. Following Argersinger, Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979), held the right to counsel exists only wherever imprisonment is actu-
ally imposed. For a critical review of Scott, see Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois
and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
71 (1979).
278. See FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(5). Caverly v. State, 8 Fla. L.W. 1364 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1983) reversed a driving under the influence conviction where a
jury trial request was denied.
279. (No. T080-53470; Orange County; Dec. 19, 1980).
280. The court accepted Wilson's civil administrative proceeding vs. criminal
prosecution analysis. Thus Roche never undertook the next level of sixth amendment
analysis, whether a chemical test for intoxication amounted to a "critical stage" under
Wade.
281. (Orange County Circuit Court; AP8I-11; Dec. 23, 1981).
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versed the lower court's decision.
State v. Formato,28 2 without discussing Oliver, found that by pass-
ing Florida Statutes section 901.2483 which states: "A person arrested
shall be allowed to consult with any attorney entitled to practice in this
state, alone and in private at the place of custody as often and for such
periods of time as is reasonable" 284 the legislature made arrest a criti-
cal stage where the opportunity to consult counsel is required. Thus
BAT Mobile videotapes taken after a refusal to let the driver call an
attorney were inadmissible. If Formato's analysis based upon Florida
Statutes section 901.24 is correct, Florida has joined states creating a
statutory right to consult counsel before submitting to breath testing.
Unfortunately, the case law on this point seems split as Oliver earlier
had reversed, without discussion, the County Court's partial reliance on
section 901.24 to find a right to counsel. Likewise, the Circuit Court in
Roche rejected a section 901.24 claim. Doing so, it examined section
901.24 in conjunction with the valid excuses for refusal of testing under
the Implied Consent Law. Since the law did not specifically mention
whether a driver was afforded the right to counsel as an issue in a
suspension hearing, the Circuit Court reasoned that the legislature by
passing secton 901.24 did not intend to amend the Implied Consent
Law. 285
Even without section 90.124 a right to counsel argument can still
be made. As noted above, under the Implied Consent Law, Florida
drivers retain the power to refuse breath testing. When testing has been
previously done over such refusal, the courts consistently declared the
282. (Broward County Court; No. 80-37621TT40; June 10, 1981).
283. FLA. STAT. § 901.24 (1981).
284. Id.
285. Roche was decided under the former Implied Consent Law. The law's new
version likewise does not indicate legislative intent to make section 901.24 valid
grounds for refusing testing.
In State v. Burts, 24 Fla. Supp. 88 (Dade County Circuit Court 1964), counsel
appeared and advised police he would not permit any chemical testing. When this was
done anyways, the Circuit Court suppressed results. Burts is irrelevant to a section
901.24 right to counsel argument. At the time Florida had no Implied Consent Law
giving drivers the option of testing or suspension upon refusal. Schmerber v. California
subsequently established the driver had no fifth amendment right to refuse testing.
Thus the results taken over the refusal should have been admitted since neither consti-
tutional grounds nor state law prohibited such.
1238 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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results inadmissible. While Florida Statutes section 316.1933288 modi-
fies former case law in limited circumstances with respect to blood test-
ing, most forced testing is still invalid. Given this recognized power to
refuse testing, a Heles - Prideaux rationale could be adopted to find
that a right to counsel exists. Besides obtaining witnesses' names, coun-
sel could play an important role in advising a driver whether to submit.
If death or serious bodily injury has occurred, convictions may be diffi-
cult to obtain without chemical test results. In such instances, counsel
will often advise refusal. Alternatively, if counsel advises submission,
the driver may request additional testing to ensure the accuracy of test
results281 or additional breath or blood samples. 88 Whatever the ulti-
mate result, one thing is clear. Most decisions finding no right to con-
sult counsel have relied on wrong analysis. Thus the right to counsel
issue is still unsettled in Florida.
V. CONCLUSION
The new "drunk driving" law makes substantial changes in prior Flor-
ida statutes and case law. Like any new law, only experience can estab-
lish how effective the changes are. Given the media attention, it should
have at least beneficial short term results .28 However, as pointed out,
286. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933 (Supp. 1982).
287. If optional testing is not afforded, suppression of other test results occurs.
City of Jasper v. Cromer, 32 Fla. Supp. 107 (Hamilton County Circuit Court 1969)
reversed a defendant's convicton where police refused a driver's reasonable request for
optional testing. The Implied Consent law does not require police to inform drivers of
any right to additional testing. Additional testing may be necessary to ensure the
proper interpretation of the first test's results. See Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 200,
disputing the validity of convictions when only one test is administered.
288. Florida law does not require police to obtain or preserve breath or blood
samples for later defense testing. See State v. Cooper, 391 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), no due process violation when blood sample lost since evidence concededly
favorable to defense; State v. Phillipe, 402 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981),
failure to preserve test ampoules is a matter for Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles rather than courts. State v. Lee, 422 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (no due process violation in state's failure to retain sample of driver's breath).
See also Thornton, Uses and Abuses of Forensic Science, 69 A.B.A.J. 289, 292
(March 1983), for criticism from a forensic scientist's viewpoint of those jurisdiction
requiring retention of Breathalyzer test amopules for independent testing.
289. After six months' operation under the new law, traffic fatalities were down
2391Drunk Driving Laws17:1983
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serious deficiencies remain. The following changes should be made dur-
ing the next legislative session:
(1) Repeal § 316.1933 allowing forcible blood sampling, or at least
restrict such when it would be medically dangerous;
(2) Provide specific authorization for the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services, or another appropriate state agency, to
adopt statewide testing procedures for urinalysis;
(3) Amend § 316.1932(1)(c) to require police officers to notify
drivers that refusal of a test will result in admission of the refusal
in any trial, along with license suspension;
(4) Amend § 316.1932(1)(h) to require law enforcement personnel
to notify drivers of the right to optional testing;
(5) Amend the law to require law enforcement personnel to obtain
additional samples of blood, breath or urine for later testing within
a reasonable time, e.g., thirty days, by defendant drivers.
Given passage of any, and hopefully all, of these recommenda-
tions,2 °0 Florida's drunk driving law will be a more effective and fairer
12% compared to 1981. See New law cited as fatalities decrease, Fort Lauderdale
News, Jan. 1, 1983, at IB, col. 5.
290. During the 1983 legislative session, there were thirteen bills introduced to
amend the "drunk driving" laws. Only one bill, H.B. 809, 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-187,
which amends Fla Stat. §§ 316.193(1) (Supp. 1982) and 316.1931(1) (Supp. 1982) by
replacing the words "model glue" with "chemical substances set forth in 877.11,"
passed. This broadens the category of chemicals, other than alcohol or controlled sub-
stances, it would be illegal to drive under the influence of. See supra text accompany-
ing n. 10-14 for description of how these sections presently read.
A brief description of the twelve bills not passing follows below:
(1) S.B. 69 would have given under Fla. Stat. § 316.1931 (Supp. 1982) the De-
partment of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles authority to revoke the license of any
driver involved in an accident causing property damage or personal injury while driving
under the influence even if the trial court withheld adjudication. The revocation period
runs from the date of offense rather than the date adjudication is withheld, thus still
making it possible for court delays to shorten the intended revocation time.
(2) H.B. 36 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.1931 (Supp. 1982) to provide
a minimum one year sentence for drivers conficted of manslaughter. This sentence
could not be withheld nor could a driver be paroled before serving the minimum one
year's time.
(3) H.B. 1202 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193(4) (Supp. 1982) to re-
quire first offenders to be placed on probation for up to one year.
(4) S.B. 962 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193 (Supp. 1982) to require
I
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means of eliminating drunk drivers from the roadways.
any driver convicted of driving under the influence or with unlawful blood alcohol level
to pay an additional $10.00 fine into the prosecuting county's fine and forfeiture fund.
(5) S.B. 179 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193(4)(a) (Supp. 1982) to
require a minimum seven days incarceration for convicted drivers who refuse to do the
"public service or community work project" required of first offenders.
(6) H.B. 942 would have amended Fla. Stat. § 316.193(4)(a) (Supp. 1982) to
forbid remuneration for any required public service. However the bill also would create
Fla. Stat. § 316.1936 making any person doing mandatory "public service" a state
employee for Workmen's Compensation purposes.
(7) H.B. 474 required a Victim Impact Statement for sentencing use, whenever
death or serious bodily injury occurs to someone else because of an offender's driving
under the influence.
(8) H.B. 551 would have repealed the statutory right to jury trial under Fla.
Stat. § 316.1934(4) (Supp. 1982).
(9) S.B. 246 would have increased the license suspension period for refusing a
blood alcohol test from three to six months for a first refusal and from six months to
one year for subsequent refusals.
(10) S.B. 224 would have required alcohol abuse education for anyone convicted
of being a "disorderly or dangerous alcohol offender" under a newly created Fla. Stat.
§ 856.012.
(11) H.B. 550 would have provided additional sentencing alternatives for minors
convicted of driving intoxicated or under the influence.
(12) S.B. 852 would have created new provisions suspending for specified time
periods the registration of any vehicle whose owner drives during a license suspension
due to drunk driving violations.
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I.R.C. Section 2518 and the Law of Disclaimers
An Update
by Don J. Jaret
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 introduced Code section 2518,2
which attempted to create definite standards for a disclaimer to be
valid for federal tax purposes. In 1978, Congress amended section 2518
to liberalize one of the many requirements which must be satisfied for a
disclaimer to be qualified,3 and in 1981, Congress again amended sec-
tion 2518 to remove the requirement that the disclaimer be valid under
state law.4 This article will endeavor to discuss the post-1978 evolution
of section 2518 beginning with a critical analysis of the Internal Reve-
nue Service's ("IRS") interpretation of that Section as incorporated in
the proposed regulations promulgated under section 2518. In addition,
the most significant of the numerous private letter rulings issued by the
IRS interpreting section 2518 will be discussed including a review of
the effect of the 1981 amendment. In conclusion, suggestions for clari-
fying aspects of the law of disclaimers will be put forth with the hope
that the stated purpose of the law will be achieved.5
I. Disclaimers as an Estate Planning Tool
A disclaimer is the refusal to accept the ownership of property or
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2518, 90 Stat. 1893 (1976),
added I.R.C. § 2518.
2. I.R.C. § 2518 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as § 2518).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(M)(1), 92 Stat. 2935
(1978), added I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
4. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 426, 95 Stat. 172
(1981), added I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) [hereinafter cited as ERTA 1981].
5. For an analysis of the law prior to the enactment of section 2518 and an anal-
ysis of the effectiveness of section 2518, see Frimmer, Using Disclaimers in Post
Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. TAX'N 322
(1978); Note, I.R.C. Section 2518 and the Law of Disclaimers, 4 NoVA L.J. 187
(1980).
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rights with respect to property.' The major importance of disclaimers is
the flexibility they provide for estate planning. Disclaimers can be used
to correct errors in an estate plan after it would ordinarily be too late
(for example, after the testator's death), adjust the estate plan to ac-
count for changed circumstances, avoid the creditors of a beneficiary
and allow post mortem estate planning. The following example will
demonstrate the use of disclaimers as a method of achieving tax sav-
ings; assume each of the following disclaimers are qualified.
A disclaimer may be used to save gift tax. 7 X devises Whiteacre to
B. B has no need for Whiteacre and would prefer it to pass to his son
C. If B accepts Whiteacre and transfers it to C for less than adequate
and full consideration, B has made a taxable gift to C.8 However, if B
disclaims Whiteacre it passes to C and no gift tax will be imposed on
B9 There is no gift from B to C because B will be treated as never
having owned Whiteacre.10
A disclaimer may be used to save estate tax."1 X devises White-
acre to B who is terminally ill. B would prefer to give Whiteacre to his
son C in a manner that will not have any tax ramifications. If B ac-
cepts Whiteacre and then dies, Whiteacre will be included in B's gross
estate. 12 If B disclaims Whiteacre, it will pass to C and there will be no
6. WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R. 14844, H.R. REP.
No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WAYS AND MEANS
COMM. REPORT].
7. I.R.C. § 2518(a) (1976); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at
65.
8. I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1972), T.D. 6334,
1958-2 C.B. 643. See Hardenbergh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 17 T.C.
338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 26 AFTR 2d 1653 (5th Cir.
1972); Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio af'd, 439 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1971); William L. Maxwell v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
9. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
10. "(a) General Rule-For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified
disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply with respect
to such interest as if the interest had never been transferred by such person." I.R.C. §
2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
11. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
For purposes of estate tax, I.R.C. § 2046 (1976) says 2518 applies.
12. "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033
(1954); Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (1963).
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inclusion in B's gross estate because B will again be treated as never
having owned Whiteacre. 13
A disclaimer may be used to prevent an overfunding or an un-
derfunding of a marital bequest for purposes of achieving the optimal
marital deduction.14 If an amount greater than the optimal marital de-
duction 15 passes to the surviving spouse, the excess will be taxed in the
estate of the surviving spouse.18 If the surviving spouse disclaims the
excess17 over the optimal marital deduction, the disclaimed property
will not be included in the surviving spouse's gross estate.18 If an
amount less than the optimal marital deduction is provided for the sur-
viving spouse, a disclaimer by another can increase the property pass-
ing to the spouse and allow use of the full marital deduction.1 9 In much
the same way, a disclaimer by one heir can be used to increase an
estate's charitable deduction. 20 Thus, a disclaimer can be an important
post mortem estate planning tool.
A disclaimer will prevent the imposition of a generation skipping
13. Brown v. Rautzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933); I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
14. I.R.C. §§ 2518(a), 2056 (1954) (amended by 1981 ERTA); WAYS AND
MEANS CoMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65. In the following discussion it is assumed
that achieving the optimal marital deduction is desired. The optimal marital deduction
is not necessarily the maximum deduction allowable, for example, where a decedent's
adjusted gross estate is less than $425,000. For the law prior to § 2518 see generally
I.R.C. § 2056(d) (1954) (amended by 1981 ERTA) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-1
(1958).
15. ERTA 1981 amended § 2056 to provide for an unlimited marital deduction.
16. It will be included in the estate of the surviving spouse as an I.R.C. § 2033
inclusion because the spouse owned the property at death. If the marital bequest were
limited to the optimal amount, the excess would escape estate tax entirely.
17. The issue of partial disclaimers will be discussed later in this article as part
of an analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See text accompanying notes 58-104.
18. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
This possibility of a surviving spouse disclaiming an interest in a marital trust and
taking a portion of the disclaimed interest under a non-marital trust will be discussed
later in this article. For purposes of this example assume the property passes to the
issue of the surviving spouse.
19. I.R.C. § 2518(a).
20. Id. For an excellent discussion and example of disclaimers with respect to
charitable deductions, see Newman & Kalter, The Need For Disclaimer Legisla-
lion-An Analysis of The Background and Current Law, 28 TAx. L. 571, 577 (1975).
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tax.21 X devises to his son B a life estate in Whiteacre with remainder
to B's son C. Assuming that the value of the propety at B's death is
greater than $250,000, a generation skipping tax will be imposed at
that time.22 If B disclaims his life estate, no generation skipping tax
will be imposed because B will be treated as never having owned a life
estate in Whiteacre.23
A disclaimer may shift the income tax consequences of a trust.2 4 X
devises to B, a wealthy individual with a large income, the power to
designate who shall be the recipient of an income interest in the trust
res. The power excludes designation of the grantor's spouse.25 If B dis-
claims his power he will not be taxed on the income.2 6 Assuming B
disclaims and the income is payable to B's son C, an individual with
very little income, income tax will be saved as a result of the graduated
tax rates.
II. Legislative History
The confusion and uncertainty surrounding the common law of
disclaimers has generated considerable discussion of ways to clarify the
law.27 Many commentators and Congress suggested that the law of dis-
claimers be federalized and specific disclaimer requirements be im-
posed.28 The widespread dissatisfaction with the pre-1977 state of the
21. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
See § 2614(c) (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607 (1976).
22. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2601-2614.
23. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 35.
I.R.C. § 2614(c) refers to § 2518 for the effect of a qualified disclaimer.
24. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
25. I.R.C. § 678(a)(1) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-I (1956).
26. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(2) (1976) treats a power with respect to property as an
interest in such property. I.R.C. § 2518(a) will treat B as never having the power if he
disclaims it. In Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'g 119 F. Supp.
360 (D.C. Pa. 1953) a widow disclaimed a portion of her interest in a trust. The court
held she was only taxable on the income of the portion she retained.
27. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 837 (1974); Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Tax Section Recommendations
No. 1974-2, 27 TAX LAW. 818 (1974).
28. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 837 (1974); Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Tax Section Recommendations
No. 1974-2, 27 TAx LAW. 818 (1974); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note
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law brought about the enactment of section 2518.29 A disclaimer of an
interest in property created after 1976 will be effective for federal tax
purposes only if it is a "qualified" disclaimer. Section 2518 delineates
the requirements a disclaimer must satisfy to be considered qualified.
Section 2518, as initially adopted, required that the disclaimed prop-
erty must pass to a person other than the disclaimant and that the
disclaimer be valid under local law.In 1978, Congress recognized that the requirement that the dis-
claimed property pass to someone other than the disclaimant would
create an undesirable situation where the disclaimant was a surviving
spouse and the property passed to a non-marital or marital trust as a
result of the disclaimer. Congress therefore amended section 2518 to
make it possible for property to pass to a decedent's spouse as a result
of a disclaimer even if the surviving spouse was the disclaimant.3°
In 1981, Congress, recognizing the local law still played an impor-
tant role in determining whether a disclaimer was qualified, amended
section 2518 in an attempt to make it independent of state law. Con-
gress felt that state law was not an adequate basis upon which to mea-
sure the effectiveness of a disclaimer because local disclaimer laws were
not uniform. This caused identical refusals to accept property to be
treated differently for Federal estate and gift tax purposes31
III. Proposed Regulations and Private Rulings
The IRS published proposed regulations for section 2518 on July
6, at 66.
29. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 837 (1974); Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Tax Section Recommendations
No. 1974-2, 27 TAx LAW. 818 (1974); (1974). The dissatisfaction stemmed from the
fact that prior to § 2518, disclaimers were handled under many different code sections
and in many different regulations and were dependent upon local law. See Treas. Regs.
§§ 25.2511-1(c) (1972), 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958), 20.2056(d)-i(a)(1958).
30. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(M), 92 Stat. 2934
(1978), amended I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) [hereinafter referred to as Tax Reform Act of
1978]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1978 at 443 (Comm. Print 1979); WAYS AND
MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6.
31. WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, ACCOMPANYING H.R. 4242, H.R. REP.
No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1981).
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22, 1980.32 At this time, the date final regulations will be issued and
the form those regulations will take is entirely speculative."3 In addition
to the proposed regulations, the IRS has attempted to interpret the law
as it relates to specific taxpayer questions by issuing numerous private
letter rulings. 4 This portion of the article will analyze several impor-
tant provisions of the proposed regulations and several significant pri-
vate letter rulings with respect to section 2518.
A. Reliance Upon State Law
The intent of Congress in enacting section 2518 was to create a
federal standard for disclaimers, thus ending reliance upon state law in
determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer. 5 Therefore,
most practitioners hoped that section 2518 would provide a uniform set
of rules for determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
However, prior to the amendment of section 2518 contained in the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,81 section 2518(b)(4)(A) and (B) re-
quired that the disclaimed interest must pass to a person other than the
disclaimant or the spouse of the decedent (the decedent being the testa-
mentary transferor). The pre-1982 absence of a federal rule or regula-
tion determining who will receive the disclaimed property 7 prevented
section 2518 from acting as a safe harbor because the courts were
forced to look to local law in making the determination as to whether a
disclaimer was disqualified. Consequently, if local law did not recognize
the disclaimer, section 2518(b)(4) could not be satisfied. Therefore,
32. Prop. Reg. §§ 25.2518-1 to 4, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980)(to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
33. On November 23, 1981, a final version of the regulations were delivered to
the Commissioner for final approval.
34. Rev. Proc. 80-20, 1980-1 C.B. 633.
35. "If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, a refusal to accept prop-
erty is to be given applicable effect for federal, estate and gift tax purposes even if the
local law does not technically charcterize the refusal as a 'disclaimer'. . . ." WAYS
AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 67. See also, Frimmer, supra note 5.
36. ERTA 1981 426(a). Section 2518(c)(3)(1981) applies to transfers creating
an interest in the person disclaiming made after December 31, 1981.
37. There are no federal rules or regulations which deal with who the recipient of
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prior to 1982, the only way to be certain a disclaimer would be quali-
fied is to satisfy both state and federal requirements.
The proposed regulations specifically provide that a disclaimer, to
be qualified, must be valid under state law.38 Moreover, in a number of
private letter rulings, the IRS has ruled that a disclaimer not valid
under state law cannot be a qualified disclaimer under section 2518.11
Recognizing that the purpose and intent of section 2518-to cre-
ate a uniform federal standard for disclaimers-was being thwarted by
the IRS, Congress, as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
added a new section 2518(c)(3) to the Code.40 Section 2518(c)(3) pro-
vides that:
(3) Certain Transfers Treated as Disclaimers. For purposes of Sub-
section (a), a written transfer of the transferor's entire interest in
the property-
(A) which meets requirements similar to the requirements of
paragraphs (2) and (3) of Subsection (b), and
(B) which is to a person or persons who would have received
the property had the transferor made a qualified disclaimer (with
in the meaning of Subsection (b)), shall be treated as a qualified
disclaimer.41
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that a disclaimer is not valid under local
law, the recipient of property could, if the requirements of section
2518(c)(3) are satisfied, transfer property to another free of transfer
tax.
The application of section 2518(c)(3) in many situations is un-
clear. Section 2518(c)(3) makes no attempt to define requirements
which are "similar to" those contained in sections 2518(b)(2) and (3).
38. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-1(c)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 25.2518). The regulation provides: "If a disclaimer is not effective under
applicable local law to divest ownership of the disclaimed property in the disclaimant
and to vest it in another, the disclaimer is not a qualified disclaimer under Section
2518."
39. See I.R.S. Letter Rulings, 8148018, July 31, 1981 (involving a pre-ERTA
disclaimer), 8027016, March 27, 1980; 8022021, Feb. 26, 1980; and 7937011, May 31,
1979.
40. ERTA 1981 § 426(a) (which added § 2518(c)(3)).
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Consequently, a disclaimant will have no reliable method of determin-
ing whether he has complied with the requirements of subsection
(c)(3). For example, is a disclaimer ten months after the date on which
the interest was created qualified because a ten-month requirment is
"similar to" the nine-month requirement? Is a disclaimer which occurs
one day after a disclaimant has accepted the benefits of property quali-
fied because the short period for which the benefits were accepted is
"similar to" the requirement that none of the benefits be accepted?
Conversely, is the "similar to" requirement to be interpreted more
stringently than the normal requirements of section 2518(b)?
Another significant defect in section 2518(c)(3) is the requirement
for a written transfer of the "entire interest" in property.42 Although
unclear, that requirement seems to prohibit the disclaimer of an undi-
vided portion of an interest. This can be illustrated by the following
example. X dies intestate with Blackacre, his only asset, passing to B.
State law prohibits the disclaimer of an intestate share. B disclaims an
undivided interest in Blackacre. If state law recognized the dis-
claimer of an intestate share, B's disclaimer would be qualified insofar
as it would be the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest.' 3 It
appears doubtful that Congress intended to limit the interest which
may be disclaimed to the "entire interest" in property in those situa-
tions where the disclaimer is not valid under state law. Therefore, sec-
tion 2518(c)(3) should be interpreted in such a manner as to allow the
disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest in property.4'
42. Id.
43. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b) and the text accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
44. Due to the recent passage of § 2518 (c)(3), there is no indication at this time
as to how the IRS will interpret the "entire interest" requirement.
The legislative history of § 2518(c)(3) provides:
Under the Committee Bill, for purposes of the estate and gift tax, a
refusal to accept any property interest that is not effective to pass title
under local law will be considered to pass the property without any direc-
tion on the part of the disclaimant if the refusal otherwise satisfies the
Federal requirements and the disclaimant timely transfers the property in-
terest to the person who would have received the property had the refusal
been an effective disclaimer under state law. Although the State disclaimer
rules will be used to determine the transferee, the refusal need not be a
valid disclaimer under local law.
S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1981).
1250 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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The person to whom the transfer must be made is the person who
would have received the property had the transferor made a qualified
disclaimer.' 5 Presumably, that language was intended to require a
transfer by the disclaimant to the person to whom the property would
have passed had the disclaimer been valid under state law."e
B. Writing Requirement
One of the more basic and straightforward requirements of section
2518 is that the disclaimer be in writing.' 7 Section 2518, however, does
not specifiy whether the written disclaimer must be signed, or, if signa-
ture is required, who must sign. The proposed regulations specifically
provide that the disclaimer must be signed, a requirement not expressly
included in section 2518, and recognize that the legal representative of
the disclaimant may sign.4 Thus, it appears that one of the questions
not resolved by the passage of section 2518-whether a legal represen-
tative may disclaim on behalf of an individual who is incapable of dis-
claiming due to a legal incapacity of one form or another-is answered
affirmatively by the proposed regulations.
The IRS has ruled that the personal representative of a deceased
beneficiary may disclaim property passing to a-deceased beneficiary's
estate.'9 the ruling did not indicate whether the result would have been
different if the disclaimer had been made by a guardian or other form
of legal representative. Presumably the precise title attached to the
fiduciary will be considered irrelevant. The ruling did, however, empha-
size the fact that the personal representative has the power to disclaim
on behalf of the estate of the deceased beneficiary under state law.
The result where a legal representative does not have the power to
disclaim on behalf of a deceased beneficiary under state law is less
clear.50 Presumably, the 1981 amendment adding section 2518(c)(3)
45. I.R.C. § 2518 (c)(3)(B).
46. Id.
47. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1) (1976).
48. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(b), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 25.2518).
49. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8146045, Aug. 19, 1981.
50. See Letter Ruling 8148018, July 31, 1981. In that ruling, the IRS held that
the disclaimer by an executor was not qualified because state law did not authorize the
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will allow a legal representative to disclaim on behalf of the person he
represents regardless of the validity of the disclaimer under state law.5 1
C. Jointly Owned Property
The law of disclaimers as it applies to jointly held property, in-
cluding tenancy by the entirety, has always been unclear. In a factual
situation arising prior to the enactment of section 2518, the IRS ruled
that jointly held property could not be disclaimed if the rights of each
joint tenant vested upon the creaton of the tenancy and no greater right
accrues by the death of either."2
The IRS appears to have changed its position with respect to the
disclaimer of jointly held property. The proposed regulations sanction
the disclaimer of jointly owned property if, in addition to the require-
ments contained in section 2518(b), the following requirements are
met: (i) the disclaimer must be made with respect to the entire interest
in property which is the subject of the tenancy, and (ii) the disclaimer
must be made within nine months of the creation of the tenancy.58
The requirement that the disclaimer must be made with respect to
the "entire interest" in property seems to prohibit the disclaimer of the
accretive interest created by the death of a joint tenant. For example,
where A and B own real property as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship and A dies within 9 months of the creation of the tenancy,
if B must disclaim his entire interest in the real property for his dis-
claimer to be qualified, B must not have an interest in the property
after the disclaimer. It is not clear whether B will be able to disclaim
his entire interest in the property which he holds immediately after A's
death because the IRS may take the position that B has already ac-
cepted the benefits of owning an undivided interest that property, i.e. B
has accepted the benefits of being a joint tenant prior to the death of A
upon the creation of the tenancy. A more logical interpretation of this
requirement would be to treat B as never having accepted the benefits
executor to disclaim on behalf of the decedent's estate.
51. See the discussion regarding the application of state law in text accompany-
ing notes 35-46.
52. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7911005, Nov. 29, 1978.
53. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
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of Blackacre. The Regulations should specifically provide that one's
status as a joint owner of property will not be sufficient to constitute
the acceptance of the benefits of ownership. Another consequence of
the "entire interest" requirement is that it can be interpreted to pro-
hibit the disclaimer of an undivided portion of the accretive interest
created upon the death of a joint tenant.
The requirement that the disclaimer be made within nine months
of the creation of the tenancy effectively prohibits the disclaimer of
jointly held property in almost all situations. This can be illustrated by
the following example. On January 1, 1982, A and B acquire a parcel
of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. On Jan-
uary 1, 1983, A dies. B, wishing to disclaim the accretive interest in the
real property passing to him as a result of A's death, files a disclaimer
with the executor of A's estate on January 2, 1983. B's disclaimer is
not qualified insofar as it was not made within nine months of the crea-
tion of the tenancy (because the tenancy was created on January 1,
1982).
The "entire interest" and "nine month" requirements for a dis-
claimer of jointly held property to be qualified are an unwarranted ex-
tension of the statute. The rules of section 2518(b) should apply to
jointly held property just as they apply to all other forms of property.
The disclaimer of the accretive interest in property should be consid-
ered qualified, and a joint tenant should not be considered as accepting
the benefits of jointly owned property by virtue of being a joint tenant.
Since the creation of a revocable joint bank account is not a taxa-
ble transfer,5 the special rules for the disclaimer of jointly held prop-
erty discussed above do not apply to revocable joint bank accounts.5
Moreover, the nine month disclaimer period does not begin to run until
the death of the donor. 6
One interesting question with respect to revocable joint bank ac-
counts is whether the donor or transferor of the property can make a
qualified disclaimer of his survivorship interest in the property on the
death of the co-tenant. For example, if H using his individual funds
creates a joint bank account with his wife, W, will H's disclaimer of
54. I.R.C. § 2511 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1972).
55. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(3).
56. I.R.S. Letter Rulings 8130069, April 29, 1981; 8124118, March 20, 1981.
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the bank account upon the death of W be qualified? The IRS has ruled
that it would not because "the estate and gift tax laws apply to the
disclaimed interest . . . as if the interest had never been transferred to
such person. Thus, the IRS reasoned that the qualified disclaimer
rules are not available to the donor or transferor of the property, but
are only available to the donee or transferee of the property. The ruling
is clearly correct inasmuch as it requires a "transfer" of property
before the disclaimer provisions can be activated. Since W died prior
the the occurrence of a "transfer" of property, the "transfer" require-
ment has not been satisfied.
D. Disclaimer of Less Than Entire Interest
Section 2518 allows the disclaimer with respect to "an undivided
portion of an interest." 58 The meaning of the phrase "an undivided por-
tion of an interest" is unclear. 9 Consequently, a devisee is faced with
the dilemma of whether the disclaimer of any of the following interests
will be qualified: a fractional interest in property (an undivided one
half interest), a portion of a pecuniary devise ($25,000 of a $50,000
devise), a portion of a specific devise (five acres of a ten acre tract) or a
carved out interest (a life estate or a remainder from a fee).
Prior to the publication of the proposed regulations, many com-
mentators believed that fractional and pecuniary interests in property
could be disclaimed whereas a carved out interest could not.60 The pro-
posed regulations seem to allow disclaimers of fractional interests as
well as some forms of pecuniary and carved out interests. The Regula-
tions attempt to clarify this uncertainty by formulating various highly
complex and totally arbitrary rules.61 The paragraphs which follow at-
tempt to explain and analyze these rules.
57. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8130069, April 29, 1981.
58. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(1) (1976).
59. See Frimmer, supra note 5, at 322 (1978) and Note, supra note 5, at 202.
60. See Frimmer, supra note 5, at 322 (1978) and Note, supra note 5, at 202.
61. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
§ 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
254 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Partial Interest Rule
The first rule with respect to the disclaimer of an undivided por-
tion of an interest is called "disclaimer of a partial interest. '8 2 The rule
reads as follows: "[i]f the requirements of this section are met, the dis-
claimer of an entire interest in property may be qualified disclaimer
even if the disclaimer has another interest in the same property."8 3 It is
rather curious that the above quoted sentence uses the term "entire
interest" and the section of the proposed regulations in which it ap-
pears is entitled "disclaimer of less than entire interest."" Moreover,
the subsection of the proposed regulations in which that sentence ap-
pears is entitled "[d]isclaimer of a partial interest."'8 This seems to
evidence the fact that the IRS has not adequately defined the terms
"interest", "entire interest", and "partial interest."
The specific requirements of this first rule of partial disclaimers,
although never clearly articulated in the proposed regulation, appear to
center around the divisibility or aggregation of interests in a single
piece of property. That is, whether the various interests of a disclai-
mant in a single piece of property should be aggregated and treated as
one, or should be treated as separate divisible elements of a single piece
of property. If the interests are considered divisible, the disclaimant
may disclaim one interest and retain the other; if the interests are ag-
gregated (i.e. treated as one), the disclaimant may only disclaim an
undivided portion of his interest as aggregated.
In order to apply the aggregation rules discussed above, criteria
must be established to determine whether various interests in a single
piece of property should be aggregated. The proposed regulations con-
tain two such rules.88 The first rule is that all income interests benefi-
cially owned by a person shall be treated as one interest in property,
and all beneficial interests in corpus shall be treated as one interest.
62. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 25.2518).
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For example, if Blackacre is devised with an income interest to A for
ten years, an income interest to B for the next ten years, an income
interest to A for the ten years after that, and then an income interest to
C for ten years, remainder to A, presumably, A will be considered as
having only two, not three, interests in Blackacre. A's first interest is
the right to receive the income from Blackacre in years one through ten
and in years twenty-one through thirty; A's second interest is the re-
mainder interest. By aggregating each of A's income interests, the pro-
posed regulation would not allow A to disclaim one of his income inter-
ests while retaining the other.8 7 The proposed regulation would,
however, allow A to disclaim his income interest and retain his corpus
interest, or to retain his corpus interest and disclaim his income
interest. 68
The second rule of aggregation is that if the separate interests of
the disclaimant are considered as merged under state law, the disclai-
mant must disclaim the entire merged interest or an undivided portion
of such merged interest.6 9 Thus, if Blackacre is devised to A for life,
remainder to A, and under state law A is considered as owning Black-
acre in fee, A's disclaimer of his life estate in Blackacre will be quali-
fied only if the disclaimer of a life estate from a fee is considered the
disclaimer of an undivided interest. 0 If A's interest is not considered as
merged under state law, A's income and corpus interests will be consid-
ered separate divisible interests in Blackacre and A could make a quali-
fied disclaimer of either."
The application of the doctrine of merger in this context, when
viewed in isolation, appears reasonable. However, remembering that
the intent of section 2518 was the creation of a uniform federal stan-
67. This result seems to follow from the example in the regulations where securi-
ties are devised to A for life, then to B for life, remainder to A's estate. The regulation
state that A could disclaim his income interest, his remainder interest or an undivided
portion of either; however, the regulations specifically state that A could not disclaim a
ten year income interest from his life estate. The IRS must therefore not consider the
disclaimer of a ten year from a life interest a disclaimer of an undivided portion of an
interest. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i). But see Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d) example 4
where a disclaimant of 40% of an income interest was qualified.
68. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i), 3(d) example 8.
69. Id.
70. This issue is discussed further at text accompanying notes 95-97.
71. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a).
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dard for disclaimers, reliance upon state law to determine whether a
disclaimant possesses divisible interests in a single piece of property ap-
pears to be another digression thwarting the uniform application of the
statute. This can be illustrated by the following example. A devises
Blackacre to B with B having an income interest until he attains age
40, then to B or B's estate. If in state #1 B's interests in Blackacre are
not merged, B's disclaimer or his income interest and/or his remainder
interest will be qualified. In state #2, if B's interests in Blackacre are
merged, B cannot disclaim solely his income interest (or his remainder
interest) in Blackacre;72 however, B can disclaim a portion of Blackacre
if his disclaimer satisfies the undivided portion rule. 3
Possibly the most distressing provision of the proposed regulation
dealing with partial disclaimers is contained in the following sentence:
"[m]oreover, if the property is divided in a manner that would permit
the disclaimant to avoid the limitations of section 2518, the separate
interests created by the grantor are treated as one indivisible inter-
est." 7 4 The meaning of that sentence is totally unclear. If this is an IRS
attempt to include a catchall in the regulations so that any disclaimer
which it deems objectionable will be caught and treated as a taxable
transfer, that sentence will contravene the entire purpose of section
2518 and inhibit the use of a provision of the Code which Congress
intended to make available to taxpayers. If that sentence is merely in-
tended to deal with a specific fact situation contemplated by the IRS,
the IRS should address that situation in more specific terms. 75
The regulations illustrate the application of this avoidance concept
in one example. In that example, C devised 'A of his residuary estate to
D with any disclaimed property to E, 'A of his residuary estate to D
with any disclaimed property to F and 1 of his residuary estate to D
with any disclaimed property to G. The regulation concludes that D's
disclaimer of the 1A of the residuary estate which passes to E is not
qualified because C divided the property in a manner that would permit
72. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i).
73. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 95-97.
74. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i).
75. C.f. the trust rule which is discussed in text accompanying notes 86-97, i.e.
split transfer into separate trusts or make greater than one transfer so the disclaimant
can disclaim part (avoid aggregation).
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the disclaimant to avoid the limitations of section 251 8.71 It is not intu-
itively obvious why the IRS finds the facts of that example objectiona-
ble. If the remainder was devised in toto to D, D could clearly have
disclaimed an undivided / interest in the property." Moreover, D may
have been able to disclaim 33 '% of the value of the remainder. 8 In
light of D's ability to disclaim / of the property notwithstanding C's
perceived attempt to avoid the limitations of section 2518, the IRS's
only objection could be that C or D has directed the person to whom
the property is passing. If the IRS's objection to the disclaimer in the
example discussed above is the disclaimant's disposition of the dis-
claimed property, it is curious that this provision was not placed in the
section of the proposed regulations dealing with the disclaimant's direc-
tion of the property.
A more fundamental question is whether the actions taken by C
and/or D constitute a transgression of the prohibition of directing the
passage of the property. Section 2518(b)(4) clearly provides that the
person making the disclaimer may not direct the passage of the dis-
claimed property. No mention is made of any prohibition of the actions
of a person other than the disclaimant. Therefore, the actions of C, in
directing who will receive the disclaimed property is not relevant to the
qualifications of D's disclaimer.
Has D directed the pasage of the property by virtue of his dis-
claiming a portion of a homogeneous property? Arguably, if the prop-
erty is homogeneous, D has directed the property because he has been
given, in effect, the right to choose the recipient of the property he
partially disclaims among a group of three, E, F and G. Would the
result be different if C devises his home ( 1 of his estate), his business
('A of his estate) and his other assets (/ of his estate) to D with a
disclaimer of his home to E, with a disclaimer of his business to F, and
with a disclaimer of his other assets to. G? In this situation, D does not
have any right to choose among E, F or G as to who will receive the
disclaimed property. Thus, D's disclaimer of any of the three specific
devises should be qualified insofar as D's disclaimer will have true eco-
76. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d) example 14.
77. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b). It may be possible under the severable property
rule or the pecuniary interest rule for D to have disclaimed 33 1h percent of the prop-
erty if it had been devised to him in total. See example 4 of Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d).
78. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d); 25.2518-3(d).
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The second rule of partial disclaimers, the "severable property
rule" is a logical application of the requirement that a disclaimer must
involve an undivided interest in property.80 That rule allows a disclai-
mant to disclaim a severable interest in property if specific reference is
made to specific items of property. Severable property is defined as
"property which can be separated from other property to which it is
joined and which after severance, maintains a complete and indepen-
dent existence.8" The proposed regulation indicates that shares of cor-
porate stock are severable property.82 Presumably, real estate will be
considered severable so that the disclaimer of five acres of a ten acre
tract wil be qualified.83
The IRS has had the opportunity to apply its definition of the term
"severable property" in two recent private letter rulings." In Letter
Ruling 8113061, the devisee of two-thirds of a residuary estate dis-
claimed his interest in the residuary estate to the extent that it ex-
ceeded a debt to the estate. The IRS, although never directly stating
that the portion of the residuary estate disclaimed by the devisee was
severable from that which he retained, discussed the severable property
rule in the paragraph immediately before the paragraph in which it
concluded the disclaimer was qualified. In Letter Ruling 8145036, the
IRS ruled that the disclaimer of a portion of a child's intestate share
would be qualified.85 The IRS's rationale again appeared to be the sev-
erable property rule. Since neither ruling made mention of the type or
79. C.f. the trust income allocation rules contained in I.R.C. § 651(b) (1954);
622(b) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.652(b)-2(b) (1960); the partnership allocation rules
contained in I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) (1954).
80. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
81. Id. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8113061, Dec. 31, 1980, where the IRS seems
to have ruled that the remainder of an estate consists of severable property.
82. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d) example 1 contains other examples of severable
property.
83. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8130127, April 30, 1981.
84. See I.R.S. Letter Rulings 8113061, Dec. 31, 1980; 8130127, April 30, 1981.
85. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8145036, Aug. 11, 1981.
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nature of the property owned by the estate, it appears that these rulings
may support the proposition that a remainder interest is comprised of
severable property, and that the IRS is interpreting the severable prop-
erty rule liberally to allow the disclaimer of a specific percentage of a
residuary estate.
Trust Rule
The third rule of partial disclaimers deals with the application of
the first rule of partial disclaimers, the disclaimer of a partial interest
88
to property held in trust . 7 That is, all interests in trust income are
treated as a single interest and all interests in trust corpus are treated
as a different single interest. The proposed regulations illustrate this
rule with the following example:
A disclaimer is not a qualified disclaimer under Section 2518
if the beneficiary disclaims income derived from specific properties
transferred in trust while continuing to accept income derived from
the remaining properties in the same trust. Similarly, since all in-
terests in the corpus of a trust are treated as a single interest, in
order to. have a qualified disclaimer of an interest in corpus the
disclaimant must disclaim all such interests, either totally or as an
undivided portion. 8
The language of the above quoted example appears to create a
distinction between a partial disclaimer of an income interest in trust
property and a partial disclaimer of an interest in the corpus of a trust.
This distinction arises as a result of the omission of the qualifying lan-
guage that "the disclaimant must disclaim all such interests, either to-
tally or as an undivided portion"89 from the portion of the example
dealing with the partial disclaimer of an income interest.
The IRS's interpretation of the interrelation between the "severa-
ble property rule" and the "trust rule" creates another artificial distinc-
tion in determining whether a partial disclaimer is qualified. Although
86. See supra text accompanying notes 62-75.
87. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
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the IRS seems to take the position that severable items of property lose
their identity as severable property when placed in trust,90 there does
not appear to be any justifiable reason for distinguishing between a
situaton where A makes a gift to B of a life interest in two paintings
followed by B's disclaimer of one life interest, and the situation where
A creates a trust with the two paintings as the corpus giving B an in-
come interest in the trust followed by B's disclaimer of the income gen-
erated by one specific painting. In the first situation, B's income inter-
ests in each painting will be considered severable property and
therefore B's disclaimer of his life estate in one of the paintings will be
qualified.91 The language of the proposed regulation seems to consider
the disclaimer in the second situation to be disqualified merely because
the property has been placed in trust.9 2 The final regulations will hope-
fully clarify this situation.
If taxable transfers to the same trust are made at different times
or by different transferors, a qualified disclaimer is permitted with re-
spect to each transfer, because each transfer will be treated as though
it were a transfer to a separate trust.93 Query: is it possible to avoid the
partial disclaimer rules as they apply to trusts by transferring property
to a trust in installments? For example, will the result in the first situa-
tion posed above be different if A transferred painting number 1 to the
trust on January 1, 1982, and transferred panting number 2 to the
trust on January 2, 1982. Would the result be different if painting
number 2 were transferred on January 1, 1983291
90. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii). But see Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i);
I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8212061, Dec. 24, 1981 and I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7913084, Dec.
28, 1978. In Letter Ruling 7913084, Dec. 28, 1978,-the IRS ruled that the beneficiary
of a trust may disclaim all, or a specified undivided portion (for example 1/20 of your
interest in the trust) or all your interest (principal and income) in a specified asset or
assets. .. "
91. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii).
92. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2). See example 5 of Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d).
93. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2).
94. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i). Is this a situation where the IRS would
attempt to invoke that provision of the proposed regulations? On its face, that provision
appears applicable because the property has not been "divided". The IRS may take the
position that the proximity in time of the transfers require their aggregation notwith-
standing the proposed regulation.
7:1983 261 1. LR.C Section 2518
84
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/9
Nova Law Journal 7:1983
262
Undivided Portion Rule
The "undivided portion rule" of partial disclaimers seems to be the
IRS's attempt to interpret the language of section 2518 which allows
the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest.95 The proposed
regulations define the term "undivided portion of an interest" as:
• . . a fraction or percentage of each and every substantial interest
or right owned by the disclaimant in such property and must ex-
tend over the entire term of the disclaimant's interest in such prop-
erty and in other property into which such property is converted. A
disclaimer which disclaims some specific rights and retains other
rights with respect to an interest in the property is not a qualified
disclaimer of an undivided portion of the disclaimant's entire inter-
est in property. Thus, for example a disclaimer is not a qualified
disclaimer if the disclaimant disclaims the fee simple in Blackacre,
but retains a life estate.96
Thus, the proposed regulation seems to expressly sanction the dis-
claimer of an undivided one-half interest in a fee.97
Pecuniary Interest Rule
The fourth rule of partial disclaimers, the "pecuniary interest
rule," seems to be a logical interpretation of the term "undivided por-
tion of an interest".98 That rule allows the disclaimer of part of a spe-
cific pecuniary amount. Thus, the disclaimer of $10,000 of a $50,000
bequest will be considered the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an
interest.
The definition of a specific pecuniary amount is not clear. For ex-
ample, the proposed regulations advise us that V, the devisee of the
income from a 500 acre farm, could make a qualified disclaimer of
40% of his income interest in the farm. The example is intended to
illustrate the disclaimer of a part of a specific pecuniary amount.1"0
95. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(1).
96. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b).
97. Id.
98. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(c).
99. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(c) example 4.
100. This is apparent by the reference in section 25.2518-3(c) to the example.
Nova Law Journal 7:19831
85
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
1 S i 1926
7:1983
The application of the pecuniary interest rule appears to be at
odds with the application of the partial interest rule, 01 the trust rule 02
and the undivided portion rule. 0 3 Those rules provide that the dis-
claimer of an income interest for ten years from a life estate would not
be qualified. If an income interest is considered a specific pecuniary
amount, 04 the pecuniary interest rule, which only specifies that "part"
of the specific pecuniary amount must be disclaimed, should be inter-
preted to allow that disclaimer. There does not appear to be a logical
reason for treating the disclaimer of 40% of a life interest as qualified,
while treating the disclaimer of a ten year income interest from a life
estate as not qualified.
E. Nine-Month Rule
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, the regulations provided
that "a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the making of a
gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of
the existence of the transfer. 0 5 On its face, this requirement seemed
logical and understandable. However, the reasonable time requirement
became an unworkable standard for determining the federal tax conse-
quences of a disclaimer. 0 6 The primary problem in using such a stan-
dard was the fact it had to be applied on a case by case basis.'0 7 There-
101. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i).
102. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a).
103. Prop. Reg. § 35.2518-3(a)(2).
104. This result seems to follow proposed regulations section 25.2518-3(D) ex-
ample 4.
105. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see W. PAGE, PAGE ON THE
LAW OF WILLS 46, 46-47, nn.5-9 (1960). There was both a common law requirement
of reasonable time and a federal law requirement of reasonable time. However, in
many cases, they were treated as a single standard. See Keniath v. Comm'r, 480 F.2d
57, 61 (8th Cir. 1973); Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919, 927 (1977); Estate of
Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275, 291 (1977), acq. 1978-12 I.R.B. 6 Contra, Jewett v.
Comm'r, 70 T.C. 430, 436 (1978). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1972).
106. WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 66-67.
107. See Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275 (1977). Therein the court
held: "[w]hat is the reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. The
time may be very long if injury to others will not result." Id. at 293 (citing In re Estate
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fore, prior to the enactment of section 2518, it was nearly impossible to
decide with certainty whether a disclaimer was made within a reasona-
ble time.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Kenaith v. Commissioner0 8 was
primarily responsible for the enactment of the nine-month rule. In
Kenaith, the disclaimant had a vested remainder subject to divestiture.
The disclaimer was made nineteen years after the creation of the inter-
est but only six months after the death of the life beneficiary. The court
was faced with the difficult question of determining when the period of
reasonable time commences. The Tax Court 09 held that a reasonable
time should be interpreted according to a federal standard,110 and
nineteen years was held not to be a reasonable time. The Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the Tax Court saying:
In determining 'reasonable time' and the related issue of when the
reasonable time commences, we perforce, absent a federal statute
or regulation defining reasonable time, must look to the law of the
states. We are not conclusively bound by the state law, but this is
the only field to probe for legal decisions and discussions on the
phrase 'reasonable time' as used in the context of making valid
disclaimers."'
After examining many authorities, the court concluded that when
a vested interest subject to divestiture is involved, the reasonable time
period commences after the death of the life beneficiary, not at the
time the interest was created.11 2 The result in Kenaith was a disclaimer
108. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra
note 6, at 66-67.
109. 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
110. The Tax Court relied on Fuller v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 147 (1961) which held
a disclaimer 25 years after the creation of the interest was not within a reasonable
time. These Tax Court decisions create a federal standard, which measures a reasona-
ble time from the creation of the interest whether the interest is a present interest or a
future interest, and whether it is vested or contingent. See Jewett v. Comm'r, 102 S.
Ct. 1082 (1982).
111. 480 F.2d at 61.
112. We hold ... that under the prevailing common law and, in particu-
lar, the jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota the holder of a vested re-
mainder interest subject to divestiture has a reasonable time within which
to renounce or disclaim the remainder interest after the death of the life
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made nineteen years after the creation of the interest, but six months
after the death of the life beneficiary, was within a reasonable time. At
that point, it became clear that allowing local law to dictate what a
"reasonable time" was presented an inadequate method of determining
the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
Section 2518 eliminated the confusion surrounding the reasonable
time rule by requiring the disclaimer to be made not later than nine
months after the date on which the transfer creating the interest in
such person is made.113 Section 2518, however, does not eliminate the
confusion surrounding the issue of when the transfer creating the inter-
est occurs.
The Supreme Court has recently decided a pre-Section 2518 dis-
claimer case in which the question presented was when did the "trans-
fer" creating the interest occur.21 4 The Court held that the disclaimer
by a trust beneficiary of a contingent interest in a testamentary trust
thirty-three years after the trust was created, but while the interest was
still contingent, was a taxable transfer because the word "transfer" in-
cludes the creation of future interests and contingent remainders.11 5
Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted "transfer" as taxable transfer.
The proposed regulations provide that the nine month period is
determined with reference to each taxable transfer.11 6 A taxable trans-
fer occurs with respect to intervivos transfers when there is a completed
gift for federal gift tax purposes; a taxable transfer occurs with respect
to testamentary transfers upon the date of decedent's death.117 This
definition is in accord with the definition of transfer intended by
Congress."'
If transfer is defined as taxable transfer, it necessarily follows that
beneficiary and that an unequivocal disclaimer filed within six months
thereof is made within a reasonable time.
Id. at 64; contra Jewett, 102 S. Ct. 1082. In Jewett, the court measured the time from
the creation of the interest, rather from the interest became indefeasibly fixed, and
concluded 30 years was not reasonable.
113. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A).
114. Jewett, 102 S. Ct. 1082.
115. Id.
116. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2).
117. Id. See also I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8008078, Nov. 28, 1979.
118. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R.-14844, H.R. REP. No. 94-
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the disclaimer of certain interests in property will become almost im-
possible. One such interest in property is created by the exercise of a
special power of appointment. Where a donee is given a special power,
the gift (or devise) is a taxable transfer. The donee must disclaim
within nine months from that date in order for the disclaimer to be
"qualified." If the donee chooses not to disclaim and subsequently exer-
cises the power, the appointee's disclaimer must be made within nine
months of the transfer of the power to the donee for it to be qualified.
The nine months do not begin when the power is exercised since the
exercise of a special power is not a taxable transfer.11 9 Consequently,
the "transfer" creating the appointee's interest is the creation of the
power. The harshness of this interpretation is somewhat amelioriated
by the extention of the nine month disclaimer period for disclaimants
less than twenty-one years of age.
In many cases, the donee of the power will refrain from exercising
it for a period in excess of nine months. In such cases, the appointee
will be precluded from making a qualified disclaimer even though as he
is unaware of his interest until it is too late.
In addition to making a qualified disclaimer of some interests im-
possible, Congress' definition of transfer as taxable transfer allows
some "qualified" disclaimers to be made many years after the interest
was created. If we assume that a special power of appointment can
reach the hands of the holder of the power without the occurrence of a
taxable transfer (which can easily happen when the holder acquired it
for full and adequate consideration, for example section 2516), when
will the nine month period begin for the appointee under the special
119. The exercise of a special power of appointment is not a transfer (completed
gift for gift tax purposes). See I.R.C. § 2514 (1954) and Self v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956). The death of B with a special power of appointment is not a
taxable transfer. See I.R.C. § 2041 (1954); Clauson v. Vaughan, 147 F.2d 84 (1st Cir.
1945); James v. Reynolds, 57 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1944). The reason the exercise
of a special power of appointment is not a transfer is because powers of appointment
are not interests in property. The following cases, although prior to I.R.C. § 2041, are
useful to demonstrate that a power of appointment (general or special) is not an inter-
est in property. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942), rev'g 121
F.2d 307, aft'd, 42 BTA 145; United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921). The exercise
of a general power of appointment is a transfer because of I.R.C. § 2514 and a general
power of appointment is included in a decedent's gross estate because of I.R.C. § 2041
(not I.R.C. § 2033).
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power? It is easier to determine when the nine month period does not
begin. We know it does not begin when the holder acquired the power
since that is not a "transfer." We know it does not begin when the
power is exercised since the exercise of the special power is not a
"transfer." Insofar as no other events occurred, we must conclude that
the period never commenced. Logic tells us that a period which never
commenced can never end. Therefore, in certain situations, the ap-
pointee may have the opportunity to disclaim many years later (assum-
ing he has not accepted the interest or its benefits) and have it qualify.
The result in the above discussion would be vastly different if the
donee is given a general power as opposed to a special power. Since the
exercise of a general power is a taxable transfer, 120 the appointee will
have nine months from the exercise of the power in which to disclaim.
Thus, an appointee under a general power will always have nine
months to disclaim;121 whereas, the appointee under a special power
(especially if it is a testamentary power) will rarely have such an
opportunity.
The obvious question that arises regarding the commencement of
the nine-month period, is whether a disclaimer of property passing by
the exercise of a special power should be treated differently than a dis-
claimer of property passing by the exercise of a general power. If we
focus upon the disclaimant's right to disclaim, there is no justification
for such a distinction. The appointees under both the general and the
special power are similarly situated. They have no way of knowing if
they will be appointed, when they will be appointed or what they will
receive if appointed. In each case, their ownership arises as a result of
the exercise of the power. Therefore, it is of little concern to the ap-
pointee what type of power the holder exercised.
The sole distinction between a general and a special power is with
120. See I.R.C. §§ 2514 & 2041; Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(a)(1) (1958).
121. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R. 14844, H.R. REP. No. 94-
1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976). The report gives the following example:
[]n the case of a general power of appointment where the other re-
quirements are satisfied, the person who would be the holder of the power
will have a 9 month period after the creation of the power in which to
disclaim and the person to whom the property would pass by reason of the
exercise or lapse of the power would have a 9 month period after a taxable
exercise, etc., by the holder of the power in which to disclaim.
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respect to the federal taxation of the holder of the power. The holder of
a general power is taxed upon its exercise; the holder of a special power
is not.122 The imposition of a transfer tax upon the holder of the power
is an inadequate basis to justify disallowing the disclaimer by an ap-
pointee under special power (if made within nine months of the exer-
cise of the power), since the tax is unrelated to the rights of the ap-
pointee. Therefore, it is unreasonable to require the disclaimer made by
an appointee under special power be within nine months of the transfer
creating the power (which may be prior to the exercise of the power),
when an appointee under a general power is permitted to disclaim
within nine months after the exercise of the power. To remedy this
unwarranted distinction, as well as to cure the situation where no trans-
fer occurs, section 2518 should be amended or regulations promulgated
defining transfer in a manner which treats the appointee under a gen-
eral and a special power similarly in all cases. Florida Statutes section
732.801123 provides an excellent example of when an interest must be
disclaimed to assure that the recipient of any interest in property has a
fair opportunity to disclaim:
(5) Time for Filing Disclaimer - A disclaimer shall be recorded
at any time after the creation of the interest, but in any event
within 9 months after the event giving rise to the right to disclaim,
including the death of the decedent; or, if the disclaimant is not
finally ascertained as a beneficiary or his interest has not become
indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity at the death of the
decedent, then the disclaimer shall be recorded not later than 6
months after the event that would cause him to become finally as-
certained and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and in quantity.124
The requirement that the disclaimant not accept any interest in the
disclaimed property provides an adequate safeguard to prevent any
abuse that may arise as a result of allowing additional interests to be
disclaimed.
122. See I.R.C. § 2514 & 2041; Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(a)(1) (1958). The
Generation Skipping Tax rules contained in I.R.C. § 2601-2614 may provide the re-
quired "taxable transfer" in certain situations where special powers are created.
123. FLA. STAT. § 732.801(5) (1977).
124. Id.
91
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
7:1983 LR.C. Section 2518 269[
Formula Clauses
It is often impossible to determine whether or not a disclaimer
should be made or the amount of property which should be disclaimed
within nine months from the date the property was transferred. In
large estates, the property may not yet have been valued and there may
be considerable litigation concerning the title to property as well as the
validity of claims filed against the estate. Thus, the disclaimant may be
faced with the dilemma of guessing whether a disclaimer is necessary
or how much property he must disclaim. Section 2518 does not ex-
pressly provide a disclaimant relief from this problem.
In several private letter rulings, the IRS has ruled that a partial
disclaimer will be qualified where the disclaimant uses a formula based
disclaimer.125 For example, a beneficiary's disclaimer of only so much
of the decedent's estate as is needed to cause property equal to the
optimal marital deduction to pass to the surviving spouse will be quali-
fied.12 This is a logical as well as practical interpretation of the
statute.
F. Acceptance of Benefits
Both the common law of disclaimers and Section 2518 provide
that the disclaimant must not accept any of the benefits of the dis-
claimed property for the disclaimer to be qualified. The proposed regu-
lations similarly provide that the disclaimant cannot expressly or "im-
pliedly" accept the benefits of the disclaimed property prior to making
the disclaimer.1 27 If the disclaimant is also a fiduciary, his actions in
such capacity to preserve or maintain the property are not considered
an acceptance of the benefits of the property.1 28 The proposed regula-
tions do not define the term "implied acceptance" other than by the use
of one example. 29 In that example, Blackacre was devised to A. A
never resided in Blackacre, but when the property taxes became due A
125. I.R.C. Letter Rulings 8145036, Aug. 11, 1981; 8130127, April 30, 1981;
7913119, Dec. 19, 1978.
126. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7913119, Dec. 19, 1978.
127. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(i).
128. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(ii).
129. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(iii) example 3.
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paid them out of his personal funds. A later attempted to disclaim
Blackacre. The example concludes that A's payment of the property
taxes was an "implied acceptance" of Blackacre. That result seems to
be an extremely harsh interpretation of the non-acceptance require-
ment in light of the fact that A was merely intending to preserve the
property. If this example is altered to provide that A, instead of paying
the property taxes, made a monthly mortgage payment on property de-
vised to him subject to a mortgage, presumably the IRS would consider
the mortgage payment an "implied acceptance".
It is doubtful that Congress intended the nine month period for
disclaimers to be shortened where there is a gift or devise of encum-
bered property. In the case of a family residence, the beneficiary or
devisee will be faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to disclaim
the property prior to the first mortgage payment becoming due or to
not make the payment of the mortgage and possibly causing a default
and/or foreclosure.
The IRS in several recent private letter rulings has taken a more
rational position with respect to acceptance of benefits. 180 In letter rul-
ing 8140025, the IRS ruled that the disclaimant's payment of utility
and light bills on property later disclaimed by the executor of the dis-
claimant did not constitute an acceptance of the benefits of the prop-
erty.131 It is difficult to find a conceptual distinction between paying the
property taxes on devised real property and paying the utility and light
bills on such property. Hopefully, the final regulations will be more co-
herent in this respect.
In an example in the proposed regulations, the IRS has taken an
erroneous position with respect to the interaction between the nine
month rule and the acceptance of benefits rule.13 2 In that example, ten
shares of stock were given to H under the State X uniform gift to mi-
nors act. Majority in state X is eighteen. At the time of the gift, H was
fifteen years old. Upon attainment of the age of eighteen, the ten
shares were delivered and registered in H's name. H, within nine
months of attaining the age of twenty-one, disclaimed the ten shares.
130. I.R.S. Letter Rulings 8140025, July 7, 1981; 7909055, Nov. 29, 1978;
7922018, Feb. 28, 1979.
131. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8140025, July 7, 1981.





et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
The example concludes that H's disclaimer is not qualified because H
received fee ownership of the shares on his eighteenth birthday but
failed to disclaim the shares within nine months thereafter. Interest-
ingly, the Regulaton did not cite H's acceptance of the benefits of the
property as its basis for concluding the disclaimer was not qualified.
The conclusion in this example is clearly wrong if it is based on the fact
that H's disclaimer was not qualified solely because it was not made
within nine months of H's eighteenth birthday. Section 2518(b)(2)(B)
clearly provides that H had nine months after the day on which he
attained the age of twenty-one in which to disclaim.
It appears to be the IRS's position that the receipt of trust income
by a beneficiary does not preclude the beneficiary from disclaiming his
interest in corpus.13 3 The proposed regulation illustrates this point in
the following example. The current income beneficiary of a trust, B, is
to receive one-half the corpus upon attainment of the age of forty. B
received one income distribution and then attempted to disclaim his
interest in the income and corpus of the trust. The example concludes
that B's disclaimer of the income is not qualified insofar as he has ac-
cepted income prior to making the disclaimer. However, B's disclaimer
of the corpus is qualified. Even though the "partial disclaimer rule"
treats B's interest in income and corpus as two separate interests, the
IRS is quite liberal in its interpretation that B has not accepted the
benefits of the corpus in this example.
G. Use of Disclaimers as a Method of Achieving Tax Savings
Charitable Remainders
It is not uncommon for individuals to make charitable dispositions
of their property upon their death. One popular form of charitable
transfer is the creation of a trust, inter vivos or testementary, with the
corpus passing to a charity upon the occurence of a stated event or the
expiration of a stated number of years.'" To be deductible for estate
tax purposes, the transfer of a remainder interest in trust property must
qualify as a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remain-
133. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(iii) example 1.
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der unitrust.13 5 There are numerous highly technical requirements
which must be satisfied for a trust to fall into these categories. 13 If for
any reason a trust fails to satisfy the requirements, the estate tax de-
duction will be lost. 37 Therefore, extreme care must be exercised to
avoid the slightest transgression of the charitable transfer rules.
If a decedent makes a transfer of a remainder interest to a charity
which is not in the required form, it is still possible to salvage a chari-
table deduction for the decedent's estate. Assume that D dies with an
estate of $100,000,000 and his will creates a trust with a corpus of
$50,000,000 for the benefit of his son, S, for life, remainder to Nova
Law Center. Under the terms of the trust, S is guaranteed an annual
distribution of $2,000,000 and the trustee has the power to invade
corpus for the benefit of S. The trust is not a charitable remainder
annuity trust or unitrust because S does not have the right to receive at
least 5% of the initial corpus annually and an amount other than the
payment of a sum certain (or fixed percentage) of corpus may be paid
to S.138 Therefore, D's estate will not be entitled to a charitable
deduction.
If S disclaims each of his interests in the trust, the transfer will be
deemed to have been made directly from D to Nova Law Center 39
which entitle D (or his estate) to a charitable deduction. Therefore, S's
disclaimer of his interest in the trust will salvage the charitable deduc-
tion for D's estate.1 40
Marital Deduction and Unified Credit
A 1978 amendment to section 2518 made it possible for property
to pass to a decedent's spouse as a result of a disclaimer even if the
135. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2)(A) (1974).
136. See I.R.C. § 664(d)(1)(2) (1954).
137. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2).
138. I.R.C. § 664(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B).
139. Letter Ruling 8031018, March 21, 1980. See also Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-2
C.B. 296.
140. Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-2 C.B. 296. In Letter Ruling 8031018, March 21,
1980, the IRS ruled that as a result of a beneficiary's disclaimer, his income interest
never arose, thus, the charity was considered as having received its interest in the estate
immediately.
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surviving spouse was the disclaimant .14 This amendment is important
because it allows a surviving spouse to disclaim an interest in a marital
trust and take the property under a non-marital trust assuming the de-
cedent's will is set up properly.142 A spouse will only make such a dis-
claimer when the marital bequest exceeds the "optimal" marital deduc-
tion.1 43 One common situation where the marital bequest exceeds the
optimal marital deduction occurs where the decedent's will fails to take
the unified credit into consideration when funding the marital trust.
The estate of every decedent who was a citizen or resident of the
United States at the time of death is entitled to a credit against his
estate tax.144 In 1982, the credit is $62,800.145 The $62,800 credit
means that a taxable estate of $225,000 or less will not have to pay any
estate tax.
Sound estate planning dictates that the decedent's taxable estate
not be less than the amount of the credit against estate tax available to
the decedent.146 The concept is illustrated by the following example. D
dies with a gross estate of $450,000. His wife, W, has no separate prop-
erty. D wishes to avoid all estate tax upon his and W's death. D's will
provides:
If my spouse survives me, I give to my trustee, hereinafter named,
141. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(M), 92 Stat. 2934
(1978), amended I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
142. The decedent's will must contain a marital bequest (one which qualifies for
the marital deduction) and a non-marital bequest (one which does not qualify for the
marital deduction and does not cause the property to be included in the spouse's gross
estate), with the decedent's spouse named as the beneficiary under each trust. The non-
marital trust should be drafted in manner so as to give the spouse all the incidents of
ownership consistent with its exclusion from the spouse's gross estate. In addition, it is
advisable to include in the decedent's will a clause which provides that any property
disclaimed shall pass to the non-marital trust.
143. The optimal marital deduction is not necessarily the maximum marital de-
duction allowable because consideration must be made for items such as the unified
credit and other deductions available to the estate.
144. I.R.C. § 2010 (1976).
145. I.R.C. § 2010(b) (1976).
146. If the taxable estate is less than the credit, the excess of the credit over the
decedent's estate tax liability will be wasted. The credit is also used to reduce the tax
payable on certain gifts made during the decedent's lifetime, thus, the entire credit
may not be available at the decedent's death.
273 1LR.C Section 2518
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a pecuniary amount equal to the maximum marital deduction al-
lowable to my estate for federal estate tax purposes, less the aggre-
gate amount of marital deductions, if any, allowed for interests in
property passing or which have passed to my spouse otherwise than
by the terms of this article.
Since ERTA 1981, the maximum marital deduction is 100% of
D's gross estate. 1 7 Therefore, the provision of D's will transfers D's
entire estate-$450,000-to a marital trust created for W. Since D's
estate will be entitled to a marital deduction of $450,000, D's taxable
estate will be zero and no estate tax will be payable on D's death. W
will have a taxable estate of $450,000 because the corpus of the marital
trust will be included in her estate upon her death. 8 If W also dies in
1982, her estate will be taxed on $450,000, yielding a tax of $138,800,
and her estate will be entitled to a credit of $62,800.
If D's will provided that the marital bequest was to be reduced to
take into consideration the value of the credit available to D with the
remainder of D's estate used to fund a non-marital trust for the benefit
of W, D's estate tax would remain zero and there would be no tax
payable on W's death because W's taxable estate would be limited to
$225,000 and the credit available to W's estate, $62,800, would reduce
the tax to zero.149 Thus, no estate tax would be payable on the death of
D and W, an estate tax savings of $76,000 over the situation above.
In those situations where a decedent's will does not allow for the
reduction of the marital bequest by the amount of credit available to
the decedent's estate, the situation can be corrected by having the dece-
dent's spouse disclaim the portion of the marital bequest which is nec-
essary to allow the decedent to make full use of his credit. In the situa-
tion posed above, W would disclaim $225,000.
The benefits to be derived by such a disclaimer are the securing of
the optimal marital deduction and the exclusion of the disclaimed prop-
erty from the disclaimant's gross estate. In theory such a disclaimer is
147. ERTA 1981.
148. I.R.C. § 2056 (1954) (amended by 1981 ERTA). I assume that the marital
trust was a qualified terminable interest trust.
149. See I.R.C. §§ 2033-2042 (1976). The non-marital portion ($225,000) would
not be included in W's estate because she would not have an interest in property of a
character which is includible in her estate.
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an effective post mortem estate planning device, but before a spouse
makes such a disclaimer, he or she will have to be convinced that it is a
beneficial course of action. The proposed regulations inhibit the ability
of a surviving spouse to disclaim in this circumstance by providing that
"[i]f the surviving spouse. . . retains the right to direct the beneficial
enjoyment of the disclaimed property in a transfer that is not subject to
Federal estate and gift tax, such spouse will be treated as directing the
beneficial enjoyment of the disclaimed property. 150 The proposed regu-
lation should be revised to provide that the typical powers given to a
surviving spouse as part of a non-marital trust should not taint an oth-
erwise qualified disclaimer.
Special Use Valuation
Generally, the property included in a decedent's gross estate is val-
ued at its fair market value at the date of the decedent's death.151 If
certain conditions are satisfied, real property included in a decedent's
estate will be valued on the basis of its current use rather than its fair
market value.15 2 To be eligible for the special valuation, the real prop-
erty must be used for farming or other closely held business purposes
and must pass to a qualified heir. 53 A qualified heir includes an ances-
tor or lineal descendant of the decedent and the decedent's spouse or
parent.'5 The IRS has ruled that a devise of real property not satisfy-
ing the requirements for special use valuation may be effected by the
use of a disclaimer. 155 In that ruling, a farm was bequeathed to A, a
150. If the marital trust is a qualified terminable interest trust, the property in-
terests the spouse receives in the non-marital trust are extremely similar to the property
interests that spouse had in the marital trust. The spouse can receive, under a non-
martial trust, the following: a life estate, a special power of appointment, a five and five
general power of appointment, a general power of appointment subject to an ascertain-
able standard, and the trustee can be given the power to invade the corpus for the
spouse's comfort or maintenance. But see proposed regulations section 25.2518-2(e)(2)
which requires the surviving spouse to give up certain of the powers that the spouse
could otherwise enjoy as part of the non-marital trust.
151. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1954).
152. I.R.C. § 2032A (1976).
153. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2) (1976).
154. Id.
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qualifying heir, and A was given a testamentary special power of ap-
pointment. The class of permissible appointees available to A included
non-qualifying heirs. Since A had the power to appoint the property to
non-qualifying heirs, the property did not qualify for special use valua-
tion.15 6 The IRS ruled that the disclaimer by A of his special power of
appointment made it possible for the property to be specially valued
because, as a result of the disclaimer, the remainder vested in a quali-
fied heir. 157
IV. Conclusion
This article has attempted to trace the law of disclaimers from the
date of enactment of section 2518 in 1976, to the present. In the six
year period beginning with the enactment of section 2518, the IRS has
not issued final regulations. Moreover, the IRS has interpreted section
2518 in a manner that caused Congress to amend that section in 1981
to carry out the expressed purpose of the 1976 legislation.
On July 22, 1980, the IRS published proposed regulations inter-
preting section 2518. Those regulations contain many definitional flaws
and examples which at best are misleading. The treatment of the dis-
claimer of jointly held property in the proposed regulations clearly im-
pose rules not contained in the statute and effectively prohibits the dis-
claimer of most interests in jointly held property. The IRS has created
numerous vague and arbitrary tests for determining whether partial
disclaimers are valid. One major shortcoming with the IRS approach is
reliance upon state law to determine whether a partial disclaimer is
qualified.
It is distressing that the IRS has yet to issue final regulations, and
has continued, in one way or another, to impose the peculiarities of
state law upon section 2518. Hopefully, the IRS will carefully review
the proposed regulations and rethink its position.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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I. Introduction
Utilizing a unique term "shared responsibility," the Florida legis-
lature, by enacting Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)(3),' has joined
1. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982) (effective July 1, 1982).
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the expanding number of states2 authorizing the elevation of joint cus-
tody to a preferred status.3 The words "joint custody" are conspicu-
ously and intentionally absent in the wording of the statute.4 The ab-
sence allows courts to continue the exercise of broad discretionary
powers when determining custody disputes involving children in Flor-
ida." This statute establishes as the public policy of this state that each
2. The total number of states with some form of joint custody statute is 23: Cali-
fornia (CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-56 (1980)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 571-46.1 (1980)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1982)); Iowa (IowA CODE
ANN. § 598.21 (West 1979) (effective July 1, 1982)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60.1610(b) (1979)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.270(3) (1980)); Louisiana (LA.
CiV. CODE ANN. art. 146, 157 (West 1981)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
214 (1981)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1981));
Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6a) (1981)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.17 (West 1981)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1981)); Ne-
vada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.140 (1981)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458.17 (1982)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4.9 (1981)); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1975)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04
(1981)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1979)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 1002 (Purdon 1981)); Texas (TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon
1979)); and Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.24(1)(b) (West 1977)).
Arizona had authorized joint custody awards by court rule. In Illinois,
New Jersey and New York, court decisions broadly interpreted the lan-
guage of existing custody statutes as giving the courts discretionary power
to grant joint custody in appropriate cases. . . bringing the total number
of states that have embraced the concept of joint custody to 27.
Joint Custody Legislation Passed By 23 States, 8 FAM. L. REP., June 29, 1982, at
2506, 2507.
3. Id. at 2506.
4. "In fact, the new law studiously avoids using the term "joint custody" in order
to escape the detrimental connotations which that term may convey. . . ." Barkett,
From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, in ANATOMY OF SHARED PAREN-
TAL RESPONSIBILITY 1.3a (Fla. Bar C.L.E. Course Manual 1982).
But see FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1972) concerning natural guardians. The term
"joint custody" appears in this statute, but a definition is not provided nor have courts
in Florida used this statute as authorization for joint custody. The statute states in
part: "[I]f the marriage between the parents is dissolved, the natural guardianship shall
belong to the parent to whom custody of the child is awarded. If the parents are given
joint custody, then both shall continue as natural guardians." Id. (emphasis added).
5. Judge Fleet of the First Circuit Court of Florida, stated on January 25, 1982
during his testimony in front of the Florida Judiciary Civil Committee meeting discuss-
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minor child shall have frequent and continuing contact with both par-
ents after a dissolution of marriage and that both parents shall be en-
couraged "to share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing."6
Generally, joint custody statutes lack specific standards or criteria
upon which the court can look for guidance in making custody determi-
nations.7 However, Florida's statute sets forth a non-exclusive list of
specific factors for the court's consideration and evaluation.8
A conceptual analysis of shared responsibility is the focus of this
note. A historical prospective of case law in Florida will highlight the
reasons for the significant changes in the newly enacted statute. The
legislature's textual changes will be discussed, in addition to a consider-
ation of the potential ramifications of the changes mandated. Based on
this analysis, recommendations are offered to facilitate the incorpora-
tion of shared responsibility into the area of child custody in Florida.
II. The Evolution of Florida Statutes Section 61.13
The 1967 amendment of Florida Statutes section 61.13 dealt with,
as does the present statute, the court's power in determining custody of
children in dissolution proceedings:
In any action for divorce and alimony, the court has power at any
stage of the action to make such orders about the care, custody and
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and what security, if
any, is to be given thereof, as from the circumstances of the parties
and the nature of the case is equitable.9
ing Senate Bill 439 (adopted as FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1982)): "Under the present law,
the judges (the trial judges), could do what this bill provides. I think this bill attempts
to generate some extra thinking on the parts of judges to get them thinking more on
the lines of sharing parental responsibilities ... it makes them think a little deeper
and rightfully so." Id.
6. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1 (1982). The statute states in part: "It is the public
policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent and continuing contact with
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and to en-
courage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing." Id.
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982).
8. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a)-(j) (1982).
9. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1967).
2791
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This amendment renumbered former Florida Statutes section
65.14 as section 61.13 and substituted the word "equitable" in lieu of
"may be fit, equitable and just, and such order touching their custody
as their best spiritual as well as other interests may require."10 Spiri-
tual interests never again receive the attention of the legislature as a
factor in determining custody."'
The 1971 amendment 12 provided a substantial rewording of Flor-
ida Statutes section 61.13. The prior text of section 61.13 became sub-
section (3). In subsection (2), the legislature codified the best interests
of the child test's and gave the father equal standing with the mother
in regard to custody.1 4 Although the legislature had not yet enumerated
the relevant factors 5 to be considered in determining the best interests
of the child, courts, while exercising their discretion in deciding cus-
tody, continued to articulate factors they considered important. 8 Some
10. FLA. STAT. § 65.14 (1965).
11. Florida Statutes section 61.13(3) (1982) has two sub-sections under which a
court may include "spiritual interests" in determining custody: "(f) The moral fitness
of the parents" or "(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute." Id.
12. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1971).
13. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2) (1971) read in part: "The court shall award
custody and visitation rights of minor children of the parties as a part of proceeding for
dissolution of marriage in accordance with the best interests of the child ... " Id.
See also infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
14. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2) (1971) read in part: "Upon considering all
relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the
mother in determining custody." Id. See also infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
But see Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975), in which the Supreme Court
of Florida announced this statutory mandate of equal consideration was not inconsis-
tent with the tender years presumption in favor of the mother. It was still the case law
in Florida that "other essential factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender
years should receive prime consideration for custody." Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22,
24 (Fla. 1975).
15. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(preference of the mature child); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (tender years); Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (stable environment); Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975) (remain-
ing in the marital home); Hosking v. Hosking, 318 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (social investigator's report); Silvestri v. Silvestri, 309 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (prior infidelity not a binding factor).
Nova Law Journal
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of these factors were codified in 197517 to define the best interests of
the child for the purpose of determining the custody of children follow-
ing a dissolution of marriage.18
In the last major amendment prior to the 1982 revisions, the legis-
lature, in 1978, authorized courts in dissolution proceedings to award
visitation rights to grandparents of a minor child.1 9 Not until the 1982
17. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1975).
18. Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1975) stated in part:
(3) For purposes of custody, the best interests of the child shall be deter-
mined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting
the best welfare and interests of the child including but not limited to the
following:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the par-
ents and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affec-
tion, and guidance and to continue the educating of the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permit-
ted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material
needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to
be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
custody dispute.
Id.
19. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b) (1978) stated:
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if
it is deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or
given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grand-
parents have legal standing as "contestants" as defined in § 61.1306, Flor-
ida Statutes. No court shall order that a child be kept within the state or
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amendment, though, were grandparents awarded "legal standing to
seek judicial enforcement of such an award." 20
III. Historical Perspective: Florida Case Law Development
A. Scope of the Problem
Prior to a dissolution of marriage, both parents are considered
joint natural guardians of their minor children.2 1 They have joint and
equal rights of custody, care and control.2 2 Upon dissolution, 3 the
court, with the judge acting in his traditional role of parens patriae,2'
determines the division of those jointly held parental rights and obliga-
tions.2 5 Because of the dramatic increase in divorce,26 courts are in-
creasingly called upon to make difficult decisions regarding child cus-
tody;27 an incorrect determination can have a devastating effect upon
Id.
But see, e.g., Putnal v. Putnal, 392 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(Grandparents allowed to participate in postdissolution custody proceedings initiated by
the father).
20. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c. (1982).
21. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1972).
22. Florida Statutes section 744.03(1) (1972) stated in part: "A guardian is one
to whom the law has entrusted the custody and control of the person or of the property,
or of both, of an incompetent." Id.
23. See supra note 4 for the text of Florida Statutes section 744.301(1) (1972).
24. Under the parens patriae doctrine the judge puts himself in the position of a
"wise, affectionate and careful parent," and makes his determination concerning the
child accordingly. This description appears in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34,
148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
25. A list of parental rights and obligations appears in Folberg & Graham, Joint
Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 523, 537-38 (1979). See
also Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 166, 147 So. 464, 466 (1933).
26. See, e.g., Note, Joint Custody: A Revolution in Child Custody Law?, 20
WASHBURN L.J. 326 (1981).
27. Child custody disputes are all too often tragic theatre. The parties ex-
perience all the agonies of characters from a Greek drama. This, in itself,
should give us cause to shudder; but there is more to the situation. A judge
who must decide these disputes and attorneys who must counsel and advo-
cate are all too frequently oracles without a hint of what to do. They are
often overwhelmed by what is asked of them. Prevailing law requires that
they focus on the "best interests of the child," but they are often ill-
105
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
7:1983 Shared Parental Responsibility 283 1
the child.2 8 In making these difficult decisions, courts through the years
have employed a variety of methods to ensure a proper placement of
the child.
B. Best Interests of the Child Test
The best interests of the child test" focuses on the child's interests
as the primary consideration." As early as 1913, the Supreme Court of
Florida enunciated the principles of the test in review of a custody
award.3 1 The court emphasized a need to examine the fitness and con-
dition of the parents in order to make a determination of what was best
for the welfare of the child.3 2 The court's discretion" was and contin-
equipped to do so. There is very little in the attorney's education and expe-
rience that prepares him to deal with such a delicate human matter; the
same is true of the judge.
Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental - Psychological Approach to Proof
and Decisionmaking, 12 WILLIAMET-TE L.J. 491 (1976).
See also Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
28. Note, supra note 26, at 327; Note, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Di-
vorced Parents, 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1084, 1092-93 (1979).
29. In Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) the Kansas Supreme Court fo-
cused on the welfare of the child, not the natural right of the father. Custody was
awarded to the maternal aunt who had raised the child from infancy, making this case
one of the earliest examples using the best interests of the child test.
30. In Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 249, 148 N.E. 624 (1925), Judge Cardozo
(quoting Queen v. Gyngall, 2 Q.B. Div. 232 (1893)) formulated the standard:
[The Judge] does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether
father or mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed against
any one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the
child. He is to put himself in the position of a "wise, affectionate and care-
ful parent" and make provision for the child accordingly . . . He is not
adjudicating a controversy between adversary parti6s, to compose their pri-
vate differences. He is not determining rights "as between a parent and a
child" or as between one parent and another. . . Equity does not concern
itself with such disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is
for the child.
240 N.Y. at 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626.
31. Harris v. Harris, 65 Fla. 50, 61 So. 122 (1913) (custody of minor son
awarded to the mother).
32. Id.
If the character of either the father, .. or the mother, .. of said minor
child, shall become disreputable and unfit to have the care, custody, or
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ues to be broad in this area which reflects the gravity of a custody
decision. 4
The Florida Supreme Court in Green v. Green 5 reiterated the con-
trolling principle of the best interests of the child test: "We are com-
mitted to the doctrine that the welfare of the child is the principal fea-
ture in determining custody, and that a very large discretion is allowed
the chancellor in this respect." 36
The best interests of the child test remained a vague standard37
and a general approach 8 to Florida custody decisions until the legisla-
ture enumerated the factors for determining best interests in 1975.39
Prior to 1975, criteria courts eluded to included: (1) which parent
could provide emotional, social, and spiritual guidance;40 (2) a whole-
some moral atmosphere and suitable educational facilities;41 (3) stabil-
control of said child, or if their treatment of said child becomes other than
parental, then they shall forfeit or lose all their rights, powers and privi-
leges granted in this decree, and said rights, powers and privileges herefore
belonging to said party shall revert to the other.
Id. at 50, 61 So. at 122.
33. Note, supra note 26, at 329.
This test, [referring to the best interests test], presupposes that it will be
best for the child. This supposition forces a judge "to evaluate and choose
between highly speculative and sharply conflicting 'expert' testimony re-
garding the personalities of the contestants and the predicted outcomes of
various custody alternatives." The judge brings to the decision his personal
opinions and feelings.
Id.
34. Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 166, 147 So. 464, 466 (Fla. 1933). The
court in Frazier noted that this discretion is subject to judicial review.
35. 137 Fla. 359, 188 So. 355 (1939) (custody of five year old daughter awarded
to mother).
36. Id. at 360, 188 So. at 356.
37. Note, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, supra note 28, at
1086: "The use of such a vague standard enables judges to rely on the mandates of
their own consciences."
38. Folberg & Graham, supra note 25, at 532.
39. FLA. STAr. § 61.13(3) (1975).
40. Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1975) (custody of two and one-
half year old twin girls awarded to the father).
41. Baxter v. Baxter, 158 Fla. 886, 888, 30 So. 2d 492, 494 (1947) (custody of
three year old son awarded to the father).
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ity and discipline;42 and (4) the advantage of the child remaining in the
same neighborhood and association with a peer group conducive to the
child's well-being.43 Fitness of the mother 4 and father45 were ex-
amined, and in rare instances when neither parent was considered fit,
custody was awarded to a non-parent.4 6 Alternative forms of custody
were also examined, for example, split custody or divided custody.47
The best interests of the child test continued to be the paramount
consideration for awarding custody after 1975,48 and should remain so
with the court's discretion intact under the newly enacted statute.4 9
42. Philips v. Philips, 153 Fla. 133, 134, 13 So. 2d 922, 923 (1943) (custody of
17 month old son awarded to the father).
43. Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(custody of boys ages four and six awarded to the mother).
44. Teel v. Sapp, 53 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1951) (mother morally unfit). But see
Norris v. Norris, 202 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mother retained cus-
tody despite entertaining "nocturnal friends").
See also Green v. Green, 137 Fla. 359, 188 So. 355 (1939) (mother who devoted
considerable time to child's supervision and training).
45. See, e.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975):
Even if the trier of fact determines that the spouse's adultery has an ad-
verse effect on the child, other factors, ie. cruelty, neglect, parental unfit-
ness, exhibited by the other spouse, may be present to tip the scales back
in favor of the award of custody to the adulterous spouse. In the latter
event, it may be that the best interest of the child would be served by
awarding custody to a third party.
Id. at 24.
46. Id. See, e.g., Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (boy, eleven,
and girl, nine, awarded to the grandmother).
47. See, e.g., Shores v. Shores, 69 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1954) (policy of the court to
keep the children together - no "split" custody); Jones v. Jones, 23 So. 2d 623 (Fla.
1945) (welfare of the children not best promoted by ordering divided custody between
the parents).
48. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 365 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (nine year old son awarded to the father who could provide a more stable
environment).
49. Florida Statutes section 61.13(3) (1982) states:
For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary physical resi-
dence, the best interests of the child shall be determined by the court's
consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best welfare and
interests of the child, including, but not limited to: (a) ... to (j) Any
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C. Tender Years Doctrine
Early English5" and American "1 courts viewed paternal custody as
a virtually absolute rule.52 Later, however, under the tender years doc-
trine, the mother of a minor child received custody unless it was
shown she was not a "fit and proper person" to rear the children." This
became known as the "Other Things Being Equal Rule" in Florida,"
meaning that presented with two equally fit parents requesting custody
of a young child, courts would elect the mother.
When custody of a young child was awarded to the father, the
welfare of the child under the best interests of the child test superceded
the doctrine56 or the "other factors" were not found to be equal as
between the parents. 57 Employment of the tender years doctrine meant
Id.
50. See, e.g., The King v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (1804) (custody of
infant awarded to father).
51. See, e.g., Carr v. Carr, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 168 (1872) (custody of three year
old child awarded to father).
52. The shift to favoring the mother began with Justice Talfourd's Act, 2 & 3
Vict., ch. 54 (1839). Custody could be awarded to the mother if the children were less
than seven years old. This Act is the origin of the "Tender Years Doctrine" in Eng-
land. Note, supra note 26, at 328.
53. Helms v. Fransiscus, 2 Bland's Ch. 544 (Md. 1830), quoted in Note, supra
note 26, at 328, provides what is considered the first American expression of the tender
years doctrine:
[Even] a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in
contempt and snatch helpless, pulling infancy from the bosom of an affec-
tionate mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father. The mother
is the softest and safest nurse in infancy, and with her it will be left in
opposition to this general right of the father.
Id. at 563.
54. Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 526, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (Fla. 1945) (boy, six,
and girl, four, awarded to mother).
55. Fields v. Fields, 143 Fla. 886, 197 So. 153 (1940) (three children, ages three,
five and seven, awarded to mother): "Other things being equal ... the mother of in-
fants of tender years is best fitted to bestow the motherly affection, care, companion-
ship, and early training suited to their needs." Id. at 887, 197 So. at 154.
56. Philips v. Philips, 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1943) (custody of 17
month old son awarded to father).
57. See, e.g., Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400, 401-02 (Fla. 1972) (custody to
father of sons six, eight and ten).
286 Nova Law Journal
7:19831
109
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Shared Parental Responsibility7:1983
"the pendulum of custody has swung from father to mother and has
finally centered upon the principal question of the welfare of the
child." 8
After the 1971 Amendment to Florida Statutes section 61.13(2), 59
the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles of the tender years
doctrine despite the statutory mandate of equal consideration for both
the mother and father in custody disputes.60 Despite the statute's ex-
press statement, it was still the case law in Florida that "other essential
factors being equal, the mother of the infant of tender years should
receive prime consideration for custody.""1
However, in 1975, the legislature amended Florida Statutes sec-
tion 61.13(3)62 to include criteria to be considered when determining
the welfare and best interests of the child. Courts then began use of
those factors to apply "equal consideration.""3 The 1982 amendment to
Florida Statutes section 61.13 states: "Upon considering all relevant
factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as
the mother in determining custody regardless of the age of the
child.""e Thus, the Florida legislature has expressly eviscerated the his-
torical and judicially followed tender years doctrine.6 5
58. Id. at 402.
59. See supra note 14 for the text of Florida Statutes section 61.13(2) (1971).
60. Anderson v. Anderson, 309 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1975).
61. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1975). See also Corvison v.
Corvison, 362 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (custody of six year old and
three year old awarded to mother). But see Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (custody of three year old awarded to father):
When, as here, there is a dearth of evidence in support of the position of
the mother, as opposed to overwhelming evidence indicating that it is for
the best interests of the child for its custody to be awarded to its father,
any 'presumption', 'prime consideration', or 'natural edge', abiding with
the mother is overcome and custody should be awarded to that parent in
whose custody the best interests of the child will be served, in the light of
the evidence adduced.
Id. at 73.
62. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1975).
63. Kerschner v. Crocker, 400 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(custody of five year old daughter awarded to the father).
64. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)l. (1982) (emphasis added).
65. Two open questions remain:
a) Since the 1982 amendment excludes the "sex" of the child as a factor for equal
2871
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D. Modification of Custody
Modification of custody, whether originally determined by an
agreement between the parties6 or by court decree,67 traditionally has
been the "proper subject for judicial consideration at any time by the
court which granted the decree of divorce."6 Since the award of cus-
tody is regarded as res judicata69 as of the time of the decree, the court
does not have the same degree of discretion to choose between the par-
ents seeking modification as it did upon the initial custody
determination.7
0
To warrant modification of a child custody decree, changed cir-
cumstances is the threshold requirement.7 1 In order to warrant up-
consideration in its text of § 61.13(2)(b)1., will a mother still have the "natural edge"
to be awarded a daughter? See, e.g., Silvestri v. Silvestri, 309 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
b) Since most custody arrangements are by agreement, will the mother still con-
tinue to be given "prime consideration" anyway by those unaware of the new statutory
mandate: "Even though the tender years doctrine is waning, its effects are still present.
In about 90% of custody cases, the mother is awarded sole custody, and the mother
assumes sole custody in at least 90% of the cases that never reach the court." Note,
supra note 26, at 328.
66. See, e.g., Forte v. Forte, 320 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975): "In-
terpretation or modification of a separate agreement affecting welfare of children is not
only permissible, but obligatory where the circumstances so indicate." Id. at 448.
67. See, e.g., Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1963) (en banc): "So long, then,
as the minor child is within the jurisdiction of the equity court, such court may exercise
its continuing jurisdiction to modify its decree as to the custody of the child, even
though jurisdiction was not expressly retained therein." Id. at 908.
68. Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 165, 147 So. 2d 464, 465 (1933), reh'g
denied, April 19, 1933; Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
69. But see, Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974): "Res
judicata does not fit in custody matters, yet some barrier must be raised against too
frequent petitions for modification." Id. at 49.
70. Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Courts are reluctant to disrupt a child's environment unless the circumstances
clearly call for it. Arguably, therefore, a clear advantage goes to the parent who wins
the initial custody determination, even if it is only a temporary custody determination
until the actual dissolution proceedings.
71. Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Philips v.
Philips, 13 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 1943). See also, Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 2d at
464.
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rooting the child, there must be competent, substantial evidence that
(1) there has been a substantial or material change in the conditions of
the parties and (2) that the best interests and welfare of the child will
be promoted by the change of custody. 2 Although a heavy burden is
placed upon the parent seeking modification, 73 it can be justified by the
protection of the child from disruption caused by too frequent modifica-
tion petitions.7 '
Factors considered in making a determination of change of cus-
tody have included, but are not limited to: (1) preference of a mature
child,75 (2) psychological evaluation, "6 (3) stability of the living envi-
ronment,77 (4) sexual activity and cohabitation of the custodial par-
[The final decree] is not to be materially amended or changed afterward,
unless on altered conditions shown to have arisen since the decree, or be-
cause of material facts bearing on the question of custody and existing at
the time of the decree, but which were unknown to the court, and then
only for the welfare of the child.
Frazier, 109 Fla. at 164-65, 147 So. 2d at 464-65.
72. Sanders v. Sanders, 376 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See
also, Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1954); Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 23
So. 2d 623 (1945); Brush v. Brush, 414 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Adams v. Adams, 385 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobs v. Ross, 304
So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). But see, Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d
106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing Hutchins v. Hutchins, 220 So. 2d 438,
439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969)):
The Fourth District Court in Hutchins did state that in modification of
child custody cases a showing must be made "not only that the general
welfare of the children will be served by a change of custody, but that it
will be detrimental to the children if custody is not changed."
Goodman, 291 So. 2d at 108.
73. See, e.g., Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); McGregor v. McGregor, 7 Fla. Law Weekly 1656 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
4, 1982) (No. 81-568).
74. Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). But see,
Prevatt v. Penney, 138 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962): "Custody of the child
has been a continuing series of rounds characterized by animosity, charges and coun-
tercharges." Id. at 539.
75. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
76. Garvey v. Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But
see the dissent in Green v. Green, 307 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
criticizing the use of counselor's investigation as a factor in determining custody.
77. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 365 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
reh'g denied, January 3, 1979.
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ent, 7 and (5) changed needs of an older child.79 Remarriage of a non-
custodial parent, as well as increased material wealth and acquisition of
a suitable home have not been found sufficient in and of themselves to
fulfill the requirement of changed circumstances.80 Finally, it is the
trend in Florida that a custodial parent need not be proven unfit to
have any factors in "changed circumstances" considered in a modifica-
tion petition.8 '
The majority of past petitions for change of custody requested a
transfer from sole custody in one parent to sole custody in another.8 2 In
cases in which the non-custodial parent requested split or divided cus-
tody,83 the burden and factors used by the court remained the same.
84
The newly enacted statute mandates shared responsibility as part
of any proceeding under the chapter85 unless the court finds that shared
parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child's best inter-
est.88 It remains an open question whether the court will continue to
follow the prior enumerated standards in a modification petition.
7
78. Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973); Young v. Young, 305 So.
2d 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
79. McGregor v. McGregor, 7 Fla. Law Weekly 1656 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 4, 1982) (No. 81-568).
80. Adams v. Adams, 385 So. 2d 688, 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Strick-
lin v. Stricklin, 383 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But see, Hoffman v.
Linley, 201 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mother was original custodian,
lost custody upon a finding of unfitness, and finally upon re-petition after remarriage
was again awarded custody).
81. Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Taylor v. Schilt, 292 So. 2d 47, 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
82. See supra note 72.
83. See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
85. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96 (amending § 61.13(2)(b)3. (1982)).
86. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
87. Two additional open questions remain:
a) Will courts now entertain modification petitions of once "boiler-
plate" sole custody agreements, thereby flooding the courts?
b) Is the newly enacted Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1982) alone
enough of a changed circumstance to reach the threshold requirement for
a modification petition?
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E. Grandparent Visitation Rights
Historically in Florida, grandparents were treated as any other
non-parents and were denied visitation rights.88 Courts recognized the
emotional bonds between the grandparents and grandchildren, yet
found visitation rights were unjustified and unenforceable. 89 Until
1978, when legislation9 ° was passed permitting an award of visitation if
it was in the child's best interests, visitation rights of grandparents
were always struck down by courts.9 1
88. In Parker v. Gates, 89 Fla. 76, 103 So. 126 (1925), the Supreme Court re-
fused visitation rights to a non-parent who had raised a nine year old child for most of
his life. The court enunciated the principle cited numerously to deny grandparents and
non-parents visitation rights: "[t]he order. . . cannot legally be enforced against the
wishes of the child's mother." Id. at 76, 103 So. at 126.
89. See, e.g., Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967):
This decision . . . need not operate to prevent the maternal grandmother
from seeing the child, for whom she has shown great interest and affection,
nor deprive the child of the benefit and pleasure to be derived therefrom
...(but) the father and his wife - he as a natural parent and she as a
parent by adoption are entitled to determine the frequency, time and the
place of visitation with the child ..
Id. at 573.
See also Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Tamargo v. Tamargo,
348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). In all cases, custody was had by fit
parents. But see Behn v. Tummons, 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
which recognized the authority of the trial court to award custody to grandparents and
non-parents limited to cases in which either or the parents are unfit to raise the child.
90. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b) (1978) read in part:
The court may award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if
it is deemed by the court to be in the child's best interest. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require that grandparents be made parties or
given notice of dissolution pleadings or proceedings, nor shall such grand-
parents have legal standing as "contestants" as defined in § 61.1306, Flor-
ida Statutes. No court shall order that a child be kept within the state or
jurisdiction of the court solely for the purpose of permitting visitation for
the grandparents.
Id.
See also Florida Statutes section 61.1306(1) (1977) which defines, "contestant" as
follows: "(1) 'Contestant' means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to
custody or visitation rights with respect to a child."
91. See supra note 89.
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Since the grandparents could now only be heard in the context of a
divorce or custody proceeding, 92 this lack of standing as contestants 3 to
maintain an independent civil action to achieve visitation rights, effec-
tively continued to cause denial of those rights.94
Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(c) 95 now provides that necessary
legal standing and should therefore fulfill the legislature's intent to pro-
vide for the best interests of the child.98 It remains to be seen whether
the legislature shall follow the trend begun to extend visitation rights to
non-parents, other relatives of the child.97
92. See supra note 90.
93. See supra note 90.
94. Osteryoung v. Leibowitz, 371 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979),
reh'g denied, July 5, 1979; Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979). But see Whitehead v. Hewett, 380 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
reh'g denied, March 18, 1980 (award of visitation rights to grandparents held not an
abuse of discretion as grandparents were legal custodians under a prior order and mod-
ification proceedings were instituted by the child's father); Putnal v. Putnal, 392 So. 2d
613 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court concluded that in entertaining a joint motion
allowing grandparents participation in a proceeding initiated by the father, in which he
and another couple were contestants, the trial court did not err. It added the trial court
would have erred had it refused to allow the grandparents to participate).
Against all prior precedent and without a statutory basis (as grandparents then
had), a non-parent was granted visitation rights on the basis of the child's best inter-
ests. See Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), in which the
court in a dissolution proceeding granted a step-mother visitation rights with her hus-
band's adopted daughter.
95. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96 (effective July, 1982).
96. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(c) (1982) states in part: "The court may
award the grandparents visitation rights of a minor child if it is deemed by the court to
be in the child's best interest. Grandparents shall have legal standing to seek judicial
enforcement of such an award."
See also 7 FAM. L. REP., Trends In Grandparent Third-Party Visitation Rights
Legislation, July 21, 1981, at 2587:
As the nation's divorce rate has climbed, the issue of grandparents' visita-
tion rights has grown in importance. Out of concern for maintaining a
family relationship that can provide emotional security for the children of
divorced parents, most states over the last decade have considered legisla-
tion to establish procedures by which grandparents and other family mem-
bers can petition for visitation rights.
Id. at 2587.
97. Other relatives may include "great-grandparents, stepparents, half-brothers
and half-sisters." Trends In Grandparent Third-Party Visitation Rights Legislation,
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F. Alternative Forms of Custody
While the norm in Florida has been to grant sole custody to the
mother,98 courts, upon considering individual circumstances, have also
awarded sole custody to the father." The best interests of the child test
has been the basis for the courts to order "divided" custody, "rotating
or alternating" custody. 100 The various terms are used interchangeably
and inexactly in courts in Florida.10 1 Case law in Florida has dealt al-
most exclusively with forms of "divided" custody, where one parent is
still the sole custodian over a distinct period of time.
The Florida Supreme Court in 1933,102 recognized a father must
be afforded an opportunity to exercise his paternal rights10 3 and be-
supra note 96, at 2587.
98. See, e.g., Shores v. Shores, 60 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Teel v. Sapp, 53 So.
2d 635 (Fla. 1951).
99. See, e.g., Jobe v. Jobe, 202 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Klein
v. Klein, 204 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), reh'g denied, December 12,
1967.
100. These terms need to be distinguished from each other. Divided (or alternat-
ing or rotating) custody is when each parent has sole custody of the child for a distinct
portion of the year. The parent in whose home the child resides has sole legal authority
(care, custody and control) during that period. Of course, the other parent has visita-
tion rights. Split custody refers to "the situation where custody of one or more children
is awarded to one parent and the remaining children to the other parent." Gerscovich
v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1151-53 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Joint custody "leaves the parental rights and obligations toward the child the same
as existed during the marriage. . . both parents have equal authority and responsibil-
ity for all facets of raising the child. . . the child's upbringing is a cooperative project;
both parents agree on the important decisions concerning the child's life. . . . Joint
custody entails the division of physical custody at relatively brief intervals, with the
child's time roughly divided equally between the parents and spread evenly throughout
the year." Note, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, supra note 28, at
1104-05.
101. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
102. In Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (1933) both parents were,
under the divorce decree, afforded six months each with the eleven year old daughter.
The modification order only allowed the father two weeks visitation.
103. The father is not only entitled to have "leave" for the child to visit
him for two weeks each year, but is entitled to have and enjoy her society
for a reasonably sufficient length of time each year to enable him to incul-
cate in her mind a spirit of love, affection, and respect for her father. . ..
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cause neither parent was considered a "good example of conduct or
character, ' 104 the court approved a divided custody plan.10 5 Ten years
later the Supreme Court 06 made an about face and took a definitive
stand against divided custody:
There can be no doubt that experience shows that it is detrimental
to the best interests of a young child to have its custody and control
shifted often from one household to another and .to be changed
often from the discipline and teachings which are attempted to be
imparted by one custodian to that other discipline and teachings
sought to be imparted by another custodian. . . .It has been writ-
ten on the pages of all time that no man can serve two masters and
it is certainly true that no child can pursue a normal life when
subjected to the precepts, example and control of first one person
and then another, regardless of how well intentioned those persons
may be. 107
In another vacillation later that same year, the Florida Supreme Court
approved a divided custody award because both parents "were of highly
respectable character." 10 8
On the whole, the case law presumption in Florida against divided
custody was reaffirmed numerous times by the Supreme Court 09 and
Parental rights of the father growing out of the father's legal responsibil-
ity, as well as recognized moral obligation, to maintain and care for both
the mother and their children, when other considerations do not materially
preponderate against it in the interest of the welfare of children must be
accorded due consideration by a court in making an order, as to the cus-
tody of children heretofore enjoyed by the father.
Id. at 167, 147 So. at 467.
104. Id. at 167, 147 So. at 467.
105. Id. The daughter would spend nine months with the mother and three
months with the father.
106. Phillips v. Phillips, 153 Fla. 133, 13 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1943).
107. Id. at 134, 13 So. 2d at 923.
108. Watson v. Watson, 153 Fla. 668, 669, 15 So. 2d 446, 447 (1943) (emphasis
added). The children would spend six months with the mother and six months with the
father. A major factor was the fact both parents worked. The court stated: "This case
is typical of many that have from time to time changed the current of some phase of
the law;" the mother's working caused her to lose her preferential standing. Id.
109. Hurst v. Hurst, 158 Fla. 43, 27 So. 2d 749 (1946) (en banc) (tender years
doctrine used to invalidate divided custody), reh'g denied, Nov. 19, 1946; Jones v.
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the district courts of appeal. 110 Despite this reaffirmation, courts did
express approval of divided custody in certain situations having "special
circumstances or legally unequal facts."111 Thus divided custody was
not absolutely prohibited, and various forms were awarded by the
courts.112 The test seemed to be a weighing of factors including the
desire of the parties to have divided custody, the proximity of custodial
domiciles, the reasonableness of the periods of divided custody, the ages
and preference of the children, and, especially, the specific circum-
stances of each case.
1 1 3
Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 23 So. 2d 623 (1945).
110. Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (not
in best interests of child due to mutual antagonism between the parents); Garvey v.
Garvey, 383 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("joint" custody order reversed
based on psychologist's report); Peterseil v. Peterseil, 307 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Unger v. Unger, 306 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Ritzi v.
Ritzi, 160 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 146 So. 2d
397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (best interests of child used to invalidate divided
custody).
111. Wonsetler, 240 So. 2d at 871.
112. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(parents to alternate custody of eleven year old girl and fifteen year old boy on a yearly
basis), as clarified, Dec. 7, 1981; Forman v. Forman, 315 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (mother to share joint custody of minor son with maternal grandparents),
reh'g denied, July 22, 1975; Hare v. Potter, 233 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (remanded to determine periods of custody), reh'g denied, Apr. 30, 1970; Lin-
dgren v. Lindgren, 220 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (mother and father
alternate custody four days one week and three days the next week of twin daughters);
Bolton v. Gordon, 201 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (mother awarded
custody nine months to coincide with school year and father to have custody during the
three summer months); Udell v. Udell, 151 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.'App. 1963)
(joint custody awarded to both parents of thirteen year old and the court would "pro-
vide definite periods of time that each parent should have custody of this child if they
could not agree among themselves as to the hours of custody, etc." Id. at 865); Hutch-
inson v. Hutchinson, 127 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (father awarded
custody during school term and mother awarded custody during summer vacation);
Metz v. Metz, 108 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (father allowed to have
daughter with him in his home outside state during part of the summer vacation), reh'g
denied, Feb. 16, 1959.
See also, Brown v. Brown, 7 Fla. Law Weekly (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 24,
1982) (No. 82-771) (for award of split custody: fourteen year old daughter and sixteen
year old son to live with father, and three year old daughter to live with mother).
113. See, e.g., Gersovich v. Gersovich, 406 So. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (Fla. 5th
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Since none of the above alternative forms of custody previously
awarded in Florida- totally embrace the concept of shared responsibil-
ity,11 4 the courts in Florida will be applying an innovative concept.
IV. The Concept of Shared Parental Responsibility: Florida
Statutes Section 61.13115
A. Purposes of the Amendments
The purposes of the 1982 amendments are set forth in Florida
Statutes section 61.13. The intent of the legislature is clearly stated:
"It is the public policy of this state to assure each minor child frequent
and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have sepa-
rated or dissolved their marriage and to encourage parents to share the
rights and responsibilities of child-rearing." 1 " This portion of the stat-
ute recognizes the child's right to have access to both parents 1 7 and
requires each parent to acknowledge and recognize the other as a full
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also supra note 103.
114. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982). It is impossible to determine the num-
ber of separation agreements between parents in Florida which may have heretofore
incorporated this concept as these are not reported.
115. On October 8, 1982, the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Commit-
tee and Family Law Section presented a lecture program called The Anatomy of
Shared Parental Responsibility. The speakers will be quoted extensively in this section.
Their statements will be reflected in footnotes by citation to their name. They were in
order of their presentations:
Honorable Rosemary Barkett, Circuit Judge, 15th Judicial Circuit, West Palm
Beach, Florida.
James Fox Miller, Attorney, Hollywood, Florida.
Honorable Frank A. Orlando, Circuit Judge, 17th Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida.
Melvyn B. Frumkes, Attorney, Miami, Florida.
Honorable Lewis Kapner, Circuit Judge, 15th Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach,
Florida.
A course manual, also entitled ANATOMY OF SHARED PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY,
1982, was distributed and contained articles by the speakers above, as well as other
contributors [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. A copy of the MANUAL is on file in the
Nova Law Review office.
116. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96 (effective July 1, 1982).
117. Judge Barkett.
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parent and partner in the rearing of the child.""8 Implicit in the statute
is the recognition of the need to reeducate lawyers, judges,11 9 parents,
and the public in this "emotional field of the law.1120 The problems
caused by sole custody 21 should be abrogated by the shared parenting
aspect of the statute.
Looking to the construction of the language of this section, as well
as all the other sections of Florida Statutes section 61.13, it becomes
evident that an entirely new vocabulary is now to be incorporated into
Florida domestic relations law.122 Custody disputes are not suited to the
adversary system. Custody is not a vested right or award "fostered by
the present system which has awarded the 'prize' to the 'winner'. 1 23
No longer will "custody be awarded" or "visitation rights" be
delineated.1 24
The statute has more depth than just the matter of the above
stated semantics - it focuses on the child and who will be responsible
for raising the child.1 25 The term "children" in the plural form has
been changed to "each [minor] child"126 used in the singular form, her-
118. Judge Kapner.
119. "The legislature addressed the concept of shared parental responsibility not
because the courts were making such awards in inappropriate cases but because some
courts refused to do so even when clearly warranted." Kapner, Shared Parental Re-
sponsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 5.12 (emphasis in
original).
120. James Fox Miller.
121. For example, (1) the stigma attached to a mother without custody, (2) that
fathers who were just "visitors" acted as such, (3) that mothers who were "custodians"
used that power against the fathers, and (4) the custody battles and contempt orders
that accompanied the former. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Over-
view, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.3(a).
122. Judge Barkett.
123. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 1.3(a).
124. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states "the court shall deter-
mine all matters relating to custody ... " The words "award custody and visitation
rights" were deleted.
Suggested new terminology includes "access and contact" instead of the word visi-
tation. Melvyn Frumkes.
125. Judge Barkett.
126. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states in part: "The court
shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties. .. ."
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aiding a shift in focus from the needs of the children of a dissolved
marriage as an entity to be examined, to a recognition that each child's
needs in a family unit be examined separately to provide properly for
his welfare. 127
Since the purpose of the statute is to focus on each individual child
rather than rely on generalizations, the statute mandates the end of the
tender years doctrine.128 In this substantive change, the statute abro-
gated the judicial presumption that the mother of a child of tender
years shall be the designated custodian.129
Further reinforcement of the policy of encouraging shared partici-
pation in child-rearing can be found in Florida Statutes section
61.13(2)(b)3.130 By giving both parents access to all records and infor-
mation pertaining to a child, this section eliminates the "ownership"
aspect of child custody and makes possible effective co-parenting.,
Finally, by speaking in general terms of rights and responsibilities
of the child to be shared by the parents, the legislature, through Flor-
The word "children" was deleted.
127. "Florida courts have routinely held that it is error to divide children be-
tween parents. However, it is to be noted that Cha. 82-96 has reworded Section
61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, from 'rights of children' to 'custody of each minor child.'
Does this subtle change indicate a legislative intent to abrogate the former case law?
Your authors take no position and will wait appellate clarification thereof." Knight &
Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.31.
128. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states in part: "Upon consid-
ering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration
as the mother in determining custody regardless of the age of the child." (emphasis
added).
129. Judge Barkett.
Arguably, even though the legislature has mandated the demise of the tender
years doctrine, trial judges may continue to order custody of young children to
mothers, supporting it on theories of bonding between the mother and child due to the
care and feeding of tiny infants more typically done by the mother than by the father.
Even if there were evidence of shared responsibilities, some judges are constitutionally
more likely to believe that meaningful nurturing was done by the mother, i.e., if the
child was breast fed.
130. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)3. (1982) states: "Access to records and
information pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to medical, dental
and school records, shall not be denied to a parent because such parent is not the
child's primary residential parent."
131. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 1.3(b) and in presentation.
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ida Statutes section 61.13, "will signal to the public an expressed pub-
lic policy recognizing that divorcing parents do not divorce their chil-
dren in the process and that they continue to be jointly responsible for
them.,,ls2
B. Changes Mandated: The Statute and Its Implementation
1. Unrestricted Shared Parental Responsibility133
Florida Statutes section 61.13 creates a statutory presumption in
favor of sharing parental responsibility: "The Court shall order that
parental responsibility for a minor child shall be shared by both par-
ents unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be
detrimental to the child. ' 13 Use of this mandatory language makes
clear that a simple custody-visitation arrangement is no longer viable in
Florida.13 5
"Shared parental responsibility is defined to mean "that both par-
ents retain full parental rights and responsibilities with respect to their
child, and requires both parents to confer so that major decisions af-
fecting the welfare of the child will be determined jointly. ' 13, Because
the statute specifically separates the areas of "primary physical resi-
dence [and] shared parental responsibility," 137 this amendment and
definition contemplate the concept of joint legal custody rather than the
term joint custody itself, which connotes a combination of joint legal
and joint physical custody.138 The absence of the term "joint custody"
in the statute and the use of clearly defined new vocabulary precludes
132. Id.
133. This term appears in the MANUAL at page 4.18, adopted from the guide-
lines prepared by the Family Law Division, 13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough
County, Florida. Its definition follows the statute stating "both parents retain legal
responsibility and authority for the control and care of their child as they did when the
family was intact." Id.
134. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982) (emphasis added).
135. Judge Barkett.
136. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982) (emphasis added). It is anticipated the
meaning of the emphasized words will be heavily litigated.
137. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (1982).
138. Melvyn Frumkes, Judge Kapner. See also Knight & Pollock, Shared Pa-
rental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.5.
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any "preconceived connotations of shared parenting or joint custody"139
in Florida.
An order for shared parental responsibility may be established by
the court or by agreement by the parties,140 after review of the individ-
ual circumstances of each case.1 41 The best interests of the child re-
mains the primary consideration of the court.1 42 Because the parents
are in the best position to determine what is best for their own partici-
pation in child-rearing, agreements between the parents are en-
couraged.143 Therefore, there is no one "shared parental responsibility"
formula and arrangements will vary considerably.144
Courts consider a number of factors when determining whether
shared parenting is appropriate, including: (1) fitness of the parents, 145
139. Barkett, From Custody to Shared Parenting - An Overview, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 1.3(b).
140. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982) states in part: "In ordering
shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the expressed desires of the par-
ties. . . .Where it appears to the court to be in the best interests of the child, the
court may order or the parties may agree. . . ." (emphasis added).
141. Kapner, Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 5.41. See also pages 5.15 - .16 of the MANUAL quoting judicial
attitudes from a survey conducted among Florida Circuit Judges in 1977.
[V]irtually all the judges would grant shared parental responsibility, so as
defined, if the best interests of the children are served (95%), the parties
are agreeable to it (85%), or the children, being of sufficient age and ma-
turity, desire it, and the parties do not object (90%). The most popular
physical arrangement was nine months with one parent and three months
with the other. Most judges (80%) eschewed a general unspecified order of
shared parental responsibility or a six months - six months alternating ar-
rangement, and a slight majority opposed Monday through Thursday with
one parent and Friday to Monday with the other. Not surprisingly, the
more mature the parents and the better the parent-child relationships, the
more likely the judges were to order shared parental responsibility.
Id. at 5.15 - .16.
142. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
143. All the speakers stated this at one point in their discussions.
144. "The truth is that responsibility arrangements are as varied as are the situa-
tions and personalities of divorced parents, and more than one arrangement can be
fairly described as a 'true' shared parental responsibility arrangement." Kapner,
Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 5.2.
145. Id. at 5.23-.24.
Nova Law Journal 7:19831
123
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
17:1983 Sae aetlRsosblt 
0
(2) positive agreement of the parents,14 (3) preference of the chil-
dren,1 47 (4) ability and willingness of the parents to cooperate with
each other,1 48 (5) the particular psychological and emotional needs of
the children, 49 (6) the degree to which possible divided residential care
would disrupt the child's normal school and schedule, 5' and (7) the
age and maturity of the children.1 51 In the alternative, courts may em-
ploy a three prong test which directs the court to consider three essen-
tial factors. First, each parent must be individually fit to act as custo-
dian of the child. Second, the parents together must demonstrate an
ability to cooperate on matters affecting the child's welfare. The areas
in which cooperation is necessary range from practical considerations
to agreement on such fundamental issues as education, health care, dis-
cipline and religious training. Finally, if the above personal criteria are
met, the court, to protect the child's best interests, must be satisfied
that the proposed custodial arrangement is reasonable, and, on its face,
workable.1 52 Finally, the statute itself provides a guiding, but not exclu-
sive, list of ten factors affecting the best interests of the child.153
146. Id. at 5.25-.27.
147. Id. at 5.27-.29.
148. Id. at 5.30-.33.
149. Id. at 5.33-.34.
150. Id. at 5.34-.36.
151. Id. at 5.36-.40.
152. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.20.
153. Florida Statutes section 61.13(3) (1982) states:
(3) For purposes of shared parental responsibility and primary physi-
cal residence, the best interests of the child shall be determined by the
court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best welfare
and interests of the child, including, but not limited to:
(a) The parent who is more likely to allow the child fre-
quent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent.
(b) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parents and the child.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial
care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in
lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining
301 1Shared Parental Responsibility7:1983
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Because the statute places a high standard of cooperation on par-
ents, specificity is imperative (1) in the delineation of what shared re-
sponsibility is to constitute for a given family and (2) for the continu-
ing success of the arrangement decided upon."" In addition, since the
statute contemplates joint legal custody and a judicial presumption ex-
ists in Florida against "divided" custody, 55 it is probable a child may
properly reside most of the year with one parent (i.e. primary resi-
dence), subject to reasonable "contact" (visitation) with the other par-
ent (i.e. secondary residence). However, both parents should have
shared control of the child's upbringing, care and education and equal
voice in decisions pertaining to the child's health, education, religious
training, vacations, etc.150
The statute requires parents to confer on these major decisions.
The requirement to confer, and the absence of the word "agree" in the
statute, provides legislative recognition that parents who are divorced
may be unable to agree but can be expected to confer and cooperate
continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the parents.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parents.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding,
and experience to express a preference.
0) Any other factor considered by the court to be rele-
vant to a particular child custody dispute.
Id.
154. James Fox Miller, Melvyn Frumkes. See also Frumkes, Negotiating and
Drafting a Shared Parental Responsibility Agreement, MANUAL, supra note 115, at
4.1-.34 (therein are sample clauses to provide for any possible contingency, i.e. "emer-
gency decisions - unilateral permitted; [minimum] contact and access by the non-
residential parent; name to be maintained; failure to exercise [contact and access], no
waiver; daily decision- making responsibility; contingency for future change in circum-
stances; provision for future possible necessity of mediation and conciliation") (text
relating to each of these clauses has been deleted).
155. Judge Barkett.
156. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.5.
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with each other on major decisions in the best interests of the child.15 7
As a practical matter, minor decisions "such as what and when to eat,
when to do chores, and when to go to bed (i.e. day to day disciplines)
should be decided by the parent with whom the child's primary physi-
cal residence is maintained."158
Shared parental responsibility allows each parent to have his or
her wishes heard. Perhaps more importantly for the child, shared pa-
rental responsibility attempts to approximate as much as possible the
prior intact family unit.15' Additional benefits of the thus created
greater stability of the parental relationship, along with great psycho-
logical, philosophical, and physical involvement with the child by both
parents, hopefully will perpetuate the cycle of shared parenting cooper-
ation and flexibility160 and outweigh any risks.16'
2. Restricted Shared Parental Responsibility162
If it is determined by a Florida court that "shared parental re-
157. Judge Barkett, Judge Kapner.
158. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility. MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.5.
159. Kapner, Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 5.8.
160. Id. at 5.6-.13.
161. Id. at 5.13-.14.
For example, if factors such as parental maturity or fitness are negative,
shared responsibility, because of its greater reliance on cooperation and
flexibility, could run the risk of greater manipulation and arguments by
both the child and the parents. A child who is shuttled back and forth
between hostile parents of sharply different life-styles and disciplinary atti-
tudes can only experience more difficult adjustment problems than other-
wise. Some critics have opposed shared or joint responsibility on the
grounds that "change and discontinuity threaten the child's emotional
well-being; that joint custody requires the 'shuttling back and forth' of
children, leading to lack of stability in the home environment; that chil-
dren may become prey to severe and crippling loyalty conflicts."
Id.
162. This term appears in the MANUAL, supra note 115, at 4.18, adopted from
the guidelines prepared by the Family Law Division, 13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsbor-
ough County, Florida. Its definition follows Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1982):
In restricted shared parental responsibility, each parent's division of re-
sponsibility is set out. Areas of decision-making include, but are not lim-
3031
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sponsibility" is inappropriate in a given situation, the next statutory
alternative is not sole responsibility. 163 Rather, "parents may agree as
to the division of various aspects of parental responsibility although the
court has authority to reject and/or modify any such agreement"1 64 or
"the court may apportion the various aspects of parental care and con-
trol between the parties if such apportionment is: a) agreed to by the
parties or b) found by the court to be in the best interests of the
child."""'
Restricted shared parental responsibility is provided for in Florida
Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.a. 66 This section of the statute is of
prime importance. It recognizes individual family uniqueness and gives
statutory authority for the myriad of orders that now can arise from
Florida Statutes section 61.13. Most importantly, it can be the basis for
awarding physical custody six months to one parent and six months to
the other or monthly variations thereof.1 6 7
ited to: residential care, education, religious, moral, disciplinary, medical
and dental, social, recreational, legal, travel and financial. Where the court
designates one parent as having primary responsibility, the court should do
so only after a finding that that parent is more likely to allow the child
frequent and continuing contact with the other parent.
Id. at 4.18-.19 (emphasis original).
163. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982).
164. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility MANUAL,,Supra note
115, at 1.19.
165. Id. at 1.18.
166. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.a. (1982) states in part:
In ordering shared parental responsibility the court may consider the ex-
pressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the ultimate
responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or may divide
those aspects between the parties based on the best interests of the child.
When it appears to the court to be in the best interests of the child, the
court may order or the parties may agree how any such responsibility will
be divided. Such areas of responsibility may include primary physical resi-
dence, education, medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities
which the court finds unique to a particular family and/or in the best in-
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3. Sole Parental Responsibility
The final statutory alternative of sole parental responsibility is not
favored in the statute and may only be ordered where the court has
determined that shared parental responsibility, whether unrestricted or
restricted, would be detrimental to the child.16 8 Detrimental is a
stronger term than "against the best interests of the child"' 169 and car-
ries with it a higher burden of proof on the parent requesting sole pa-
rental responsibility or on the court ordering it. 70 It is suggested that a
balancing test be applied and only when the risks of shared parenting
outweigh the benefits can the presumption in favor of shared parental
responsibility be overriden.17"
Sole parental responsibility implies parents are incapable of con-
ferring and cooperating and also "implies that the relationship with one
parent will-and-should be limited."1 2 Arguably, it may even be re-
quired173 that an agreement by the parents, who desire and have mutu-
ally agreed upon sole responsibility, shall state a finding "that shared
parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child."17 This may
168. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982) states in part: "If the court
determines that shared responsibility would be detrimental to the child, the court may
order sole parental responsibility." (emphasis added).
Sole parental responsibility is defined in section 61.13(2)(b)2.b. as: "responsibility
for the minor child ...given to one parent by the court, with or without rights of
visitation to the other parent." (emphasis added).
In section 61.13(2)(b)2.b., the word "visitation" is used. It is the opinion of this
author that the word as used in this section is in direct conflict with the deletion of the
same word in section 61.13(2)(b)1., and in conflict with the recognized need for new
terminology in the statute. It is therefore this author's recommendation that the word
"visitation" be replaced with the words "contact and access" by the legislature. "Con-
tact and access" are words borrowed from Melvyn Frumkes and appear in the MAN-
UAL, supra note 115, at 4.2-.3.
169. Judge Kapner.
170. Kapner, Shared Parental Responsibility: Is It For Everyone?, MANUAL,
supra note 115, at 5.7.
171. Id. at 5.14.
172. Id.
173. Divergence of view exists regarding whether an agreement or order for sole
responsibility must track the words "detrimental to the child" if both parents have
agreed that the sole responsibility is best for them. Judge Barkett and Melvyn Frumkes
said the words must appear; Judge Kapner said they need not appear.
174. FLA. STAX. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
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raise a constitutional issue. Parents may balk at being required to track
the words of the statute in a voluntary agreement for sole responsibil-
ity. If challenged, a requirement of including the exact language of the
statute in an agreement could be found to be an unconstitutional usur-
pation of parental rights when forced on parents against their will.1"5
4. Modification of a Previously Rendered Custody Award
Until the 1982 enactment of Florida Statutes section 61.13, Flor-
ida case law prescribed a material change of circumstances to warrant
modification of child custody. This may no longer be true in Florida;
there are three possible approaches to modification of custody as a re-
sult of the 1982 revisions to the statute. 17 6
Chapter 82-96, section 2 states that "the provisions of this act
shall be applicable to all proceedings under Chapter 61, Florida Stat-
utes, that are pending on the effective date of this act," 177 and section
4178 provides for a liberal construction of the statute. The above sec-
tions read in conjunction with the discretionary powers vested in the
courts by the legislature 17 9 furnish the basis for the alternative argu-
175. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). Based on this case, the State
of Florida may have to justify by clear and convincing evidence the intrusion on paren-
tal rights if the statute is interpreted to require a statement of a finding that shared
responsibility is detrimental to the child, if forced on parents against their wishes and
belief when they both desire sole responsibility for personal reasons.
Arguably, though, Santosky may not be applicable; it is a termination of parental
rights case and the issues as to custody and visitation may be considered entirely differ-
ent. Appellate review may clarify this issue.
176. Until a case reaches the Florida District Court of Appeal on this issue for
clarification, it is uncertain as to which standard will apply. This was a topic of discus-
sion at the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Committee Course on October 8,
1982. The possible positions discussed infra pages 306-309 come either from that
course or from the course manual.
177. 1982 FLA. LAWS ch. 82-96, § 3 (emphasis added). The word "pending" is
not defined by the legislature.
But see Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.24-.25 for Florida case law definitions of "pending."
178. Florida Laws chapter 82-96, section 4 (1982) states that "the provisions of
this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this
act." (emphasis added).
179. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
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ments on the central issue: In a court determination of a previously
rendered custody award, is the newly amended Florida Statutes section
61.13 enough of a changed circumstance itself to sustain a petition for
modification?
An unchanging court, following established case law,180 would say
no.181 A well-established rule of statutory construction states "that in
the absence of clear legislative expression to the contrary, a law is pre-
sumed to operate prospectively."1 82 This is to enable parties to rely on
the substantive rights created by the statute prior to the 1982 revi-
sions.183 Therefore, the prior two-prong test for modification 8 4 would
remain the standard of review under this view and "the provisions of
Cha. 82-96 should not be applied to proceedings for modification begun
prior to the effective date of Cha. 82-96 if a final judgment of dissolu-
tion of marriage awarding custody has previously been rendered."' 1815
Under this conservative view, Florida Statutes section 61.13 cannot be
the sole basis for modification of a prior custody award. 186
On the other hand, a liberal court could find that there is clear
legislative expression in the statute1 7 to warrant finding the statute
180. See, e.g., Frazier v. Frazier, 109 Fla. 164, 147 So. 464 (Fla. 1933).
181. "Where child custody award is rendered prior to the effective date of chap-
ter 82-96, such child custody award may not be modified without a substantial change
of circumstances." Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra
note 115, at 1.26. Melvyn Frumkes also holds this view.
182. Id. at 1.23. But by examining the statute itself, it could be argued the legis-
lature, by specific changes, has implied the contrary. Florida Statutes section
61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) which states in part: "The court shall determine all matters relat-
ing to the custody of each minor child of the parties as a part of any proceeding under
this chapter. . . ." The words emphasized were added in the 1982 revision. In addi-
tion, the words that had previously followed chapter - "for dissolution of marriage"
- were deleted. These changes could indicate a broader, rather than narrower, reading
of the above phrase.
183. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.23.
184. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
185. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.25.
186. Id. at 1.26. Two additional arguments are set forth on pages 1.26-.27.
187. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982) states in part: "It is the public
policy of this state. . . to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of
child-rearing." See also supra note 183.
307 1Shared Parental Responsibility
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alone provides standing to seek modification. Under this view, because
the legislative public policy statement is clear and the provisions of the
act are to "be liberally construed to effectively carry out the purposes
of this act,"188 it could be argued the aforementioned rule of statutory
construction is inapplicable. Therefore, a court adhering to this broad
view would allow a modification proceeding based solely upon the
changed circumstance of the revised Florida Statutes section 61.13,189
even if a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding custody
has previously been rendered. 190
Adhering to a middle-of-the-road view, a moderate court may find
standing to seek modification dependent on the specific circumstances
in each case.191 A threshold of changed circumstances would probably
still be required. 92 If a prior modification order came about after liti-
gation of a custody dispute and the court based its decision on the prior
facts and law, the court may be able to review the order if it appears
the parties requested and were refused shared parental responsibility
because of the then existing law.193
Until this issue receives appellate review in Florida, no clear stan-
dard may exist as to modification of a previously rendered custody
188. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
189. Judge Barkett holds this view. Judge Barkett also stated that where a prior
custody order was followed by numerous contempt hearings, review should be allowed.
190. Thus, a judge could give retroactive application to chapter 82-96 and not
address the issue of impairment of vested rights. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental
Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.28-.29.
191. Judge Kapner holds this view.
192. According to Judge Kapner, if the child is now much older than when the
original custody agreement was made, this fact alone could be enough of a changed
circumstance to authorize standing to seek modification. This would seem to be a lesser
burden of proof than substantial or material change required by prior Florida case law.
See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
Also, Judge Kapner suggests the intent of the original agreement between the par-
ties could be examined. Even though a pre-existing agreement does not reflect the lan-
guage of shared responsibility, if the parties intended to share parental responsibility,
the order may be changed to reflect the new terminology of Florida Statutes section
61.13 (1982).
193. Judge Kapner. Shared parental responsibility may now only be refused
upon a finding that such an order would be detrimental to the child. FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
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5. Grandparents Given Standing to Enforce Visitation
Florida Statutes section 61.13 has been amended to provide grand-
parents with "legal standing to seek judicial enforcement" of an award
of visitation.195 "It is unclear whether or not grandparents have legal
standing to file or participate in an initial petition or a petition for
modification of a final judgment so as toobtain visitation privileges.",,"
Since, under Florida Statutes section 61.13, the court shall determine
all matters relating to custody in accordance with the Uniform Child
Custody Act197 which provides that all parties with an interest in the
proceeding should be named, there is an argument for allowing grand-
parents to participate in either petition.1 98 Also, "if the grandparents do
not commence a proceeding, there seems to be no prohibition against a
trial court modifying a custody award so as to grant grandparents visi-
tation and allowing grandparents to participate in the proceeding."1 9
C. Can It Work?: Problems and Their Possible Resolution
Florida Statutes section 61.13 now specifically encourages parents
to share all the rights and responsibilities of raising a child,20 0 and rec-
ognizes that a myriad of alternative orders may result.201 Setting aside
the major unresolved judicial issue of modification,202 there will be
three general problem areas for parties in reaching an agreement of
shared parental responsibility: "(1) division of time; (2) issues concern-
194. The entire panel of speakers agreed to the lack of consensus as to how this
issue will be resolved in the courts.
195. Florida Statutes section 61.13(2)(b)2.c. (1982) states in part: "Grandpar-
ents shall have legal standing to seek judicial enforcement of such an award."
196. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.29-.30.
197. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
198. MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.30, (citing Putnal v. Putnal, 3,92 So. 2d 613
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
199. Id.
200. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)1. (1982).
201. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)2. (1982).
202. See supra notes 176-94.and accompanying text.
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ing the child's welfare; and (3) money."203 Again, all of these can be
handled in an infinite number of ways depending on the specific cir-
cumstances of each family.
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage where there are minor
children, the court has the authority to: "Order either or both parties to
consult with a marriage counselor, psychologist, psychiatrist, minister,
priest, rabbi or any other person deemed qualified by the court and
acceptable to the party or parties ordered to seek consultation,"' ' to
aid the parties in coming to an agreement. Extra judicial means of res-
olution are necessary both to reach such an agreement and to decide
any unforseeable disputes. 5
In conjunction with the amendments Florida Statutes section
61.13 passed under 1982 Florida Laws chapter 82-96, Florida Statutes
section 61.21 was created to authorize the counties in Florida to "es-
tablish a family mediation or conciliation service to assist parties in
resolving any controversy involving the family." 06 This statute also
provides that the court can refer the parties to the service upon motion
of a party or upon its own motion; 07 that all verbal and written com-
munications which occur during the mediation or conciliation proceed-
ings be considered confidential and inadmissible as evidence in subse-
quent legal proceedings, unless the parties agree otherwise; 208 and that
203. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.22. Specificity in all three general areas of potential dispute is absolutely
necessary for shared responsibility to be successful.
A major specific problem to be addressed relates to Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So.
2d 27 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), a recent decision which appears to inhibit the
ability of the primary residential parent to leave Florida, notwithstanding the absence
of specific words in an agreement to that effect. Melvyn Frumkes suggested that speci-
ficity in an agreement on this issue is necessary as a result of GiachettL
204. FLA. STAT. § 61.052(2)(b)(1) quoted by Knight & Pollock, Shared Paren-
tal Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.32.
205. Knight & Pollock, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 1.22.
206. Florida Statutes section 61.21(1) (1982) states: "Counties may establish a
family mediation or conciliation service to assist parties in resolving any controversy
involving the family." (emphasis added).
207. Florida Statutes section 61.21(2) (1982) states: "The court on its own mo-
tion or on motion of a party may refer the parties to this service." (emphasis added).
208. Florida Statutes section 61.21(3) (1982) states: "All verbal or written com-
munications in mediation or conciliation proceedings shall be confidential and inadmis-
sible las evidence in any subsequent legal proceeding, unless both parties agree
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a family mediation and conciliation service serves a valid purpose and
is authorized to be funded either by general county revenues or by levy-
ing a service charge of no more than two dollars on any circuit court
proceeding.20 9 This "court-connected alternative to the adversary pro-
cess" is the legislative answer to the unique problems in the area of
domestic relations. 210
Florida Statutes section 61.21 contains no provision mandating
mediation or conciliation. Also, this statute does not effectuate the
court's determination because all happenings during mediation are con-
fidential and inadmissible in court unless the parties agree otherwise.
This is where this new shared parental responsibility statute falls short.
Recognizing that agreements between the parties are to be encouraged
and that very few of the shared responsibility agreements will be done
within the framework of the adversary system in court,211 the imple-
mentation of the purposes of Florida Statutes section 61.13 cannot be
accomplished without further action by the legislature. Arguably at
least one mediation session, preferably a minimum of three should be
required. 212 Although a counter-argument can be made that parties
should not be forced into mediation,13 in order to (1) identify the par-
otherwise."
209. Florida Statutes section 61.21(4) (1982) states: "A family mediation or
conciliation service is hereby declared to serve a valid public purpose. The board of
county commissioners may support such a service by appropriating moneys from
county revenues or by levying a service charge of no more than $2 on any circuit court
proceeding."
210. Orlando, Mediation and Conciliation Under Section 61.21, MANUAL, supra
note 115, at 3.1. Judge Orlando defines mediation and conciliation, and distinguishes
them from negotiation and arbitration. Id. at 3.1-.2.
211. Judge Orlando.
212. Judge Orlando said that ninety-five percent of the parties after three ses-
sions of mediation come to some agreement or overcome post-judgment problems. See
also Joint Custody Legislation Passed by 23 States, supra note 2, at 2507:
The new Iowa statute which takes effect July 1, 1982 ... stipulates that
on the application of either parent, the court shall consider granting joint
custody even in cases where the parents do not agree to it. Before ruling on
the petition in such a case, the court may require the parties to participate
in custody mediation counseling to determine whether joint custody is in
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ties as good candidates for shared parental responsibility,214 (2) aid
parties in the stress of divorce to reach the specificity of agreement that
will be necessary on the logistics of shared parental responsibility, (3)
resolve problems, and (4) to truly lessen litigation in this area,215
mandatory mediation sessions with some form of court access to recom-
mendations of the mediator, will assist in making the shared parental
responsibility enactment, Statutes section 61.13, workable in the state
of Florida.2"'
V. Conclusion
With the enactment of the 1982 revisions to Florida Statutes sec-
tion 61.13, the Florida legislature reaffirmed the court's wide discretion
in the area of child custody to focus on the specific circumstances of
the case and to determine what is in the best interests of the child. The
legislature has incorporated by statute joint legal custody, using the
innovative terminology of shared responsibility.
By creating a presumption for shared parental responsibility and
expressing, in mandatory language, Florida's public policy of encourag-
ing both parents to share the rights and responsibilities of raising the
child, courts must make all efforts to accomplish that end. Specific
214. Knight & Pollock, Shared Parental Responsibility, MANUAL, supra note
115, at 1.21-.22.
215. There is concern that Florida Statutes section 61.13 (1982) will result in an
overload of cases flooding the courts. During the panel discussion on October 8, 1982, a
suggestion arose that Florida should join many other states in creating a family court
division in which judges would only hear domestic relations problems. To prevent high
"burn-out" of judges in this emotional area, it was suggested also that this division be
"underloaded." Melvyn Frumkes and James Fox Miller agreed with creating a family
court division in Florida.
216. In California, mediation is mandatory where there is a custody issue. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1982).
Judge Orlando stated that at the present time it would appear that private practi-
tioners in Florida cannot provide mediation services because of ethics problems. Or-
lando, The Nuts and Bolts of Mediation, MANUAL, supra note 115, at 3.6. As media-
tion becomes a more widely used tool and recognized as a means to incorporate shared
parental responsibility in agreements thus lessening litigation, alternatives to the ethics
problems facing attorneys arguably should be considered. The county-formed family
mediation or conciliation service may not be able to handle alone the large number of
possible parties. FLA. STAT. § 61.21(1), (4) (1982).
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guidelines are provided to aid the court in its determination. The judi-
cial presumption against divided custody makes it unlikely that the
physical residence of the child will be equally shared six months with
each parent. But if the circumstances so warrant, i.e. equally divided
physical custody is workable for the family, the statute provides the
authority for the courts to so order.
Parents are now expected to confer on major aspects of child-rear-
ing although agreement between the parents is not required in the stat-
ute. Should it become evident to the court that the parents are unable
to confer, a variety of orders may result, thus dividing ultimate respon-
sibility for aspects of child-rearing between the two. Sole responsibility
is the last alternative, only ordered upon a showing that shared respon-
sibility would be detrimental to the child's best interests.
In addition to the changes in semantics and the increased empha-
sis on individual circumstances, the Florida legislature has accom-
plished specific substantive changes. The demise of the tender years
doctrine is statutorily mandated. Grandparents now have standing to
seek judicial enforcement of a visitation award. The parent with whom
the child does not primarily reside now has access to records pertaining
to that child.
However, certain problem areas remain. Until a modification peti-
tion receives appellate review, the standard of review for modification
of custody remains uncertain. Although the legislature authorized a
new statute providing for mediation and arbitration, there is no
mandatory participation required as an extra-judicial means for the
parents in executing and implementing a custody agreement. Until re-
education of parents, citizens, and attorneys occurs regarding the
meaning of shared responsibility, the fears and reluctance related to
this joint legal custody statute will slow its total implementation by the
courts and full incorporation in agreements. Finally, we must await ju-
dicial clarification of the 1982 revisions of Florida's shared parental
responsibility statute through appellate review to provide full under-
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Introduction
"The Fortune Teller" is a painting attributed to the French seven-
teenth century artist Georges de La Tour and is believed to have been
painted between 1632 and 1635. It hangs in the Metropolitan Museum
of Art and is in the center of a controversy that has spanned two conti-
nents and still has not been definitively settled. The painting was pur-
chased by the museum for $675,000 in 1968 and several distinguished
critics have branded it a fake. They claim it is a forgery." One might
1. Hochfield, Can the Fortune Teller be Trusted?, ART NEWS, Summer 1982, at
137
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
316 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
wonder how a museum of the caliber of the Metropolitan Museum of
Art could have been so incompetent as to have bought such a lemon.
Others might wonder why the issue-whether it is or is not a fake-is
still not settled to everybody's satisfaction. The issue that should grab
center stage, however, is: Why does this painting, bought by the mu-
seum as a great work of art and enjoyed as such for an extended period
of time, lessen in value when its authorship becomes doubtful? Does it
really make any difference by whom or when it was painted? Is the test
of greatness the aesthetic appeal, the ability of the work to be univer-
sally enjoyed, or is it defined in more concrete mundane terms? These
questions are significant ones to be answered in the context of forgery
and the art market and in consideration of the legal ramifications of a
situation such as the one exemplified by "The Fortune Teller."
There have been many hoaxes and forgeries throughout history;
Van Meegeren's faked Vermeers are among the most notable.' In
many of these situations, as with Van Meegeren's forgeries, the works
of art were enjoyed and mistaken for the originals. They provided aes-
thetic pleasure for the average person, and even the experts could not
tell the difference. Why then do we brand such works as forgeries or
fakes and provide legal penalties and remedies? In what context are
these remedies and penalties established, and how adequate are they?
Why do we have such difficulty in accepting a work of art once we have
discovered it is a forgery? The "fake" painting or other work of art has
the aesthetic qualities of composition, color, harmony, power, and
whatever else one wants to attribute to aestheticism. Logically, there is
no reason not to accept the work and value it.
Other cultures like the ancient Egyptians and Chinese made no
distinction between copies and originals. There was no stigma attached
to acquiring or making a copy. The Romans and Greeks commissioned
and collected copies. During the Renaissance an acknowledged imita-
tion could bring as much as half the price of the original. In the seven-
teenth century Emperor Rudolf II sent court painters to copy the best
of Venice and Rome. Experts today still have trouble distinguishing
these paintings from the originals.$ In Germany, if a work in one of
their museums was determined to be a fake the word "nach" ("in the
2. L. ADAMS, ART ON TRIAL 115 (1976).
3. Banfield, Art Versus Collectibles, HARPERS, Aug. 1982, at 28, 31.
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manner of") was put before the artist's name. The work could then be
celebrated for its own merits and appeal.4 The art historian Walter
Pach wrote that until modern times "copies, imitations; and even for-
geries were made by men of such talent that the works possess qualities
connoisseurs value in themselves." 5 Today, however, our experience and
view of art have shifted along with changes in culture, economics, and
aesthetic values. To understand a problem such as forgery, it is perti-
nent for one to analyze it in relation to these changes-to look at it
philosophically, historically, and legally. Art related problems such as
forgery have arisen in the context of our culture and the art market,
and our response and law reflect these factors.
I. Art Forgery-A Philosophical Enigma
In 1962 the Fogg Museum of Harvard University held an exhibi-
tion intentionally displaying copies along with original works. The
guests were art connoisseurs who were to decide which was which.
Among the items exhibited were an original portrait by Annibale Car-
racci, an important painter of the Italian baroque, and a copy of that
work. An original Picasso and two forgeries of the same were also dis-
played. Many of the experts incorrectly picked the forgeries instead of
the originals.' Therefore, the disturbing question arises whether these
forgeries or copies then became less beautiful or less valuable because
painted by somebody else. "The fact that even professional experts are
unable to point out the difference in artistic merit between the true and
the false Picasso, Carracci, or Vermeer is conclusive proof that no such
difference can be registered by the laymen's eyes."' If we do not see
any difference is there really an artistic difference? Are we so myopic
that a signature or the postmark of a period is more important than the
intrinsic beauty of the object itself?
The answer lies in contemplation of the total art experience. Art
does not live in a vacuum of aesthetic beauty but reflects the values,
psyche, and structure of the people and society in which it was created.
4. G. APOLLINAIRE, APPOLLINAIRE ON ART: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS 1902-1918,
at 10 (1972).
5. Banfield, supra note 3, at 31.
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Our attitude towards art-how we value it aesthetically-is tied to
other factors as well. If one was to return home and say he met some-
one who looked like Elizabeth Taylor, that would not have the same
value as one who could claim he met the actual Mrs. Taylor.8 So it is
with art. As people, we are imbued with a system of value and criteria
of excellence and worth. We have a sense of history from which art as
well as other life experiences cannot be isolated. There is a "magical
pull" inside of us that enhances the experience when we know it is real
or historic. The shirt with a spot of blood becomes more alluring when
it belongs to Rommel. Napoleon's inkpot or a galley proof corrected by
Tolstoy himself possesses a magic that we cannot escape.' Perhaps this
stems from a belief by "[o]ur forbears ...that an object that had
been in the possession of a person became imbued with his emanations,
and in turn emanated something of his substance."10
The art experience is a subjective one; all that has really changed
when we discover a forgery is our own subjective experience. Only then
does the work become less valued. We attribute to the original or au-
thenticated version inordinate importance rooted in an almost uncon-
scious feeling state of awe and magic.
The second process that interferes with our acceptance of forgeries
or copies is "period consciousness." We look at art in the context of its
history and its place in that history as well as in the context of isolated
present experience. There is a relativism of aesthetic judgment that
makes allowances and perverts our scale of values. Much of art is only
appreciated in the context of its place in the development of styles of
art and if taken out of that context would be considered junk."1
Thirdly, our aesthetic interest as a matter of psychology is tied to
pecuniary interest and the realities of an art market. Many people find
things beautiful in direct relation to their cost. Costliness is associated
with power, fame, respect, and awe. Cost stirs the emotions which are
then transferred to the work of art and contributes to aesthetic atti-
tudes.1 2 It would probably be safe to say that some people who stood in
line to look at "Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer," after the
8. Banfield, supra note 3, at 34.
9. Koestler, supra note 6, at 53.
10. Id. at 52.
11. Id. at 53.
12. Banfield, supra note 3, at 34.
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Metropolitan Museum of Art paid six million dollars to get it, would
have just as soon stood in the same line to see six million dollars in
cash. 13 It is therefore apparent, although perhaps illogical, that to "the
extent that these nonaesthetic feelings are linked with aesthetic ones,
the public will not accept a perfect copy as a perfect substitute for the
original. 14
Lastly, a person who buys a forged work of art or the artist whose
work is forged or misrepresented is injured in his possession or in his
interest. There is an interference with the individual freedom of the
victim. There is an infringement on the personal expression of the artist
that is offensive to many people. There is frustration of purpose for the
artist in his desire to express his individuality and a frustration of the
collector's quest for truth in beauty or aesthetics."' The fraud is per-
ceived as a degradation. It is out of step with the social tenets of mod-
ern society and is an imposition upon one's desire for truth. "It threat-
ens and abuses the possessions, values and interests of the individual
and society."16 It is an aggressive act.17
II. Art Forgery-A Reflection of the History and
Development of the Art Market
A. Early History
"Art history is traditionally taught in visual terms and rarely ex-
amines either the society influencing the artist or the market that ab-
sorbs the work."18 To understand the current highly competitive struc-
ture of the art market and its impact on society including the present
legal ramifications, it is instructive to understand how this market
developed.
Historically, art forgery and art fraud did not become an offense
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Wurtenberger, Criminal Damage to Art-A Criminological Study, 14 DE
PAUL L. REv. 83, 88 (1964).
16. Id. at 85.
17. Id. at 83.
18. P. FRISCHER & J. ADAMS, THE ARTIST IN THE MARKET PLACE 21 (1980)
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under English law until 1562. There were a variety of punishments.
They included having both ears cut off, standing in the pillory, slitting
and searing the nostrils, forfeiting land, or even imposing perpetual im-
prisonment. In the seventeenth century capital punishment was in-
cluded. Since that time there have been a hoard of statutes, but the
penalties have lightened. Han van Meegeren made over half a million
pounds from his forgeries and received only a one year sentence.19
Today this type of crime is considered more or less "white collar."
Generally, the federal and state criminal statutes have been ineffective
in reducing the amount of forged and faked works in circulation. Most
of the applicable statutes are general antifraud statutes imposing rela-
tively minor penalties. Only a few states have statutes that specifically
deal with art fraud.20 Therefore, in pursuing a remedy one, for the
most part, must rely on civil remedies applying contract and tort law
principles. These are not always satisfactory to the victim of the fraud
who, while participating in the art market, has invested a great deal of
time, money, and emotion.21
Originally there was no free market in art as we know it today;
therefore, art forgery was not a profitable viable alternative. The con-
cept of the creative artist as distinct from the artisan is relatively new.
The status of the artist until the fourteenth century was that of a work-
man.22 Almost all painters also worked as decorators. They might be
called upon to paint walls or to decorate furniture panels. 3 The artist
in Greek or Roman times was treated as a carpenter or mason. He
usually did not create a work unless it was ordered in advance because
the risk of not selling it was great. 4
The role of the artist became more important with the growth of
the power of the Church. However, the Church controlled the artist's
creativity. It dictated what was acceptable and had a pervasive influ-
ence on the composition and execution of works of art. The clergy were
19. J. MILLS & J. MANSFIELD, THE GENUINE ARTICLE 12 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as J. MILLS].
20. R. DUFFY, ART LAW: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS, AND COLLECTORS
12 (1977).
21. Id. at 13.
22. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at 22.
23. G. SAVAGE, FORGERIES, FAKES & REPRODUCTIONS 2 (1964).
24. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at 22.
1320 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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the organizational go-betweens in art dealings so they had to be
obeyed.25
At the time of the Renaissance the painters of pictures were re-
garded as the social equivalents of craftsmen. These painters were usu-
ally skilled in several related crafts and were commissioned by patrons
who exercised some control over the work. During this period, it was
known for an artist of note to make a replica of the work of another to
fulfill a patron's order. (Of course, there were no copyright acts.) These
duplicate works would not be regarded as forgeries today; but, there
are implications in terms of possible misrepresentations which might
arise when, along with the effect of time on the work, a copyist compe-
tently imitates the style, materials, and methods of a master. The prob-
lem becomes one of attribution.2
Most artists were members of guilds. These guilds were trade
unions and often controlled the materials used and the terms of sale.
They examined the quality of the work produced condemning that
which was inferior. Much of the artist's work was done with the aid of
apprentices and employees. However, the influence of the master would
predominate in the style of the work. For example, the face in a por-
trait might be painted by the master but the background filled in by
another. Replicas of paintings would be ordered from the artist and
carried out by a workman under his supervision. The buyers of the time
were well aware of the nature of their purchase and made no demand
that the master should execute every aspect of the creative process
from priming the canvas to the finishing touches and signature.2 7 "The
signature was not the hallmark of genius, it was the trade-mark of the
studio. 28 Today the fashion is for the personality cult. Collectors de-
mand the unaided work of the artist. As a result, such work has more
value than composites or replicas done by others, thus paving the way
for art fraud, false attribution, and forgery.
Toward the end of the sixteenth century creativity was elevated to
a new position of recognition. There began a transformation of the art-
ist from artisan to creative human being. The idea espoused was that
25. Id.
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since artists could translate God's creations into recognizable form,
they must be closer to God than other people. Now the artist was in
demand rather than the subject. Therefore, a work of art for the first
time became subject to the laws of supply and demand. The notion of
art for profit and investment was created, and some painters such as
Raphael were in much demand and profited enormously, although most
still lived in poverty.2 9
This market in art gave the artist and his work a new status and
created an elitism in art. The high cost of procurring an artist's services
due to these laws of supply and demand made art less available to the
ordinary person and produced a wide division between art and the
lower classes. The emerging role of the artist at the height df the Ren-
aissance, especially in Italy, was no longer compatible with the
Mechanical Arts and the guilds. The artist became the companion and
friend of princes. He was sought after and fought over by rival patrons
seeking the fruits of his genius. This was in marked contrast with his
role in the Middle Ages of the humble artist-decorator.30 However, the
Church still retained a great deal of control. For many artists it was
their main sponsor and sole means of support.
As the struggle against the reformation developed, the Church
tightened its control decreeing what should be painted, and many of
the gains toward artistic individuality were stifled. The artist was once
again an extension of the Church with little room to freely express or
create. Art was brought back to the people reducing it from the elite
status of the Renaissance."
It was not until Louis XIV of France that artists were again ele-
vated to a high status. Louis used art to enhance the splendor of his
court. He exercised control by making the artists civil servants who had
to satisfy the king to be paid. However, Louis' extravagances began to
bankrupt the state and the position of the artist was again threatened.
The artist now had to turn to the open market for a living. He had to
struggle to survive without the support of the king as did all members
of the lower class.32
29. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at 24.
30. G. KEEN, THE SALE OF WORKS OF ART 21 (1971).
31. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at-24-25.
32. Id. at 26.
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During this time Dutch painters, foreshadowing the twentieth cen-
tury artists, had been fighting for survival in the open market. They
were basically free of the religious and political restrictions that bound
artists elsewhere in Europe. They produced paintings at will relying on
their sales to make a living. This period saw the rise of the middle class
collector in northern Europe while the fervor of the Italian Renaissance
in art was essentially limited to the rich and noble and the Church.33
The Dutch were aware of art as an investment and pushed collect-
ing to extremes, creating a glut on the market which resulted in low
prices. Artists had to turn to other employment. Some such as Vermeer
and Rembrandt became dealers.3 Speculation on the fame of artists
was a natural outgrowth as it caught the imagination of almost all who
could afford it.3 5 There emerged a group of professional art dealers who
saw opportunity in an oversupplied and under-promoted market. Deal-
ers associated with particular artists making them sign contracts
whereby the artist agreed to hand over to the dealer everything he cre-
ated. However, the market was still in its early stages. These dealers
did not have sufficient control of it and as a result the artists not under
a contractual obligation continued to saturate the market with work.
Prices fell even further and dealers turned to handling the works of the
old masters. These were in short supply and had a greater potential for
profit.36
Thus, the foundation of the modern art market was laid and with
it the law as applied to this market and to art in general developed.
Economic circumstances in France and Holland necessitated artists
find alternative means to sell their product. Salons were established
with public exhibitions to introduce art to buyers. The idea of prints to
distribute before sales, as publicity, was developed. Along with this
came the idea of catalogues and printed criticism which were refined
sales techniques but which paved the way for more indepth analysis of
what actually constitutes art. Intellectualism pertaining to art was born
as men discussed theories of art, and the resultant ideas influenced the
creativity of artists eager for recognition.37
33. G. KEEN, supra note 30, at 22.
34. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at 27.
35. G. KEEN, supra note 30, at 22.
36. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at 28.
37. Id. at 29.
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This new spirit of individualism with an accompanying change of
values further enhanced the status of the individual. As society more
and more recognized the artist's genius, the higher was his rise in social
life and the more advanced his economic gain. He was respected for his
achievements and talents. The value of art was tied to the social recog-
nition of its creator. It was considered a part of the artist and conceptu-
alized as an "original" in the sense the public knows it today. It was
important in the development of art forgery and art fraud that this
value was associated with the artist through development of a capitalis-
tic market. In today's modern market originals draw higher prices and
are more valued as trade commodities. As a result, wherever art is dis-
posed, traded, or collected there is the temptation for dishonest people
to enrich themselves by forgery or fraud. 8
In Europe during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries there was profound political change. The old elitist system was
fighting for survival and the artist was again redefining his role in the
marketplace. There developed "the idea of the artist as isolated and
oppressed yet somehow above the real world. . . ."" This idea was
perpetuated by the artists themselves as they took refuge from the
harsh realities of life in a world of romantic unreality. The idea of art
for art's sake and the refusal of the artist to accept many of the regi-
mens of society scandalized the bourgeoisie. In the years before and
after the French revolution, art became a weapon of propaganda for
the people as the artist further realized his identity and began to see
himself more and more as a producer of a commodity.40
B. The Modern Market
The role of Great Britain in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries paralleled that of America in the late nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries in relation to the art market. The industrial revolution
and expansion of its trading empire gave Britain power and prosperity.
Travelers and traders returned to Britain from the Continent laden
with art.41
38. Wurtenberger, supra note 15, at 84.
39. P. FRISCHER, supra note 18, at 29.
40. Id. at 29-30.
41. G. KEEN, supra note 30, at 23.
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American collecting began its tremendous impact in the late nine-
teenth century. As America became the richest country in the world in
the twentieth century, it achieved a dominant position in the art mar-
ket. In this century art treasures from Europe have continuously flowed
westward to the United States and the fashion for collecting has been
firmly established.42 Art prices have multiplied phenomenally since the
early 1950's,' 3 and public interest in the sale of art has continued to
bring exceptional prices. Everyone wants to get into the act, creating a
ripe environment for fraud and forgery.4 '
The art market, although dominated presently by the United
States, is an international market with London as a center of opera-
tions. There are many important European collectors, and Japan is ex-
erting a powerful influence.4'5 Besides the growth of huge auction
houses such as Sotheby's and Marlborough Fine Art, the post war pe-
riod has been marked with a vast increase in the number of small scale
dealers and collectors. 4'6 Due to a reverential attitude toward art, the
educated middle classes have taken up collecting on an impressive
scale. The availability of education to so many has created an environ-
ment which fosters respect for artistic genius and achievement, an ap-
preciation of art history, and a clientele to purchase the more minor
prizes of the art market.' 7
Thus, today the art market is prosperous and conducive to fraud
and forgery. Many people buy as much for an investment as for pleas-
ure or aesthetic taste. As a result, the issue concerning the value of the
"original" versus its aesthetic duplicate arises. There are important
forces at work to prevent the separation of artistic and pecuniary value.
The individuals who own originals have an important financial and
emotional stake. If reproductions lose their stigma and become legiti-
mate alternatives to original works, these originals would lose their
value. Museums directly and indirectly (by virtue of tax exemptions for
wealthy donors) are among the mainstays of pecuniary value. If "they
were to substitute reproductions for originals the multibillion dollar art
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id. at 31-32.
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business would fall into an acute and permanent recession." '48
Also, many of the experts relied upon to authenticate works of art
are art historians. Due to their training, these experts are usually more
sensitive to historical than to artistic values. In their view the authen-
ticity of the work is of supreme importance. Most of the educated pub-
lic who purchase art have learned from books and courses by these art
historians; therefore, they also see art as part of this history or culture
rather than as a solely aesthetic experience. The professional's respect
for the authentic and his contempt for the inauthentic have been trans-
ferred to the public at large and the art market.49
Therefore, many factors go into determining the value of a work of
art and help to create a climate ripe for forgery and fraud. The nature
of the art market has created a valuable pecuniary commodity. Associ-
ated with this pecuniary value are cultural ideals of beauty and aes-
thetics, artistic merit, the reputation of the artist, and also psychologi-
cal factors such as prestige, and a sense of historical appreciation or
magic. The work's provenance, i.e. whether it was once part of a great
collection or not, enhances its value.50 The condition of a painting is
important as is its rarity or lack of it. Price is also dependent on who is
selling and who is buying. A work will be worth more if sold by a
dealer of worldwide fame rather than by an unknown dealer.'
Importantly, since the market is an international one, it is affected
by the legal, fiscal, and commercial policies of the countries in which it
operates. These policies can have a major influence on values. For ex-
ample, Italy has more restrictions on export than England or the
United States; therefore, the same painting would bring less in Italy.52
Auction prices in Paris are usually ten percent lower than prices in
London because in France there is a sales tax. In the United States
favorable tax considerations for donations to museums have encouraged
speculation and lavish spending. In some cases, a collector who buys a
painting that significantly increases in value can receive a charitable
deduction for income tax purposes in excess of the amount he originally
48. Banfield, supra note 3, at 33.
49. Id. at 34.
50. G. KEEN, supra note 30, at 41.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Id.
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paid for it.53
III. Art Forgery-Legal Considerations
A. Factors Perpetuating Art Forgery
In recent years the exigencies of the art market and its develop-
ment into a free trading international market have given ingenious
forgers and ordinary confidence men plenty of opportunity for swin-
dling the art buying public. There has been an increase of public
awareness of art and an increase in the number of people who can af-
ford to buy these works. They have proven to be in many cases a more
attractive investment than the stock market. In these inflationary times
when people tend to turn to collectibles to preserve the value of their
money, art works have been a favorable investment. They have reacted
to the market forces of supply and demand, increasing tremendously in
value as the supply of authentic works remains relatively constant while
consumer demand rises.
The market forces and structure of the art market have set the
stage. The art forger steals the scene by taking advantage of the situa-
tion. Although since the advent of art forgery as a recognizable offense
authorities and victims have sought to eradicate it, the risk of convic-
tion for a sale of an art forgery is relatively small. There are several
reasons for this. On one side stands the scientist with his technical
equipment for detection of fraud. However, he must rely upon the art
experts. It is the historian's or connoisseur's trained eye that first de-
tects the possibility of the forgery, thus alerting the technicians. These
experts are not available to everybody desiring to buy art and there are
no licensing agencies, ethical committees, or competency exams to con-
trol the quality and validity of these authentications. The situation is
ripe for negligent or incompetent advice. On the other side stands the
forger who has all the modern technical and artistic resources available
to aid in his attempt to stay one step ahead of the authenticators. In
the middle are the galleries, the collectors, and the directors of muse-
ums. These participants many times unwittingly aid the forger. They
often are hesitant in the face of costly advice, huge publicity, and a
53. Id. at 43. See I.R.C. § 170 (1983).
149
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
328 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
desire not to besmirch the good name of the art market or their own
good names to admit publicly they have bought a forgery and thus fail
to cooperate in criminal prosecution. If a fraud is reported the victim
dealers are afraid they will lose customers, and the victim collectors are
afraid they will lose the value of their bargain if the fraud becomes
known. So they both remain silent-one to preserve his supposed integ-
rity and one to preserve the supposed "authenticity" of his purchase.
The sympathies of the general public often tend to side with the
forger. We see something glamorous in somebody with the skill and
cunning to produce a work the apparent equal of a great master.5 4 We
somehow do not see this crime as being as aggressive or as debilitating
as others. "[T] he crime of the forger is not violent, it is just cunning." 55
Taking all the foregoing factors into account and considering: (1)
there are jurisdictional problems due to the international nature of the
art market,56 and (2) that presently both federal and state laws are
inadequate in specifically dealing with this problem, the risk of convic-
tion for the sale of forged art remains relatively small.5 Although all
states have penal statutes that prohibit forgery, these statutes do not
deal specifically with the marketing of fake paintings or art forgery as
a distinct statutory crime.58 Prosecutions generally fall under laws deal-
ing with conspiracy, larceny, and fraud which are not conducive to ef-
fective art forgery deterence5 9
"A work of art has been defined as an aesthetic expression that is
a product of a particular time, place, and person. A fake pretends to
this but is not."6 0 If a person wants to buy a fake and pays a proper
price there is no legal problem. "The essential feature of art forgery is
not imitation, which may have many other motives, but the intention to
deceive either the general public or an individual dupe or-as a
54. J. MILLS, supra note 19, at 21.
55. Id.
56. Comment, Current Practices and Problems in Combatting Illegality in the
Art Market, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 506, 508 (1982).
57. Id. at 507.
58. Note, Legal Control of the Fabrication and Marketing of Fake Paintings, 24
STAN. L. REV. 930, 940 (1972).
59. Comment, supra note 56, at 507-08.
60. Committee Report, Legal Problems of Art Authentication, 21 THE RECORD
96 (1966).
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rule-prospective buyers."6 Therefore, to obtain a conviction the es-
sential element is fraudulent intent. To obtain the necessary proof of
intent in a criminal prosecution for art forgery under these statutes and
to carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is difficult.6 2 It
is easy for the faker to claim he had no knowledge the fakes would be
sold as originals. It is easy for the dealer to claim he thought the works
were authentic.
It is also sometimes difficult for the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the painting is indeed a fake. Scientific analysis is not
foolproof and the appraisals of experts are just expressions of opinions
which juries and judges may not find convincing. The prosecution must
prove a connection between the fake and the faker which is costly and
many times difficult because the chain of title or origins of the work
often can be difficult to trace. This is further complicated by the inter-
national nature of the art market.6 3
B. Other Problems to be Considered
The case of the State of New York v. Wright Hepburn Webster
Gallery, Ltd.64 is instructive as to some of the problems associated with
the prevention of art forgery. Defendant David Stein was a former art
dealer who had been convicted of forgery. After serving a jail sentence
he was deported to France where he was again convicted for selling art
forgeries in that country. While in jail he was permitted to produce
fakes provided he signed his own name. After a successful London sale
these paintings were exhibited in New York accompanied by the sign
"Forgeries by Stein."'6 5 The New York Attorney General attempted to
enjoin the sale or transfer of these paintings on a theory of public nui-
sance.66 Stein's name could easily be removed and replaced with the
name of the imitated master. Thus, the contention that a threat of
61. 2 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW AND THE VISUAL ARTS 6-87 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as J. MERRYMAN].
62. Comment, supra note 56, at 508.
63. Note, supra note 58, at 941.
64. 64 Misc. 2d 423, 314 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1970), af'd, 37 A.D.2d 698,
323 N.Y.S.2d 389 (App. Div. 1971).
65. Id. at 424, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
66. Id.
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fraud was posed to the cultural welfare of that segment of the popula-
tion which is involved in the sale and collection of works of art was
valid in a pragmatic sense. However, legalistically the court refused to
grant the relief asked for saying that no crime had been committed.
Both sides conceded that no forgery was involved.67 Stein has the right
to sell under his own name even if there is. the possibility of a future
criminal act. The court cannot enjoin a potential crime. As regards for-
gery, the case does not fall within any sections of the Penal Law which
requires a showing of intent to defraud. Also paintings such as the ones
displayed are not included among the items declared by the statute to
be a nuisance subject to abatement.6"
Another problem is represented by the case of Weisz v. Parke-
Bernet Galleries, Inc.69 where forged paintings were bought at auction
pursuant to a catalogue that listed each artist and described each
painting stating that each purchaser would be given a signed certifi-
cate. This was followed by a "disclaimer of warranty as to genuineness,
authorship and the like."'70 The issues here were: (1) whether the plain-
tiffs knew of the disclaimer and, if they did, to what extent were they
legally chargeable with such knowledge; and (2) if the answer to the
first question is yes, to what extent was the auction house responsible,
given this disclaimer, where a sale resulted from a representation of
genuineness that later proved to be inaccurate.71 The court concluded
on the trial level that even if plaintiffs had knowledge of the disclaimer
other factors were relevant. The auction house had superior knowledge
and experience. It demonstrated an intention that the buyers rely on
the catalogue for their descriptions. This, accompanied by such factors
as the wording and arrangement of the catalogue, the technical lan-
guage, and the subtle presentation of the disclaimer, made it ineffec-
tive. 2 Thus, the court relied on "requirements of fair dealing where
there is a relationship between parties in which there is a basic inequal-
67. Id. at 428, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
68. Id. at 427, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
69. 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 80, 351
N.Y.S.2d 911 (App. Div. 1974).
70. Id. at 1078, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
71. Id. at 1079, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
72. Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
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ity of knowledge, expertness or economic power".
' 7 3
The judgment, however, was reversed on appeal.74 The court main-
tained that there was no implied warranty of authenticity of authorship
as a result of the expressed opinion or judgment of the seller. There
was a clear disclaimer of warranty of authenticity in the catalogue and
no willful intent to deceive was demonstrated.75 The court relied upon
common law precode principles which date back to the cases of
Jendwine against Slade and Hyslop v. Shirlaw."7 If a seller repre-
sents what he believes, he is guilty of no fraud. 8
C. The Uniform Commercial Code-The Problem Continues
Now New York, where Weisz was tried, and a majority of the
states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code which could be re-




Generally under the Uniform Commef'cial Code "an express war-
ranty can be created by an 'affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller,' a 'description of the goods,' or by a 'sample or model,' so long as
the affirmation, description, or sample is part of the 'basis of the bar-
gain.' "80 The seller does not have to specifically make the warranty
73. Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
74. Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 77 Misc. 80, 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911,
912 (App. Div. 1974).
75. Id. at 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
76. 2 Esp. 572, 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (1797). See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 61, at
6-106.
77. 42 Scottish Law Reptr. 668 (Sheriff Court, Lanarkshire 1905). See J. MER-
RYMAN, supra note 61, at 6-106.
78. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 61, at 6-107.
79. Comment, supra note 56, at 523. This Note will not consider the warranty of
title provided by section 2-312.
80. Comment, Regulation of the New York Art Market: Has the Legislature
Painted Dealers into a Corner?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 954 (1978). See U.C.C. §
2-313 (1979) which states:
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any affir-
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through actual words of warranty or guarantee. Likewise, the seller
need not intend a warranty for such to exist.8' A critical issue to be
determined is whether an affirmation of fact was made by the seller or
whether he was just stating an opinion or puffing his product.82 This
problem arises continuously in the sale of art works when dealers attri-
bute value or authorship to a painting or other work of art. This was an
issue in the Weisz case. Did the cataloguing of the paintings along with
the names of the artists create an express or implied warranty despite
the disclaimer? Generally a statement of opinion or of value by the
seller is considered mere puffing and does not create a warranty8 "
However, express warranties have been found where the seller's expres-
sion tends to assert facts that are in some way measurable.8 4
The seller's contention in regard to the application of the Code to
the sale of works of art is that any statement as to value or authorship
can be construed as merely opinion, identification, and description as
opposed to a warranty. However, such a contention is not necessarily
valid when considering the nature of the art market. To maintain that
a dealer's description, attribution, or affirmation of authorship or value
does not go to the basis of the bargain is to deny the realities of that
market. One who purchases works of art, especially expensive pieces or
those for investment, is paying for more than the materials and labor.
The intrinsic value of the work is derived from its history, the reputa-
mation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opin-
ion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
81. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1979).
82. Comment, supra note 80, at 954.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 955.
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tion of the artist, its previous sales price, and even who the previous
buyer or present seller is. It takes into account the judgments of critics,
major dealers, and collectors. Its intrinsic value is even affected by how
often it has been offered for sale within a given period of time. There-
fore, a statement of authorship or even value refers to a specific attri-
bute of the work and can reasonably be attributed to the basis of the
bargain. 5
It also could be maintained that the most precise way to determine
authorship is through acknowledgement by the artist himself. Once the
artist dies, authentication is less precise, especially given the prevalence
of forgeries and the expertise in their execution. Most people, therefore,
buy works of art relying on the word of authenticators such as experts,
dealers, and the like and must accept the reality of the uncertainty as
to origin. Given this knowledge that a dealer's statement of authentic-
ity is just his opinion, it could be maintained that it is incumbent upon
the buyer not to rely on the word of the dealer as an express warranty.
However, this would be impractical. It is the expert or dealer who actu-
ally sets the value through his affirmations; therefore, it would be only
equitable that he should bear the burden of the truth of these represen-
tations. Thus, if the seller receives a high price for a painting as a
result of an expert's opinion that it is genuine and receives the benefit
of that bargain, he should bear the burden if that opinion later turns
out to be incorrect.86
U.C.C § 2-316
If it is determined that the seller's description or affirmation is
part of the basis of the bargain, the seller is considered to have made
an express warranty. Nevertheless, the seller may attempt to disclaim
the warranty. Prior to the Uniform Commercial Code the seller could
disclaim warranties virtually at will; caveat emptor was the order of the
day.88
Under section 2-316(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code general
85. Id. at 956.
86. Id.
87. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1979).
88. Comment, supra note 80, at 957.
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disclaimers of express warranty are likely to be found inoperative.8"
Where these disclaimers conflict with specific express warranties, the
Code "gives effect to the express warranty."9' 0 To avoid liability the
seller must prove that no express warranty existed initially. This may
prove difficult because there are a variety of representations that give
rise to express warranties. 1 For example, is a listing with a name of
the artist in a catalogue a representation that gives rise to an express
warranty? (The Weisz case could fall directly under section 2-316.)
This further demonstrates the sensitivity of the law to the art market.
The courts dislike general language of disclaimer. If they refuse to give
effect to such disclaimers, they can protect the art market from disrep-
utable dealers who attempt to hide their fakes and poor quality works
of art by using these disclaimers in their contracts. 2 But it is still a
question of fact whether the seller's prior statement of authorship,
value, etc. is consistent with a later statement that no warranties were
made. So, although the Uniform Commercial Code provisions concern-
ing express warranty and disclaimer can provide adequate protection
for works of art, the buyer must prove the creation of the express war-
ranty as to authorship and the inconsistency of the disclaimer with that
express warranty. 8
89. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1979). This section provides:
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provi-
sions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation
or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment I states: "This section ... seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language
when inconsistent with language of express warranty. .. ."
90. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and
Forgery, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 409, 420 (1972). See also U.C.C. § 2-316, Com-
ment 1.
91. Comment, supra note 90, at 420.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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In the context of art forgery, section 2-315 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code presents an alternative to the art buyer by establishing an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The warranty
would arise under this section if "the seller at the time of contracting
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods .... ."'In order for liability to occur
three elements must be present: (1) the seller must know or should
know what the buyer's particular purpose is; (2) there should be on the
part of the seller actual or constructive knowledge that the buyer is
relying on his skill; and (3) there must be actual reliance on the seller
by the buyer.95
A distinction should be made here between particular purpose, as
contemplated by a warranty of merchantibility related to a special use
particular to the nature of one's business, and ordinary purpose, mean-
ing the customary use made of the goods. 8 Thus, if one purchases a
painting for his own pleasure or a museum buys it for exhibition, the
section could not be invoked since the art is being used for its ordinary
purpose. They are the customary uses or not peculiar to the buyer's
business. It might be difficult to envision a use for a work of art that is
not "ordinary" and would fall under the "particular use" require-
ment.97 However, it is possible to make a case in the context of forgery
94. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1979) (emphasis added). This section provides:
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any partic-
ular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
95. U.C.C. § 2-315. See also U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1; Comment, supra note
90, at 428.
96. U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 2 states:
A "particular purpose" differs from the ordinary purpose for which the
goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is
peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for
which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability
and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.
97. Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Provisions and the
335 I1
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if one was to buy for the purpose of completing a collection, or if the
purchase is for a certain gift or investment based upon public demand
for a particular artist or period. If the three aforementioned require-
ments are met, the sale of a forgery or that which was not bargained
for could constitute breach of warranty for a particular purpose.9 8
U.C.C. § 2-314
Lastly, with regard to section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code dealing with the implied warranty of merchantibility for the sale
of goods, the issue in relation to art revolves around merchantibility.
The provision "limits liability to a 'merchant with respect to goods of
that kind.' "" It would not apply to a private sale. Therefore, there
could arise the issue of whether the seller-dealer is a merchant under
the Code. Assuming he is a merchant, the buyer must establish the
Theory of Strict Liability in Tort as Solutions to Art Counterfeiting in Painting: A
Critical Analysis, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 531, 549 (1976).
98. Comment, supra note 90, at 428.
99. Comment, supra note 97, at 546. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1979) which states:
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to gbods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the prem-
ises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 3 (1979) states: "A person making an isolated sale of goods
is not a 'merchant' within the meaning of the full scope of this section and, thus, no
warranty of merchantability would apply."
I
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work was not merchantable because it was a forgery.100 To be mer-
chantable the goods must be fit for their "ordinary purpose" and must
be "honestly resalable in the normal course of business because they
are what they purport to be."' 011
Taking this into account, an argument could be made two ways.
One could maintain that a forgery would defeat the purpose of buying
an original and would certainly not be "honestly resalable" as an origi-
nal. However, on the other side, a viable contention is that the ordinary
purpose of a work of art is aesthetic pleasure. Thus, if one cannot tell
the difference between a forgery and the original with one's naked eye,
fitness for ordinary purpose can be accomplished with a forgery, which
returns to the philosophical issue raised in part one of this article. Also,
to be proven conclusively not to be "honestly resalable" is difficult.
Only the artist himself knows for sure if the work is his. If he is dead
and there is disagreement among the experts as to attribution or origi-
nality, such proof could be difficult. Just because several critics label a
painting a forgery, this does not mean there are not others who will
certify it as an original, thus fulfilling the "honestly resalable" require-
ment and creating a problem of certainty.0 2 The possible application of
this section is also pertinent in that it does not require the showing of
intent. The seller's knowledge of the defect is not essential. This would
provide some redress to the victims of forgeries. It is a form of strict
liability that could be applied even in situations where the seller is una-
ble to discover the defect in the work of art. 03
D. New York Legislation Leads the Way
New York has led the way in terms of art related legislation. This
seems to be a logical outgrowth of New York's status as a leading art
market and the continuing problems of preventing art forgery and pro-
viding sufficient remedies. Illinois and California have attempted to fol-
low New York's lead.0 Such legislation can significantly affect the art
market by setting standards of behavior or customs of the trade. In
100. Comment, supra note 97, at 546.
101. Comment, supra note 90, at 425. See U.C.C. § 2-314, Comment 8 (1979).
102. Comment, supra note 97, at 547.
103. Comment, supra note 90, at 423-24.
104. Hodes, Wanted: Art Legislation for Illinois, 57 ILL. B.J. 218, 219 (1968).
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regard to forgeries, sales of works of art not warranteed under New
York law will not be readily accepted in other markets. Disclosures
relied upon by buyers under New York law will most likely not be
ignored in other markets not subject to the same requirements.
New York Penal Law § 170.45
Under section 170.45 of the Penal Law, New York has made art
forgery a separate punishable offense. It makes "fraudulent misrepre-
sentation and simulation of antiques, objects d'art, rare books and com-
parable matter"105 a misdemeanor. However, proof of criminal intent is
still necessary and it is questionable whether a penalty of up to a year
in jail is sufficient deterence given the huge profits to be made through
forgeries.
New York General Business Law Articles 12-C to 12-H
Articles 12-C through 12-H of the New York General Business
Law have helped alleviate the problem through additional regulation,
although there is some duplication of and inconsistency with pre-ex-
isting law.le
Article 12-C of the New York General Business Law attempts to
protect the artist by imposing a trust obligation on the dealer.10 7 Arti-
105. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.45 (Consol. 1977). This section provides:
Criminal simulation
A person is guilty of criminal simulation when:
1. With intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object in such manner
that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it
does not in fact possess; or
2. With knowledge of its true character and with intent to defraud, he
utters or possesses an object so simulated.
Criminal simulation is a class A misdemeanor.
106. Comment, supra note 80, at 961. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW arts. 12-C to
12-G (Consol. 1980); 12-H (Consol. Supp. 1982).
107. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-a (Consol. 1980). This section provides:
Artist-art dealer relationships
1. Any custom, practice or usage of the trade to the contrary notwith-
standing, (a) whenever an artist delivers or causes to be delivered a work
of fine art of his own creation to an art dealer for the purpose of exhibition
and/or sale on a commission, fee or other basis or compensation, the deliv-
ery to and acceptance thereof by the art dealer is deemed to be "on con-
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cle 12-D relates to the protection of the art consumer. Some maintain
signment", and
(i) such art dealer shall thereafter, with respect to the said work of fine art
be deemed to be the agent of such artist, and
(ii) such work of fine art is trust property in the hands of the consignee for
the benefit of the consignor, and
(iii) any proceeds from the sale of such work of fine art are trust funds in
the hands of the consignee for the benefit of the consignor,
(b) a work of fine art initially received "on consignment" shall be deemed
to remain trust property notwithstanding the subsequent purchase thereof
by the consignee directly or indirectly for his own account until the price is
paid in full to the consignor. If such work is thereafter resold to a bona
fide third party before the consignor has been paid in full, the proceeds of
the resale are trust funds in the hands of the consignee for the benefit of
the consignor to the extent necessary to pay any balance still due to the
consignor and such trusteeship shall continue until the fiduciary obligation
of the consignee with respect to such transaction is discharged in full.
(c) no such trust property or trust funds shall be or become subject or
subordinate to any claims, liens or security interests of any kind or nature
whatsoever, of the consignee's creditors, anything in uniform commercial
code section 2-326 or any other provision of the uniform commercial code
to the contrary notwithstanding.
2. Any provision of a contract or agreement whereby the consignor waives
any provision of this article is absolutely void except as hereinafter pro-
vided. A consignor may lawfully waive that part of subdivision one of sec-
tion two hundred nineteen-a of this article which provides that "any pro-
ceeds from the sale of such work of fine art are trust funds in the hands of
the consignee for the benefit of the consignor", provided: (a) that such
waiver is clear, conspicuous, in writing and subscribed by the consignor
and (b) that no waiver shall be valid with respect to the first two thousand
five hundred dollars of gross proceeds of sales received in any twelve-
month period commencing with the date of the execution of such waiver
and (c) that no waiver shall be valid with respect to the proceeds of a work
of fine art initially received "on consignment" but subsequently purchased
by the consignee directly or indirectly for his own account.
(d) that no waiver shall inure to the benefit of the consignee's creditors in
any manner which might be inconsistent with the consignor's rights under
subdivision one of this section.
3. Nothing in this amendment shall be construed to have any effect upon
any written or oral contract or arrangement in existence prior to the effec-
tive date hereof nor to any extensions or renewals thereof except by the
mutual written consent of the parties thereto.
4. All of the provisions of this article are applicable notwithstanding the
1 7:1983
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this article is an unnecessary duplication of the Uniform Commercial
Code. However, it is a type of express warranty legislation which cre-
ates a presumption that the authorship of a work of art is part of the
basis of the bargain. 10 8 Thus the burden of proving authenticity is
shifted from the buyer to the seller. This overcomes the difficulty of
proof in an action for breach of warranty under the Code discussed
previously. There is no longer uncertainty as to "whether the written
description set forth in a bill of sale is sufficient to constitute a war-
absence of, or their conflict with, any written agreement, receipt, note or
memorandum between the consignor and the consignee concerning any
matter covered by such provisions and notwithstanding any conflict be-
tween such provisions and the uniform commercial code or any other stat-
ute, requirement, rule or provision of law.
108. Id. § 219-c. This section provides:
Express warranties
Any provision in any other law to the contrary notwithstanding: 1. When-
ever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes
to a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant, a written instrument
which, in describing the work, identifies it with any author or authorship,
such description (i) shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bar-
gain and (ii) shall create an express warranty of the authenticity of such
authorship as of the date of such sale or exchange. Such warranty shall not
be negated or limited because the seller in the written instrument did not
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or because he did not
have a specific intention or authorization to make a warranty or because
any statement relevant to authorship is, or purports to be, or is capable of
being merely the seller's opinion.
2. In construing the degree of authenticity of authorship warranted as
aforesaid, due regard shall be given to the terminology used in describing
such authorship and the meaning accorded to such terminology by the cus-
toms and usage of the trade at the time and in the locality where the sale
or exchange took place. A written instrument delivered pursuant to a sale
which took place in the state of New York which, in describing the work,
states, for example,
(i) that the work is by a named author or has a named authorship, without
any other limiting words, means, unequivocally, that the work is by such
named author or has such named authorship;
(ii) that the work is "attributed to a named author" means a work of the
period of the author, attributed to him, but not with certainty by him;
(iii) that the work is of the "school of a named author" means a work of
the period of the author, by a pupil or close follower of the author, but not
by the author.
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ranty of genuineness." 10 9 When the seller gives the buyer a written in-
strument where authorship is stated, an express warranty of authorship
is created.11 0 It also requires any disclaimers to be clear and conspicu-
ous, making it more difficult for the seller to disclaim.",
Article 12-E protects the artist's reproduction rights. Although it
has been preempted by the new federal copyright law, it has recognized
that advances in the techniques and technology of reproduction have
created a new dimension in the field of fine art. Article 12-E establishes
the creation of new property rights with substantial monetary value
based on the ability to reproduce formerly unique one-of-a-kind cre-
ations. The establishment of these property rights has created confusion
and controversy as to who has title to and as to who may realize the
proceeds from the reproduction of the sale of fine works of art. Here
the legislature attempted to set guidelines in regard to the right of re-
109. Hodes, Fake Art and the Law, 27 FED. B.J. 73, 77 (1979).
110. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-c (Consol. 1980).
111. Id. § 219-d(1). N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-d provides:
Disclaimers
Words relevant to the creation of an express warranty of authenticity of
authorship of a work of fine art and words tending to negate or limit war-
ranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other;
but subject to the provisions of section 2-202 of the uniform commercial
code on parol or extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to
the extent that such construction is unreasonable. Subject to the limita-
tions hereinafter set forth, such construction shall be deemed unreasonable
if:
1. The language tending to negate or limit such warranty is not conspicu-
ous, written and contained in a provision, separate and apart from any
language relevant to the creation of the warranty, in words which would
clearly and specifically apprise the buyer that the seller assumes no risk,
liability or responsibility for the authenticity of the authorship of such
work of fine art. Words of general disclaimer like "all warranties, express
or implied, are excluded" are not sufficient to negate or limit an express
warranty of authenticity of the authorship of a work of fine art, created
under section two hundred twenty-two of this article, or otherwise; or
2. The work of fine art is proved to be a "counterfeit", as that term is
defined in this article, and this was not clearly indicated in the description
of the work; or
3. The work of fine art is unqualifiedly stated to be the work of a named
author or authorship and it is proved that, as of the date of sale or ex-
change, such statement was false, mistaken or erroneous.
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production.11 The courts had previously protected these interests,
known in Europe as droit moral, by using tort or contract law with less
than satisfactory results or consistency.113
Under article 12-F of the New York General Business Law, the
consumer is given further protection by the implementation of a crimi-
nal penalty for the creation and circulation of false certificates of au-
thentication. 4 This misdemeanor applies to a situation not covered by
forgery provisions of the Penal Law.1 1 5
The New Article 12-H: New York's Visual Multiples Disclosure Bill
Article 12-H of the New York General Business Law, better
known as New York's visual multiples disclosure bill, is a relatively
new section regarding works of art."" It became effective in September
1981 with penalties to be imposed as of March 1, 1982; thus, it gave
people some time to comply.11  This new bill was passed as a result of
New York's dominant position as a center in the art market and its
continuing effort to legislate in the art field to prevent art fraud, the
corrupting of this market, and disillusionment on the part of the collec-
112. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW art. 12-E (Consol. 1980). See History. Art. 12-E, §
219-g provides:
Right to reproduce works of fine art
Whenever a work of fine art is sold or otherwise transferred by or on be-
half of the artist who created it, or his heirs or personal representatives,
the right of reproduction thereof is reserved to the grantor until it passes
into the public domain by act or operation of law unless such right is
sooner expressly transferred by an instrument, note or memorandum in
writing signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or his duly authorized
agent. Nothing herein contained, however, shall be construed to prohibit
the fair use of such work of art.
113. Comment, supra note 80, at 962.
114. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-i (Consol. 1980). This section provides:
Falsifying certificates of authenticity of works of fine art
A person who, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, makes,
utters or issues a false certificate of authenticity of a work of fine art is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
115. Comment, supra note 80, at 962.
116. Nils, Legal Protection for Print Collectors, ART NEWS, Oct. 1982, at 8.
See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW art. 12-H (Consol. Supp. 1982).
117. Chamberlain, Fraudulence Curtailed, AMERICAN ARTIST, Mar. 1982, at 10
[hereinafter cited as Chamberlain, Fraudulence].
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tor which could cause the bottom to fall out of the market.
The worst offenses with regard to art forgery arise in the field of
prints. Lithographs are especially vulnerable as today's technology
makes it easy to fool the public into thinking photomechanical litho-
graphic reproductions are real lithographs.118 In the past twenty years
abuses have increased tremendously as the market has grown. Previ-
ously, prints did not bring enough money to make forging them worth-
while. However, this small market has grown to do an estimated busi-
ness of $125 million to $150 million a year for modern prints alone. 19
An increase in demand has caused prices to increase tremendously.
People can now own original works by well-known artists by purchasing
limited edition fine prints at a fraction of the cost of a drawing or
painting by the same artist.1 20 Due to the multiplicity of the print, a
collector can ascertain its value at a particular time through auction
results or prices asked by other dealers for the same print. This cer-
tainty creates a greater feeling of security for the buyer and enhances
the desirability of prints as an investment. 21
The basic problem with a print occurs when trying to distinguish
between an "original" print and a reproduction . 22 The aesthetic value
is controlled by the degree of active participation of the artist and is
diluted to the extent that the work is done by others. There is a differ-
ence in the artistry involved between an "original" print and a repro-
duction; thus, there exists a disparity in value. 2 It has been suggested
that a modern print be classified as an original if it meets three criteria:
(a) the artist has created the master image in or upon the plate,
stone, wood block or other material for the purpose of creating the
print; (b) the print is made from this material by the artist or pur-
suant to his directions; and (c) the finished print is approved by the
artist.1
24
118. Chamberlain, Gold Brick Control, AMERICAN ARTIST, Mar. 1981, at 10
[hereinafter cited as Chamberlain, Gold].
119. Wallach, The Trouble with Prints, ART NEWS, May 1981, at 60, 62.
120. R. DuFFY, supra note 20, at 59.
121. Id. at 60.
122. Committee Report, supra note 60, at 98.
123. Hodes, supra note 109, at 75.
124. Committee Report, supra note 60, at 98.
3431
165
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
N w l
If a product is made by photomechanical and other processes, usually
in large quantities independent of the artist's supervision and without
his final approval, it is a reproduction. The sale of reproductions as
"originals" or under misleading names such as heliographs results in
much fraud. Other factors that must also be distinguished to qualify a
print as a more valuable original include: the size of the edition, the
quality and condition of the print, the date of the artist's signatire and
impression, or whether future editions will be printed. 125
This new law which covers prints and photographs sold for $100
and up is "an attempt to design a law that would deter deceptive print
practices, thwart misleading advertising and provide purchasers with
'the information for making an intelligent choice,' by legally requiring
the disclosure of certain facts that-as the law points out-most repu-
table dealers- already furnish voluntarily. ' 126 It protects the buyer's
125. Id. at 98-99.
126. Nils, supra note 116, at 8. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 220-b (Consol.
Supp. 1982) which states:
Full disclosure in the sale of certain visual art objects produced in multiples
1. An art merchant shall not sell or consign a multiple in, into or from this
state unless a written instrument is furnished to the purchaser or con-
signee, at his request, or in any event prior to a sale or consignment, which
sets forth as to each multiple the descriptive information required by sec-
tion two hundred twenty-c of this article for any period. If a prospective
purchaser so requests, the information shall be transmitted to him prior
to the payment or placing of an order for a multiple. If payment is made
by a purchaser prior to delivery of such an art multiple, this information
shall be supplied at the time of or prior to delivery. With respect to auc-
tions, this information may be furnished in catalogues or other written
materials which are made readily available for consultation and purchase
prior to sale, provided that a bill of sale, receipt or invoice describing the
transaction is then provided which makes reference to the catalogue and
lot number in which such information is supplied. Information supplied
pursuant to this subdivision shall be clearly, specifically and distinctly ad-
dressed to each of the items listed in section two hundred twenty-c of this
article unless the required data is not applicable. This section is applicable
to transactions by and between merchants, non-merchants, and others con-
sidered art merchants for the purposes of this article.
2. An art merchant shall not cause a catalogue, prospectus, flyer or other
written material or advertisement to be distributed in, into or from this
state which solicits a direct sale, by inviting transmittal of payment for a
specific multiple, unless it clearly sets forth, in close physical proximity to
7:1983 1Nova Law Journal
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right to full disclosure. It is an attempt by the legislature to stifle such
practices as the "use of editions 'stretched' by an undisclosed and un-
usually large number of artist's proofs, undeclared closely related edi-
tions, misrepresented reproductions and claims that a work is
'signed' "127 by the artist when the signature is that of another. Inter-
estingly, the law never uses the terms "original" or "fine print." The
criterion is whether it is the artist's print approved by the artist after
completion.
the place in such material where the multiple is described, the descriptive
information required by section two hundred twenty-c of this article for
any time period. In lieu of this required information, such written material
or advertising may set forth the material contained in the following quoted
passage, or the passage itself, containing terms the nonobservance of which
shall constitute a violation of this article, if the art merchant then supplies
the required information prior to or with delivery of the multiple:
"Article twelve-H of the New York general business law provides for dis-
closure in writing of certain information concerning multiples of prints and
photographs when sold for more than one hundred dollars ($100) each,
exclusive of any frame, prior to effecting a sale of them. This law requires
disclosure of such matters as the identity of the artist, the artist's signa-
ture, the medium, whether the multiple is a reproduction, the time when
the multiple was produced, use of the master which produced the multiple,
and the number of multiples in a 'limited edition'. If a prospective pur-
chaser so requests, the information shall be transmitted to him prior to
payment or the placing of an order for a multiple. If payment is made by a
purchaser prior to delivery of such an art multiple, this information will be
supplied at the time of or prior to delivery, in which case the purchaser is
entitled to a refund if, for reasons related to matter contained in such in-
formation, he returns the multiple substantially in the condition in which
received, within thirty days of receiving it. In addition, if after payment
and delivery, it is ascertained that the information provided is incorrect,
the purchaser may be entitled to certain remedies."
This requirement is not applicable to general written material or advertis-
ing which does not constitute an offer to effect a specific sale.
3. In each place of business in the state where an art merchant is regularly
engaged in sales of multiples, the art merchant shall post in a conspicuous
place, a sign which, in a legible format, contains the information included
in the following passage:
"Article twelve-H of the New York general business law provides for the
disclosure in writing of certain information concerning prints and photo-
graphs. This information is available to you in accordance with that law."
127. Nils, supra note 116, at 8.
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To accomplish its purpose article 12-H is divided into sections ac-
cording to the availability of information. Prints dated from 1950 to
1981, 1900 to 1950, and prior to 1900 require progressively less re-
quirements of disclosure as the availability of information diminishes
due to the age of the print.12 8 Only that information which is reasona-
128. Chamberlain, Fraudulence, supra note 117, at 10. See N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW §§ 220-c to 220-f (Consol. Supp. 1982) which states:
§ 220-c. Information required
The following information shall be supplied, as indicated, as to each multi-
ple produced on or after the effective date of this article:
1. Artist. State the name of the artist.
2. Signature. If the artist's name appears on the multiple, state whether
the multiple was signed by the artist. If not signed by the artist then state
the source of the artist's name on the multiple, such as whether the artist
placed his signature on the master, whether his name was stamped or es-
tate stamped on the multiple, or was from some other source or in some
other manner placed on the multiple.
3. Medium or process. (a) Describe the medium or process, and where
pertinent to photographic processes the material, used in producing the
multiple, such as whether the multiple was produced through the etching,
engraving, lithographic, serigraphic or a particular method and/or mate-
rial used in photographic developing processes. If an established term, in
accordance with the usage of the trade, cannot be employed accurately to
describe the medium or process, a brief, clear description shall be made.
(b) If the purported artist was deceased at the time the master was made
which produced the multiple, this shall be stated.
(c) If the multiple or the image on or in the master constitutes a
photomechanical or photographic type of reproduction of an image pro-
duced in a different medium, for a purpose other than the creation of the
multiple being described, this information and the respective mediums
shall be stated.
(d) If paragraph (c) of this subdivision is applicable, and the multiple is
not signed, state whether the artist authorized or approved in writing the
multiple or the edition of which the multiple being described is one.
4. Use of master. (a) If the multiple is a "posthumous" multiple, that is, if
the master was created during the life of the artist but the multiple was
produced after the artist's death, this shall be stated.
(b) If the multiple was made from a master which produced a prior lim-
ited edition, or from a master which constitutes or was made from a repro-
duction of a prior multiple or of a master which produced prior multiples,
this shall be stated.
5. Time produced. As to multiples produced after nineteen hundred forty-
nine, state the year or approximate year the multiple was produced. As to
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bly obtainable is required. The dealer must provide certain basic infor-
multiples produced prior to nineteen hundred fifty, state the year, approxi-
mate year or period when the master was made which produced the multi-
ple and/or when the particular multiple being described was produced.
The requirements of this subdivision shall be satisfied when the year stated
is approximately accurate.
6. Size of the edition. (a) If the multiple being described is offered as one
of a limited edition, this shall be so stated, as well as the number of mul-
tiples in the edition, and whether and how the multiple is numbered.
(b) Unless otherwise disclosed, the number of multiples stated pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall constitute an express warranty, as
defined in section two hundred twenty-g of this article, that no additional
numbered multiples of the same image, exclusive of proofs, have been
produced.
(c) The number of multiples stated pursuant to paragraph (a) of this sub-
division shall also constitute an express warranty, as defined in section two
hundred twenty-g of this article, that no additional multiples of the same
image, whether designated "proofs" other than trial proofs, numbered or
otherwise, have been produced in an amount which exceeds the number in
the limited edition by twenty or twenty percent, whichever is greater.
(d) If the number of multiples exceeds the number in the stated limited
edition as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, then state the
number of proofs other than trial proofs, or other numbered or unnum-
bered multiples, in the same or other prior editions, produced from the
same master, or from another master as described in paragraph (b) of
subdivision four of section two hundred twenty-c of this article, and
whether and how they are signed and numbered.
§ 220-d. Information required; nineteen hundred fifty to effective date
The information which shall be supplied as to each multiple produced dur-
ing the period from nineteen hundred fifty to the effective date of this
article, shall consist of the information required by section two hundred
twenty-c of this article except for paragraph (d) of subdivision three, para-
graph (b) of subdivision four and paragraphs (c) and (d) of subdivision six
of section two hundred twenty-c of this article.
§ 220-e. Information required; nineteen hundred to nineteen hundred forty-
nine
The information which shall be supplied as to each multiple produced dur-
ing the period from nineteen hundred through nineteen hundred forty-nine
shall consist of the information required by section two hundred twenty-c
of this article except for paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of subdivision three
and subdivisions four and six of section two hundred twenty-c of this
article.
§ 2204. Information required; pre-nineteen hundred
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mation in writing which is considered part of the basis of the bargain
creating an express warranty. This warranty cannot be negated by the
merchant for the lack of the use of formal words of warranty, or for the
lack of intention or authorization to make a warranty, or because the
statement could be interpreted as the seller's opinion. 29 If the informa-
The information which shall be supplied as to each multiple produced
prior to nineteen hundred shall consist of the information required by sec-
tion two hundred twenty-c of this article except for subdivision two,
paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of subdivision three and subdivisions four and
six of section two hundred twenty-c of this article.
129. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 220-g(2) (Consol. Supp. 1982). N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 220-g provides:
Express warranties
1. Whenever an art merchant furnishes the name of the artist pursuant to
subdivision one of section two hundred twenty-c of this article as to multi-
ples created prior to nineteen hundred fifty, the warranties created by the
provisions of section two hundred nineteen-c of article twelve-D of this
chapter shall apply, except that said section shall be deemed to include
sales to art merchants. However, with respect to photographs produced
prior to nineteen hundred fifty, and other multiples produced prior to
nineteen hundred, as to information required by subdivision three of sec-
tion two hundred twenty-c of this article, the merchant shall be deemed to
have satisfied this section if a reasonable basis in fact existed for the
information required.
2. Whenever an art merchant furnishes the name of the artist pursuant to
subdivision one of section two hundred twenty-c of this article for any time
period after nineteen hundred forty-nine, and otherwise furnishes informa-
tion required by any of the subdivisions of section two hundred twenty-c of
this article for any time period, as to transactions including offers, sales, or
consignments made to non-merchants and to another art merchant, such
information shall be a part of the basis of the bargain and shall create
express warranties as to the information provided. Such warranties shall
not be negated or limited because the merchant in the written instrument
did not use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or because the
merchant did not have a specific intention or authorization to make a war-
ranty or because any required statement is or purports to be, or is capable
of being merely the seller's opinion. The existence of a basis in fact for
information warranted by virtue of this subdivision shall not be a defense
in an action to enforce such warranty. However, with respect to photo-
graphs produced prior to nineteen hundred fifty, and other multiples pro-
duced prior to nineteen hundred, as to information required by subdivision
three of section two hundred twenty-c of this article, the merchant shall be
deemed to have satisfied this section if a reasonable basis in fact existed
1348 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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tion provided is erroneous, the buyer is entitled to a full refund. If the
buyer can prove that the seller willfully failed to provide the required
information or knowingly provided false information, the buyer may be
able to collect treble damages and attorney's fees from the seller.130
for the information provided. When information is not supplied as to any
subdivision of section two hundred twenty-c of this article because not ap-
plicable, this shall constitute the express warranty that the subdivision is
not applicable.
3. Whenever an art merchant disclaims knowledge as to a particular item
about which information is required, such disclaimer shall be ineffective
unless clearly, specifically and categorically stated as to such particular
item and contained in the physical context of other language setting forth
the required information as to a specific multiple.
130. Id. § 220-i. This section provides:
Remedies and enforcement
1. An art merchant, including a merchant consignee, who offers or sells a
multiple in, into or from this state without providing the information re-
quired in sections two hundred twenty-b and two hundred twenty-c of this
article for any time period, or who provides information which is mistaken,
erroneous or untrue, except for harmless errors such as typographical er-
rors, shall be liable to the purchaser to whom the multiple was sold. The
merchant's liability shall consist of the consideration paid by the purchaser
with interest from the time of payment at the rate prescribed by section
five thousand four of the civil practice law and rules or any successor pro-
vision thereto, upon the return of the multiple in substantially the same
condition in which received by the purchaser. This remedy shall not bar or
be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or with the exercise of
additional remedies otherwise available to the purchaser.
2. In any proceeding in which an art merchant relies upon a disclaimer of
knowledge as to any relevant information set forth in section two hundred
twenty-c of this article for any time period, such disclaimer shall be effec-
tive unless the claimant is able to establish that the merchant failed to
make reasonable inquiries, according to the custom and usage of the trade,
to ascertain the relevant information or that such relevant information
would have been ascertained as a result of such reasonable inquiries.
3. If an art merchant offers, consigns or sells a multiple and:
(a) Willfully fails to provide the information set forth in sections two hun-
dred twenty-b and two hundred twenty-c of this article for any time pe-
riod; or
(b) Knowingly provides false information; or
(c) The purchaser can establish that the merchant willfully and falsely
disclaimed knowledge as to any required information, the purchaser of
such a multiple may recover from the art merchant an amount equal to
1 7:98
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Such information as the actual total number in the edition including
the artist's proofs must be revealed if the print is represented as being
from a limited edition. Also, a statement as to the authenticity of the
artist's signature, the year executed, the medium used, and whether the
work was authorized by the artist if there is no signature must be
provided.131
The potential impact of this law is significant in that it provides an
enforcement mechanism through its penalties previously lacking in sim-
ilar versions adopted in California (1971), Illinois (1972), Maryland
(1975), and Hawaii (1978).111 Interest in the new law has been ex-
pressed by such states as North Carolina, Michigan, and California
where they do not have the enforcement procedures expressed in the
New York law.133
Some objections to the law have been raised by dealers who claim
that the information necessary to complete a transaction provides un-
due paper work and expense, complicating the process. Some artists
have complained that requiring disclosure of the total number in a lim-
ited numbered edition is too restrictive as they cannot wait and see how
an edition will be received and sells. If an artist miscalculates and is-
sues too many, the value inherent in scarcity is lost.13 4 However, these
three times the amount recoverable under subdivision one of this section.
As to this paragraph and paragraph (a) of this subdivision, a merchant
may introduce evidence of the relevant usage and custom of the trade in
any proceeding in which such treble damages are sought. This subdivision
shall not be deemed to negate the applicability of article twelve-f of this
chapter as to authenticity and article twelve-f is applicable, as to authen-
ticity, to the multiples covered by the provisions of this article.
4. In any action to enforce any provision of this article, the court may
allow the prevailing purchaser the costs of the action together with reason-
able attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees. In the event, however, the court
determines that an action to enforce was brought in bad faith, it may allow
such expenses to the art merchant as it deems appropriate.
5. An action to enforce any liability under this artcle [article] shall be
brought within the period prescribed for such actions by article two of the
uniform commercial code.
131. Chamberlain, Fraudulence, supra note 117, at 10. See N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW §§ 220-b to 220-e (Consol. Supp. 1982) for disclosure requirements.
132. Wallach, supra note 119, at 69.
133. Nils, supra note 116, at 8.
134. Chamberlain, Gold, supra note 118, at 11.
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objections have been overcome when weighed against the potential con-
tribution of this article to the stability and integrity of the market, and
its important benefits provided to the collector who would otherwise
have little recourse. Article 12-H helps establish a basis for values.135
The fair market value of these prints is based partly on scarcity. It is
pertinent for the collector in determining estate taxes; it is necessary
for the seller who warrants his product and must make refunds or ab-
sorb additional penalties if labeling is inaccurate. 13 6
Earlier proposals of this law had included sculpture which is a
runner-up to prints in the fraud market. However, it was not included
due to an intention of giving it separate consideration in another law
that deals specifically with sculpture.37 The problems with regard to
sculpture are similar to those of prints. Significant is the number of
casts which have been made. Multiplicity of casts creates the potential
for forgery, unauthorized editions, excess production, and inferior re-
production which might be dealt with through specific legislation
within the next couple of years.138
Conclusion
In today's world, aesthetic pleasure is not the sole test of the value
of a work of art. Art is not created in a vacuum isolated from external
influences both creative and economic. The experience of uncovering an
art forgery that at one time was admired as a great work of art is
inseparable from our ideas of art as a reflection of history-the truth
about its creation and antiquity, the impact of a particular artist, and
the functioning of an international art market.
Art forgery, as a crime of major proportion, is connected to mar-
ket forces which, accompanied by generally inadequate legal protec-
tions, make it possible to amass huge profits. There is an alliance be-
tween society as a whole and art's economic status so that works of art
have acquired tremendous investment value. The result is a currently
thriving art market in which the artist has become the source of the
economic interest of others and himself. The idea of the isolated es-
135. Id.
136. Chamberlain, Fraudulence, supra note 117, at 10.
137. Id.
138. Committee Report, supra note 60, at 99-100.
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tranged artist now seems irrelevant in the context of the corporate age
where this international art market contemplates huge investment and
profit.139
There are no simple solutions to the problem of art forgery. It is a
function of man's creativity--creativity to produce and creativity to
find ways to profit illegally. As of yet there has not been much specific
legislation to deal with the problem. At the national level some sort of
strict uniform legislation seems advisable; however, this has not oc-
curred. Only a few states have adopted legislation specifically geared
towards art forgery and art fraud. New York in its position as a center
for the art market leads the way with the strictest most effective legis-
lation. The new article 12-H of the New York General Business Law
and a possible statute dealing specifically with sculpture are examples
of New York's continuing innovative effort in this field. The Uniform
Commercial Code can also be an effective remedy. The warranty provi-
sions (sections 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-316) if used effectively and cre-
atively can provide relief to the unwary or duped victims of art forgery.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized both legally and commercially
that there is a necessity for an effective realistic approach to the prob-
lem of art forgery in view of the modern art market.
Peter Barry Skolnik
139. Gablik, Art Under the Dollar Sign, ART IN AMERICA, Dec. 1981, at 13.
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Complaint Review Boards for Florida's Police
Officers: Who's Complaining?
The Florida Legislature enacted' Florida Statutes sections 112.531-
.341 to formally grant specific civil rights to Florida law enforcement
officers whose official conduct was under investigation. The rights enti-
tle officers to notice of disciplinary action, presence of counsel, and to
the formation of a complaint review board where grievances may be
aired.2 The statute provides that officers may institute civil suits where
the rights are abridged;' and every agency employing law enforcement
officers is required to create a system to receive and process com-
plaints.4 Injunctive relief may be sought where an agency fails to com-
ply with these requirements. 5
Florida Statutes section 112.532(2), which establishes the Com-
plaint Review Board, has recently become controversial. The section
states:
A complaint review board shall be composed of three mem-
bers: One member selected by the chief administrator of the
agency; one member selected by the aggrieved officer; and a third
member to be selected by the other two members. Agencies having
more than 100 law enforcement officers shall utilize a five-member
board with two members being selected by the administrator, two
members being selected by the aggrieved officer, and a fifth mem-
ber being selected by the other four members. The board members
shall be law enforcement officers selected from any state, county, or
municipal agency within the county.6
Throughout Florida, courts have rendered opinions offering various in-
1. FLA. STAT. § 112.531-.34 (1981).
2. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(2) (1981).
3. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(3) (1981).
4. FLA. STAT. § 112.533 (1981).
5. FLA. STAT. § 112.534 (1981).
6. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(2) (1981).
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terpretations and applications of this area of legislation. Although the
Florida Supreme Court has recently reviewed a case specifically involv-
ing the purpose behind section 112.532(2), further legislative action is
required to uniformly set the complaint review board process in motion.
The objective of this note is to examine the rationale behind the
diverse opinions, to examine similar legislative action in other progres-
sive states, and to offer suggestions to achieve a clarified statutory.
scheme in Florida concerning the civil rights of its law enforcement
officers. In addition, since the statute includes provisions for dismissals
or suspensions, its compliance with procedural due process require-
ments will be reviewed. Finally, this note will outline an innovative plan
by which the civil rights of Florida police officers can be protected
through the use of complaint review boards.
Legislative Purpose
Florida Statutes sections 112.531-.34 were enacted in 1974,7 and
have remained relatively unchanged. Section 112.532(2) specifically
deals with a complaint review board. As it presently exists, however,
section 112.532(2) fails to define the purpose or power of the complaint
review board. Longo v. City of Hallandale,8 a Broward Circuit Court
decision, delved into the legislative proceedings records in an attempt to
ascertain the intent of this enactment:
[T]he purpose of the act is to protect a police officer from arbitrary
and unreasonable interrogation and investigation by superior of-
ficers whom he is otherwise in no position to resist. It is also clear
from the legislative debates that the act was intended to apply only
to intra-departmental interrogation and investigation, and had as
its purpose the protection of subordinate officers from 'third degree'
tactics by superior officers, especially in jurisdictions where the
subordinate officer was not protected by civil service.9
As to section 112.532(2) specifically, the Longo court concluded:
7. 1974 Fla. Laws 728.
8. 42 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1975).
9. Id. at 57.
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In addition, we are uncertain as to the functions of the complaint
review board provided in § 2(2), when and how it is to be imple-
mented in the event of a dispute, what it is supposed to do, and
what effect or weight is to be given and by whom to its determina-
tion, assuming it is supposed to make a determination.10
To assist the Florida Legislature in pinpointing areas requiring
clarification through amendment, a review of similar enactments in
Texas and Pennsylvania proves beneficial.
Civil Rights Protection for Police Officers in Other States
Policemen's Civil Service in Texas
The law enforcement officers of Texas have been afforded numer-
ous civil rights to protect their employment status through Article
1269m, Texas Civil Statutes Annotated."' The Article establishes a Po-
licemen's Civil Service, 2 complete with a commission overseeing the
Civil Service activities, in all but the smallest cities in the state. The
commission is comprised of three members who are appointed by the
city's chief executive. Each member must be a citizen of the particular
city, over twenty-five years of age, and must not have occupied any
public office within the three years preceding appointment.
The commission is formally required to inspect all police depart-
ments annually to ensure compliance with the civil service regula-
tions.1" It may further initiate investigations into matters concerning
alleged violations of law enforcement officers' rights. The commission
has the power to subpoena, order depositions and request production of
evidence, as well as administer oaths. Article 1269m, in fact, comments
that the commission's powers are to be honored in the same manner as
those of any civil court.
In order for an officer to receive a review hearing before the com-
mission, he must file a statement denying the allegations against him
10. Id. at 59.
11. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982).
12. Id. § 1 Creation of Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service; § 3 Firemen's
and Policemen's Civil Service Commission. Texas firemen also have the protection of
this statute.
13. Id. § 5a Investigations and inspections.
! 7:98
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within ten days after notice of termination.14 The complainant has the
right to counsel at the hearing, and may invoke the witness rule. The
commission's decision is to be based solely on evidence presented at the
hearing. If a policeman is dissatisfied with the commission's findings,
that officer may petition the district court for relief within ten days
after the decision. 5 The court may set aside the commission's ruling
and order the case tried de novo.
Where an aggrieved officer is granted reinstatement by the com-
mission, the employing department must immediately comply; failure
to do so will subject the department head to contempt sanctions. If the
disobeyance continues for ten days, the chief executive has a duty to
discharge that department head from city employment. 16
Texas courts have had much success in applying these specific
guidelines to particular cases. For example, a Texas Court of Civil Ap-
peals reviewed an order handed down by a city's Civil Service Commis-
sion in Richardson v. City of Pasadena.17 In Richardson, an aggrieved
policeman petitioned the court to set aside the commission's order,
which had affirmed his dismissal for refusing to submit to a polygraph
examination. The officer claimed that, after the civil service hearing
had concluded, the commission improperly received several affidavits
buttressing the insubordination charges. The police officer contended
that the commission violated his civil rights by reviewing the affidavits
out of the presence of the officer or his attorney.
The Court of Civil Appeals first concluded that the dismissal was
founded upon legitimate principles: "Insubordination in refusing a rea-
sonable and constitutional command cannot be upheld without jeopard-
izing the system of police administration which is premised on disci-
pline." 8 The court then rejected the claim that the post-hearing
14. Id. § 17 Procedure before Commission.
15. Id. § 18 Appeal to District Court.
16. Id. § 16 Indefinite suspensions.
17. 500 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 14th Civ. App. 1973), reversed on factual grounds,
513 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1974). For a discussion of the Richardson reversal, see infra note
19.
18. Richardson, 500 S.W.2d at 177. Accord State Dep't of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles v. Zimmer, 398 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Farmer v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 400 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
But see Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 8 Fla. Law Weekly 68 (Fla. Feb. 20,
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affidavits tainted the commission's ruling, and refused to order a new
hearing. The fact that substantial evidence had been presented during
the hearing, in the presence of the officer and his counsel, was sufficient
to find the officer guilty of insubordination. However, the court, in
dicta, stated that if the post-hearing affidavits had been the sole basis
for the commission's decision, the officer's due process rights would
have been violated. 9
1983) (Case No. 61,001), in which the Florida Supreme Court overturned the Zimmer
rationale which had established the reasonableness of ordering police officers to take
polygraph examinations, so long as officers were not coerced into waiving their Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination. The court discussed the stance of other
jurisdictions on the reasonableness issue related to compulsory polygraph examinations
of public employees, including Richardson.
Justice Adkins, in his majority opinion, stressed the failure of polygraph propo-
nents to demonstrate the science's reliability to a judicially recognizable level. Conse-
quently, Justice Adkins deemed compulsory orders to submit to these examinations un-
reasonable. Farmer, 8 Fla. Law Weekly at 69 (citing Zimmer, 398 So. 2d at 466-67
(Anstead, J., dissenting)). "Suffice it to say that polygraph testing has not taken its
place alongside fingerprint analysis as an established forensic science. It may someday
meet that burden, but has as yet not done so." Farmer, 8 Fla. Law Weekly at 70.
Recognizing that the complaining officer freely answered questions posed to him with-
out the threat of polygraph testing, the majority concluded that:
[t]o further subject petitioner to the same questions when he is attached to
a machine of undemonstrated scientific reliability and validity to obtain
test results which could not be used in court, is, we believe, not a lawful
and reasonable order and can thus not provide a basis for dismissal.
Id.
Chief Justice Alderman dissented, citing the Zimmer case as supporting the rea-
sonableness of orders to submit to polygraph examinations in the public sphere, where
the personal integrity of employees is a prime concern. Farmer, 8 Fla. Law Weekly at
71.
The Farmer decision severely hampers the internal investigative processes of Flor-
ida police departments. This concern was discounted by the Farmer majority, however,
which adjudged that "the possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the
foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a reed to support a
denial of a police officer's right to be subjected only to lawful and reasonable orders."
Id. at 70. Judicial and legislative attack against the Farmer ruling can be expected
soon. Fort Lauderdale Assistant City Attorney Jerry Knight has indicated that the
City will petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in Farmer.
19. Richardson, 500 S.W.2d at 178. See § 17 Procedure before Commission.
Unfortunately, the availability of clear legislative guidelines does not necessarily assure
their correct application. In Richardson v. City of Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.
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It is important to recognize that, because the Commission's struc-
ture and procedures were clearly enumerated by the legislature, the
appellate court had ample guidelines to follow in making its
determination."
Civil Service Protection in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's statutory counterpart equals the specificity of the
Texas statute.2 1 The two enactments differ, however, in the selection of
commission members. While Texas places the authority to appoint with
the chief executive of the particular city, and requires a three-year gap
between public office and commission duty, Pennsylvania law dictates
that elections by the city council be used to select commission mem-
bers, and fails to require an interval from public office. 22
1974), the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling that substantial evi-
dence of insubordination had been presented at the commission hearing. In its reversing
opinion, the court stated that:
the testimony. . . was directly in conflict on the essential issue of whether
Richardson disobeyed an order or merely refused a request. When the
hearing ended, the Commission's decision rested on which man the Com-
missioners believed; there was no other evidence. The subsequently submit-
ted affidavits bore directly on the essential fact issue in the case; yet Rich-
ardson had no opportunity to cross examine the affiants, object to the
affidavits or offer rebuttal testimony prior to the Commission's resolution
of this disputed fact issue.
Id. at 4.
Based on its perception of the facts, the court concluded that "[it is only when a
decision is influenced by evidence of which one party has no knowledge or has no
chance to confront and explain that a due process problem arises." Id.
20. Although the factual issues in Richardson produced differing opinions at the
appellate levels, the clear and unambiguous legislation contained in Article 1269m al-
lowed no discrepancies as to the legal principles to be applied:
The Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act provides for a trial
de nova in the district court in the event the policemen [sic] is dissatisfied
with the decision of the Commission. Such an appeal is governed by the
substantial evidence rule. The review is limited to an ascertainment of
whether there was substantial evidence reasonably sufficient to support the
challenged order.
500 S.W.2d at 177-78.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 12621-12638 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1982).
22. Id. § 12625 Civil service commission; election; organization; oath of commis-
sioners; powers as to investigations.
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The statutes correspond in their grants of power to these tribunals.
The Pennsylvania commission's decisions are binding, and carry con-
tempt sanctions for non-compliance. Both enactments require that no-
tice of dismissal be given to the officer prior to actual termination, in-
cluding notice of the officer's right to a review hearing.23
Procedural Due Process Rights of Governmental Employees:
Recent Supreme Court Rationale
Procedural Due Process and Federal Employment: Arnett v.
Kennedy
Florida Statutes section 112.532(4) requires that notice of impend-
ing disciplinary action be given to an officer.24 However, due to the fact
that a dismissal may deprive a governmental employee of economic se-
curity and future employment, the statute could be constitutionally at-
tacked as being insufficient in terms of procedural due process.
The United States Supreme Court, in Arnett v. Kennedy2 5 dis-
cussed the adequacy of procedural due process constraints set forth in a
federal employment statute. Kennedy was a non-probationary federal
employee who was terminated for allegedly slandering his superior. The
employee asserted that the statute, which authorized termination only
for cause, did not specify his right to a trial-type hearing before re-
moval, thereby denying him procedural due process of law.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a plurality of the Court, pointed
out that the federal statute had been supplemented by federal Civil
Service regulations. These regulations enlarged the statute's protec-
tions, by requiring an evidentiary hearing before a Civil Service Com-
mission where the employing agency had previously decided to termi-
23. Id. § 12638 Removal, etc.; statement of reasons; investigations and hearings;
written charges against policemen and firemen; suspension pending hearing.
24. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(4) (1981) states:
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION.-No dismissal, demotion,
transfer, reassignment, or other personnel action which might result in loss
of pay or benefits or which might otherwise be considered a punitive mea-
sure shall be taken against any law enforcement officer unless such law
enforcement officer is notified of the action and the reason or reasons
therefor prior to the effective date of such action.
25. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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nate the employee.
More importantly, the plurality opinion stated that a statute which
allows termination only for cause may also establish the method in
which cause is determined. Because the employee's interest is created
statutorily, that interest may also be terminated by statute, without re-
gard to the constitutional guarantees applicable to other types of inter-
ests. The Court reasoned that "the employee's statutorily defined right
is not a guarantee against removal without cause in the abstract, but
such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress has
designated for the determination of cause."2 Relating this theory to
the facts of Arnett, Justice Rehnquist upheld the procedural limitations
embodied in the federal employment statute, stating that "the Govern-
ment might, . . . constitutionally deal with appellee's claims as it pro-
posed to do here."'27
In Arnett, Kennedy also contended that he was effectively accused
of dishonesty, thereby damaging his reputation as a loyal and trustwor-
thy employee. He argued that the Fifth Amendment entitled him to a
hearing before he could be deprived of this liberty interest.28 The plu-
rality responded negatively to this argument, by determining that the
employee's reputation was not damaged as a result of the termination.
To clarify this position, Justice Rehnquist cited Board of Regents v.
Roth,29 which involved an untenured teacher's attempt to be rehired:
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any
charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and
26. Id. at 152. Justice Rehnquist alluded to a sliding-scale approach to issues of
constitutional protection: "The types of 'liberty' and 'property' protected by the Due
Process Clause vary widely, and what may be required under that Clause in dealing
with one set of interests which it protects may not be required in dealing with another
set of interests." Id. at 153.
27. Id. at 155. While the Court quickly passed over the property interest issue,
its recognition of the review procedures afforded by the statute and supplemental Civil
Service regulations implied that a property interest was granted to the employee, but
that the review procedures satisfied due process requirements. This rationale leads di-
rectly to Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the theory of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, later in the opinion.
28. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
29. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
!
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associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his
contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dis-
honesty, or immorality. . . . In such a case, due process would ac-
cord an opportunity to refute the charge. . ... 30
Justice Rehnquist concluded by pointing out the limited purpose of ad-
ministrative hearings, and the need to exhaust those remedies before
seeking judicial relief:
[L]iberty is not offended by dismissal from employment itself, but
instead based upon an unsupported charge which could wrongfully
injure the reputation of an employee. Since the purpose of the
hearing in such a case is to provide the person an opportunity to
clear his name, a hearing afforded by administrative appeal proce-
dures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. Here appellee chose not to
rely on his administrative appeal, which, if his factual contentions
are correct, might well have vindicated his reputation. .... 31
The concurring opinion of Justice Powell, with whom Justice
Blackmun joined, found fault in Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the
statute's own procedural limitations system: "Governmental deprivation
of [a property or liberty] interest must be accompanied by minimum
procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing." 32
Justice Powell reiterated the Court's opinions in Board of Regents v.
30. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 156-57 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573).
31. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 157. The plurality opinion concluded:
In sum, we hold that the [Act],. . . did not create an expectancy of
job retention in those employees requiring procedural protection under the
Due Process Clause beyond that afforded here by the statute and related
agency regulations. We also conclude that the post-termination hearing
procedures provided by the Civil Service Commission ... adequately pro-
tect those federal employees' liberty interest, . . . in not being wrongfully
stigmatized by untrue and unsupported administrative charges.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 164. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971): "The formality
and procedural requisites for [a due process] hearing can vary, depending upon the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Id.
at 378.
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Roth33 and Perry v. Sindermann,34 which discussed the proper defini-
tion of a property interest, and the duties of agencies granting such
interests. In Roth, the Court had established that a person was granted
a property interest only where he had:
[A] legitimate claim of entitlement to it. . . . It is a purpose of the
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a
person to vindicate those claims ...
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure cer-
tain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.35
The Sindermann Court had emphasized that once a property interest
had been granted, deprivation of that interest would have to be accom-
panied by some form of notice and a hearing.36
Justice Powell reasoned that once a property interest was granted
by the legislature, the Constitution would determine what procedural
constraints would be required. Relating this rationale to the facts in
Arnett, he found that the federal statute, which guaranteed continual
employment absent cause for discharge, granted the employee a claim
of entitlement to employment.3 7 Justice Powell concluded that the em-
33. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
34. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
35. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 165 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
36. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 165-66.
37. Id. at 166. Justice Powell further commented:
The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal em-
ployment determines not only the nature of appellee's property interest,
but also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay
claim. . . . This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural
due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by consti-
tutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a prop-
erty interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize
the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate
procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized, the ade-
quacy of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in consti-
tutional terms.
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ployee was thereby entitled to notice and a review hearing as required
by the Due Process Clause. 8
Justice White's concurring opinion in Arnett found that, while the
Constitution required notice and opportunity for hearing, the statute
and its supplementary review guidelines satisfied these requirements.39
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Arnett, agreed that the Constitu-
tion should govern the adequacy of termination review procedures.
However, utilizing a balancing test to determine whether a post-dismis-
sal hearing was sufficient under the circumstances, Justice Marshall
found that the inevitable delays in the statute's appeal process unduly
burdened the employee's financial resources, and necessitated a pre-dis-
Id. at 166-67. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Justice Powell also discussed whether an evidentiary hearing was required before
removal: "The resolution of this issue depends on a balancing process in which the
Government's interest in expeditious removal of an unsatisfactory employee is weighed
against the interest of the affected employee in continued public employment." Arnett,
416 U.S. at 167-68. Reasoning that the government's removal interest was substantial,
and in light of the fact that appellee would be entitled to backpay and reinstatement if
he prevailed on the merits, Justice Powell found that a pre-termination hearing was not
necessary. Id. at 171. Cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254, where the impending discontinuance
of welfare benefits warranted a pre-termination hearing because "termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits." Id. at 264.
38. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 166. Although disagreeing with the plurality's approach
to procedural due process analysis, Justice Powell ultimately concurred in the finding
that the statute and Civil Service rules together provided an adequate termination re-
view system.
39. Id. at 185-86. Justice White remarked:
[A]s a matter of due process, a hearing must be held at some time before
a competitive civil service employee may be finally terminated for miscon-
duct. Here, the Constitution and the [Act] converge, because a full trial-
type hearing is provided before termination from the service becomes
final. ...
A different case might be put, of course, if the termination were for
reasons of pure inefficiency, assuming such a general reason could be
given, in which case it would be at least arguable that a hearing would
serve no useful purpose and that judgments of this kind are best left to the
discretion of administrative officials.
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missal hearing.40
Procedural Due Process and State Employment: Bishop v. Wood
More recently, the United States Supreme Court resolved a con-
troversy involving the statutory grounds for termination of a municipal
police officer. The petitioner, in Bishop v. Wood,41 asserted that a city
employment ordinance violated his procedural due process rights by
failing to grant him the right to a termination review hearing. Officer
Bishop contended that, as a permanent city employee whose termina-
tion was authorized only on specific grounds, he had a sufficient expec-
tancy of continual employment to constitute a protected property
interest.
In rejecting the officer's property-interest argument, the Court
noted that, because a state statute was involved, "the sufficiency of the
claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law."4 The
majority followed the trial court's interpretation of state law, which
held that the employee was merely given certain procedural rights
which, in the instant case, were not violated by the terminating agency.
This conclusion effectively foreclosed the petitioner's "continual em-
ployment" argument, by classifying him as terminable at will.43
The officer also asserted, however, that the reasons for his dis-
charge seriously stigmatized his reputation, thereby depriving him of
his liberty without due process.44 Reasoning that the absence of public
40. Id. at 226-27. Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred in the Marshall dis-
sent. Justice Marshall noted: "We have repeatedly observed that due process requires
that a hearing be held at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, but it re-
mains for us to give content to that general principle in this case by balancing the
Government's asserted interests against those of the discharged employee." Id. at 212
(citing excerpts from Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (emphasis ad-
ded)). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McEl-
roy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
Justice Marshall theorized that "the plight of a discharged employee may not be
far different from that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg who, pending resolution of
a controversy. . . may [be] deprive[d] ...of the very means by which to live while
he waits." Arnett, 416 U.S. at 220 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264).
41. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
42. Id. at 344.
43. See Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 504 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
44. Officer Bishop was dismissed based on a failure to follow certain orders, poor
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disclosure prevented the alleged impairment of the officer's "good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity",4 5 the Supreme Court cited the
rationale pronounced in Board of Regents v. Roth:" "[It stretches the
concept too far]to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he
simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek
another."4 7 The Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny hear-
ing rights to the officer, by stating:
In the absence of any claim that the public employer was moti-
vated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an em-
ployee's constitutionally protected rights, we must presume that of-
ficial action was regular, and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in
other ways. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel
decisions.48
Justices Brennan and Marshall, in their dissenting opinion, rea-
soned that the charges made by the employing agency warranted a
hearing to allow the officer an opportunity to clear his name. Although
no public disclosure had been made, the Justices recognized that, when
prospective employers inquired into the employee's past through his
previous employers, disclosure of the charges was imminent.49
Most importantly, the dissenters joined in censoring the majority's
adoption of the rationale that the statute, and not the Constitution,
attendance at police training classes, causing low morale, and conduct unsuited to an
officer.
45. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which discussed the interplay of
reputation and employment.
46. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
47. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348 (citing 408 U.S. at 575).
48. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 350.
49. "It is difficult to imagine a greater 'badge of infamy' that could be imposed
on one following petitioner's calling; in a profession in which prospective employees are
invariably investigated, petitioner's job prospects will be severely constricted by the
governmental action in this case." Id. at 350. The dissent further reasoned that
"merely because the derogatory information is filed in respondent's records and no
'publication' occurs until shortly after [petitioner's] discharge from employment does
not subvert the fact that a postdeprivation hearing to accord petitioner opportunity to
clear his name has been contemplated by our cases." Id. at 352.
I
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governed the sufficiency of administrative review. The dissent pointed
out that six Justices had plainly rejected that view in Arnett v.
Kennedy.50
Bishop v. Wood illustrates the Court's preference for a federalistic
stance, when afforded a direct interpretation of state law which finds
that no property interest has been created by state or municipal legisla-
tion. The Arnett and Bishop decisions offer the theory that, where
property interests are specifically granted, evidentiary-type review hear-
ings must be made available. Where such interests are lacking, how-
ever, compliance with statutory termination procedures is the only pre-
requisite to lawful dismissal.
This rationale directs the focus into Florida case law to determine
whether state law enforcement officers have protected property interests
in their employment. If such interests have been granted, termination
procedures concerning those officers must comply with the require-
ments of procedural due process in order to sustain a constitutional
attack.
Property Interests of Florida Police Officers
The issue of whether Florida Statutes section 112.532(2) granted
law enforcement officers the right to a review hearing was discussed in
West v. State, Department of Criminal Law Enforcement.51 Special
50. Justice White's dissent summarized: "The majority's holding. . . rests, then,
on the fact that state law provides no procedures for assuring that the City Manager
dismiss [petitioner] only for cause. The right to his job . . . is thus redefined . . . by
the procedures provided . . . and as redefined is infringed only if the procedures are
not followed." Id. at 357. The opinion of Justice White concluded:
The views now expressed by the majority are thus squarely contrary
to the views expressed by a majority of the Justices in Arnett. . . . The
ordinance plainly grants petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause
to fire him. Having granted him such a right it is the Federal Constitution,
not state law, which determines the process to be applied in connection
with any state decision to deprive him of it.
Id. at 360-61. Compare id. at 345 n.8, where the majority attempts to distinguish Ar-
nett by finding that the differences of opinion hinged on federal regulation interpreta-
tion, with id. at 360 n.3, where the dissent maintains that the Constitution's interplay
with employment regulations was the obstacle dividing the Arnett Justices.
51. 371 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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agent West was terminated for allegedly violating department orders.
He requested a complaint review board hearing to determine whether
his dismissal was justified. Upon the Department's denial of the re-
quest, West appealed directly to the First District Court of Appeal,
requesting that his right to a hearing be established.
The First District held that section 112.532(2) did in fact grant
West the right to a hearing.52 The court's decision was apparently
swayed by West's lack of opportunity to examine evidence and cross-
examine witnesses against him. In a questionable move, however, the
appellate court concluded that the language of section 112.532(2)'
made it apparent that complaint review board hearings must conform
with the requirements of due process.5 3
This broad statement affecting section 112.532(2) is troubling,
since no mention was made of statutory language implying any "legiti-
mate claim of entitlement" to continual employment.54 When viewed in
light of the Roth-Arnett-Bishop sequence of cases, the West decision
clearly falls short of judicially recognizing that Florida law enforce-
ment officers enjoy property interests in their employment.
The ruling seems instead to have rested on the officer's claim of
liberty deprivation, alleging that his reputation had been injured by
media coverage of the controversy. The United States Supreme Court
would apparently concur in granting West certain procedural due pro-
cess rights, assuming the officer sufficiently pled injury to his reputa-
tion. However, if no liberty deprivation had been pled, the Court would
no doubt rule that no hearing rights were granted absent a determina-
tion that a Florida employment statute had granted property interests
to law enforcement officers.5 5 Because West was primarily based on a
liberty argument, no statutorily-created property interest was effec-
tively established by the decision.56
52. Id. at 109.
53. Id.
54. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
55. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
56. The West court no doubt recognized the absence of civil service protections
available to officers of the Department, and that Florida Statutes section 112.532(2),
forming a complaint review board, was the only legislation offering these officers any
hope of receiving review hearings. Florida Statutes section 110.051(3) (1977) had ex-
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The property-interest issue was more directly addressed, however,
in Ragucci v. City of Plantation.57 Lieutenant Ragucci was dismissed
from employment after an investigation allegedly revealed his involve-
ment in the sale of fully automatic weapons, and narcotics usage. The
officer was given a Complaint Review Board hearing, which resulted in
a recommendation affirming the dismissal. Officer Ragucci then sued to
have his right to a City Council review hearing established, pursuant to
the procedures adopted in the City Charter.58
empted employees of the Department of Criminal Law Enforcement from the review
procedures of the State Career Service System, contained in Florida Statutes section
110.061 (1977). In 1978, however, the Florida Legislature amended section 110.051(3)
to provide that employees of the Department were now subject to section 110.061,
except in matters relating to transfer. See 1978 Fla. Laws 720. These sections were
renumbered in 1979: section 110.051(3) now appears as section 110.205(3); section
110.061 has been changed to section 110.227. See 1979 Fla. Laws 740. The amend-
ments of 1980 (1980 Fla. Laws 1599), and 1981 (1981 Fla. Laws 842) have not af-
fected subsection (3) of section 110.205.
Florida Statutes section 110.227 (1981) concerns the suspension, dismissal, reduc-
tion in pay, demotion, layoff or transfer of Career Service employees. Subpart (1) pro-
vides that permanent employees may be suspended or dismissed only for cause, e.g.,
negligence, insubordination, wilful violation of agency rules, conduct unbecoming a
public employee, etc. Subpart (2) calls for the establishment of rules and procedures
regarding disciplinary action, subject to approval by the Administration Commission.
Subpart (5a) grants a permanent employee- the right to written notice of disciplinary
action at least ten days prior to the date such action becomes effective. The aggrieved
employee must be given an opportunity to appear before the agency or official taking
such action, within the ten-day period, in order to respond to the charges either orally
or in writing. Suspended or dismissed employees are entitled to Career Service Com-
mission hearings.
Florida Statutes section 110.305 (1981) spells out the powers and duties of the
Commission. With the power to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, and sanction
hearing misconduct, perjury, or non-compliance with Commission orders, the Commis-
sion appears as a quasi-judicial body. Written notice of employee appeals must be filed
within twenty days after receipt of notice of dismissal or suspension.
According to Florida Statutes section 110.309(5) (1981), the Commission's order
is conclusive. A party may appeal that order, however, in the respective district court of
appeal, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 120.68(2) (1981).
57. 407 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
58. Plantation's City Charter provided that the mayor had a duty:
to suspend any appointed officer, except councilmen, at any time for gross
neglect or dereliction of duty; provided, however, that the grounds for sus-
pension of a police officer . . shall also include the following: Incompe-
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court's
ruling, held that the City's adopted procedures had to be followed, and
that section 112.532(2) did not supplant that requirement. "What is at
stake here is due process. Section 15 of the Charter conveyed upon the
City's law enforcement officers a property interest in their employment
because it expressly required that their termination be for cause." 59
The Ragucci court adopted the views expressed in Thurston v.
tency, neglect of duty, drunkenness, immorality, failure to obey orders
given by proper authorities, insubordination or any other just or reasonable
cause, at the same time notifying such officer or police officer in writing
the cause of the suspension, and giving him notice to appear at the next
regular meeting of the Council and answer thereto.
Id. at 934 n.3. Compare Lauderhill Code, Division 2 (Civil Service), particularly sec-
tions 2-37 (Discharge, suspension, demotion of employees), and 2-38 (Appeal to
Board); Hallandale Code, Chapter 21, sections 21-10 (Discharge of permanent employ-
ees-Notice of discharge), 21-11 (Same-Right to appeal to civil service board; time
of hearing; notice to employee of hearing; hearing to be public), and 21-12
(Same-Amendment of charges prohibited; procedure of hearing; right to counsel at
hearing; decision by civil service board).
Municipalities have been granted power to legislate in these areas through Florida
Statutes section 166.021(4) (1981), which states:
The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the con-
stitution. It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipali-
ties the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or pro-
prietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or
special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially
imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those
so expressly prohibited. However, nothing in this act shall be construed to
permit any changes. . . which affect. . . any rights of municipal employ-
ees, without approval by referendum ....
59. Ragucci, 407 So. 2d at 935 (emphasis added). Justice Anstead concurred
specially, stating that the Plantation City Charter could be amended to do away with
procedures which bog down the review process (such as the City Council's role in con-
ducting the hearings). The concurring opinion also pointed out that termination of
Ragucci could still be effectuated using the Charter's procedures, assuming that ade-
quate grounds for dismissal existed. Id. at 936.
Plantation City Attorney Donald J. Lunny has indicated that an ordinance
designed to place review hearings within the jurisdiction of a "Job Description Com-
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Dekle,6 ° a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which had estab-
lished property interests in employees under a Jacksonville Civil Ser-
vice rule. That rule authorized suspension or dismissal of an employee
only for cause, and included a lengthy checklist of possible employment
violations satisfying the cause requirement. Also included were
mandatory notice requirements, and an appeal procedure structured
around a Civil Service Board.
The Fifth Circuit in Thurston held that "city employment which
allows termination only for cause creates a constitutionally protectable
property interest. Once created, the employment property interest may
not be taken away without due process.""1 The Thurston court ruled
that the procedures contained in the civil service rule did comport with
the requirements suggested in Arnett v. Kennedy.6 2
The essential issue in Thurston, however, did not center on
whether the existing provisions of the rule satisfied due process. The
crux of Thurston focused on whether due process required the institu-
tion of additional procedural safeguards where employees are dismissed
before review hearings are convened. The court responded in favor of
the employees:
Where a governmental employer chooses to postpone the opportu-
nity of a nonprobationary employee to secure a full-evidentiary
hearing until after dismissal, risk reducing procedures must be ac-
corded. These must include, prior to termination, written notice of
the reasons for termination and an effective opportunity to rebut
those reasons. Effective rebuttal must give the employee the right
to respond in writing to the charges made and to respond orally
before the official charged with the responsibility of making the
termination decision.63
It seems clear that Florida employment statutes or ordinances,
which condition termination on a finding of cause, grant employees a
60. 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 1272.
62. Id. at 1273. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
63. Thurston, 531 F.2d at 1273. Although the Fifth Circuit recognized that Ar-
nett involved the adequacy of existing procedures, "[Arnett guides] us to focus on pro-
cedures which will minimize the risk of improper termination associated with any dis-
missal process." Id.
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constitutionally protected property interest in continual employment.
The Roth-Arnett-Bishop sequence tacitly concludes that any legislation
which affords employees this type of interest must also include their
constitutional right to an evidentiary-type hearing to review termina-
tions. The Thurston decision imposes further restraints where the hear-
ing is to be held after actual dismissal occurs.
Do Sections 112.531-.34 Authorize Terminations Which Violate
Procedural Due Process?
While the enactment of sections 112.531-.34 does not purport to
grant any specific employment status to Florida law enforcement of-
ficers, section 112.532(4) authorizes dismissals and suspensions, condi-
tioned only upon notification to the officer of the impending action and
the reasons for it.64
Imagine a situation where a Florida police officer has been granted
a recognized property interest by statute or ordinance, but is termi-
nated under the provisions of section 112.532(4) after an investigation
into his conduct allegedly reveals wrongdoing. While section
112.532(4) requires only notice of the dismissal and the reasons for it,
due process may require an evidentiary hearing into the propriety of
the action. Without granting the officer a review hearing, the officer's
property interest would be violated. A successful constitutional attack
against section 112.532(4) will require amendments granting disci-
plined officers the right to review hearings.6 5
64. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(4) (1981).
65. Of course, since the courts do not favor constitutional disputes, perhaps the
Florida Supreme Court will take affirmative action by applying a gloss over this con-
troversial legislation. The court may require some type of review hearing to satisfy any
constitutional concerns. See infra note 88.
Where the procedural due process rights of probationary law enforcement officers
are concerned, Bembanaste v. City of Hollywood, 394 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), offers some direction. Citing the City's civil service regulations which ex-
pressly allowed dismissal of probationary employees without cause, the Fourth District
found that the officer was not entitled to a review hearing. Footnote 5 of the
Bembanaste opinion indicated that, notwithstanding this hearing denial, the officer may
have been entitled to a hearing on other grounds, specifically if his complaint had al-
leged 'stigmatization' as a result of the dismissal.
See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977), a per curiam (5-4) decision which in-
3711
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Assuming complaint review boards were established to review dis-
missals of police officers, their present undefined powers are clearly in-
adequate to protect the due process rights of these employees. Gather-
ing the suggestions offered in Arnett v. Kennedy66 and the sample
legislation highlighted from Texas and Pennsylvania, the Complaint
Review Board introduced in section 112.532(2) should possess quasi-
judicial powers and should conduct review hearings with similar for-
malities. The Board's decision should have a binding effect on the par-
ties, and provisions should be made for contempt sanctions, in the event
the ruling is not fully obeyed.
Statutory Interpretation Problems in the Florida Courts:
Identifying the Purpose of the Complaint Review Board
Aside from the constitutional issues involved in implementing
Florida Statutes sections 112.531-.34, Florida courts have produced va-
rious, if not contrary, interpretations regarding the purposes to be
served by this legislation, and the procedures to be utilized in attaining
those objectives. The disjointed and undefined layout of these sections
has largely contributed to the confusion. Before any conclusions can be
properly drawn concerning the actual purpose of the Complaint Review
Board, however, a review of the applicable case law is necessary to re-
volved a nontenured city policeman's attempt to gain hearing rights to review his dis-
missal. Finding that no property interest question was at issue, the Court focused on
the policeman's claim of stigmatization. Recognizing that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment granted the officer an opportunity to refute the charges
against him, the Court commented that "if the hearing . . . is to serve any useful
purpose, there must be some factual dispute between an employer and a discharged
employee which has some significant bearing on the employee's reputation." Id. at 627.
Since the officer failed to substantially deny the charges, no right to a hearing was
granted:
But the hearing required where a nontenured employee has been stig-
matized in the course of a decision to terminate his employment is solely
to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. . . . Only if the
employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression
about the employee in connection with his termination is such a hearing
required.
Id. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
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veal the diverse opinions pronounced by the Florida courts.
A Broward Circuit Court decision, Longo v. City of Hallandale,7
offers the most in-depth discussion of the apparent purposes behind sec-
tions 112.531-.34. Although the general intent to protect subordinates
from intensive questioning was established by its lengthy investigation,
the Longo court was unable to determine the exact purposes and pow-
ers attributable to the Complaint Review Board formed in section
112.532(2).8
Another legislative flaw was revealed in City of Hallandale v. In-
glima,9 where two municipal police officers sued to enjoin their city
employer from disregarding the reinstatement recommendation handed
down by a complaint review board. The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal reversed the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction
against the city. Although the appellate court's decision rested on sev-
eral grounds, its most important statement revealed the advisory nature
of complaint review board decisions.7 1 Since the injunction was based
67. 42 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1975).
68. Id. at 57.
69. 346 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
70. Id. at 86. The Fourth District relied on AGO 076-38, 1976 Op. Att'y Gen.
65 (Feb. 18, 1976), which stated in part:
Since no quasi-judicial powers or duties are prescribed by statute for any
such complaint review board, any such board that might be established in
connection with s.3 [section 112.533] of the act is not, by the terms of Ch.
74-274, made an 'adjudicatory board' or one vested with quasi-judicial
powers, duties, or functions.
However, a municipality, under the authority of the Municipal Home
Rule Powers Act (Ch. 166, F.S.), can create such a board in conjunction
with the complaint processing and investigative system mandated by s.3 (s.
112.533, F.S.) of the act and prescribe its powers, duties, and functions so
as to grant the board such quasi-judicial powers necessary to give the find-
ings and determinations of any such board the status of final
adjudications. ...
See also AGO 075-41, 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. 68 (Feb. 19, 1975), which
commented:
Section 2(2), Ch. 74-274, Laws of Florida, provides that a complaint
review board 'shall be composed' of persons from specified areas, but does
not give it any powers or duties whatsoever. The legislative history of the
bill is unilluminating as to what the review board was intended to do. Fur-
thermore, the original bill, Senate Bill 84, from which the act is derived,
gave no powers to the board. . ..
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solely on the board's recommendation, such relief was improperly
granted.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Waters v. Purdy,7 1 further
attempted to define the situations in which complaint review boards
were available for termination review purposes. Officer Waters had
been terminated for violating department personnel rules. The Third
District emphasized the importance of defining the exact reasons for an
officer's discharge when determining whether the right to a complaint
review board hearing existed:
After scrutinizing Section 112.532, Florida Statutes (1975) in
its entirety, we find that subsection (2) . . . must be read in pari
materia with subsection (1) which provides in part:
. . . Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investiga-
tion and subject to interrogation . . . ,such interrogation shall be
conducted under the following conditions ...
. . . Waters was not under investigation, but rather was termi-
nated for violation of . . . personnel rules which he admitted vio-
lating. . . . [S]ection 112.532(2), Florida Statutes (1975) is not
applicable to the instant situation .... 72
Waters determined that only officers dismissed as a result of
agency investigations were entitled to the protections of the statute.
This theory was expanded when the protections to be incorporated into
the complaint review board process were discussed in West v. State,
Department of Criminal Law Enforcement.73 The First District Court
of Appeal in West granted complaint review board hearing rights to an
officer who was dismissed for violating department operational rules.
Surprisingly, the First District's remarks disclosing the underlying ra-
tionale used to reach that result were rather shallow and vague, al-
though the court apparently established that the officer was under in-
vestigation at the time of his dismissal.74
71. 345 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
72. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
73. 371 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
74. Note that the employing agency admitted the applicability of section
112.532(2), but defended on the ground that the complainant had not timely requested
the hearing while he was under investigation. This classification of investigation-related
dismissals parallels the views expressed by the Third District Court of Appeal in
1374 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Responding to the lack of statutory guidelines defining the powers
and procedures of complaint review boards, the West court ruled that
due process constraints would apply. The decision seemingly trans-
formed a statutorily-naked Board hearing into a quasi-judicial proceed-
ing to be used in determining the validity of investigation-based termi-
nations. The First District also failed to reconcile this grant of power
with the Board's established advisory authority. While the result in
West seems in line with notions of fairness,75 the blatant absence of a
well-organized, in-depth synopsis of the court's thought processes is
troubling.
However, the distress generated by the West court's conclusory
statements, and general theory of complaint review board use, was soon
quashed. The Florida Supreme Court, in Mesa v. Rodriguez,7 6 tangen-
tially redefined the scope and purpose of section 112.532(2). Mesa in-
volved a dispute between an arrested citizen and the arresting officer,
concerning the officer's conduct during the incident. The officer at-
tempted to establish his right to civil action against the complaining
citizen through section 112.532(3). 7
While the Mesa decision held that the officer could not sue under
section 112.532(3) because the citizen had not utilized the complaint
process established pursuant to section 112.533,78 the court in dictum
pointed out that:
Waters.
75. The First District was apparently swayed by the absence of alternative re-
view remedies at the aggrieved officer's disposal. See supra note 55.
76. 357 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1978).
77. FLA. STAT. § 112.532(3) (1981) states:
CIVIL SUITS BROUGHT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OF-
FICERS-Every law enforcement officer shall have the right to bring civil
suit against any person, group of persons, or organization or corporation,
or the head of such organization or corporation, for damages, either pecu-
niary or otherwise, suffered during the performance of the officer's official
duties or for abridgement of the officer's civil rights arising out of the of-
ficer's performance of official duties.
78. FLA. STAT. § 112.533 (1981) reads: "Receipt and processing of com-
plaints-Every agency employing law enforcement officers shall establish and put into
operation a system for the receipt, investigation, and determination of complaints re-
ceived by such employing agency from any person."
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If Rodriguez [citizen] had chosen, -he could have lodged a com-
plaint with the investigation system set up, pursuant to the statute,
by the Miami Police Department. His complaint could have been
reviewed by a Complaint Review Board. . . . And, the board, after
a hearing, would have had authority to render an advisory recom-
mendation as to action to be taken against Officer Mesa."9
This dictum offered a suggested use for complaint review boards not
readily ascertainable from the statute's face. Despite Mesa's views on
the probable purpose of complaint review boards, however, Florida law
remains unsettled on this issue. Although subsequent case law has con-
curred generally with the Mesa theory, a direct and authoritative pro-
nouncement by the Florida Supreme Court is needed to fully and
clearly resolve the existing uncertainty of complaint review board use.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal tracked the Mesa rationale
recently in Migliore v. City of Lauderhill.8" The Migliore court ex-
pressed its deep disapproval of the statutory interpretation pronounced
in West. Officers Migliore and Picarelli were dismissed for disobeying a
superior's order, although a citizen's complaint had been previously
lodged against them. The officers were advised of their right to a hear-
ing before the city's Civil Service Board," but opted to seek the em-
paneling of a complaint review board pursuant to section 112.532(2).
Upon the city's refusal to submit to the officers' demands, petitions for
writs of mandamus and injunctive relief were filed against the city.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's re-
fusal to grant judicial relief to the officers, most importantly on the
ground that the facts surrounding the officers' dismissals rendered a
complaint review board hearing inapplicable. Before rendering its inter-
pretation of the complaint review board's purpose, the Fourth District
expressed its dismay over the absence of meaningful legislative guide-
lines embodied in section 112.532(2). To establish the circumstances in
79. 357 So. 2d at 713 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion of Justice
Hatchett was not published, nor was any information concerning its contents available
through the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court.
80. 415 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), approved, 8 Fla. Law Weekly
159 (Fla. May 5, 1983) (Case No. 62,299). This author assisted Lauderhill City Attor-
ney Anthony J. Titone in creating the appellee's jurisdictional and answer briefs to the
Florida Supreme Court.
81. See Lauderhill Code §§ 2-37, 2-38.
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which complaint review boards were to be used, the appellate court
reviewed the entire statute, but centered its attention on section
112.533 for guidance:
The significant language of [section 112.533] for our present
purposes is contained in the final phrase "complaints received by
such employing agency. . . ." We interpret the statute as provid-
ing a law enforcement officer with a means of vindicating his ac-
tions and his reputation against unjust and unjustifiable claims
made against him by persons outside the agency which employs
him. We differ in that respect with the First District Court of
Appeal .... 82
In order to fully clarify its position, in light of the fact that a citizen's
complaint had initially subjected the officers to official scrutiny, the
court continued:
Under our interpretation of the purpose of Section 112.532 et
seq., appellants would have been entitled to a hearing on the basis
of the original written complaint against them. It is important to
note, however, that appellants were discharged not on the basis of
that complaint but on the basis of their refusal to obey the order of
a superior officer. We are of the view that a complaint review
board is not a forum available to appellants to test the validity of
their discharge under those circumstances.8 3
82. Migliore, 415 So. 2d at 64 (emphasis added). See FLA. STAT. § 112.533
(1981). Note that although the Fourth District's interpretation of the Complaint Re-
view Board's purpose mirrors that espoused by the Florida Supreme Court in Mesa,
357 So. 2d 711, the Migliore opinion makes no references to Mesa whatsoever.
83. Migliore, 415 So. 2d at 64-65. Commenting on the Complaint Review
Board's questionable effectiveness in its present form, the Fourth District reiterated the
finding that "its [the Board's] decision is not adjudicatory but advisory only." Id. at 65
(citing City of Hallandale v. Inglima, 346 So. 2d at 86). The Migliore court also fo-
cused on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, stating that:
Appellants' claims. . . should have been brought before the appropri-
ate administrative board. Here, a discharged, suspended or demoted em-
ployee of the city may appeal to the Civil Service Board. . . . The Board,
after an evidentiary hearing, may order reinstatement and back pay. ...
Appellants, having failed to avail themselves of the appropriate adminis-
trative remedy, cannot now obtain reinstatement or recover back pay.
415 So. 2d at 65.
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Practitioners no doubt will argue as to the extent to which the
West and Migliore interpretations conflict. As with all apparently con-
flicting opinions, however, distinctions inevitably will be found. One
possible distinguishing factor is the presence of civil service protections
in Migliore, and the absence of such alternative remedies in West.
Moreover, the equitable circumstances surrounding the two cases are
clearly contrasted. The complainants in Migliore sought judicial relief
without exhausting the administrative remedies available, while the
complaint review board hearing in West represented the only review
method conceivably available to the aggrieved officer. Interestingly,
with officers of the Florida Department of Criminal Law Enforcement
now enjoying state civil service protections,84 the prevailing equitable
thrust behind the West decision seems to have vanished. While West
may have been decided fairly under the circumstances, the theory of
complaint review board use which West supported has been conclu-
sively overturned by the Florida Supreme Court's approval of
Migliore.85
See Florida Weld. & E. Serv., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 386
(Fla. 1973): "Where a method of appeal from an administrative ruling has been pro-
vided, such method must be followed to the exclusion of any other system of review.
Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought by ex-
hausting this remedy before the courts will act." Id. at 389-90. See also Brooks v.
School Bd. of Brevard County, 382 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
The Migliore court also recognized a potential problem in the area of Complaint
Review Board membership, as presently provided by section 112.532(2) (1981):
Further, the fact that the board is required to be composed of law
enforcement personnel belies the kind of impartiality and lack of bias that
are ordinarily requisites of a panel established to determine substantive
rights between the body politic (standing in the shoes of the taxpayer) and
one of its own whose right to continue to represent and therefor to
financially benefit from that body politic has been challenged. We do not
mean to suggest that a complaint review board so constituted would neces-
sarily act in a biased manner; only that it gives the impression of impropri-
ety, which the legislature would obviously have avoided at all costs.
415 So. 2d at 64.
84. See 1978 Fla. Laws 720.
85. Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 8 Fla. Law Weekly 159 (Fla. May 5, 1983)
(Case No. 62,299).
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Conclusion
Florida Statutes sections 112.531-.34 lack the legislative clarity
and structure necessary to facilitate accurate and consistent judicial
applications. The absence of expressed procedures and powers to imple-
ment the newly-ascertained purpose of complaint review boards inhibits
meaningful reliance upon these provisions. The Florida Legislature
should amend sections 112.531-.34 to closely parallel the specificity and
depth of the Texas and Pennsylvania enactments discussed previously. 86
As the court in Longo v. City of Hallandale8 7 remarked, this legis-
lation was apparently designed to protect the civil rights of law enforce-
ment officers who did not otherwise enjoy civil service status. However,
municipal ordinances and recent state legislation have brought civil ser-
vice protections to seemingly all law enforcement officers in this state.,8
In addition, judicial developments up to and including the Florida Su-
preme Court opinion in Migliore have rejected the Longo view. The
legislature must decide whether the purpose of this act has been accu-
rately determined by the judiciary; if so, further legislative action is
necessary to rid these sections of their present disabilities.
Moreover, the role which complaint review boards play in this leg-
islative scheme remains a troubling mystery. In an attempt to reconcile
the Board's placement among various civil rights provisions, this author
offers the following analysis:
Because the legislature inherently utilizes legal jargon to ease judi-
cial implementation, the word Complaint as used in section 112.532(2)
gains crucial significance. A complaint represents the initial stage of
litigation, or better yet, rights enforcement. Therefore, the theory that
these boards are to serve as appellate forums for disciplined officers
seems incongruous with the normal meaning given to the language
used. A more plausible theory is that complaint review boards are to do
just that-review complaints made by persons outside the police
agency (citizens), concerning alleged misconduct demonstrated by the
agency's officers.
In the event a complaint review board finds the complaint fairly
86. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 1269m (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 12621-12638 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1982).
87. See Longo v. City of Hallandale, 42 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla.,17th Cir. Ct. 1975).
88. See supra notes 55, 57.
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substantiated by the evidence presented, it may recommend (or compel,
if proper amendments are made) that formal investigations commence
into the implicated officer's conduct. At this point, the civil rights set
forth by the remaining provisions of this statute are activated. In order
to prevent the officer from damaging his civil defenses against the com-
plainant, his rights to counsel, and reasonable discovery, must be ob-
served and preserved throughout the on-going departmental inquiries.
The statute's injunctive and mandamus relief provision is available
where these crucial rights are abridged during the investigation.
In light of the proposed purpose behind section 112.532(2), per-
haps the citizen-oriented complaint review board envisioned in Migliore
and Mesa will be formally and definitively established by the legisla-
ture.89 In view of recent skirmishes involving police officers and citi-
zens, a review panel of this type would be useful in resolving disputes
concerning police conduct, and in promoting the community's belief
that police conduct can be effectively scrutinized. 90 Whatever the legis-
lature's intentions may be, amendments clearly expressing those inten-
tions are needed if complaint review boards are to be effectively used in
the future.
Furthermore, the legislature must not overlook the procedural due
process rights of those affected by the statute. If provisions of this stat-
ute authorize dismissals, some formal requirements of notice and hear-
ing rights must be mandated to protect officers who have been granted
property interests in their employment.91
89. Notwithstanding the Florida Supreme Court's approval of complaint review
board use as espoused in Migliore, the Florida Legislature must elaborate through
amendment as to how this supposed legislative purpose is to be achieved. Pre-hearing
procedures must be established, as well as operating standards to maintain objectivity
during the hearing process.
90. Despite the expectation that a citizen-oriented review system will result from
the present disarray, this accomplishment may be tempered somewhat by recent state
legislation limiting the information disclosed by public records. See 1982 Fla. Laws
3175, which amends section 112.533 by ordering the deletion of the identities of all
witnesses and, most importantly, the officer under scrutiny from the record, where the
complaint involved is found to be unsustainable. According to the newly-created sub-
part (2)(b) of section 112.533, such information may be disclosed to a citizen only
through the discovery process of an on-going civil suit. This requirement severely limits
the citizenry's access to important information concerning police conduct.
91. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d
1380 7:1983 1
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Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Florida courts have valiantly
attempted to apply this statute equitably in each fact situation. While
the intended purpose of complaint review boards seems to have been
conclusively ascertained, questions as to how that objective is to be uni-
formly implemented remain unanswered. 92 The period of permissive in-
activity has passed; the time is now for legislative relief. Florida's law




1264 (5th Cir. 1976).
92. Without further legislative guidance, uniform civil rights protection for Flor-
ida police officers cannot be ensured.
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Religious Deprogramming: A Solution Through
Judicially Appointed Guardians
Introduction
Conflicts between parents and children concerning values have
long been fought. This is exemplified by the religious deprogramming
controversy. In recent years children have been breaking with their tra-
dition and joining unorthodox religious cults.1 Parents, concerned for
their children's welfare, have been physically abducting them and sub-
jecting them to religious deprogramming. This process forces the chil-
dren to relinquish their membership and repudiate their beliefs.
The first section of this note will discuss recruiting techniques and
alleged brainwashing practices applied by the cults. The second will
analyze and discuss the current self-help method of deprogramming
and the cases involving its legality. The third section will recommend
and discuss the feasibility of using both the guardianship statutes and
the thirteenth amendment's slavery prohibitions as possible solutions to
the problems of self-help.
I. Cults, Recruiting and Brainwashing
Religious cults have been under substantial attack by the public
recently, due mainly to recruiting techniques' and what has been per-
ceived as their members' zombie-like appearance.8 The underlying issue
is the cult's alleged use of brainwashing.
Brainwashing is a term coined to describe the mind-altering tech-
1. This note concerns religious cults such as: The Children of God, The Unifica-
tion Church, The Church of Armageddon, The International Society of Krishna Con-
sciousness, and others.
2. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Rice, The Pull of Sun Moon, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1976, Sunday
Magazine, at 8 ("Those who observe Monies closely often notice a glassy spaced-out
look, which, combined with their everlasting smiles, makes them resemble tripped out
freaks." Id. at 23.).
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niques practiced by Koreans with prisoners of war during the Korean
Conflict. The fact that this mind-alteration does occur has yet to gain
full acceptance in the United States. This was most evident in both the
Manson Family' and Patty Hearst5 trials. In both cases, the defense
contended and the court heard evidence that brainwashing would miti-
gate liability. The fact that this evidence was accepted indicates that
the courts will give some credence to brainwashing even though guilty
verdicts were returned in both.
Those who acknowledge the detriments of brainwashing find it
reprehensible since it destroys the mind's ability to function under its
own will, or to its full capacity.6
The criteria established to identify brainwashing include: isolating
the person to be brainwashed, severing ties with his past, depriving him
of sleep, fatiguing his body, changing his diet, playing on the member's
feelings of guilt and shame, changing language, keeping the cults' cen-
tral beliefs secret from the recruit, and others.7
The cults seem to employ most, if not all of these methods. There
is evidence indicating that the cults isolate new recruits and do not
4. In the Tate-Labianca murders committed by the Manson Family, Charles
"Tex" Watson, tried separately from the rest of the Family, pled not guilty by reason
of insanity since "he was simply an unthinking zombie programmed by Charles Man-
son." V. BUGLIOSI with C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER 627 (1974). In defense of this
claim "Tex" called eight psychiatrists, but the District Attorney's cross-examination
showed "Tex" was in "complete command of his mental faculties." Id. at 626-27.
5. See, Mathews & Cook, Patty's Defense, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1976, at 20;
Fraker, Kasindorf & Camper, What Is Brainwashing?, NEWSWEEK, March 1, 1976, at
31; Mathews, Kasindorf & Cook, Patty On Trial, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1976, at 24.
6. See, e.g., Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion
Under The First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977) ("The recruit's impaired
intellectual functioning appears to reflect a loss of many I.Q. points. . . ." Id. at 14).
7. See, W. SARGANT, BATTLE FOR THE MIND, A PHYSIOLOGY OF CONVERSION
AND BRAINWASHING (1957) (for an application of Sargant's factors to the Children of
God, see REPORT SUBMITTED BY CHARITY FRAUDS BUREAU, FINAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CHILDREN OF GOD , To HON. LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1974) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].);
R. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF
BRAINWASHING IN CHINA (1961) (for an application of Lifton's factors to today's reli-
gious cults, see C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 172-76 (1977); E.
SCHEIN WITH I. SCHNEIER & C. BARKER, COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961).
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permit them to contact family or friends.' They are often denied the
opportunity to read a newspaper.' If parents attempt to see their child,
he is often hidden from them.10 Many cults have their members take on
new biblical names to further sever ties with the past."1
Most cults also rely heavily on fatigue and sleep deprivation dur-
ing both the recruiting and membership periods. Days start before
dawn and run till after midnight for the recruit. They are filled with
such activities as lectures on theology, calisthenics, sports, chanting and
prayer.12 For the fully-inducted member, it is long days of recruiting
and fundraising. 3
8. See, Rice, supra note 3, at 23 ("There is neither time nor opportunity for
phoning or writing relatives or friends."). See also, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 42
("Generally, [Children of God] elders intercepted mail addressed to members who ei-
ther never received it or received it in censored form, with portions deleted .... mem-
bers were required to leave all outgoing mail unsealed for censorship and posting...
."1).
9. One ex-moonie said that "I asked about getting a newspaper and they told me,
'No. Newspapers are full of negativity and are not useful in our life.' I thought that
was ridiculous and I said so, but I didn't argue, because it wouldn't have mattered." C.
STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 170.
10. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 22-23, where one ex-member of
the Children of God testified:
They then persuaded me to hide in another loft next door ... I heard
my parents come up and I heard them scream and everything and the cops
came-and I stayed there until my parents left the building . . .I heard
my mother asking Abram and Ruth where I was and Abram denied by
presence at the Children of God and stated I left the Children of God and
they did not know where I was.
Id.
11. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 24 ("The use of bible names also
obviously serves as a new identity for a [Children of God] member, which reinforces
the concept of severing all ties, both familial and societal.").
12. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 3, at 23. "An exhausting and rigid schedule leaves
little time for sleep and none for private reflection. Recruits get a daily dose of six to
eight hours of mind-numbing theology based on Moon's 'Divine Principle'." Id. Accord,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 38. A former member of the Children of God testified:
"I was so constantly kept busy the entire time . . . that I didn't have time to think
about anything else but what they had planned for me .... from the time I got up in the
morning until I went to bed at night, which was usually very late." Id.
13. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 3, at 23-24 ("[Moonies] put in grueling dawn-
dusk days recruiting and fundraising."); Kennedy & Kennedy, The Devil's Work,
PENTHOUSE, March, 1982, at 53 ("I worked alone-no salary either-and spent eigh-
3851Religious Deprogramming
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There is also evidence that the cults play on members' feelings of
guilt and shame. One ex-member of the Church of Armageddon said
she felt "[]ike the world's most rotten person. They told me the
sores all over my body (scabies caused by mites that bury them-
selves under the skin and lay eggs there) were caused by my own
sinfulness and would go away only when I began to lead a more
obedient pure life.""'
This play on guilt and shame drives some members to self-mutila-
tion.15 It is alleged one member "committed suicide because he didn't
consider himself worthy of the Moon cause.'"
Many cults change words and phrases in the recruits' language
and quote the bible out of context, making the cultist spend many in-
tensive study hours.17 In addition, they often keep the central beliefs of
their doctrine secret from the recruit to further confuse him.' 8
The fact that the cults make use of these methods leading to
brainwashing does little to explain how this phenomena occurs. Dissat-
isfied with previous studies in this respect, Flo Conway and Jim Siegel-
man, after an extensive four year investigation,' 9 sought to explain the
physiological effects these factors have on the brain when practiced by
the cults. The authors explain that the brain is an information storage
device which operates holographically. A holograph is a mathematical
teen hours a day, seven days a week and 365 days a year to get donations for the
Unification Church." Id. at 52-53.).
14. C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 109.
15. Delgado, supra note 6, at 16.
16. 122 CONG. REc. H1390, 1392 (1976) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (Repre-
sentative Wilson read an article previously run in the National Enquirer by Jan Good-
win, Multimillionaire Minister Woos Children From Their Families To Beg For Him
On The Streets, which quoted New York psychiatrist Dr. Ernest Giovanoli).
17. For example, in the Children of God, "stress is placed upon intensive memo-
rization of selected biblical verses, taken out of context." FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,
at 29. See also, C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 175 ("Each religious cult has
created an entire new language and teaches adherents meaning of words in their
language.").
18. See, e.g., C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 7, at 174-75 ("Implicit in this
concept is the idea that the cult's resulting laws of morality are absolute, and therefore
must be followed automatically." Id. at 174.).
19. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING (1978).
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model to store three-dimensional information in two dimensions photo-
graphically, from which the three-dimensional image can be
reconstructed.20
. The original theorist of the holographic model of the brain, neurol-
ogist Karl Pribram, has explained that under this model "we can store
things in our brains in terms of various frequencies of information.
Then we can read out the information in either linear or spatial fash-
ion.... space and time are not in the brain; they are read out of it."2 1
Conway and Siegelman show that experience can alter the brain's
basic hologram,22 that which determines how information is read out.
Thus, the interplay of the aforementioned criteria which establish
brainwashing will cause the brain to have a holographic crisis. At this
exact moment, which Conway and Siegelman call the moment of snap-
ping,23 there will be a "sudden drastic alteration of an individual's en-
tire personality" 24 and, "if he remains in an alien setting with little or
no connection to his former life . . . his personality will almost cer-
tainly be refashioned in the image of his new surroundings, and his
awareness . . . with that of people around him."25 "In the wake of
snapping the individual's ability to question and to act suffer dramatic
impairment. At the same time, he becomes almost wholly vulnerable to
suggestion and command." 2
This vulnerability to suggestion has been taken to such extremes
as killing. 27 Who among us can forget Jim Jones leading 900 zombie-
20. Id. at 118. See also PRIBRAM, LANGUAGES OF THE BRAIN: EXPERIMENTAL
PARADOXES AND PRINCIPLES IN NEUROPSYCHOLOGY (1971).
21. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 121 (1978) (reporting interview
with Karl Pribram).
22. Id. at 125-33. This experience comes to the brain in terms of "information".
"Deprived of information, the brain ceases functioning normally; starved to extremes it
goes altogether haywire." Id. at 127.
23. Id. at 134.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 136-37.
26. Id. at 155.
27. An ex-member of the Children of God said:
I was told by an older member that if my leaders told me to kill someone,
I would have to kill someone, but I hesitated on that and asked them why?
... He said 'Well, we are not under the law and we are responsible only
to our leaders, who are responsible to God for us'.
387 1
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eyed people to commit suicide in Guyana.28
Many libertarians believe that allowing people to put themselves
at the command of others is a price we must pay for living in a free
society.29 Critics of the cults may also believe this in principle, but
counter that it is the unconsensual nature of the cults' recruiting, and
subsequent brainwashing, which they find so offensive.30
Cult recruiters are told to "watch on the streets and campuses for
the lonely"31 who are considered more prone to suggestion. The re-
cruiter will then act as a loving friend 2 just willing to listen, often even
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 33.
It was also claimed that the Tate and Labianca murders committed by the Man-
son Family were a result of Manson's brainwashing the members of his family. See V.
BUGLIOSI, supra note 4.
28. See, e.g., Mathews with Harper, Fuller & Nater, The Cult of Death, NEWS-
WEEK, Dec. 4, 1978, at 38; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1978, at Al ("authorities put the
final count of the number of dead at the Jonestown Commune at 909").
29. See, e.g., Kelly, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, Civ. LIB. REV.,
July-Aug. 1977, at 23 ("A part of religious liberty is the right of all of us to make
what seem to others to be foolish choices, to be hoodwinked or to be exploited for the
sake of what seems to us to be the truth." Id. at 31.).
30. This requirement of consent is clearly in line with traditional notions of lib-
erty. As libertarian John Stuart Mill has written:
this then is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the
most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific,
moral or theological .... Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes
and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of
doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without im-
pediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm
them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse or
wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining
being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
J. S. MILL, On Liberty! in JOHN STUART MILL, A SELECTION OF His WORKS 16-17
(Robson ed. 1966).
31. C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 6 (1977) ("[B]ackpack and
guitar case were symbols of rootlessness and therefore those carrying them were special
targets for recruitment.").
32. See, e.g., id. at 6-7.
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denying affiliation with the cult.3 3
The recruiting process is separated into a number of stages so that
even when the recruit gives consent, it is only to the next step in the
process.34 "The consequences of the final step are thus concealed until
the victim reaches the penultimate stage, at which time he has been
'softened up' to such a degree that committing his life and fortune to
the cult seems but a small step."35
II. Brainwashing and the First Amendment: Must They
Coexist?
Despite claims that cults practice brainwashing and that resultant
harms exist, the cults have claimed that their practices are not subject
to interference since they are protected by the first amendment.3 6
Parents have sought to deny this protection by contending that
cults are not "bona fide religious groups [but rather their] primary and
motivating purposes are economic and political gain."37 The defendants
33. See, e.g., id. at 27 ("[C]ult recruiters may carefully avoid or even deny that
the group is a religion.").
34. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("[R]ecruits rarely decide to become Moonies. They just
evolve into Moonies by putting off the decision.").
35. Delgado, supra note 6, at 55. See also, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 28
("This initial period of indcotrination may last up to five days, isolated from all outside
influences, and culminates in the new 'convert'. . . signing the 'Revolutionary Sheet'.
Here he agrees to turn over all his income, present and future, to the [Children of God]
and consents to have his mail opened.").
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, which provides that: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ..."
37. Rankin v. Howard, 527 F. Supp. 976, 977 (D. Ariz. 1981) ("[D]efendants
... contend that the Unification Church is not a bona fide religious group but that its
primary and motivating purposes are economic and political gain.").
This claim is not without factual substance however. As a result of an investiga-
tion into the activities of the Children of God by its Charity Frauds Bureau, the New
York Attorney General concluded that: "In view of the testimony. . ., one is led to the
irresistable presumption that fund gathering by Children of God is largely intended for
the personal gain of the leadership and for proselytizing new converts who in turn serve
as additional fund gatherers and contributors." FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
Nor is the Children of God the only cult this practice is associated with. "The
average Moonie takes in $50 to $200 a day; the more successful can make up to $500.
Every penny is turned in to the team leader who turns it over to the church." Rice,
supra note 3, at 24. See also, Kennedy & Kennedy, supra note 13, at 53 ("When I was
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made just such a contention about the Unification Church in the
deprogramming case of Rankin v. Howard.3 8 However, the court in
Rankin found United States v. Ballard9 controlling on this issue, and,
as such, held that "there can be no inquiry as to whether a religious
group is bona fide."'40 It was in Ballard, where Justice Douglas had
proclaimed:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as
real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact
that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that
they can be made suspect before the law.4
eighteen, I brought in $90,000 a year for my church, the Unification Church of Rev.
Sun Myung Moon.").
38. 527 F. Supp. 976.
39. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
40. Rankin, 527 F. Supp. at 978. But see, Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology
of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982), where a former member of the
church brought an action against it alleging fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, breach of contract, violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, and a class action
for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The court said that "[a]lthough we agree that the Free Exercise Clause protects all
religions, old and new, alike once its protection attaches, in determining whether that
protection applies courts may require a newer faith to demonstrate that it is, in fact,
entitled to protection as a religion." Id. at 1144. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972), where the Supreme Court found the application of Wisconsin's com-
pulsory education laws to Amish children beyond the eighth grade unconstitutional as a
violation of the first amendment's free exercise clause with F. & F. v. Duval County,
273 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973), where the Florida court found that a self-
ordained minister of the "Covenant Church of Jesus Christ" could not avoid the state
compulsory education laws by teaching his children at home. In Yoder, the court drew
attention to the fact that the Amish's "religious beliefs and what we would today call
'life style' have not altered in fundamentals for centuries." 406 U.S. at 205. In F. & F.
on the other hand, the Florida court found the fact that the church was not established
in Florida and the lack of the minister to hold services for anyone other than his chil-
dren to bear on the issue. 273 So. 2d at 18. See generally, Note, Toward a Constitu-
tional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978).
41. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87. Although Ballard prohibited examination of the
truth of one's beliefs, it did permit an examination into whether those beliefs were held
in good faith. As such, Ballard may be interpreted to allow a determination of whether
the cults are bona fide religious groups or economically and politically motivated.
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If, then, religion is subject to protection, and it is not open to ques-
tion whether these cults are religious, can anything be done to alleviate
the harms accruing from the brainwashing practices of the cults?
This question has recently faced a number of parents. Upon bal-
ancing a perceived harm to their children against the freedom of reli-
gion claim, many parents expend great sums of money to have their
children abducted and subjected to religious deprogramming. (
42. Deprogramming is a practice whereby the child is kidnapped, taken to a
motel room and then a marathon encounter ensues. Ted Patrick, the world-famous
deprogrammer, says: "Essentially it's just talk. I talk to the victim, for as long as I
have to." T. PATRICK with T. DULACK, LET OUR CHILDREN Go! 75 (1976). One of the
standard tools used for deprogramming is Chapter 22 in Robert Lifton's book, Thought
Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing (supra note 7)
since it "seems to be written about today's religious cult recruiting and indoctrination
practices instead of some far-off Oriental prison camp." C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra
note 31, at 172. Patrick also claims to make use of the Bible, putting passages the cults
took out of context back into context, forcing the child to "read the whole chapter from
where it was taken." T. PATRICK, supra, at 78.
Patrick does say that "[w]hen a victim is exceptionally vigorous, it may even mean
a measure of physical restraint," Id. at 75, but, "the child is rarely held in custody by
the parents and [Patrick] for longer than three days. Usually it takes Patrick less than
one day to deprogram a person. I've managed to do it on occasion in an hour." Id. at
76.
But see, LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 599 (1978), where he describes deprogramming in a much different light.
The deprogramming process begins with abduction. Often strong men
muscle the subject into a car and take him to a place where he is cut off
from everyone but his captors. He may be held against his will for
upwards of three weeks. Frequently, however, the initial deprogramming
only lasts a few days. The subject's sleep is limited and he is told that he
will not be released until his beliefs meet his captors' approval. Members
of the deprogramming group, as well as members of the family, come into
the room where the victim is being held and barrage him with questions
and denunciations until he has recanted his newly found religious beliefs.
Id. at 603-04. LeMoult says that deprogramming "is far more like 'brainwashing' than
the conversion process by which members join various sects." Id. at 606. He especially
draws attention to the sudden break that Patrick describes during a deprogramming
session (See T. PATRICK, supra at 79 ("the moment when that happens is always un-
mistakable"). Compare with F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra notes 23-26 and ac-
companying text.). Patrick counters "I do not brainwash. I ask questions, basically, and
I try to show the victim how he has been deceived. Whereas, in the cult indoctrination,
everything possible is done to prevent the person from thinking, in deprogramming I do
391 1Religious Deprogramming
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While a great many of these deprogrammings have freed members
from the grips of the cults, 43 many which have failed have ended in
litigation. In these cases, it has been the children who have brought suit
against their parents and deprogrammers, alleging both tort claims and
federal civil rights statute violations. These causes of action must be
resorted to because the first amendment requires state action, and ap-
plies only to Congress and the federal government, or to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4" Where
parents carry out the deprogramming themselves state action is clearly
lacking.45
Two recent parental deprogramming cases, both of which turned
on the court's belief in the validity of strikingly similar arguments,
have come down on opposite sides of the fence. Since the United States
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in both cases, it appears unlikely
that any uniformity will be developed in the near future.
The first of these cases, Ward v. Connor,46 upheld a complaint
everything I know how to start him thinking." T. PATRICK, supra, at 76.
43. Ted Patrick claims to have "deprogramm[ed] and arranged for deprogram-
ming of over one thousand Americans." T. PATRICK, supra note 42, at 37.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(free exercise clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment
clause).
45. This is not always true however. Where parents have been using guardian-
ships, there is significant involvement of the judiciary, which has been held to consti-
tute state action. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforce-
ment of a discriminatory restrictive covenant).
Where there has been an overstepping of judicial bounds, suits have been filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for discriminatory conspiracies under color of state law. See,
e.g., Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) (son sued parents and judge).
See also, Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (Police officer knew of
kidnapping for deprogramming but did not take any action. "Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged state action in violation of § 1983 to sustain a cause of action against Defen-
dant police officers." Id. at 568). But see, Orlando v. Wizel, 443 F. Supp. 744 (W.D.
Ark. 1978) ("there is no contention that the parents and [professional deprogrammer]
'conspired' with the State Police or Judge, . . . A state, merely by providing a forum
and a means of enforcing regularly issued court orders, does not 'color' the action of
private litigants with state action." Id. at 748.).
46. 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 455 U.S. 907
(1982). For a complete discussion of Ward see Comment, Civil Rights: A Civil Rem-
edy for Religious Deprogramming Victim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 21 WASHBURN
L. J. 663 (1982).
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which alleged that parents are liable for conspiring to deprogram their
children under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).47 The second case, Peterson
v. Sorlien,48 found the parents of a member of The Way Ministry not
liable for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress in their deprogramming attempt. Although the causes of action
are different, both cases turned on the level of credence the court gave
to the claim that the parents acted out of concern for the well-being of
their child.
In Ward, the court was confronted with 42 U.S.C. section
1985(3), the Ku Klux Klan Act. This statute was originally enacted in
47. This statute reads:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted au-
thorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or
more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citi-
zen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support to advocacy in
a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified
person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or prop-
erty on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set
forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (West 1981).
48. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). For a
complete discussion of Peterson see Comment, When parents, or their agents, acting
under the conviction that the judgmental capacity of their adult child is impaired,
seek to extricate that child from what they reasonably believe to be a religious or
pseudo-religious cult, and the child at some juncture assents to the actions in ques-
tion, limitations upon the child's mobility do not constitute meaningful deprivations of
personal liberty sufficient to support a judgment for false imprisonment-Peterson v.
Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1742 (1981), 30 EM-
ORY L.J. 959 (1981).
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1871 to stop Ku Klux Klan violence against the newly freed blacks4
but little attention was paid to it until 1971, when the case of Griffin v.
Breckenridge" found state action unnecessary, allowing the statute to
reach purely private conspiracies. To find liability the statute requires
that the defendants must have conspired for the purpose of depriving
the plaintiff "of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws."8 1 In order to give effect to section
1985(3) yet avoid interpreting it as a general federal tort law, Griffin
found the statute's language to require a showing of intent-that the
defendants acted out of some "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus. ' '52
To find a deprogramming attempt actionable under section
1985(3), it must be decided whether religious affiliation is the type of
class Griffin intended to protect. The Ward court, in deciding that reli-
gion was a protectable class, was confronted with a split of authority.
The trial court in Ward,58 which was reversed on appeal, had found
that the voluntary joining and leaving of a church did not result in the
requisite "discrete, insular and immutable characteristics,"" that are
49. See generally, Wildman, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)-A Private Action to Vindi-
cate Fourteenth Amendment Rights: A Paradox Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 317
(1980); Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c): A Sug-
gested Approach, 64 MINN. L. REV. 635 (1980); Comment, The Deprogramming of
Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section 1985(3), 74 N.W.
U. L. REV. 229 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Deprogramming of Reli-
gious Sect Members]; Comment, Civil Rights: A Civil Remedy for Religious
Deprogramming Victim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 21 WASHBURN L.J. 663 (1982);
Comment, Civil Rights: A Federal Remedy Against Private Class Discrimination
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)-Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), 47
WASH. L. REV. 353 (1972).
50. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). Griffin upheld a complaint which allowed blacks from
Mississippi to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) from a group of white citizens for
allegedly conspiring to deprive them of the right to interstate travel, despite the ab-
sence of state action.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (West 1981).
52. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
53. Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 657 F.2d 45 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Mandelkorn v. Ward, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
54. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 437. This test was originally established in Bellamy v.
Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Va. 1973), arid, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.
1974), where the court denied relief for discrimination to a member of the Ku Klux
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inherent in classifications such as race, national origin and sex.5 This
point was expressly countered, however, in Baer v. Baer," another pa-
rental deprogramming case, where Judge Williams stated that:
While religious status may differ from racial status, because it
is not a congenital and inalterable trait, membership in a minority
religious group, like membership in a minority racial group, has
often excited the fear, hatred and irrationality of the majority. Two
thousand years of human history compellingly prove that no easier
road to martyrdom is found than in adherence to an unpopular reli-
gious faith.87
The Ward circuit court followed this approach and found religion
a protectable class," under section 1985(3). The mere fact, however,
that religion is protectable does not give rise to parental liability for
their deprogramming efforts. It must still be shown that the conspiracy
was the result of some "invidiously discriminatory animus"5° due to
membership in this type of religious class.60
Several trial courts, including the Ward district court, have found
this discriminatory animus clearly lacking since "[i]t is readily appar-
ent . . that defendants were motivated to act .. by their concern
for the well-being of a loved one.""1 These rulings were ignored by the
Klan who lost his job due to his affiliation with that group.
55. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 437.
56. 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
57. Id. at 491.
58. The Ward court based their decision primarily upon the legislative history to
the forerunner of § 1985(3), the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The court quoted Senator
Edmunds during the debates preceding that statute, where he said: "[I]f in a case like
this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because he was
a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Method-
ist .... then this section could reach it. Cong. Globe, 42d Congress, 1st Sess. 567
(1871)." Ward, 657 F.2d at 48.
59. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
60. Ward, 657 F.2d 45.
61. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 438. See also, Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717
(D.R.I. 1978) ("In fact, it was shown, and this Court finds, that Defendants' actions
were primarily, if not entirely, motivated by the maternal concerns of Plaintiff's
mother" Id. at 724.); Styn v. Styn, No. 79-3468, slip op. at - (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("There
is no invidiously discriminatory animus here. Defendants were motivated, not by their
395 1
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Ward circuit court, which ruled that "the complaint sufficiently
charge[d] that the defendants were motivated to act as they did not
only because they found the plaintiff's religious beliefs intolerable, but
also because of their animosity towards the members of the Unification
Church." '6
This dichotomy of whether parents' liability emanated from "their
concern for the well-being of a loved one"6 or "animosity toward the
members of the. . . church"" was settled in favor of a reasonableness
standard in a well-reasoned decision by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota. In that case, Peterson v. Sorlien,3 a member of The Way Minis-
try sued her parents for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of
emotional distress for their efforts in deprogramming her. The court
denied relief, choosing to establish a reasonableness standard, holding
that when parents or their agents, acting under the conviction that
dislike of a particular religious group, but by concern for the well-being of a family
member." Id. at _.).
Although speaking in the context of minor children and compulsory education law
the Supreme Court has commented that: "The history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
62. Ward, 657 F.2d at 49. This is in agreement with at least one commentator,
who has said:
The fact that the defendants are personally concerned about the plaintiff
does not destroy the class-based nature of their animus. There is no spe-
cific intent requirement in section 1985(3). Defendants may believe they
are doing good and actually helping the plaintiff. However, if their concern
is caused by a deep-seated hostility toward the plaintiff's chosen religion
and lifestyle, this seems the very essence of "class-based animus"--a stere-
otyped view of the class as having no constitutional rights, which inspires
the defendant to act illegally and unconstitutionally, as in Griffin.
Comment, The Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members, supra note 49, at 241.
But see, Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. at 724 ("[Plaintiff's] actions which resulted in
her combination with Defendants, arose not from her abhorrence of the Unification
Church per se, but rather arose directly from the solicitude which a mother holds for
her daughter's health and well-being.").
63. Ward, 495 F. Supp. at 438.
64. Ward, 657 F.2d at 49.
65. 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
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the judgmental capacity of their adult child is impaired, seek to
extricate that child from what they reasonably believe to be a reli-
gious or pseudo-religious cult, and the child at some [later] junc-
ture assents to the actions in question, limitations upon the child's
mobility do not constitute meaningful deprivations of personal lib-
erty sufficient to support a judgment of false imprisonment."8
If brainwashing is to be considered a "public wrong", and
deprogramming is necessary to rectify that "wrong", Peterson is per-
haps a reasonable rule which provides some relief from the problem.
Giving a license to kidnap and deprogram children, however, is a
potential "time bomb". The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this
in formulating Peterson, cautioning that "owing to the threat that
deprogramming poses to public order, we do not endorse self-help as a
preferred alternative. '67
Consider a hypothetical case in which parents kidnap their lesbian
daughter and have her raped in an effort to deprogram her of her sex-
ual preferences. 8 Although these parents would likely be found liable
under Peterson, the girl was still forced to go through a rape due to
what some parents would consider, a parental license to deprogram.
"Indeed, according to the Gospel of Mark, Jesus was a candidate for
'deprogramming' since his own family thought he was berserk and his
religious leaders said he was possessed of the devil."' 9
66. Peterson, 299 N.W.2d at 129. A very similar argument has been used to
plead a defense of necessity where the deprogrammer has been charged with kidnap-
ping. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976), where the dis-
trict court's rulings were held unreviewable because of double-jeopardy. In that case,
the district court found that a parent may legally kidnap an adult child for deprogram-
ming based upon necessity and: "[w]here parents are, as here, of the reasonable belief
that they were alone not physically capable of recapturing their daughter from existing,
imminent danger, then the defense of necessity transfers or transposes to the consti-
tuted agent, the person who acts upon their behalf under such conditions." Id. at 145.
But see, People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1981)
(necessity defense not allowed in the absence of a showing of an emergency situation
and that the agent reasonably believed a need for criminal action existed).
67. Peterson, 299 N.W.2d at 129.
68. Although this author has been told such a case has occurred, numerous hours
of research have proven fruitless in finding it.
69. H. Cox, Playing the Devil's Advocate, as it Were, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1977, at A25, col. 1.
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III. Must We Settle for a Reasonableness Standard? Some
Suggested Solutions
If the goal of solving the problems inherent in parental deprogram-
ming is to take the power of deciding whether to deprogram away from
parents, and put it in the hands of some other decision-making body,
then first amendment70 obstacles must be overcome. 71
The cults and their supporters claim that freedom to practice their
religion is protected by the first amendment. However, if brainwashing
is part of their religious practice, should it be similarly protected? The
Supreme Court has recognized that not everything associated with the
practice of a religion is constitutionally protected. Justice Roberts,
speaking for a majority of the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,7
wrote that "[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two con-
cepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject
to regulation for the benefit of society. '" 7 3
Commentaries have been critical of Peterson for this reason.
Taken to its logical extreme, . . . if Lutheran parents become upset that
their child has converted to Roman Catholicism and has entered a monas-
tery, the parents are justified in extricating the adult child. According to
Peterson, to avoid liability in such a case, the parents need only confine the
child, subject him or her to harangues and threats of commitment to
mental institutions or other manner of "persuasion", until the child
assents.
Comment, supra note 48, at 1004-05.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. The first amendment provides "that Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Id. Besides
applying to the federal government, these provisions have been found to apply to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as part of "[t]he
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that amendment. . . ." Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (free exercise clause). See also, Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause).
72. 310 U.S. 296.
73. Id. at 303-04. "Thus, religious operations that endanger public safety,
threaten disorder, endanger the health of a member, or drastically differ from societal
norms may be regulated or prohibited." Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp.
367, 372 (D.R.I. 1978), afid per curiam, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1978). Accord, Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) ("The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
219
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
If a state were to attempt to regulate brainwashing as religious
conduct, the regulation "must be so exercised as not, . . [to] unduly
. . . infringe the protected freedom."'I Although procedures could be
established to strike this delicate balance, there are those who find this
unlikely:
If the state were allowed to determine that proselytizing re-
sulting in conversion were really "brainwashing" it would be ques-
tioning the validity of a religious experience and thus, as a result,
the underlying validity of the religion. It would also be invading the
highly protected area of free speech. Such a determination would
violate the free exercise, establishment, and free speech clauses of
the first amendment.7 5
Since any deprogramming regulation will of necessity encroach upon
latter to ill health or death." Id. at 166-67.).
In Turner, it was alleged that brainwashing on the part of the Unification Church
arose to the level of involuntary servitude (for a complete discussion of this claim see
infra notes 121 through 144 and accompanying text). The court found that Cantwell
allowed examination of these claims in view of the fact that it "is unquestionably an
act which has a serious adverse effect upon one of the Church's followers and consti-
tutes conduct that violates the most fundamental tenets of both American society and
the United States Constitution." Turner, 473 F. Supp. at 372.
But can belief and action truly be separated? In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), where a challenge was made to that state's compulsory education laws, Chief
Justice Burger stated: "This case. . . does not become easier because respondents were
convicted for their 'actions' in refusing to send their children to the public high school;
in this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compart-
ments." Id. at 220. This language was later quoted in Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal.
App. 3d 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), an action to set aside five
conservatorship orders granted for religious deprogramming. The court said further:
"When [it] is asked to determine whether that change was induced by faith or by
coercive persuasion is it not investigating and questioning the validity of that faith?"
Id. at 987, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 255. "The total picture disclosed must be tested by princi-
ples applicable to the regulation of acts of religious organizations and their members."
Id. at 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
74. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
75. LeMoult, supra note 42, at 614. See also, Note, Conservatorships and Reli-
gious Cults: Divining A Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978) ("A
member relies on the sect leaders for guidance and follows their commands unquestion-
ingly due to a belief that the leaders articulate the will of God. That belief is inextrica-
bly bound up with the member's will and thought." Id. at 1283.).
399 1Religious Deprogramming17:1983
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some first amendment rights, it must be in furtherance of a compelling
state interest.70 The state has such an interest in promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.7 Deprogramming, in seeking to pro-
mote the mental health of brainwashed members by removing the ef-
fects of brainwashing, is just such an interest. Further, if brainwashing
has induced self-mutilation,7 8 murder79 and mass-suicide 0 can anyone
truly say that it is not in the states' interest to regulate such activity?
If governmental regulations were made applicable to deprogram-
ming, it would put the government in a position of forcing a person to
accept treatment against his will. Doesn't each individual, however,
have the right to do with his own body as he sees fit? While this right
does exist as part of the right to privacy,81 it is not absolute. 2 Since
76. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1962); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) ("[T]he state may abridge religious
practices only upon a demonstration that some compelling state interest outweighs the
defendants' interests in religious freedom." Id. at 718, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr.
at 71.).
77. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vacci-
nation laws). See also, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ("State's important, and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point in the light of
present medical knowledge is at approximately the end of the first trimester....
[F]rom and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health." Id. at 163.).
78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
79. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 27 ("I was told by an older member that if
my leaders told me to kill someone, I would have to kill someone." Id. at 33.).
80. Mathews, supra note 28 (Jonestown slayings).
81. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (mother has a right before
viability to decide whether to have an abortion); Guardianship of Roe, - Mass. ._, 421
N.W.2d 40 (1981) ("competent individual has the right to refuse ... treatment." Id.
at -, 421 N.W.2d at 51.); Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)
("[Constitutional right of privacy] is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to
decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions." Id. at 40, 355 A.2d 663.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Satz v. Perl-
mutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (competent terminal patient has
a right to refuse extraordinary treatment as part of his constitutional right of privacy),
approved, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) ("[C]ompetent adult patient, with no minor
dependents, suffering from a terminal illness has the constitutional right to refuse or
discontinue extraordinary medical treatment where all effected family members con-
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this right has been held to be a fundamental one,83 however, a compel-
ling governmental interest must be shown before it can be intruded
upon. 4 Here too, this compelling interest is the promotion of the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
Since the claim of brainwashing assumes the person is unaware
he's been brainwashed, would such a person be in a position to decide if
he should be.treated by deprogramming to have this condition removed,
or is he incompetent to rationally reach such a decision? While incom-
petence is generally thought of as the result of age, disease or infir-
sent." Id. at 360.).
The privilege of privacy is extremely important for both the individual
and society. It is necessary for individuality and the consciousness of indi-
vidual choice in life. Without solitude, which allows one to know what he
thinks and feels, the individual cannot achieve more than a primitive sense
of self. Independence and personal strength, as well as the diversity of
thought that arises from nonconformity, are desirable traits in a social sys-
tem. They result in leadership and creative surges that are essential for
social progress. Moreover, by enabling an individual to maintain degrees of
intimacy and distance, privacy is an integral aspect of personal liberty,
freedom and dignity. It places the individual in control of his own destiny,
thus allowing him to maximize his own creativity and desires. The mean-
ing of love, trust, and friendship are enhanced when the individual is able
to make his own decisions. Privacy both promotes purity of individual deci-
sions regarding the nature of one's relationships and assures that these re-
lationships are maintained.
A. SLABY & L. TANCREDI, COLLUSION FOR CONFORMITY 34 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (after viability, state can pro-
scribe abortion); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood withdrawal to
analyze alcohol content despite verbal refusal); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(sterilization of inmates who have a hereditary form of insanity or imbecility); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination). But see, Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (compulsory stomach pumping to search for drugs
found violation of due process as "conduct that shocks the conscience" Id. at 172.).
83. See, e.g., Wade, 410 U.S. at 155; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) ("[The
freedom to care for one's health and person,] though fundamental, [is] likewise subject
to regulation on a showing of 'compelling state interest'." Id. at 213. (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
84. See, e.g., Wade, 410 U.S. 113. See also, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (fundamental right to travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (funda-
mental right to marry); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (freedom of
religion).
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mity, 85 can the physiological effects of brainwashing be much
different?86
The Supreme Court has held that to confine a non-dangerous
mental incompetent without treatment is unconstitutional as a violation
of due process.87 The Court has yet to determine, however, whether a
non-dangerous mental incompetent is denied due process if treated
against his will.
The United States Supreme Court was asked, in Mills v. Rogers,88
to determine whether "an involuntarily committed mental patient has a
constitutional right to refuse treatment ... -19 The Court vacated the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals9" and remanded the case for
further proceedings91 to determine what effect an intervening Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts opinion, Guardianship of Roe,92 might
have on the case.93 The Court's decision to remand was based upon the
fact that "it is distinctly possible that [the state] recognizes liberty in-
terests of persons adjudged incompetent that are broader than those
protected directly by the Constitution of the United States. 94 In re-
85. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1982) ("When using
the terms 'mentally incompetent', 'incompetent' and 'incapable' . . , these are defined
as including one who is not adjudicated insane but, because of old age, disease, weak-
ness of mind or other reasons, is unable without assistance to adequately care for his
person or property and, therefore could be deceived by artful or designing persons." Id.
at 1351.), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3533 (Jan. 18, 1983). See generally 41 AM. JUR.
2D Incompetent Persons § 1-7 (1968).
86. But see, LeMoult, supra note 42. "One would search in vain to find 'brain-
washed zombies' listed in any of the standard texts on mental disorders." Id. at 630.
87. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The Supreme Court has also
held that "[t]he mere fact that [a person] has been committed under proper procedures
does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982). "Respondent thus enjoys
constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasona-
bly non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by
these interests." Id. at 2463.
88. 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
89. Mills, at 2448.
90. Id. at 2452.
91. Id.
92. - Mass. -, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
93. Mills, at 2452.
94. Id. at 2450.
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gard to those rights protected by Massachusetts' laws, the Court found
this so "[e]specially in the wake of [Guardianship of Roe]." 5 As such,
it appears the Court is tacitly approving Guardianship of Roe as hav-
ing met at least minimal due process standards.
Guardianship of Roe involved the forcible treatment of a non-in-
stitutionalized incompetent with anti-psychotic drugs. The court began
their inquiry with the precept that "[a]bsent an overwhelming State
interest, a competent individual has the right to refuse ... treat-
ment." 96 The court held that this right was not lost due to incompe-
tence, but rather the question was: who may exercise it?
The court found the following factors to weigh heavily in its deci-
sion that "in order to accord proper respect to this basic right of all
individuals . . . a judicial determination of substituted judgment must
be sought." 97 A determination of substituted judgment would require
the courts to decide what "that" person would do if given the choice, as
opposed to the court deciding what they think "that" person should
do. 8 Those factors the court relied upon in reaching this decision were:
95. Id. at 2450.
96. Guardianship of Roe, at _, 421 N.E.2d at 51. While a competent individual
can refuse treatment, incompetent individuals have even been denied the opportunity to
consent in extreme situations. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42
U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty., Mich., July 31, 1973), where it was held that
"involuntarily detained mental patients cannot give informed and adequate consent to
experimental psychosurgical procedures on the brain." Id. at 2064.
97. Guardianship of Roe, at _, 421 N.E.2d at 51-52.
98. The Massachusetts court
emphasize[d] that, the determination is not what is medically in the
ward's best interests-a determination better left to those with extensive
medical training and experience. The determination of what the incompe-
tent individual would do if competent will probe the incompetent individ-
ual's values and preferences and such an inquiry in a case involving anti-
psychotic drugs is best made in courts of competent jurisdiction.
Id. at 52 (emphasis original). But see, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982)
("[T]here certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than ap-
prorpriate professionals in making [treatment] decisions." Id. at 2462.).
This dichotomy has been exemplified by the terminally ill "right to die" cases. In
Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), the highly publicized case where
a 22 year old girl, Karen Quinlan, was in a comatose state and her parents sought to




Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/9
404 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
"(1) the intrusiveness of the proposed treatment, (2) the possibility of
adverse side effects, (3) the absence of an emergency, (4) the nature
and extent of prior judicial involvement, and (5) the likelihood of con-
flicting interests."9 9 Applying these factors to religious deprogramming,
we see that: the intrusions to both liberty and first amendment freedom
of religion are great; 100 there is a substantial possibility of harm if the
wrong person is deprogrammed since deprogramming is trying to effect
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the
responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possi-
bility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a
cognitive, sapient state and that the life-support apparatus now being ad-
ministered to Karen should be discontinued, they shall consult with the
hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the institution in which Karen
is then hospitalized. If that consultative body agrees that there is no rea-
sonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may
be withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal liabil-
ity therefor on the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician,
hospital or others.
Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671. But see, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), where the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts rejected the Quinlan "Ethics Committee" approach, taking "a dim
view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the
duly established courts of proper jurisdiction. . . ." Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. The
court went further, saying that "such questions . . . require the process of detached
but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial
branch of government was created." Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. As such, the court
held a judicial determination of substituted judgment was necessary.
99. Guardianship of Roe, at -, 421 N.E.2d at 52. The court gave a number of
additional factors which also were considered:
Among them are at least the following: the extent of impairment of the
patient's mental faculties, whether the patient is in the custody of a State
institution, the prognosis with the proposed treatment, the complexity, risk
and novelty of the proposed treatment, its possible side effects, the pa-
tient's level of understanding and probable reaction, the urgency of deci-
sion, the consent of the patient, spouse, or guardian, the good faith of those
who participate in the decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to
what is good medical practice, the interests of third persons, and the ad-
ministrative requirements of any institution involved.
Id. (quoting Matter of Spring, - Mass. -, 405 N.E.2d 115, 121 (1980)).
100. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts (first amendment);
and notes 81-103 and accompanying text (liberty).
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thought processes and holographic patterns of the brain;101 deprogram-
ming does not arise in an emergency setting since members have usu-
ally been with the cult for a period of time;10 2 and finally, conflicting
interests such as freedom of religion are great.103 Consequently, it
seems likely that, for decisions determining whether to deprogram, the
criteria set forth in Guardianship of Roe would require a judicial de-
termination of substituted judgment. The court in Guardianship of
Roe, however, did not decide that anyone could be treated where a
judicial determination was made. In that case, a guardian had previ-
ously been appointed so that there was already an adjudication of
incompetence.
Guardianship Statutes
The application of guardianship statutes to deprogramming has
been advocated by many.10 ' This approach permits parents to petition a
court to be appointed as guardians for deprogramming purposes and
the court can then determine what, if any, treatment should take place.
The success of obtaining court appointed guardianships, however, var-
ies because different states require different standards of incompetence
to be met before a guardian will be appointed.
This was exemplified in two recent cases. In California, the case of
Katz v. Superior Court0 5 overturned the trial court's orders which had
granted guardianships to the parents of five members of the Unification
Church for deprogramming purposes. The court found that under the
applicable state statutes, "in the absence of such actions as render the
adult believer himself gravely disabled . . . , the processes of this state
101. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., People v. Patrick, 126 Cal. App. 3d 952, _, 179 Cal. Rptr. 276,
282 (Ct. App. 1981) (Necessity defense was not allowed in the absence of an emer-
gency. "After some seven years of alleged cult membership, any imminent harm
threatening [the member], if it existed at all, was of a character not justifying the
violent action undertaken by the [Parents] with Patrick's help.").
103. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts.
104. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6, at 88. In California, guardianship orders
were obtained for five members of the Unification Church, although they were later set
aside. See Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (lst Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
105. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234.
405 1Religious Deprogramming
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cannot be used to deprive the believer of his freedom of action and to
subject him to involuntary treatment."' 06
In Oklahoma, where the standard to be applied is whether "the
alleged incompetent is incapable of 'taking care of himself and manag-
ing his own property', '1 0 7 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Tay-
lor v. Gilmartin,0 8 found the issuance of conservatorship orders to par-
ents for deprogramming improper. In that case, it was the failure to
follow proper procedure and to produce evidence showing incompetency
which were at fault. It is entirely possible that if these circumstances
were different, the conservatorship would have been upheld.
If a state does not have a guardianship statute applicable to
deprogramming, its legislature should consider enacting one. Despite
the obstacles posed by the first amendment 0 9 and the due process
clause's right to refuse treatment,"10 a deprogramming statute would be
less intrusive than allowing parents to engage in self-help"' and less
offensive than requiring a brainwashed person to remain that way.
If such a statute were enacted, procedural safeguards must be in-
cluded so that it would not violate due process. Although "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands,"" 2
[w]hen the state participates in deprivation of a person's right to
personal liberty. . . . at a minimum, due process requires that the
person receive a hearing after adequate written notice of the basis
for the proposed action; an opportunity to appear in person and to
present evidence in his own behalf; the right to confrontation by,
and the opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses; a neutral
and detached decision maker; findings by a preponderance of the
evidence and a record of the proceeding adequate to permit mean-
ingful judicial or appellate review." 3
106. Id. at 988-89, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
107. Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3533 (Jan. 18, 1983).
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts.
110. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
113. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 937-38, 569 P.2d 1286, 1296, 141 Cal.
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These safeguards are in line with the goals a deprogramming stat-
ute would seek to achieve-the undoing of unconsensual brainwashing
and minimal intrusiveness to personal liberty.
At the proceedings, the judge questions the victim, observes his de-
meanor and hears psychiatric testimony. If conservatorship orders
issue, they spell out the powers of the parent or conservator, includ-
ing the location and type of any treatment to be given. The treat-
ment proceeds, under the supervision of the court, which may ques-
tion the treating physician, observe progress or order the treatment
discontinued.1 1 4
In Guardianship of Roe, the Massachusetts court recognized the
serious impact of deciding whether to treat a person against his will.
The court therefore "set forth . . . guidelines to be followed in order to
"1115ensure accuracy and consistency in [such] proceedings ... .
(1) The ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment ...
Even if the ward lacks capacity to make treatment decisions, his
stated preference is entitled to serious consideration....
Rptr. 298, 308 (1977). See also, Guardianship of Roe, - Mass. 421 N.E.2d 40,
47 (1981) ("[P]reponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard to
be applied ... a conscientious judge, being mindful of the adverse social consequences
which might follow an adjudication of mental illness, will subject an individual to
guardianship only after carefully considering the evidence and indicating those factors
that persuade him."). But see, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil involun-
tary commitment for an indefinite period of time requires "clear and convincing" level
of proof).
114. Delgado, supra note 6, at 91.
115. Guardianship of Roe, at_, 421 N.E.2d at 61. Such guidelines are necessary
considering the implications of extraordinary treatment:
The awesome moral problem of these treatments is confused by the
fact that the individuals so treated may in most cases be incapable of ob-
jecting to the treatment after it has occurred. In his altered state, the pa-
tient is pleasant and happy; he has no recollection of his prior condition
and is therefore incapable of asserting any objections he might have to the
treatment, be they physical, philosophical, or recalcitrant. The new person-
ality is reformed and even artificial, almost as if a new soul had been
transplanted into an old body.
N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 388 (1971).
407 1
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(2) The ward's religious beliefs....
(3) The impact upon the ward's family ....
(4) The probability of adverse side effects ....
(5) The consequences if treatment is refused ...
(6) The prognosis with treatment...
These factors should facilitate deprogramming efforts while
prohibiting society from imposing upon both religious rights protected
by the first amendment and the member's right to privacy. "In short, if
an individual would, if competent, make an unwise or foolish decision,
the judge must respect that decision as long as he would accept the
same decision if made by a competent individual in the same
circumstances.
1 1 7
Despite such procedural safeguards, deceptive practices of the
cults might render any action impossible. In view of these deceptive
practices, the deliberate hiding of members from their parents118 and
the total disregard of the law by some of the cults,119 many advocate an
ex-parte hearing to ensure that guardianship orders are issued. Consid-
ering the intrusions of an ex-parte order to personal liberty it is recom-
mended that a two-stage proceeding be adopted. The first stage could
116. Guardianship of Roe, at -, 421 N.E.2d at 57-58.
117. Id. at -, 421 N.E.2d at 60 n.20.
118. One ex-member of the Children of God has testified:
They then persuaded me to hide in another loft next door... I heard
my parents come up and I heard them scream and everything and the cops
came-and I stayed there until my parents left the building. . .I heard
my mother asking Abram and Ruth where I was and Abram denied my
presence at the Children of God and stated I left the Children of God and
they did not know where I was.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 22-23 ("Our files are replete with the testimony of
parents and ex-members of similar incidents." Id. at 23.).
119. For instance, a "Moses Letter" entitled "Public Relations" which is used by
the Children of God for leadership training, proclaimed: "You can ask to see the war-
rant-make sure who it's for, and while you are stalling, someone else can inform the
disciple involved who then has a perfect right to run out the back door if he wants to."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.
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be a "probable cause" ex-parte hearing to bring the member within the
jurisdiction of the court. The cults could then be legally compelled to
produce the member at the second stage. It is at this second-stage pro-
ceeding where the court can determine if guardianship orders shall be
issued. If the court does issue such orders, then a later additional pro-
ceeding would be required, after all the evidence is in, to determine
whether to permit the deprogramming.
In view of the fact that "due process is flexible" 120 and depends
upon the situation, an initial ex-parte hearing to confer jurisdiction
should not be violative. The state interests in alleviating brainwashing
and thereby promoting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens
should substantially outweigh the inconvenience that would accrue to a
member not in need of deprogramming by making him appear in
court.
121
120. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
121. Such a balancing of interests is the test usually applied to procedural due
process questions. The test was given in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976):
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
Id. at 335. This language was later quoted in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816 (1977) and Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
In Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Penn. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S.
119 (1976), a balancing of state against individual interests led the court to mandate a
civil probable cause hearing within 72 hours of commitment of minors. While the case
was vacated as moot, due to an intervening legislative change, a similar balancing of
interests should permit the court to take jurisdiction before a decision of whether to
deprogram is made.
Such a system has already been used for deprogramming. See Religious Cults
Newest Magnet for Youth, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, June 14, 1976, at 52
("On at least one occasion, sheriff's deputies have gone out in the pre-dawn hours to
pick up the person, so the commune does not have time to spirit him away." Id. at 54.).
409[1Religious Deprogramming
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Thirteenth Amendment's Slavery Prohibitions
A blanket approach might be developed to effectively prevent
brainwashing. As a result of a Grand Jury investigation, the People of
the State of New York, in People v. Murphy,2 2 charged two leaders of
the Hare Krishna movement with unlawful imprisonment. The basis
for this charge was that:
through "mind control", brainwashing, and/or "manipulation of
mental processes" the defendants destroyed the free will of the al-
leged victims, obtaining over them mind control to the point of ab-
solute domination .... 123
While the charge was dismissed "on the ground of insufficient le-
gal evidence" 124 it is possible that the argument was proper but that
instead of unlawful imprisonment, the charge should have been thir-
teenth amendment slavery violations.1 25
If the New York District Attorney, and others, are correct in
claiming that brainwashing gives such "control to the point of absolute
domination" 12 6-is this not slavery? Compare this basis for the New
York case with the modern definition of slavery given in United States
v. Ingalls:1 27
A slave is a person who is wholly subject to the will of another, one
who has no freedom of action and whose person and services are
wholly under the control of another and who is in a state of com-
pulsory service to another. 128
Professor Richard Delgado has found a number of similarities be-
tween the cults' practices and those practices which previous courts
122. 98 Misc. 2d 235, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
123. Id. at 239-40, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
124. Id. at 243, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, which provides that: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime . . . , shall exist within the
United States. . . ." Id. For a complete discussion of this claim, see Delgado, Reli-
gious Totalism As Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51 (1980).
126. Murphy, at 239-40, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
127. 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
128. Id. at 78.
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have found give rise to a thirteenth amendment claim. For example,
Cultists often are recruited by force and deception, then removed
to isolated surroundings from which escape is difficult .... Doubts,
"improper" thoughts, or insufficient fund-raising may be punished
by forcing the recruit to "pay indemnity" and undergo physical
self-mortification....
...Work assignments are made by the leaders, who control
every detail of the convert's life, including residence, meals, hours
of sleep, even choice of marital partner .... Recruits work 12-14
hour work days, seven days a week. All the proceeds are turned
over to the cult leaders .... 1'9
Courts have found combinations of the following practices to constitute
slavery: maintaining farm and field hands with little chance of escape
by charging exorbitant expense charges for food and rent which were
set against their pay,'13 0 threatening to disclose a thirty-eight year old
morals charge to authorities,' 31 threatening violence, 132 insufficient
food, 33 and long hours.' 3
It is clear that at least for involuntary servitude, "the law takes no
account of the means of coercion,"11 5 so that brainwashing, if suffi-
ciently proven, may well be enough to constitute slavery. If this charge
129. Delgado, supra note 125, at 58-59.
130. See United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bibb, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).
131. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. at 77 (defendant threatened to have slave committed to
prison because of adultery and an abortion 38 years ago).
132. Bibb, 564 F.2d at 1168 ("Each victim testified that he did not leave Ivory
Lee Wilson's employ because he feared that he would be physically harmed by the
defendants."). See Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (defendants were severely beaten).
133. Bibb, 564 F.2d at 1168 ("There is evidence that the food furnish~l to her
by defendant was of substantially lower standard than that common to servants
generally.").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1167-68 ("Various combinations of physical violence and of threats of
physical violence for escape attempts are sufficient"); Bernal v. United States, 241 F.
339 (5th Cir. 1917) ("The law takes no account of the amount of the debt or the
means of coercion." Id. at 342.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918); Pierce v. United
States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945), reh'g denied,
157 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 814 (1947).
7:1983 411 1Religious Deprogramming
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of slavery were to be accepted, the cult could not claim protection of its
practices by the first amendment. In Turner v. Unification Church,136
the Unification Church made just such a claim in defense of an ex-
member's charge of involuntary servitude. The court responded:
The alleged involuntary servitude is unquestionably an act which
has a serious adverse effect upon one of the church's followers and
constitutes conduct that violates the most fundamental tenets of
both American society and the United States Constitution. The
Unification Church cannot seek the protection of one constitutional
amendment while it allegedly deprives citizens the protection of
other constitutional guarantees.137
The plaintiff's claim was eventually dismissed, as a claim upon
which relief could not be granted.138 The problem was that rather than
asking to be released from a state of involuntary servitude, the plaintiff
asked for damages for a previously terminated servitudal relationship.
Professor Delgado, who originally espoused use of a thirteenth
amendment claim, found the amendment's categorical approach most
appealing. "[I]f a particular practice constitutes slavery, it is prohib-
ited,"1 9 so that, "one need not show that the slaves are unhealthy, in-
competent, or in danger of becoming insane; it is enough to show that
they are slaves."' 40 While this approach provides an easy method to
attack brainwashing, and therefore the cults, it completely overlooks
the individual's right to privacy and his first amendment right to freely
practice the religion of his choice.
Moreover, the claim that mind control is a form of slavery under
the thirteenth amendment is based upon the supposition that brain-
washing, a psychological concept, renders the victim subject to the
master's control. To use Delgado's theory that we no longer have to
show incompetency or unhealthiness due to the thirteenth amendment's
categorical approach would be to use flawed reasoning. This is so be-
cause brainwashing presupposes incompetency or lack of health. Were
136. 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978).
137. Id. at 372.
138. Id. at 375-76.
139. Delgado, supra note 125, at 53.
140. Id. at 55.
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it otherwise, we could not explain how the slaves were compelled to be
slaves since there was no physical compulsion.
Professor Delgado seeks use of the thirteen amendment to effectu-
ate his own ideals. As he himself writes: "The thirteenth amendment's
prohibition of human bondage offers a method by which our instinctive
reaction to such cases can be made legally cognizable. Our intuitions
should respond to fundamental notions about the way in which we, as a
society, wish to live. We do not want slavery."141 Although we do not
want the cults to use brainwashing techniques, can we allow our intu-
itions to get the better of us? We must respect the first amendment
freedoms14 2 and the individual's right to privacy.1 43 While brain-
washing will not be protected under either of these constitutional guar-
antees, the Constitution demands that this brainwashing be fully
proven before we send a "lynch mob" after the cults.
Instead of seeking to use the thirteenth amendment in a vacuum to
rectify brainwashing by the cults, it seems far more palatable to use the
policies against slavery as a further compelling state interest to over-
come both the first amendment and right to privacy obstacles in using
guardianship-type statutes, thus more fully protecting individual
freedoms.
Present remedies have proven insufficient to prevent the use of
brainwashing techniques and have only provided relief after the fact. If
claims of slavery are proven the thirteenth amendment's enforcement
statutes144 provide penal sanctions which should deter cults from using
such techniques in the future, thus buttressing the guardianship and
deprogramming post hoc solutions.
Conclusion
There is persuasive evidence that religious cults brainwash their
members. This, combined with deception in the recruiting phase, raises
a strong doubt as to whether these members are exercising their free
will. This brainwashing may actually constitute a form of slavery.
Parents, distressed over seeing their loved ones in such a state, find
141. Id. at 61.
142. See supra notes 36-41, 70-80 and accompanying texts.
143. See supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
144. These include 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1581-87 (West 1976).
413 1Religious Deprogramming7:1983
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themselves in a dilemma. Should they take action on their own, at-
tempting a rescue, or should they stand idly by as their child deterio-
rates? A number of parents have chosen self-help, kidnapping and
deprogramming their children at the risk of being held liable for de-
priving their child of his civil rights.
Recognizing the parents' dilemma, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota adopted a reasonableness standard, under which parents cannot
unconditionally kidnap their children. The parents, to avoid liability,
must have acted upon a reasonable belief that deprogramming was nec-
essary. In view of the child's civil rights, and the fact that parents are
unlikely to be able to objectively evaluate whether their actions are rea-
sonable, it is far better to take the power to decide such a course of
action from the parent and vest it in the judiciary. The court can weigh
all sides and the child is provided the opportunity to be heard. If the
court does determine that deprogramming will take place, it will set the
parameters. This can best be effectuated through use of guardianship-
type statutes. Moreover the thirteenth amendment's enforcement stat-
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Eleventh Circuit Rejects Claim of Florida Death Row
Inmates: Ford v. Strickland.
Introduction
In Ford v. Strickland,1 issued January 7, 1983, a divided United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the death
sentence of Alvin Bernard Ford, condemned for killing a Fort Lauder-
dale police officer.2 Its ruling swept aside a major legal barrier to the
execution of Ford and 122 other death row inmates, who claimed that
the Florida Supreme Court violated their constitutional rights by read-
ing secret psychological reports during its review of their sentences.$
The 123 inmates first challenged this practice in a 1980 state court
lawsuit, Brown v. Wainwright.4 In deciding that case, the Florida Su-
preme Court denied any wrongdoing and refused to vacate their death
sentences. The United States Supreme Court, which still may ulti-
mately decide the issue, declined to hear Brown in November, 1981.'
1. 696 F.2d 804 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
2. While the habeas corpus petition filed by Ford and the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion concern seven issues in all, this comment will be restricted in scope to the issue
designated as "I" by the court of appeals.
3. That the justices did in fact engage in the practice complained of seems over-
whelmingly clear. According to an article in AMERICAN LAWYER magazine, the prac-
tice was unearthed by public defenders in 1978, who found during oral argument that
they were being challenged on information that the justices had received ex parte.
Cramer, Florida Supreme Court Declares Itself Not Guilty, AM. LAw., Apr. 1981, at
24. "But nothing was made public until August, 1980 when .. . the St. Petersburg
Times reported that the justices had seen profiles of at least 20 men who were waiting
on death row for the court to review their sentences." Id. at 25. Closely following this
report was the confirmation by a justices' law clerk "that in 1978 she shredded 30
reports on the advice of another clerk." Id. Ford's brief to the Eleventh Circuit charges
that a purge took place, and this allegation was not controverted. Brief for Petitioner-
Appellant at 57,59, Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner-Appellant].
4. 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981).
5. 454 U.S. 1000 (1981). The order denying certiorari in Brown was issued on
Nov. 2, 1981. Just two days later, a death warrant was signed for Ford. Since Ford was
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Ford was scheduled to die on December 8, 1981, when the Elev-
enth Circuit granted a stay of execution less than fourteen hours before
the sentence was to be carried out. Through his appeal, the so-called
Brown issue reached a federal appellate court for the first time. Had
the federal court ruled in his favor, the death sentences of nearly two-
thirds of Florida's 201 condemned inmates might have been invali-
dated. Ford's request that he be allowed to prove his allegations
through evidentiary proceedings further posed the specter of summon-
ing sitting Florida Supreme Court justices, by federal subpoena, for
examination regarding their motives and use of the controversial mate-
rial. A victory for Ford would have dealt a staggering blow to the cred-
ibility of Florida's highest court and its overburdened appellate system.
Last April, a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit upheld
Ford's sentence,6 finding "not an iota of evidence" that the Florida
justices considered any secret material in his case. The full court then
agreed to rehear his case, indicating that its resolution of Ford would
dispose of all similar pending appeals by the other affected inmates.
The six to five decision8 in the State's favor reflects recent, conservative
trends in federal-state relations and evidences the Eleventh Circuit's
reluctance to disregard the Florida Supreme Court's disclaimer in
Brown. Most significantly, the Ford ruling moves many death row in-
mates closer to execution, since Brown was the final issue being raised
in their appeals.
Origin of the Issue: Brown v. Wainwright
In the fall of 1980, 123 convicted murderers, at that time compris-
ing nearly all of Florida's death row population, petitioned the Florida
Supreme Court for relief from allegedly unconstitutional death
sentences.9 The prisoners' petition alleged that, for a number of years,
a petitioner in Brown, he became the first to satisfy exhaustion requirements and be
eligible to raise the claim in his individual habeas corpus action.
6. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982).
7. Id. at 444.
8. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
9. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1000 (1981). The name of convicted murderer Joseph Brown appeared first on the
petition and, since the Florida Supreme Court declined to acknowledge a class habeas
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the Florida Supreme Court systematically "'engaged in the continuing
practice of requesting and receiving information concerning capital ap-
pellants which was not presented at trial and not a part of the trial
record or record on appeal.' "10 Documented by transmittal letters to
Starke Prison requesting that confidential reports be sent directly to the
Florida Supreme Court, the suit charged the court with improperly re-
viewing "pre-sentence investigations, psychiatric evaluations or contact
notes made in the corrections system after conviction, and psychologi-
cal screening reports made after conviction by prison personnel."" As-
suming their truth, the allegations in Brown exposed a practice unique
to Florida and questionable from a constitutional perspective. By re-
viewing these reports on an ex parte basis, without allowing defense
counsel an opportunity to examine or challenge their contents, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court may have violated a United States Supreme Court
decision, Gardner v. Florida,1 2 relating to proper standards for sentenc-
ing in capital cases, and denied due process rights of individual
prisoners.
In the Florida Supreme Court's view, the Brown petitioners "con-
tend[ed] that our alleged misconduct requires our invalidation of all
death sentences imposed or approved in Florida, and by necessary im-
plication, that we declare Florida's death penalty statute invalid and
unconstitutional in its operation." 3
A. The Florida Supreme Court's Disclaimer
The acrimonious manner in which the Florida Supreme Court at-
tacked the suit in their ruling demonstrates how deeply rankled the
justices were by the prisoners' accusations. First, even though the peti-
corpus action, it was in his name alone that the ruling was eventually issued.
10. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1330. The reasons for the justices' behavior have never
been divulged. As one commentator pointed out, their motivations may have been to
seek justifications for reducing sentences, in the face of a growing public demand for
executions. Cramer, supra note 3, at 26. Benign motives, however, could not forestall
cries of "foul!" by prisoners and counsel disturbed by the surreptitious nature of the
court's acts.
11. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1330.
12. 430 U.S. 349 (1977), cited in Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1330-31.
13. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1331.
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tion was filed with the name of each of the 123 participating inmates
attached, the court refused to allow what it saw as a type of class ac-
tion proceeding. 14 The court pointed out that the petitioners were in
different stages of appeal and noted that allowing a joint petition
"would distort habeas corpus beyond recognition and create a perni-
cious precedent in capital cases."' 5 Vowing to reject any such future
"class actions" summarily, the court nonetheless stated in the next
breath that it would "avoid absurd technicalities" by disposing of the
claims for relief of all the Brown petitioners in its disposition of
Brown's individual petition. 8
While declining to make any factual findings or admit to receipt of
any non-record material in reviewing capital sentences, the court stated
that even if the petitioners' most serious charges were true, the court's
review of the challenged material was totally irrelevant to its appellate
function or to the validity of any individual death sentence.17
Citing Florida's death penalty statute,' the court proceeded to
construe its role in capital cases as qualitatively different from the trial
judge's role of sentence "imposition."'" Appellate "review" consisted of
two very limited functions: first, to determine whether procedural regu-
larities were observed in the sentencing and secondly, to compare the
case under review with all past capital cases to ensure relative propor-
tionality. The statute gives the court no independent fact-finding role.
So long as the trial court properly followed procedures and no dispro-
portionality exists, it must affirm thie sentence. With the court's func-
tion so tightly circumscribed, "it is evident . . . that non-record infor-
mation we may have seen . . . plays no role in capital sentence
'review'. ''20 Finally, the court vigorously disclaimed the possibility that
14. Id. at 1329-30.
15. Id. at 1330.
16. Id. at 1330. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit would use the Ford case to make
a sweeping disposition of this issue.
17. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1331.
18. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1979).
19. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1331.
20. Id. at 1332-33. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (The Supreme
Court's expressed concern, in the first amendment area, that irrelevant information
may be utilized in rendering administrative decisions, with no effective means of judi-
cial review).
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it would improperly use any non-record information in fulfilling its
duties.
A remaining question is whether the reading of non-record
documents would so affect members of this Court that they could
not properly perform their assigned appellate functons. Plainly, it
would not. Just as trial judges are aware of matters they do not
consider in sentencing, [citation omitted] so appellate judges are
cognizant of information that they must disregard in performance
of their judicial tasks.21
The effect of this disclaimer, however, is somewhat diluted by a foot-
note comment: "The 'tainted' information we are charged with review-
ing was, as counsel concedes, in every instance obtained to deal with
newly-articulated procedural standards."22 This cryptic statement inti-
mates that the justices did use the psychological profiles in some
manner.
B. Implications of Proffitt v. Florida and Gardner v. Florida
Two leading cases discussed throughout the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion and of paramount importance to the eventual resolution
of the Brown issue were Proffitt v. Florida23 and Gardner v. Florida.24
In Proffitt, decided in 1976, the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved Florida's new death penalty statute, enacted in the wake of
Furman v. Georgia.25 Since judge, jury and appellate courts were ac-
corded distinct roles, with a minimum of discretion at each level, Flor-
ida's scheme did not violate the eighth or fourteenth amendments' pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Proffitt plurality
emphasized the importance of mandatory appellate review in prevent-
ing arbitrary sentencing, noting that "the Florida court has undertaken
responsibily to perform its function of death sentence review with a
maximum of rationality and consistency. '26 Language in the opinion
21. Id. at 1333.
22. Id. at 1333 n.17.23. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
24. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-59.
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suggests that appellate review was seen as an arm of the sentencing
process.27 Gardner, a case closely following Proffitt, invalidated a Flor-
ida death sentence in which the trial judge overruled the jury's recom-
mendation for a life sentence, relying in part on a confidential report
that had not been disclosed to the defendant or to his counsel.
Confronted with the Gardner holding in Brown, the Florida Su-
preme Court dismissed it rather breezily, stating:
Gardner stands for the proposition that a sentence of death may
not be imposed (note the word "imposed") to any extent on non-
record, unchallengeable information. Since we do not "impose"
sentences in capital cases, Gardner presents no impediment to the
advertent or inadvertent receipt of some non-record information.28
The justices believed Proffitt provided support for their distinction be-
tween the trial and appellate levels in capital sentencing.
C. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to grant
Brown's petition for certiorari,29 Justice Marshall wrote a dissent that
portended many concerns echoed by judges passing on the same issue
in Ford. Justice Marshall addressed the questionable nature of the
Florida court's review practice, which seemed to him a violation of due
process. He regarded the practice as inconsistent with his court's past
insistence on strict procedural regularity, especially since the material
seen by the Florida Supreme Court appeared to be unreliable hear-
say.30 Gardner, he proposed, "suggested no relevant distinction between
27. Under Florida's capital-sentencing procedures, in sum, trial judges are
given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to
impose a death penalty or life imprisonment. Moreover, their decisions are
reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with other sentences imposed in
similar circumstances. Thus, in Florida, as in Georgia, it is no longer true
that there is 'no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'
Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
28. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1332 (Fla. 1981) (citations omitted).
29. 454 U.S. 1000 (1981).
30. Id. at 1001 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the trial court's initial imposition of a sentence and an appellate court's
discharge of its mandatory review function." 1 In Justice Marshall's
opinion, the imposition/review distinction drawn by the Florida court
was irreconcilable with Proffitt. If ex parte reports were actually re-
ceived, the Proffitt court's premise that the Florida court would under-
take rational and consistent review was, in his view, clearly invalid. If
sentences had been upheld or vacated based on non-record grounds,
there would be no way for the Florida court to conduct a review for
proportionality. Finally, Justice Marshall articulated the bottom-line
question which resounds throughout the Brown and Ford cases, "If the
court does not use the disputed non-record information in performing
its appellate function, why has it systematically sought the
information? 3 2
Ford v. Strickland P3
A. The Facts of Ford3 4
The second name listed on the unsuccessful Brown petition was
that of Alvin Bernard Ford, a death row inmate convicted of murdering
a Fort Lauderdale policeman. On the morning of July 2, 1974, Ford
and three accomplices, having decided to commit a robbery, went with
weapons to a Fort Lauderdale restaurant. During the robbery, several
employees escaped from the restaurant. Realizing the police would soon
arrive, Ford's accomplices fled while Ford unknowingly remained be-
hind, completing a theft of approximately $7,000 from the restaurant's
vault. As Ford was leaving the building, he was confronted by Officer
Dimitri Walter Ilyankoff. Ford fired at the officer, shooting him twice
in the abdomen without warning. While Ilyankoff was lying outside the
back door of the restaurant, Ford discovered his accomplices had aban-
doned him. There were no keys in the police cruiser, so Ford returned
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1002.
33. Because of the procedural posture of the Ford case, where the Eleventh Cir-
cuit issued two separate decisions, its earlier ruling will be referred to as "Ford I."
Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (1982).
34. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496, 497 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, Ford v. Florida,
445 U.S. 972 (1980). See also Ford v. Strickland, No. 81-6663, slip. op. at 1-2 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 10, 1981).
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to the officer who had, in the meantime, radioed for assistance and was
struggling to get up. Ford demanded the keys; Ilyankoff tried to coop-
erate. Ford then shot the officer in the head at close range, took the
keys, and escaped in the police cruiser at high speed. He soon aban-
doned the cruiser and stole a Volkswagen, which he was driving when
arrested for the murder.
Evidence at the trial included the testimony of an employee who
saw and heard the shots as she cowered in a utility room at the back of
the restaurant, testimony from a nearby resident who also witnessed
the incident, the tape of Ilyankoff's call for help, and Ford's finger-
prints which were found in the abandoned police cruiser. The jury
found Ford guilty of first degree murder and recommended the death
penalty. Entering a judgment on the verdict, the trial judge sentenced
Ford to death. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
both the judgment and sentence,35 and the United States Supreme
Court denied Ford's petition for certiorari.3 6 He then joined in the un-
successful Brown petition. Governor Bob Graham signed a death war-
rant for Ford on November 4, 1981, requiring his execution on Decem-
ber 8, 1981. Represented by a law professor and a staff attorney for the
Southern Prisoners Defense Committee, Ford responded with a flurry
of legal maneuvers. His post-warrant state appeals were concluded on
December 4, when the Florida Supreme Court refused to grant a
stay.37 Ford's recourse was to federal district court in Fort Lauderdale,
where his hastily-filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus was enter-
tained. The district judge refused to issue an immediate stay, instead
conducting a two-day evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Brown
issue and several other claims made by Ford. Finally, on December 7,
1981, the district court ruled against Ford on all points, denying habeas
corpus relief or a stay of execution.3 8 Prior to this, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit entered a stay in order to preserve Ford's right to appeal
the adverse ruling. 9 With his stay being issued only hours before the
35. Ford v. State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979).
36. Ford v. Florida, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
37. Ford v. State, 407 So. 2d 907 (1981).
38. Ford v. Strickland, No. 81-6663 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1981).
39. This was an unusual procedure, as courts confronted with a petition for a
stay of execution prefer to avoid ruling as long as there is any chance of the stay being
granted by a lower court.
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scheduled execution, Ford had come closer to the electric chair than
any other Florida inmate since John Spenkelink. His habeas appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit was the first to present that court with the Brown
issue. Sensing the need for a rapid, definitive resolution of this recur-
ring claim, the court of appeals made a rare grant of a motion by the
State to expedite the appeal.
B. Ford's Legal Argument
In his brief to the Eleventh Circuit, Ford alleged that the Florida
Supreme Court's practice infringed numerous constitutional guaran-
tees: the right to due process of law, to the effective assistance of coun-
sel, to confrontation, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
and to be protected against self-incrimination.4 0 Referring to the ex
parte nature of the communications in question and the surreptitious
manner in which they were received, Ford argued that the Florida Su-
preme Court's practice posed a greater risk of prejudice and misplaced
reliance than the trial court's behavior in Gardner.41 If it is constitu-
tionally impermissible for trial judges to entertain extra-record mate-
rial in affirming jury recommendations, should not the logic behind this
guarantee extend to the appellate phase? Ford attacked the Brown
court's description of its role in capital appeals as myopic, 42 marking a
complete departure from its earlier self-characterization as part of a
trifurcated sentencing process.4 3 The Florida Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of itself as a body sharing equally in responsibility for imposing
death sentences had been a major factor in the Proffitt court's approval
of Florida's death penalty scheme. The court's covert practice, Ford
40. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant supra note 3, at 61.
41. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 3, at 63-64 (citing Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1979)).
42. Id. at 66.
43. See, e.g., Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1979); Tedder v.
State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The three components are the jury, which
renders an advisory opinion; the trial court judge, who imposes sentence based on cer-
tain enumerated aggravating and/or mitigating factors, and the Florida Supreme
Court, which conducts a direct mandatory review of all death sentences. Whether the
Florida Supreme Court's role was purely one of review or, as Ford argued, was to
equally share in the responsibility of imposing a death sentence, represented a crucial
distinction for purposes of applying Gardner.
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argued, violated his right to reliable, 44 rational4 5 sentencing.
Ford further contended that the secret receipt of non-record infor-
mation "disrupts the court's role as the guardian of proportionality in
capital sentencing."" Disproportionate infliction of the death penalty
could be anticipated, since the formal record will be incomplete, por-
tions invisible to appellants and other courts, which may really have
shaped the outcome.47 Ford refused to credit the Florida court's dis-
claimed statement as providing an acceptable explanation for its
conduct.
Even though Ford's legal arguments were persuasive, his petition
suffered from the lack of documentation supporting the allegation that
he had been a target of solicitation. This deficiency forced Ford to
charge the Florida Supreme Court with the general claim that it had
reviewed extra-record reports on a regular basis, and later purged them
from its files. The purge, according to Ford, made factual substantia-
tion of an individual's claim very difficult. Ford claimed he was entitled
to an opportunity to prove his allegations, possibly gaining relief from
his death sentence. He proposed remanding the case to the district
court so that discovery proceedings could be undertaken which, al-
though unstated, seemed almost certain to be directed against the Flor-
ida Supreme Court justices. 48 This inability to specifically tie any in-
jury to himself may have been a "fatal-flaw" in Ford's petition due to
the nature of habeas corpus relief.49
44. As required by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). "[T]his qualita-
tive difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability
when the death sentence is imposed."
45. As guaranteed by Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). "It is of
vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose
the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."
46. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 3, at 72.
47. Id.
48. The possible course such proceedings might have taken is discussed at note
90, infra.
49. The gravamen of habeas corpus relief is that direct harm has occurred to the
prisoner as a result of the alleged violation. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). In rejecting
Ford's petition, the federal district judge declared it to be wholly speculative as to him,
and labelled Ford's expressed need for discovery a "fishing expedition." Ford v. Strick-
land, No. 81-6663, slip. op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1981).
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C. The State's Response
The State's brief emphasized the fact that Ford's claims were, as
to him, totally unsubstantiated.50 Moreover, the Brown issue involved
an interpretation of Florida's death penalty scheme. As a matter of
state law, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation should be inviola-
ble. The State defended the Florida court's distinction between the im-
position and review phases of capital sentencing. Since Ford's constitu-
tional rights were observed at trial, and the sentencer did not use any
undisclosed information, his asserted due process violation was un-
founded. The State pointed out that when the Florida Supreme Court
acts to change a capital sentence, it can only do so in one way - to
reduce a sentence from death to life imprisonment. The court has no
authority to review a sentence where life imprisonment was imposed
and increase it to death. Even if non-record materials were viewed by
the Florida Supreme Court during their review, what harm could be
done? 51
Ford's proportionality argument is countered with the retort:
If the unstated premise in the Appellant's argument is that the
state appellate court routinely decides cases on bases other than
and unrelated to the reasoning stated in the Court's decision, it
must fall for the Appellant's bare and unsupported allegations fail
to overcome the presumption that judges duly and regularly per-
form their judicial acts and duties.52
Whether the allegations against the Florida Supreme Court were suffi-
cient to overcome this presumption was to become a pivotal issue in the
Eleventh Circuit's analysis. As its final point, the State noted that Ford
produced no cases where the sentence of a similarly charged and sen-
tenced defendant was reduced. The State cited numerous cases where
capital sentences were affirmed in circumstances similar to Ford's.53
50. Answer Brief of Resondents-Appellees at 51-52, Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d
434 (11th Cir. 1982).
51. Id. at 56.
52. Id. at 58.
53. Id. at 60. See, e.g., Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1981); Raulerson v.
State, 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978); Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 1976);
Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1977).
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D. Ford v. Strickland I: The Panel Opinion
Following briefs and oral arguments, Ford's case was submitted to
a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Febru-
ary, 1982. Any doubt that the Eleventh Circuit intended to use Ford to
make a blanket ruling on the' Brown issue was dispelled by the strong
language and directives in a stay of execution granted another Florida
inmate while Ford was under advisement.5 In that order, Chief Judge
Godbold characterized the Brown issue as "a serious and difficult one"
and declared that the district judge erred in not entering a stay while
the specially expedited Ford case was pending.55
On April 15, 1981, the panel rendered a two to one decision af-
firming the district court's denial of relief on all grounds, including the
Brown claim. 6 In an opinion authored by Judge Roney and joined by
Judge Virgil Pittman,5 7 the panel ruled that the Florida Supreme
Court's disclaimer in Brown would be accepted as vindicating them of
any wrong. Starting at the outset that they rejected the Brown conten-
tion "both generally and specifically as made for Ford," the panel
found the Florida Supreme Court's description of its function to be cor-
rect and aptly stated.58 The Florida court engaged only in sentence re-
view, not imposition, so their distinction of the Gardner case was valid.
Ford's alleged due process violations were found to be without merit.
Moreover, the majority ruled that "there is not an iota of evidence to
indicate the Florida Supreme Court viewed any extra-record materials
in affirming petitioner's conviction and sentence," 59 nor that, had it
done so, such review would have been harmful. Labelling Ford's claims
bare and unsupported, 0 they approved the district court's refusal to
permit discovery. The majority stressed that principles of comity and
federalism demand deference to the Florida court's interpretation of its
54. Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 942.
56. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982).
57. Significantly, a visiting judge from the Southern District of Alabama, sitting
by designation.
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procedural role'1 and its statement that its members properly perform
their functions.
In a biting dissent, Judge Kravitch criticized what she saw as the
majority's wholesale adoption of the Florida Supreme Court's reason-
ing.62 She inferred that the Eleventh Circuit was more interested in
expediting its docket than ensuring that federal standards are applied
to capital sentencing cases. Describing herself as disturbed and unper-
suaded by the majority's discussion, Judge Kravitch declared that am-
biguities in Brown left the question of the Florida court's conduct un-
resolved.6" If "tainted" information were used by the court, it would
undercut the defendant's right to a rational, reliable review as guaran-
teed by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt. Any attempt to
confine the implications of Gardner to the trial level is based on an
illusory distinction. An appellate court's use of erroneous or misinter-
preted material may lead to arbitrary imposition of the death sentence
as easily as use by a trial judge." Judge Kravitch skirted the comity
issue, but proposed that Ford be given an opportunity to develop a fac-
tual record through discovery or an evidentiary proceeding in the dis-
trict court.
Thirteen days after this divisive opinion was issued, the court of
appeals sua sponte ordered that Ford be reheard en banc.65 Although
no reasons were given for this uncommon procedure, perhaps the nar-
row wording in parts of Ford, which did not foreclose the Brown claim
to petitioners with direct evidence, displeased those members of the
court hoping for a more broad-brush ruling. Without a complete dispo-
sition, the Brown issue would resurface in various forms for years to
61. "As the highest court in the state, the Florida Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of its procedural role is the law of the state and we do not question it." Id.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Id.
64. [T]he risk that an appellate court's reliance on nonrecord information,
without providing notice to the defendant of the substance of that informa-
tion or an opportunity to contest its accuracy, will result in the affirmance
of a sentence on the basis of erroneous or misinterpreted information
presents as great a threat of the arbitrary imposition of death condemned
in Furman as the risk involved when such a procedure is engaged in by the
initial sentencer.
Id. at 454.
65. Id. at 456.
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come, and the questions involved required a unified, dispositive treat-
ment. The fact that the panel's ruling turned on the vote of a visiting
judge,6 with the two permanent court members splitting, might have
provided an impetus for rehearing. In any event, the number of counsel
for both sides multiplied, supplemental briefs were filed, and extended
oral arguments were scheduled for June, 1982.7
Arguments made in Ford's supplemental brief remained substan-
tially the same. Buoyed by Judge Kravitch's dissent, the defense brief
emphasized the ambiguities in Brown and hammered away on the pos-
sibility of a Gardner violation if the court had actually used non-record
material."8 The fact that the judges systematically solicited the mate-
rial rather than passively received it belied the suggestion that it was
not used, and rebutted the presumption of proper conduct regarded as
dispositive by the panel majority.6 9
The State took on a more aggressive tone, relying on a recent
United States Supreme Court ruling70 which pointedly reminded fed-
eral courts not to make unwarranted assumptions about the conduct of
state judges. As the Court had said, a federal court may not require a
state court to explain the reasons for its actions unless it first deter-
66. See supra note 57.
67. A distinguished former federal court judge, Marvin E. Frankel, who had ar-
gued Brown to the Florida Supreme Court, was recalled by the NAACP to assist on
the brief and deliver Ford's oral argument. Obviously the defense hoped Frankel would
be better received by the federal court than in state court, where his demeanor had
been described as patronizing, imperious, and arrogant. Cramer, supra note 3, at 24.
68. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner-Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 14-16,
Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983).
69. The Ford majority determined that the Florida Supreme Court was entitled
to the presumption of correctness accorded state court's findings on factual issues under
the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976); cf. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.
539 (1981). But can the Brown ruling, in which the court's analysis proceeds from a
hypothetical ("Even if petitioners' most serious charges were accepted as true .
392 So. 2d at 1331) really be regarded as a proper subject of the presumption?
70. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981), in which a trial judge conducting a
bench trial rendered what appeared to be inconsistent verdicts. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted the defendant's argument that the judge must have consid-
ered inadmissible evidence in arriving at his decision, and ordered that relief be granted
unless the judge issued an explanation for his actions. The United States Supreme
Court reversed this ruling, holding that a federal court may not require a state court to
explain itself unless its actions are first determined to be unconstitutional.
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mines that those actions violated the Constitution. The Florida court's
act of soliciting and receiving non-record information would not violate
the Constitution since it cannot be presumed that the reports were con-
sidered in passing on the cases. In fact, the court is entitled to the
opposite presumption. Judge Kravitch's dissent, raising the possibility
of misuse as a rationale for granting relief, showed just the kind of
speculation that was disapproved in Harris. The only issue presented
was not why the Florida justices acted as they did, but whether they
improperly used any non-record information in arriving at decisions.
Not only had the Florida Supreme Court disclaimed any consideration
of nonrecord material in Brown, but its opinions in capital cases thor-
oughly discuss the facts and law pertinent to its decision. Speculative
assumptions cannot overcome the presumption that the Florida justices
acted properly, or justify requiring them to testify to their thought
processes in federal court.7 '
Ford v. Strickland II: The En Banc Ruling
After lengthy and impassioned arguments, the Eleventh Circuit
took Ford under advisement in June, 1982. The number of complex
issues as well as the divergent attitudes towards their resolution possi-
bly explains why no opinion was issued until January, 1983. In the in-
terim, more stays of execution had been granted based on the pendency
of Ford.2 When finally issued, with a blaze of publicity, the six to five
division of the judges and the sheer size of the opinion showed how
protracted and diligent the judges' labors were. Their per curiam opin-
ion, which serves as a preface to the five separate opinions, makes ref-
erence to the full briefing, extended oral arguments, and months of de-
liberation which comprised the court's efforts.7 3
71. Supplemental Brief of Respondents-Appellees on Rehearing En Banc at 12-
13, Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983).
72. See, e.g., Christopher v. Florida, 541 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Palmes
v. Wainwright, No. 583 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 1982); Straight v. Wainwright, No. 82-
607 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 1982); Johnson v. Wainwright, No. 82-875 (M. D. Fla. May
14, 1982).
73. In a bizarre note, the per curiam opinion reveals that, several months into
their deliberations, the judges received a communication from Ford purporting to be a
request that all appellate proceedings cease and his sentence be carried out. After nine
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A. The Eleventh Circuit's Analysis
The author of the panel's opinion, Judge Roney, on rehearing was
joined by four others in his opinion affirming the district court's denial
of relief to Ford. Judge Tjoflat, through a separate opinion, became the
final member of the plurality to reject the Brown issue on its merits.
Judge Roney summarized the issues raised by Ford's Brown claim
in the following three questions.7 If just one were answered affirma-
tively, the court of appeals would be faced with a possible constitu-
tional violation.7 5 The first question, "Does Florida state law permit the
use of such non-record material in the review of Ford's sentence, or any
other capital sentence?" was answered in the negative, based on the
Brown court's statement that factors outside the record were irrelevant
and played no part in their sentence review role. Regarding their sec-
ond question, "Was the material used in contravention of state law?"
the plurality replied that they "must be content" to answer no. The
highest court of a state must be presumed to follow its own law and
procedures. Since Ford was a class petitioner in Brown, he is subject to
the court's statement that non-record materials were not used in re-
viewing the petitioners' sentences. Ford did not specifically allege that
he had been treated differently from all others. Referring to "current
notions of comity and federalism," the court recoiled from the prospect
of requiring a state's appellate judges to respond to questions in federal
court concerning what was or was not considered by them in review of
years of appeals, it certainly seems incredible that Ford's attitude would so change
almost on the eve of a full review of his claims. The court refused to be dissuaded from
ruling, however, dismissing his request as "untimely."
Another interesting preface to the court's treatment of the Brown issue is the pres-
ence on the court of Judge Hatchett, a former Florida Supreme Court justice who had
affirmed Ford's conviction on direct appeal shortly before his appointment to the fed-
eral bench. Of course, he recused himself from any part of the Ford case. Considering
that, at its most fundamental level, the Brown issue as raised by Ford really does seek
to explore the mental processes of judges, it is interesting to contemplate that the
judges had in their midst a man, possessed of candid, firsthand knowledge of the Flor-
ida court's actual use of non-record material, who was relegated to the role of mute
spectator to the proceedings. Had the relief Ford requested been granted, one of the
Eleventh Circuit's own brethren would have been subject to whatever discovery proce-
dures the district court authorized.
74. Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 810 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
75. Id.
251
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
1 7:1983 Ford v. Strickland 431
a state case.
Finally, in response to its third question, "Would reading the non-
record material so affect the Florida judges that the federal court
should, for constitutional review purposes, treat the case as if the infor-
mation had been used by them?" the court ruled that the Florida Su-
preme Court's holding in Brown supplied a negative answer, thus con-
cluding the matter for purposes of review. Despite his commitment to
principles of comity, Judge Roney's uneasiness with the Florida court's
ambiguous language and "veiled suggestion(s)" in Brown is expressed
in his final comments. He wishes the Florida court had given a candid
answer to the perplexing question first raised by Justice Marshall in his
dissent to the denial of certiorari in Brown, i.e., if the court did not use
the disputed information, then why had it sought it?"6
In his separate concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat agrees that
Brown effectively disposed of the issue but adds that a crucial distinc-
tion has not been adequately made by the majority. Neither Gardner
nor any other authority, he maintains, forbids an appellate court from
merely reading non-record material, so long as it does not rely on it.
Maybe the Florida court's statement did not deny reading non-record
material about the petitioners, but it clearly denied relying on any ex-
tra-record factors in reviewing their sentences. Since Ford's case was
effectively embraced in the Brown holding, his claim is especially lack-
ing in merit. Judge Tjoflat rejects Ford's contention that an exception
be made to the premise that judges disregard what they must simply
because the Florida court solicited rather than passively received the
reports.77 If such a capability exists, he responds, it does not logically
depend on how the information is obtained. Even if such a distinction
were conceptually valid, it would be unworkable as a practical matter.
Considering how frequently judges see non-record information, count-
less claims would be made charging that a judge saw information he
could not disregard. If such claims turned on the factual issue of
whether the judge requested the information or passively received it,
the burden on the justice system would be staggering.
In conclusion, Judge Tjoflat remarks that the premise of proper
judicial conduct falls when a judge's behavior appears so improper that
76. Id. at 811.
77. Id. at 833.
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it is detrimental to society at large. In such a case, appearance rather
than a judge's actual capabilities is at issue. Judge Tjoflat suggests
that, had Ford's claim proceeded on this basis, his "swing vote" might
have gone the other way."
A troublesome aspect of the case is the majority's failure to meet
Ford's argument that use of non-record material undercuts the man-
dated "proportionality" review. If extra-record material does influence
Florida Supreme Court reviews, the real reasons for upholding or com-
muting a death sentence will be obscured. Thus, the ability of later
appellants to receive a meaningful comparative review will be impaired.
Given the tenor of the majority's decision, however, further arguments
on this issue are unwelcome.
B. The Dissenting Opinions
The three separate dissenting opinions share a number of common
themes.7 9 Each expresses dissatisfaction with the Florida Supreme
Court's language in Brown, and an unwillingness to accept it as disposi-
tive. According to Judge Kravitch, the court neither denied that it sys-
tematically requested and received such information, nor acknowledged
that the practice is legally objectionable. Moreover, it did not specifi-
cally disclaim having used the non-record information it admittedly ob-
tained; it said only that such information is "irrelevant." She maintains
the court conceded such use by its footnote statement that "[tihe
'tainted' information we are charged with reviewing was . . . in every
instance obtained to deal with newly-articulated procedural stan-
dards." 80 Likewise, Judge Godbold states that he "cannot find in the
Florida Supreme Court's opinion what the majority describes as 'the
statement that it [extrinsic material] was not used,' and that the dispa-
rate views of the judges on this point further demonstrates the opinion's
78. Id.
79. Of the five dissenters, three wrote separate opinions. Judge Kravitch wrote a
lengthy opinion incorporating many of her earlier criticisms. Chief Judge Godbold is-
sued an opinion joined by Judge Clark. Judge Johnson wrote an independent dissenting
opinion and, finally, Judge Anderson, with no separate opinion, joined those of Judges
Godbold, Kravitch and Johnson with respect to the Brown issue.
80. Ford, 696 F.2d at 851-52.
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'intractable ambiguity.' "81 In his opinion, Judge Johnson reads Brown
to say that the court actually did consider nonrecord material. 2
Given this difference of opinion as to the extent of the disclaimer,
the dissenters maintain that the majority erred in accepting it without
a more thorough analysis. In a strident tone, Judge Kravitch character-
izes the majority's analysis as an "attempt to evade the difficult ques-
tions presented,"8 and Judge Johnson states that "the majority simply
cannot avoid the direct implication of Gardner."" The gravamen of the
dissents is that Gardner does apply to appellate as well as trial courts.
Death sentence cases, under Gardner, "require a greater degree of reli-
ability than others" and the Florida Supreme Court's solicitation of ex-
tra-record materials, in Judge Johnson's opinion, has jeopardized the
degree of reliability and rationality required in the administration of'
the death penalty.8 5 A violation of due process and other constitutional
protections is thus present. Judge Kravitch confronts the comity issue
by stating that where a state court has ruled that its own procedure is
legally sound, independent federal constitutional issues are raised mak-
ing review by a federal court proper.88
While the dissenters agree as to the nature of the constitutional
problem, each proposes a different remedy. Judge Godbold maintains
that a direct, unequivocal statement by the Florida Supreme Court
would satisfy him.87 A conditional grant of Ford's petition by the dis-
trict court is proposed by Judge Johnson, who also seeks a more definite
statement from the Florida court: He would have the writ become final
"in the event that the Florida Supreme Court does not grant petitioner
a new direct review of his conviction and sentence."88 Such a review, to
satisfy Judge Johnson, would have to be undertaken without the benefit
of non-record material or, if such material were used, with prior notice
to Ford and his counsel. Under Judge Kravitch's analysis, the ambigu-
ous statements by the court overcome the presumption of regularity.
81. Id. at 821.
82. Id. at 874.
83. Id. at 850.
84. Id. at 872.
85. Id. at 872-73.
86. Id. at 852.
87. Id. at 821.
88. Id. at 874.
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Accordingly, she would place the burden on the State to affirmatively
demonstrate that non-record information was not requested, received,
or used by the Florida Supreme Court in connection with Ford's case.
She would deny relief to Ford only if the State met this burden. If not,
she would grant Ford a new appellate review of his sentence89 with the
conditions proposed by Judge Johnson.
Interestingly, none of the judges, either in the majority or the dis-
sent, confronted directly the issue of the impact that granting relief to
Ford would have had on the Florida justice system. Ford asked for re-
mand to the district court so that he could undertake full discovery.
While his counsel at oral argument refused to commit himself as to
what the scope of such discovery might encompass, the claims made by
Ford, if given cognizance, would seem to require nothing less than an
exploration of the justices' motivations and actual mental processes. 0
89. Id. at 853. It is noteworthy that this remedy differs from that proposed in her
dissent to the April panel opinion, where she argued in favor of a remand for eviden-
tiary procedures. Ford v. Strickland, 676 F.2d 434, 455 (1 1th Cir. 1982). While earlier
in her second opinion, Judge Kravitch argues that discovery would not result in embar-
rassment to the Florida Supreme Court, she is unconvincing and clearly uncomfortable
with the sensitive issues a remand would raise.
90. In the words of the opinion:
[I]t is obnoxious both to the traditional role and procedures of the appel-
late process and to current notions of comity and federalism to suggest
that a state appellate judge should be required to respond in a federal
court to questions concerning what was or was not considered by him in
the review of a state case. Petitioner virtually admits his argument would
eventually carry that far if all else failed in obtaining the proof of what he
asserts. Any principle that supports the start of that journey would support
a conclusion which is not now a part of American law.
Ford, 696 F.2d at 811. (Roney, J., plurality opinion).
While it is speculative to envision what might have followed in the event of a
remand, discovery would probably, as a courtesy, have taken the form of depositions or
interrogatories rather than examination in open court. The question then posed is
whether it would be sufficient to undertake discovery only in Ford's case. Perhaps the
procedures would have to be repeated 123 times to vindicate the claims of all similarly
situated inmates.
If, instead, the relief granted were a right to a fresh, direct review, how could the
court of appeals overcome the argument that the Florida justices were already tainted?
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, made this point in a recent dissent to a
denial of certiorari in another Florida case. A trial judge found to have previously
considered inadmissible material re-imposed a death on remand. The justices objected
1 434 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Had Ford prevailed, the stage would have been set for vacating
the death sentences of nearly two-thirds of Florida's death row inmates.
The upheaval such an outcome would have caused can easily be
imagined.91 Quite possibly, the Brown issue provided a greater threat to
Florida's statutory death penalty scheme and its judiciary than any
claim raised by death row inmates since Furman v. Georgia.92
Conclusion
Unlike the more narrowly-worded panel opinion, the en banc rul-
ing on Ford clearly intended to sweep within its scope the similar
claims of all Florida inmates, regardless of their ability to document
their allegations. As a blanket ruling, it effectively disposes of the
Brown issue unless certiorari is granted by the Supreme court. In a
press interview given January 10, 1983, 93 Florida Attorney General
Jim Smith stated that, for many death row inmates, the decision ended
their avenues of appeal, and predicted that executions would resume in
four to six months. Pending disposition of his petition for certiorari,
however, the stay of Ford's execution remains in effect.
Whether the Supreme Court will agree to hear Ford on certiorari
is debatable. It refused to hear Brown less than two years ago, and
declined to grant a stay of execution in the Spenkelink case. 94 The
Ford case only affects Florida and thus may not be seen of sufficient
national importance to justify the court's review. Sentiment on the cur-
rent court to stretch comity notions and leave unchallenged the highest
to the same judge reviewing his previously imposed sentence. Harvard v. Florida, No.
82-5444, 51 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983). Fairness standards articulated in
Gardner require that resentencing be entrusted to a different judge, to avoid the possi-
bility that the judge previously imposing a death sentence may do so again based on a
"natural human tendency to rationalize it and suppress doubts." Id. at 3507. It is thus
likely that if granted, a viable review of Ford's case would have required appointment
of special associate justices.
91. As a most dire speculation, the public outcry that would surely accompany a
ruling that the Florida justices had caused their death penalty statute to be invalidated,
by virtue of their own furtive behavior, might have shamed the responsible members of
the court into resigning.
92. 408 U.S. 238 (1971).
93. Fort Lauderdale News, Jan. 11, 1983, at 6A, col. 1.
94. Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 1301 (1979).
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state court's interpretations of state law may prevail over the dissent-
ers' suggestion that the Florida Supreme Court's disclaimer should be
discounted. Moreover, both sides to the debate realize that the Brown
issue has been reviewed fully and conscientiously. The fact that the
Eleventh Circuit twice entertained the case and twice ruled in favor of
the State may discourage the Supreme Court from feeling that it would
elicit any new perspective.
As a countervailing consideration, Florida's death row population
stands at 201. 95 Although only one state would be affected by a Su-
preme Court decision in Ford, the number of inmates whose lives are
at stake is the nation's largest. Finally, because the Ford opinion was
so closely divided, the Court may see the lack of consensus as signaling
a need for its consideration. Unless certiorari is granted, however, the
mystery and unanswered questions which surrounded the Florida Su-
preme Court's practice seem destined to remain so.
Valerie Shea
95. Miami Herald, Mar. 5, 1983, at 1 A, col. 1.
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A Common Law for the Age of Statutes. By Guido Calabresi.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982, Pp.
319. $25.00
Reviewed by Ronald Benton Brown*
In common law days, the law evolved gradually on a case by case basis
as courts applied the general principles to new and different fact situa-
tions. Each adjudication was merely a step in the process by which the
judges made the law. The guiding principle was that like cases should
be given like treatment. Earlier cases, precedents, were consulted to
produce a semblance of consistency as a changing environment caused
the law to change and grow.
The twentieth century, particularly since the New Deal, has seen
the "'statutorification' of American law" 1 as legislatures responded to
rapid social and technological changes by an "orgy of statute mak-
ing". 2 Consequently, courts have been forced to learn a new role, that
of primarily applying the law given to them rather than creating it.
Judges have not always taken this demotion gracefully, especially when
the legislation before them is less than perfect. When the statute under
consideration is obsolete, the loss of the common law power to change
the law is particularly frustrating.
Inertia tends to insulate even an obsolete statute from repeal. Not
until a sufficiently powerful group has been offended will there be a
change. The legislature may not even realize that a statute is out of
date until there is some public uproar about its application. Guido Cal-
abresi, the Sterling Professor at Yale Law School, proposes in A Com-
mon Law for the Age of Statutes that it is appropriate in the course of
adjudicating disputes, for courts to discover which statutes are no
longer consistent with the current legal topography. Judges have the
training and experience necessary for this task, and the judicial process
is particularly likely to reveal any anachronism in the law. Moteover,
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. B.S.M.E. 1970, Northeastern
University; J.D. 1973, University of Connecticut; LL.M. 1976 Temple University.
1. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
2. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977), quoted in G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 1, at 1.
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courts are already engaged in this discovery mission.
More importantly, Professor Calabresi points out, courts often re-
fuse to stop at discovery of anachronisms but rather proceed to employ
a number of techniques for dealing with obsolete statutes. A court may
overreact by finding the statute in question to be constitutionally infirm
due only to its obsolescence, or may strain to interpret the statute to
eliminate the flaw or to magnify the flaw so as to coerce some legisla-
tive reaction. The court might, alternatively, refuse to enforce the stat-
ute on the basis of desuetude, vagueness, or invalid delegation. But
each of these techniques is a subterfuge for what the court is actually
doing and each involves dangers to our political system.
The greatest danger is that all are inherently dishonest. In each
technique the court claims to be making its decision on a ground other
than the true one-the obsolescence of the statute. The result may be
incomprehensible to the electorate. Worse, if the subterfuge is detected,
it could deprive the court of its credibility.
If the obsolete law had evolved from cases in the traditional com-
mon law fashion, the court could react to the obsolescence by changing
the law openly and directly. Faced with an out-of-date statute rather
than out-of-date case law, the court encounters a dilemma. The legal
literature reveals no doctrine which would justify judicial modification
of a statute and, therefore, such judicial action lacks all legitimacy.
Professor Calabresi proposes considering a doctrine which would
allow courts to deal with the archaic statute candidly. His proposal
would allow the court, after finding the statute no longer fits into the
current legal framework, to allocate the burden of the next step accord-
ing to the appropriate competence of the legislature, judiciary or even
an administrative agency. The court would be allowed to alter, nullify,
or even enforce the statute subject to a specific statement that a legisla-
tive reconsideration resulting in a revision, repeal or reaffirmation is
necessary.$ This procedure would have the benefit of providing the
3. Legislative reaffirmation of a statute becomes possible if the court has ex-
pressed its opinion that the statute is defective solely because it no longer fits the legal
topography. The legislature may respond that it is still supported by a majority and is
therefore valid. If the court had used a subterfuge such as unconstitutionality, such a
direct and simple response from the legislature would be impossible. What would be
required would be either a reworking of the statute to squeeze within constitutional
limits or a constitutional amendment.
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court with a legitimate course of action. It would also increase the flex-
ibility with which a legislature could subsequently deal with the obso-
lete statute.4
Calabresi denies advocating the adoption of this novel doctrine; he,
claims to be merely presenting it as a possible alternative to the present
situation because it would allow courts to continue substantially on
their present course, but without deception. The latter aspect might in-
crease the credibility of the courts, garnering majoritarian support.
However, he implies that it is really the only viable alternative because
our system lacks an effective mechanism to stop the courts from nulli-
fying or modifying statutes by subterfuge. The present dishonest ap-
proach will end only if courts are offered a more attractive method of
eliminating out-of-date statutes.
Unfortunately, Professor Calabresi fails to address another hy-
pothesis which might better explain the present system. The judicial
reaction to statutes might not be a result of the fact that judges are
better trained and in a better position to discover the outdated statute,
but rather that as a result of their education and professional socializa-
tion, judges are convinced that the final word on what is the law should
lie with them.6 Judges, aware that nonlawyers may not share this be-
4. If the court were to determine that a statute is invalid due to vagueness, the
legislature in enacting a replacement would have to avoid the "vague" language. Like-
wise, if the court were to find a statute constitutionally defective, any subsequent stat-
ute must avoid a similar defect. If the actual basis for the judgment was that the
statute was obsolete rather than vague or unconstitutional, the legislature in reacting
must not only produce a modern statute but must also avoid the "vague" language or
constitutional defect.
5. This hypothesis is based upon the theory that the electorate would respond
affirmatively to a court decision which was based upon an easily understood concept,
obsolescence, rather than on esoteric legal doctrine and also would responds affirma-
tively to court decisions which did not preclude in absolutist terms any response by the
electorate through the legislature.
6. The education at Harvard Law School at the time Felix Frankfurter entered
in 1902 is described as follows: "Langdell's innovations [the case method] reinforced
the conservative legal values that dominated the training of most students, who learned
the superiority of judge-made common law over legislation. . . ." M. PARRISH, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 18 (1982). Moreover, one of the
most influential of Frankfurter's professors, John Gray, pointed out explicitly that "[A]
judge might be swayed by precedent, expert opinion, custom, moral principles, or legis-
lative statutes, "but in truth all the Law is judge-made law." M. PARRISH, id. at 20
1 7:1983
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lief,7 avoid a confrontation with the legislature and the electorate by
utilizing subterfuge to reclaim the lost common law power. Adoption of
the proposed doctrine would simply legitimate the judiciary's return to
primacy by its own edict.8 Such a bold grasp of power may eliminate
(quoting in part from M. COHEN & E. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY] 407-15 (1951).
The same bias in legal education still exists. See generally E. GEE & D. JACKSON,
FOLLOWING THE LEADER? THE UNEXPLAINED CONCENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL CURRIC-
ULA (1975); 0. Lewis, Curricula Study (1982) (unpublished manuscript); J. SELIG-
MAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1978). See
also Brown, The U.C.C. (Sales) as an Introductory Law School Course, 30 J. OF LE-
GAL EDUC. 592 (1980) arguing that at least one statutory course, such as Sales, should
be taught in first year of law school based upon the experience that law students, fol-
lowing a typical first year of common law subjects, strongly resist utilizing even clearly
applicable statutes rather than the common law.
7. In 1848 Alexis de Tocqueville criticized American Law because: "Our written
laws [the French Civil Law Code] are often hard to understand, but everyone can read
them, whereas nothing could be more obscure and out of reach of the common man
than a law founded on precedent." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267
(J.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
It may be hypothesized that one impetus for the "statutorification" of the twenti-
eth century was the electorate's desire for understandable laws. The shift of lawmaking
power from the judiciary to the legislature would appear to be a first step in accom-
plishing that majoritarian desire.
The electorate believes that courts are bound to enforce statutes which are consti-
tutional. Only if there is no statute can judges make their own law. This may be illus-
trated by an excerpt from a popular college text: "What happens if there is no statu-
tory law governing a case that comes before a court? What if the legislature has not
formalized any rule to apply to the dispute? Then the judge must apply the common
law. Common law is judge-made law." J. BURNS & J. W. PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY
THE PEOPLE 514 (1966) (emphasis added).
The currentness of this belief was recently evidenced in the Senate confirmation
hearings of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realis-
tic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IOWA L. REV. 711
(1982).
8. de Toqueville pointed out the special status enjoyed by judges and lawyers in
the early 19th century: "If you ask me where the American Aristocracy is found, I
have no hesitation in answering. . . . It is at the bar or the bench that the American
aristocracy is found." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 268.
Few would argue that judges enjoy such elevated status today. See, e.g.,
Yankelovich, Skelley & White, Highlights of a National Survey of the General Public,
Judges, Lawyers, and Community Leaders in State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future 5
(proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Judiciary held in Williams-
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the very marjoritarian support which Professor Calabresi hopes it will
garner.
If the power to make, revise and repeal statutes properly belongs
to the legislature alone, then the judicial behavior which Professor Cal-
abresi has described is improper and the discussion should focus on the
formation of an effective mechanism to curb such behavior in the fu-
ture. Only if the courts are legitimately exercising revision and repeal
powers do we need a doctrine to explain the proper limits of that activ-
ity. A Common Law for the Age of Statutes makes fascinating reading
but shifting the discussion to statutory obsolescence and the effect of
inertia in statutory revision seems uncomfortably like a subterfuge to
avoid tackling the real issue: whether the ultimate lawmaking power
should reside with the courts or with the legislature.9
burg, Virginia, (March 19-22, 1978). See also McConnell, Why People Today Dis-
trust the Courts, 17 JUDGES' J. 12 (1978).
9. The point is illustrated by the following hypothetical conversation about a hy-
pothetical statute which prohibitied removal of another person's gall bladder.
"that law couldn't conceivably pass."
"But suppose it did."
"Come on, it wouldn't. We've got problems enough without hypothe-
sizing absurdities."
"Suppose it did."
"Okay, I'll play your game. If it passed, I think we could get it re-
pealed pretty quick."
"What if we couldn't?"
"Then I'd suppose my elected representatives had found out some-
thing about gall bladders that you and I are unaware of."
"Suppose they hadn't. Suppose they were just acting crazy."
"Vote them out. Impeach them. Repeal the law."
"Can't. Most people believe they're doing the right thing."
"And they're just acting crazy too?"
"Right."
"I don't suppose we can reason with them."
"Nope."
"You know what you're telling me? That you don't believe in
democracy. .. "
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 182 (1980).
Ely's book, of course, focuses on the scope of judicial review for constitutional
violations while Calabresi focuses on the scope of judicial review of obsolete statutes.
Both books are, however, reactions to the same ultimate question, what is the appropri-
ate role of courts, vis a vis legislatures, in our democratic system. A subsequent ques-
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tion would be how the courts can perform their tasks without alienating the popular
support necessary for continued successful performance of these tasks.
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